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ABSTRACT
This dissertation considers fundamental questions about real options reasoning
and its application in the face of uncertainty: do firms behave as real options reasoning
predicts, and are there performance benefits from its application? The concept of
uncertainty is further developed by considering two primary types: technological
uncertainty and market needs uncertainty.
A qualitative industry level historical case study is performed on the flat panel TV
industry, chosen because it exhibits high technological uncertainty and low market needs
uncertainty. Real options logic predicts, in such an industry, that firms will develop and
maintain technology options until uncertainty is resolved. Firm level case studies for
major incumbent Japanese TV set manufacturers and other relevant firms are performed.
Comparison across the cases, and between several specific firms is conducted to test and
further develop theory.
The firms studied are found to generally behave as predicted by real options logic.
Evidence from the study does not present a clear relation between options-related
behavior and performance. Although this study identifies evidence not holding options
can have large negative performance results, firms holding options as predicted by theory
did not realize lasting performance improvements. With one exception, firms attempting
to leverage technological capabilities into improved market positions were unable to
realize durable improvements in their positions. The development and release of flat
panel TV coincided with changes in performance for many firms in the industry;
however, these performance changes were short lived. By the end of the study period,
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industry players had generally returned to the trajectories they were previously on.
Between-case analysis of several outlying firms in the sample provides a rich and
nuanced view of requirements for firms to dramatically improve performance in the face
of high technological uncertainty in a market with very large size potential and relatively
well-understood customer needs.
This research contributes to the empirical literature on real options and is novel
amongst academic research in its coverage of the flat panel display history using
Japanese sources. Finally, this dissertation includes managerial implications regarding
the usefulness of real options reasoning as well as practical issues in its implementation.

Keywords: real options, uncertainty, strategic commitment, flat panel display industry,
television set industry.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND THEORY
DEVELOPMENT

Strategy may be defined as commitments made by the firm in the face of an
uncertain future largely beyond its prediction or control. Strategic commitments are path
dependent, non-reversible decisions. Commitments constrain future decisions because
they are costly and difficult to reverse (Barney, 1991; Ghemawat, 1991; Raynor, 2007).
The logic of competitive advantage suggests a firm unwilling to make commitments until
uncertainties are largely resolved will be unable to achieve competitive advantage;
although it may survive it will never excel (Gemawat, 1991; Raynor, 2007). Because
such a firm will wait to enter markets until after uncertainty has been resolved, it will
miss the opportunities to create competitive advantage through positioning or
development of competencies (Raynor, 2007).
Commitments matter precisely because the future is uncertain. Commitments can
be thought of as bets made by the firm; even with the most thorough strategizing and
forecasting, the firm often will make the wrong bet (e.g., Raynor, 2007). If the future
were knowable, firms would be able to make investments with certain returns rather than
risky bets. Herein lies what Raynor (2007) termed the “strategy paradox;” firms making
strategic commitments experience the extremes in performance outcomes, with those on
the bottom extreme frequently going bankrupt.
Decision makers face a conundrum. If they do not make commitments, the firm
will be limited to market returns, whereas if they make commitments, the firm may
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perform very well or very poorly. It might have to exit the industry or even go bankrupt.
Because of the downsides, uncertainty tends to drive out action. Confronted with a high
chance of undesired outcome, how do firms make commitments under high levels of
uncertainty? How can managers mitigate uncertainty while still gaining the advantages
of commitment?
One possible answer is real options reasoning (e.g., McGrath, 1997, 1999;
McGrath, Ferrier & Mendelow, 2004). It suggests firms can develop and maintain
option-like investments to keep open the opportunity to reap the benefits of commitment
while maintaining flexibility to abandon these investments with a relatively small cost.
Although this theory appears to offer a way for firms to manage uncertainty, extant
research does not document the performance impact of its application. Additionally,
whether firms actually behave in a way consistent with real options reasoning (ROR) or
not is a question yet unanswered.
To examine these questions, this research performs an historical case study of the
flat panel TV industry. This method is appropriate for the study because it allows the
inclusion of extreme performance events (i.e., exit), it allows for flexibility to examine a
variety of relevant sources of data, and will be generalizeable to industries with similar
attributes. The industry is interesting because it exhibits a high level of technological
uncertainty.
This dissertation is organized as follows. This chapter develops theory based
upon real options reasoning under uncertainty. A model is developed and propositions
argued. Chapter two specifies the methodology and research setting, the flat panel TV set
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industry. The flat panel TV set industry faced technological uncertainty due to
competing display technologies, while it exhibited relatively low market needs
uncertainty. Chapter three describes the former, and chapter four the latter. Chapter five
contains firm-level case studies identifying options portfolios held over time. Chapter six
performs analysis across and between the cases to identify patterns in behavior and
performance. Based upon data and analysis from Chapters five and six, Chapter seven
develops findings in terms of theory and propositions developed in Chapter one. Chapter
seven also develops some post hoc theorizing and analysis. Chapter eight contains the
discussion and conclusion.

BACKGROUND AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT
The introduction briefly discussed real options. Below, uncertainty, real options,
and strategic commitment are discussed in more detail. A distinction is made between
two different types of uncertainty: customer needs uncertainty and technological
uncertainty. Based upon this distinction, a model is developed and propositions
presented.

Uncertainty
It is important to distinguish the concept of uncertainty from that of risk. The
notion of risk is that although the outcome of a given event is not known in advance, its
probability distribution is known or at least knowable (Knight, 2006). In the case of
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uncertainty, the probability distribution is not known (Knight, 2006); arguably, even the
range of possible outcomes may not be knowable in advance in many cases. Uncertainty
has been framed in terms of complexity and dynamism (e.g., Duncan, 1972). Regardless
of how one tries to break down and define it, however, the level of uncertainty itself is
not knowable in advance or while it is being experienced, but can be classified with more
accuracy retrospectively. Many of the different underlying causes may be not visible or
knowable until after unexpected changes have occurred. The nature of their impact may
also change over time.
Because uncertainty can be endogenous or exogenous to the firm, overall
uncertainty levels are not identical across firms, even those competing in the same
product market and geographical locations. Folta (1998) described endogenous
uncertainty as uncertainty that can be reduced by the firm taking action and learning from
the feedback, and exogenous uncertainty as uncertainty that cannot be wholly resolved by
the firm. For the purpose of this research, it makes more sense to define endogenous and
exogenous uncertainty based upon the source of uncertainty. Endogenous uncertainty is
due to the firm’s own capabilities including its ability to understand customers and
competitors. Exogenous uncertainty is uncertainty caused by things outside of the firm.
Such uncertainty is not necessarily beyond the firm’s ability to reduce. For instance,
expeditionary marketing can be used to reduce uncertainty of needs in a new product
market (Hamel & Prahalad, 1991). Similarly, pre-investments such as taking on lobbying
activities in the face of uncertain legislation may also reduce uncertainty (McGrath,
1997). These uncertainty reduction approaches would be classified differently using the
definitions used by Folta (1998) and that proposed here. As the source of uncertainty is

4

outside the firm in both cases (uncertain market needs in one case and uncertain
legislation in another), the definition proposed here would code them both as exogenous,
however, Folta’s (1998) definition would code them as endogenous as both can be
reduced through firm actions.
This distinction is important because the research in this dissertation is primarily
focused on exogenous uncertainty. The level and type of endogenous uncertainty is by
nature firm-specific. Because of this, it is difficult to compare the actions and
performance of firms relating to endogenous uncertainty. Exogenous uncertainty, on the
other hand, affects all firms in the product market in question, and for this reason allows
comparison between firms more readily. However, it should be noted that the distinction
– although useful – may not always be clearly visible to the outside observer.

Uncertainty Types
Different types of uncertainty have different implications for the firm. The ways
that firms can make commitments and manage uncertainty depends upon the nature and
type of uncertainty it faces. Firms make commitments in the face of market needs
uncertainty and technological uncertainty. Others have made this distinction in the
literature (e.g., MacMillan & McGrath, 2002; Oriani & Sobrero, 2008), although specific
definitions vary between authors. Below, market needs uncertainty is discussed before
moving on to consider technological uncertainty. Although this discussion of market
needs includes technologically related examples, its focus is on the market needs.
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Uncertainty of market needs, the needs of current and potential customers in a
given product market, may exist at a number of levels. The spectrum of needs runs from
basic needs to ever changing trends in desirability of specific aspects of a good or service
(Kaldor, 1971). For example, nourishment and clothing are basic needs. Although many
basic needs do not change much over time, the way they are best served does. Sometimes
these may appear to be predictable trends, and other times not.
At any point in time, there may be latent needs and preferences that cannot be met
due to technological limitations. Some latent needs may be predictable, at least for a
certain timeframe. For instance, the consumer preference for a flat panel television was
fairly clear even when Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) technology was the only feasible way to
create video displays. If given the choice, consumers would prefer something that
provided a larger picture size but took up less space in their homes. With many products,
customers will tend to prefer faster, higher quality, greater reliability, more convenience
if the price is the same – and often even it is higher. In the case of televisions, thinness is
another of these attributes. In the case of hard disk drives, storage capacity has been a
differentiating attribute. Given the choice between drives of the same format size in the
same price range, historically customers have chosen drives with larger storage capacity.
Christensen (1997) argues that these kinds of needs can become oversupplied. In
other words, improvements are made past the point where further increases are no longer
seen as beneficial to customers. At the point that they have become oversupplied,
improvements in this dimension no longer differentiate the product. A good example of
this is hard disk space. After a point, the average customer cannot use additional storage
space, so he no longer values additional capacity. From this point onward, other
6

differentiators will become more important in customers’ choices. Literature on product
and industry development cycles (e.g., Geroski, 2003) and customers’ usage development
cycles (e.g., Moore, 2005) describes how these changes occur over time. Firms work to
make technological improvements to their product along the attribute dimensions
historically valued by customers. As one attribute reaches a point of oversupply, the
dimension of needs it represents is replaced by another dimension. When and where
these points will be reached and what the next dimension of differentiation will be are
uncertain.
Although future customer preferences appear to be relatively clear in some cases,
they are much more speculative in others. Exogenous economic and demographic
changes increase needs uncertainty (Oriani & Sobrero, 2008). For instance, the 1970s oil
shocks drove American car buyers to place greater value on fuel economy and less value
on vehicle size. Exogenous change may or may not be predictable by the firm in
advance. Even when its existence is predicted, however, the magnitude of impact is
highly uncertain.
Furthermore, customers typically do not know how to value a product with which
they are not familiar. Latent needs are particularly uncertain where no offerings currently
exist (Geroski, 2003). Potential customers may not be known, nor may be the way of best
serving them or the price they are willing to pay (MacMillan & McGrath, 2002).
Although the television set customer may be able to say that he would prefer a larger
thinner screen before LCD technology became viable, the potential PDA user did not
know what to value in a PDA prior to their introduction.
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Interestingly, seemingly minor changes to product characteristics can fuel large
changes in customer demand levels. For example, the first Apple iPod entered into an
existing market for mp3 based portable music players. It had a superior interface and
larger storage than existing products, but was not cutting edge from a technological
perspective. Sony, which had been a pioneer in portable audio, first with the world’s first
transistor radio and later with the Walkman, was already in the mp3 player market.
Audio electronics firms such as Sony – who thought they understood market needs for
portable consumer audio – were probably very surprised to see customers prefer the
offering of a computer company to their own.
The above discussion of market needs uncertainty has considered unknowable
latent market needs, changes in attribute dimensions that customers value, and the
potential for exogenous demographic and economic change to impact customer needs.
Below, technological uncertainty is discussed.
Where multiple technologies vie to fulfill a customer need, existing or latent,
technological uncertainty can be said to exist (e.g., Tegarden, Hatfield, & Echols, 1999;
Anderson & Tushman, 1990, Oriani & Sobrero, 2008). However, just because a
technology grows to dominate an industry does not mean that technological uncertainty is
completely absent. There is still the possibility that a competitive or substitute technology
will arise from outside the firm (e.g., Stuart & Podolny, 1996). Furthermore, future
convergence of different technologies cannot be accurately forecast (Sherden, 1998). It is
not clear which technologies will emerge or become feasible at any future point in time.
In general, the ability to accurately predict how technologies will evolve and co-evolve in
the future is limited. There are some notable exceptions to this observation, such as
8

Moore’s law for microprocessors that predicts the number of components that can be
placed on integrated circuits doubles every two years (e.g., Schaller, 1997).
The distinction between endogenous and exogenous uncertainty is particularly
important to make with regard to technology. Folta (1998) described endogenous
uncertainty as uncertainty that can be reduced by the firm taking action and learning from
the feedback, and exogenous uncertainty as uncertainty that cannot be wholly resolved by
the firm. Oriani & Sobrero (2008) defined technical uncertainty as being endogenous to
the firm. The ability of a firm to complete a technology development project is an
example of this type. Firms can reduce this kind of endogenous uncertainty by pursuing
multiple parallel projects on the same technology (Nelson, 1961). (As compared with
exogenous technological uncertainty, which can be addressed by pursuing parallel
projects on competing technologies.) Oriani & Sobrero (2008) further defined
technological uncertainty as exogenous to the firm, and occurring at industry level. This
definition agrees with the one employed by this research.
This distinction does not mean that R&D investment has no impact on uncertainty
levels. Indeed, unlike risk in financial markets which is resolved over time, exogenous
technological uncertainty is reduced through R&D investments. Where financial options
are concerned, investors do not impact the future outcome probability distribution by
buying or selling options. In the case of technology options, investments can change the
level of uncertainty. The same is true for market needs uncertainty.
Although technological development and market needs may appear to be
predictable in the very short term, this appearance may be misleading. Very little can be
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forecast or predicted with any accuracy except in the very short term (Sherden, 1998).
Strategic uncertainty is greater over the long run than the short run (Raynor, 2007).
Capabilities that are further upstream, such as research-related capabilities, have longerterm impact, therefore they face a greater level of uncertainty (Raynor, 2007).
The antecedents of variation in technologies and market needs differ; accordingly
the types of uncertainties are not symmetrical. In other words, uncertainty in the
technology development vector is different from uncertainty in the evolution of market
needs. They are related in that new technologies enable new products fulfilling
previously unmet needs, and identification of unmet needs can stimulate additional
investment in technologies potentially capable of meeting these needs. Therefore, a
change in the level of one kind of uncertainty may impact the level of the other.

Commitment Types
Like uncertainty, commitments can also be thought of in terms of market needs
and technologies (Ghemawat, 1991). Firms can make commitments to one or both types.
For instance, a firm may commit to developing a technology at an early stage where its
ultimate benefits are not concretely known. This would be a commitment to the
technology but not to a market need. Alternatively, a firm could commit to a market
without having a technology at all. A supermarket chain, for instance, can commit to the
beverage market using its own brand and distribution infrastructure and outsource
development, formulation, production and other functions. In this case, it would have
made a commitment to the market need, but not to technology needed to fulfill this need.
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Developing technologies requires commitment because of time compression
diseconomies inherent in knowledge building (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). In other words,
once a technology is known to be of value, it may be too late to catch up to the leaders.
Technological lockout may result (Schilling, 1998), and keep the firm from entering (or
remaining) in the product market in question. At the same time, it is costly to maintain
technological capabilities (e.g. Miller, 2002).
Firms making early commitments to market needs benefit in several ways. There
are limitations to customer attention; therefore early branding may capture attention more
effectively than later brand building efforts. Similarly, there are limitations to
distribution channels. Strong positions in these channels may be easier to achieve at an
early stage rather than after uncertainty has been reduced. Some market commitments
may create switching costs, protecting market share and making it difficult for new firms
to enter the market (e.g. Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Finally, early commitment to
market needs may result in a fine tuned understanding of needs and therefore greater
ability to meet them (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1989, 1990 in Kerin, Varadarajan &
Peterson, 1992).
These two kinds of commitment are not symmetric. Costs and capabilities
required to undertake them are different. Furthermore, as can be seen from the discussion
above, the nature of spillover effects on learning is also different (McGrath, 1997).
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Real Options
Application of real options has been suggested as a way to manage uncertainty.
The fundamental idea behind a real option is that uncertainty can be managed by making
a partial commitment rather than a full commitment (Anand, Oriani & Vassolo, 2007).
These partial commitments are sequential and irreversible (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). By
holding the real option, the firm benefits from the flexibility to make future decisions to
commmit (Li, James, Madhavan & Mahoney, 2007). Tong and Reuer (2007:5) formally
defined real options as "investments in real assets, as opposed to financial assets, which
confer the firm the right, but not the obligation, to undertake certain actions in the
future." Two aspects of this definition separate real options from investments in general.
First, real options do not include financial assets. Second, some kinds of investments do
carry obligations to undertake future action.
Although there is agreement about these fundamental descriptions, there is
disagreement upon what constitutes a real option in the strategy literature (Adner &
Levinthal, 2004; McGrath, Ferrier & Mendelow, 2004). On the one extreme, Adner &
Levinthal (2004) argue for a relatively narrow and specific definition. They suggest that
real options theory requires a discrete investment logic. In other words, investment
decisions must be characterized by clearly demarcated stages with “go, no-go”
investment decision points. Furthermore, where there is too much flexibility regarding
the technology to be developed or market in which to apply it, the option becomes more
difficult to clearly define or analyze, and the investment logic ceases to be discrete. In
these cases, they argue real options theory ceases to apply (Adner & Levinthal, 2004).
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McGrath et al. (2004), on the other hand, suggest a broader definition of real
options. They identify four different conceptualizations of real options appearing in the
literature: (1) the notion that the firm’s market value includes a growth option
component, (2) a single and clearly defined proposed investment which has qualities
similar to options – often this approach considers how to value the option in question and
sometimes compares this with other project evaluation techniques, (3) more generic types
of choices made by managers that can be applied to more than one proposal – the focus
here is on the choice and not the underlying assets; and (4) the notion of real options
reasoning as a heuristic applicable to strategy. These conceptions represent sub-streams,
however they do not appear to be mutually exclusive. For instance, considering real
options as a strategy heuristic does not mean that one dismisses the idea that a portion of
the firm’s market value is due to growth options. McGrath et al. (2004) is strongly
supportive of the inclusion of the real options as a heuristic in strategy research.
The second conceptualization, which some have called option pricing or options
valuation, has received attention as an alternative to net present value (NPV) for
evaluating potential investments. NPV ignores the option value in projects and therefore
may lead to underinvestment in projects having higher option value but lower NPVs than
competing proposals. This approach puts its emphasis on numerical calculation with its
origins in finance. Although this approach has apparent benefits, case studies have found
that firms have difficulty implementing it (Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001). Furthermore,
as a decision making tool, option pricing does not lead to the same conclusions as other
real options conceptualizations, as can be seen in the discussion below.
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When Miller and Arikan (2004) simulated search under uncertainty, they made
the distinction between option reasoning and option pricing. The option pricing approach
was strongly related to financial conceptions of option value, whereas option reasoning
was based upon the conceptualization of options as a heuristic. In Miller and Arikan’s
(2004) model, the real options logic firm searched by developing two competing
technologies and putting off specialization until the value of one technology significantly
outweighed the other. The options pricing firm, on the other hand, compared the two
option values and put all its investment in one of the two technologies, assuming that the
value of the option was greater than its cost. The differences in the models clarify the
different ways of thinking about real options. Not surprisingly, the outcomes for the real
options reasoning firm and real options pricing firm differ in this simulation.
While the conceptualization of real options as a valuation technique has merit, it
faces limitations in its applicability in situations where technological and/or market needs
uncertainty are high. First, it is hard to identify a suitable basis for valuation of options in
these situations. Second, while time may resolve uncertainty relating around the value of
the underlying assets of financial options, uncertainty relating to market needs and
technologies is resolved by development and feedback loops. The number of firms and
the size of their efforts to develop technologies and markets have an impact on how long
it takes for uncertainty to be resolved. However, real options as a valuation technique
does not take this into full consideration.
This research follows the option reasoning conceptualization and considers real
options to be a strategy heuristic. This conceptualization has also been called real options
logic, real options thinking, or real options reasoning in the literature. Real option
14

pricing and real options reasoning seek to address strategic investment decisions. While
real option pricing is a prescriptive evaluation methodology that has been promoted for
practitioner use, real options reasoning is a strategy heuristic managers are often thought
to follow even if they do not categorize it as such. McGrath and Nerkar (2004:2)
describe this reasoning as implying that “decision-makers implicitly (or explicitly)
respond to the value of the right to preserve decision rights in the future in their
investment choices.” Bowman and Hurry (1993) presents a relatively broad picture of
real options that includes elements of real options logic. They emphasize the idea that
small incremental investments in options can be made to learn and develop capabilities,
and that these should be followed by large commitments (option exercises) later on.
They suggest the timing of the commitment has a major impact on the actual performance
achieved by the firm (Bowman & Hurry, 1993).
McGrath (1999) further argues that real options reasoning allows the potential
benefits of entrepreneurial failure to be properly understood. In other words, a failed
project can bring valuable knowledge that is exploitable in the future, and if the
investments are made in stages, losses can be contained at the same time. More
generally, this logic suggests that attempts to avoid failure may result in lost opportunities
for growth and for learning. To the extent that investments are staged suitably, it is
possible to limit the cost of failure without limiting the benefits of success (McGrath,
1999).
Maritan and Alessandri (2007) suggest that some real options are available to all
firms in an industry, whereas others are proprietary and available only to particular firms.
Options values depend on the bundle held by the firm; additional options can be sub15

additive or super-additive, and the value of an option available to all firms in the industry
is not necessarily the same to each firm (Anand et al., 2007; Vassolo, Anand & Folta,
2004).
It appears likely that not all types of real options have been identified. This is
partially due to the different conceptions of real options. Real options can be considered
in terms of generic choices made by managers (e.g., the option to abandon an investment
or the option to invest) or by the object of the option (e.g., research and development
options). Tong and Reuer (2007) suggest the economics and finance literatures have
assembled a taxonomy of generic choice options. However, the identification and
categorization of options as objects, on the other hand, is far from complete. Research
focusing on options as objects rather than choices has identified different types of
investments that can be option-like including capabilities (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001),
sequential R&D investment (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), technology licensing (Bowman
& Moskowitz, 2001), joint ventures (e.g., Kogut, 1991), equity investments (e.g., Folta,
1998; Vassolo et al., 2004), and venture capital investments (Hurry, Miller & Bowman,
1992). However, this area is still developing and cannot be considered to represent the
entire universe of potential objects for options. While this leaves open the opportunity
for future development, at the same time it represents a risk that the current empirical
work fails to identify all option-like investments that have not appeared in the prior
literature, potentially resulting in misleading results.
Although real options has great appeal and substantial theoretical work has been
done, empirical work in the area is lacking (Reuer & Tong, 2007). Published empirical
work on real options is very limited. Several papers have used pharmaceutical patent
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data to perform research relating to real options (e.g., Chi & Levitas, 2007; McGrath &
Nerkar, 2004). Guler (2007) analyzed venture capital firms investments in startups from
a real options perspective. Other empirical research has studied firms attempts to
integrate real options valuation techniques into their investment decision making
processes (e.g., Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001). It should be noted some of these papers
used the conceptualization of real options reasoning, while others focused on real options
as an investment valuation technique. Empirical work to date has not differentiated
between alternative kinds of uncertainty. Li et al. (2007) called for future studies to
investigate different kinds of uncertainty, how they may interact, and the impact upon
how investments in options are made. This dissertation contributes to the real options
literature by performing an empirical study of option-like investment in an industry
encountering uncertainty of a specific nature.

Model of Uncertainty Environments
Firms face different degrees of technological and market needs uncertainty at
different times and in different industries. Although it is not possible to define the type
and degree of uncertainty an industry will experience in the future, it is possible to define
time periods in specific industries where large or small amounts of uncertain change
occurred in the past. The model introduced here integrates these kinds of uncertainties
with the commitment types discussed above. Macmillan and McGrath (2002) propose
what appears to be a similar model, however it differs in several important ways. First,
they consider (endogenous) technical uncertainty, as opposed to (exogenous)
technological uncertainty. Second, they suggest that practitioners can identify the level
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of uncertainty they face. This research argues that levels of uncertainty cannot be
accurately identified ex ante and are more reliably observed and understood in retrospect.
While there are some readily observable indicators that identify high uncertainty at the
time it is present, the absence of these indicators does not preclude a high level of
uncertainty. For instance, the existence of multiple competing technologies for the same
application indicates a high level of technological uncertainty, however the absence of
competing technologies does not necessarily mean that technological uncertainty is low,
as new technologies can emerge at any point in time. As this suggests, managers may be
able to identify high uncertainty in some circumstances but they cannot identify low
uncertainty.
To facilitate analysis, the degree of environmental uncertainty is dichotomized
into low and high levels along the two axes representing market needs uncertainty and
technological uncertainty types (See figure 1-1). The resulting model describes four
different types of environments. In the upper right hand corner, quadrant B, both market
needs and technology uncertainty is high. When both types of uncertainty are high, the
environment described is typically that of a product market in its infancy before a
dominant design has emerged (Abernathy, 1978). Despite the lack of a dominant design,
there significant activity may be observed in this environment. This kind of market is
typically described by large numbers of small competitors, a large variation in the
products in the market, and generally low sales volume. Geroski’s (2003) analysis of the
American automobile industry provides such an example. The Ford Model T represented
a dominant design that drastically changed the entire industry. Approximately 400 firms
entered the market between 1885 and the Model T’s introduction in 1908, and about 275
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of these were operating in 1907 (Geroski, 2003). Both technological and market needs
were quite uncertain during this period before the Model T was introduced. However
after its introduction, uncertainty regarding market needs as well as uncertainty regarding
production technology were both greatly reduced. Consequently, the number of
manufacturers declined and industry sales grew rapidly.
The lower left-hand quadrant represents a stable environment with no significant
uncertainties. Product markets in this quadrant are typically long established industries.
Examples of these kinds of industries include rail transport and dry cleaning.
FIGURE 1-1
Four Environment Types Depending on Uncertainty Levels
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The upper left hand corner, quadrant A, describes a situation where uncertainty
surrounding market needs is high but technological uncertainty is low. Such an
environment can be the result of an external shock that changes demand in a previously
developed product market. Alternatively this situation can arise when a proven
technology is applied to an unknown market need. A large regulatory change, for
instance banking deregulation, is an example of an external shock. Regulation can
prevent the firm from using different levers such as pricing and accessibility, thereby
making it impossible for the firm to explore (and exploit) latent market needs through
market interaction. Accordingly, when regulation is removed, the market needs may
appear to change dramatically, when in fact they are just reverting to latent needs that
could not be met due to regulation. The situation where a proven technology is
introduced into an undeveloped latent market would also be categorized into this
quadrant. The introduction of microwave technology - originally developed in the
military - into restaurant and consumer cooking appliance usage is one example of this
situation. Raytheon engineers knew that microwave energy could be used to heat objects,
but they didn’t know much about non-military customer needs that could be addressed
using this capability. Cooking was an application of heating technology. After entering
this application market, Raytheon had to discover the customer needs for microwave
cooking. For example, they did not originally have answers to basic questions such as:
how big should the oven be? how powerful? at what price level would it start to be
attractive (Hammack, 2005)?
In the lower right hand quadrant technological uncertainty is high, quadrant C, but
market needs uncertainty is low. In other words, although market needs are clear, the
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way to best meet these needs is not. This description fits what Helfat and Raubitschek
(2000: 965) termed a “replacement product market.” Frequently, this situation occurs
when newly developed technologies vie for satisfying a need previously met by an earlier
technology. For example, the basic need to be able to listen to music where and when
wanted has been known for some time, however the industry went through several
periods of high technological uncertainty as numerous technologies, each with its own
benefits and drawbacks, have vied to be the portable music playing technology of choice.
As a result, new portable audio technologies have replaced existing ones over time.
Cassette players were largely replaced by Compact Disk players, which in turn were
largely replaced by hard drive based mp3 players and later DRAM based mp3 players.
For the purpose of building this model, the levels of customer needs uncertainty
and technological uncertainty were dichotomized. This simplification facilitated
categorization and analysis of the different situations represented by the four quadrants.
It also enables identification of option usage patterns expected to outperform alternatives
for each quadrant. The ability to classify industries is important to the research process
here in that it allows focus and reduction of alternative hypotheses.
However, at the same time it is important to note that uncertainty levels are not,
strictly speaking, binary in nature (i.e., low or high) but rather belong somewhere along
some continuum. Uncertainty levels change over time and can result in movement
between the quadrants when they are large, and more nuanced movement within a
quadrant when small. Also, unlike risk in financial markets, levels of customer needs
uncertainty and technological uncertainty are affected by firms’ investments. For
example, introducing a “new to the world” product into a market that had not previously
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been supplied results in feedback from the market and changes the uncertainty of
demand. While time resolves risks in financial markets, action reduces the types of
uncertainty discussed here.
Real options reasoning suggests firms hold options to manage uncertainty. Since
the kind and type of uncertainty differs between the different quadrants in the model, the
type of options held by the firm following real options logic in each quadrant would also
differ. The firm following real options reasoning reduces the likelihood of unwanted
performance outcomes, but this benefit does not come without cost. Developing and
holding options is expensive, which in turn has performance implications.

Full Commitment and Survival Bias
In each environment the single highest performing firms may be those that made
winning bets on market and technologies in advance and held no options, if there were
such lucky firms. Conversely, the firms that made incorrect bets in their full
commitments to both are likely to exhibit the worst performance. These groups of firms
may be effectively thought of as representing one type – full strategic commitment to
both technologies and needs. These firms serve as exemplars of what Raynor (2007:1)
terms “the strategy paradox.” Both groups make bold strategic commitments, which
result in high performance when the firm guesses right and poor performance or exit
when the firm guesses incorrectly.
Consider the introduction and evolution of the videocassette recorder business
discussed in Raynor (2007). The consumer VCR was a new to the world technology.
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Market needs were largely unknown. What premium would customers put on higher
picture and sound quality? How would consumers use it: for watching prepackaged
videos or time shifting over the air TV shows? Sony and Matsushita both made
commitments based upon specific guesses of what customers would value. Sony bet that
high picture and sound quality would be worth a price premium to consumers and that
consumers would use the machines for time shifting. It developed Betamax. Matsushita
bet customer needs would be greater for lower cost, lower picture quality machines with
longer recording and playback capabilities capable of recording feature length films.
Matsushita developed VHS. As the market developed, VHS won over Betamax. Sony
stopped making Betamax and eventually licensed VHS. Neither firm could have known
what would happen prior to product introduction. Sony’s bet on Betamax was not stupid,
it was just unlucky. It is unlikely Matsushita was prescient, rather it was lucky in this
case.
The extreme performance outcomes of firms making strategic commitments
increases the possibility for attribution bias and survivor bias in research topics such as
this one. In the case of the firm guessing successfully, it would be a mistake to attribute
the performance solely to their approach. In order to see whether such firms actually
have consistently high performance, as opposed to being lucky at one point in time, they
need to be studied over time. Frequently, the firm that is unlucky in its commitments
exits. Most research methods do not correctly identify or investigate firms that do not
survive. Accordingly they risk mistaking the relationship between the firm’s actions and
its performance. Further complicating this picture is the tendency of firms that survive
initially to become more competent, or more reliable, and further reduce their mortality
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rate (Levinthal, 1991). Firms with past successes may be buffered from current troubles
by their organizational capital, financial and otherwise (Levinthal, 1991). This means
that they may exhibit relatively high long-term performance at the firm level even though
specific commitments that they make may sometimes fail.
While these issues could be serious in a cross sectional study design, they are
reduced by a design that considers firm and industry attributes and performance over
time, as a string of luck is far less likely than a single lucky hit. A study design that
covers an industry also has the benefit of capturing exit in addition to performance of
firms that stayed in the industry. Accordingly, the research approach followed here
addresses the survival bias issue by looking at a whole industry over an extended time
period.

Width and Depth of Real Options Portfolios
This research identifies portfolios of real options, relating to technologies, held by
firms in a single industry. The width and depth of these portfolios is important as these
portfolios can take a variety of shapes. These different shapes will have different cost
structures and implications about the relative flexibility they offer.
Investments in technologies can be conceptualized as belonging to different levels
relating to the degree of commitment, flexibility gained, and proximity to market entry
they reflect. The metaphor used below is that of an option ladder, where higher rungs
represent increasingly expensive options that come increasingly close to a major
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commitment and market entry. Figure 1-2 below illustrates a simple technology option
ladder.

Figure 1-2: Technology Option Ladder

Each additional option generated increases the value of the previous options in the
same technology (e.g., McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). At the bottom of the ladder, several
levels of R&D represent relatively low cost, flexible option-like investments. Moving up
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the ladder increases the proximity to a product market, but at an increase in cost and a
decrease in flexibility. At the top of the ladder is investment in mass production plant
and equipment. The cooperative arrangements to the right of the ladder represent ways
firms can reduce required investment levels and share risk while increasing their
proximity toward the market. Firms holding options on a single technology at many
levels of this ladder are considered to have a “deep” portfolio of options in this
technology.
The existence of multiple competing technologies is indicative of high
technological uncertainty. Creating options on competing technologies increases the
breadth of options held by the firm. A firm with all of its options on a single technology
can be characterized as holding a narrow portfolio, whereas a firm holding options on a
large number of competing technologies can be said to have a wide portfolio.

Propositions
This section develops theory and introduces propositions based there upon. As
discussed in the following chapter on research methods, the current research is only able
to address a portion of the propositions introduced below because it focuses on one
combination of uncertainty levels mirroring one of the quadrants in the environmental
model. Failure to include propositions relating to other uncertainty level combinations
would naturally raise questions in the reader’s mind. Accordingly, the propositions are
presented in their entirety although some cannot be evaluated in this dissertation.
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This research seeks to consider several basic questions about real options
reasoning. First, do firms behave as real options reasoning (ROR) would predict?
Second, do firms behaving as prescribed by ROR enjoy performance benefits over those
not behaving as prescribed?
Real options reasoning predicts that firms will hold options in the face of
uncertainty (e.g., Bowman & Hurry, 1993; McGrath, 1997). Published empirical
research seeking to test this prediction is almost non-existent. The one exception,
McGrath and Nerkar’s (2004) study of patenting behavior in the pharmaceutical industry,
found firms behaved in a manner consistent with ROR. However, one single-industry
study is not enough to sufficiently support or refute this prediction. Accordingly
additional research is required.
This dissertation develops theory based upon the existence of two types of
uncertainty: market needs uncertainty and technological uncertainty. It develops a model
with four combinations of high and low levels of these two uncertainty types. ROR
would predict firms hold different portfolios of options based upon which quadrant they
are in. For example, if technological uncertainty is high, ROR would suggest firms hold
technology options, but if low ROR would predict firms not hold technology options.
Given this general framework, there are several potential analytical approaches
that could be used to consider ROR’s prediction. Comparison of the ratio of different
options types (e.g., customer needs options versus technological options) held by firms in
a single industry, would at first appear to be a suitable approach. However, customer
needs options and technology options are not symmetrical and therefore attempts to
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compare across the two types are likely to lead to misleading or difficult to interpret
results. Another potential analytical approach would be to compare between options
portfolios held by firms in industries belonging to different quadrants in the model.
However, without some major methodological breakthrough (e.g., discovery of a high
quality, easy to measure, accessible proxy measure for options held), this approach would
necessitate a research project much larger in scope than this one.
Rephrasing the question as: “Do firms generate and hold options in the face of
uncertainty?” provides an alternative way to approach the issue; that is, to ascertain
whether firms hold options relating to the type of uncertainty they face. The question,
thus stated, does not require analysis between different types of uncertainty, but is
nonetheless in line with theory. To control for the level and type of uncertainty, firms
studied should belong to a single industry. Propositions stated below relate to the
quadrants in the model where one uncertainty type is low and the other high.

P1* 1: If firms belonging to a single industry exhibiting high technological
uncertainty and low market needs uncertainty follow real options
reasoning, they will, all else equal, hold options on more than one
alternative technology.

1

Asterisks mark those propositions addressed by empirical research in this dissertation.
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P2: If firms belonging to a single industry exhibiting low technological
uncertainty and high market needs uncertainty follow real options
reasoning, they will, all else equal, hold options on more than one
competing market need.

Real options reasoning predicts firms in the low-low quadrant would hold no
options and the high-high quadrant (quadrant C) would hold options on both market
needs and technologies. Propositions are not developed for these quadrants. The highhigh case may include complex hybrid options, which although of interest, are beyond
the scope of this research.
Performance depends on how well the firm manages uncertainty, or in other
words, how well the mixture of commitments and options the firm holds fit with the
environment in which it operates. Looking retrospectively it is possible to categorize the
firm’s commitments and options portfolios as well as the level of revealed market needs
and technological uncertainty. Firms that made commitments in the face of uncertainty
are expected to exhibit performance extremes, and firms that made commitments in the
face of certainty and held options in the face of uncertainty to exhibit more consistent
performance. Figure 1-3 depicts the mixture of commitment and options this line of
thinking predicts to fit best in the four environment types.
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FIGURE 1-3
Uncertainty Levels and Best-fitting Uncertainty Management Approach

The lower right quadrant (quadrant C of the environment types model) of figure
1-3 above depicts a situation where needs are certain but technology is not. Here, firms
committing to market needs and holding options on technologies are expected to
outperform other firms when compared as groups. Firms making commitments to
technologies in the face of uncertainty may exhibit higher performance than those
holding options, but only when they are lucky enough to have committed to a bet that
later paid off. Those firms making commitments which were not lucky would be left
holding expensive, difficult to reverse investments that have small or no payoffs.
Accordingly, they will exhibit low performance and may exit the market. Together, those
firms making technology commitments in the face of technological uncertainty are
expected to exhibit extreme performance outcomes. While most will underperform
30

industry competitors holding options, occasionally a firm will be lucky and exhibit very
high performance.

P3*: In the face of technological uncertainty, firms making substantial
commitments to single technologies will exhibit the highest performance
and lowest performance in their industry.

Firms developing and maintaining options on multiple competing technologies
will have the opportunity to select the most appropriate technology as technological
uncertainty is resolved over time, while having limited exposure to the downside on the
technologies that did not pan out in the end. Technology options can be created through
in-house investment in multiple R&D streams, licensing technologies developed by other
firms, entering into joint ventures or other equity based investments with firms
developing competing technologies. By committing to market needs, these firms will
develop a greater understanding of market needs than outside firms, and will also benefit
from markets being familiar with their branding.

P4*: In the face of technological uncertainty, firms that commit to a
market need and generate options on multiple technologies to fulfill these
needs will not exhibit performance extremes when compared to other
firms in their industry.
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Propositions P3 and P4 considered the situation in an environment characterized
by high levels of technological uncertainty and low levels of market needs uncertainty.
The upper left hand quadrant of figure 1-3 above describes an environment of high
market needs uncertainty and low technological uncertainty, analogous with quadrant A
of the environment types model. As a group, the most successful firms in this quadrant
will commit to a technology and create options on product-markets where the technology
may potentially be useful. These options may take one of several different forms,
including working with multiple marketing partners, expeditionary marketing, and rapid
cyclical product development to clarify needs in a particular market (Hamel & Prahalad,
1991). Firms that bet on a single customer need, rather than holding options on several,
face a greater chance of betting on one that never materializes. This was the case with
Sony’s bet on Betamax VCR already discussed. Sony made one bet on market needs for
VCRs. This bet was that market needs for VCRs would be for high picture and sound
quality for use in time shifting over the air TV shows. Sony guessed wrong and the
Betamax was beaten by VHS in the marketplace.
Similar to the case with technological uncertainty, those firms making lucky bets
on market needs are expected to exhibit high performance because they do not have the
cost of developing and maintaining options but gain the benefit of access to the market
need that emerge. Those making unlucky bets and not holding options are expected to
exhibit low performance and may exit. Rephrasing this logic into proposition form, P5
below states firms making market needs commitments in the face of market needs
uncertainty will exhibit two performance extremes, high and low, when compared with
competitors in their industry. Firms that made commitments based upon lucky guesses
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will have the highest performance; meanwhile firms making commitments based upon
guesses that were not lucky are expected to exhibit very low performance, including exit.

P5: In the face of market needs uncertainty, firms exhibiting the highest
performance and lowest performance in their industry will have previously
made commitments to market needs.

P6 predicts the situation for firms developing and holding market needs options in
the face of market needs uncertainty. Developing and maintaining multiple market needs
options is costly, therefore these firms are not expected to exhibit as high performance as
those that make lucky singular commitments. However, by holding options on multiple
competing market needs, these firms increase the odds that some of the options will
eventually become “in the money.” Accordingly, the likelihood of extremely low
performance is much less than that of the committing firms discussed in P5.

P6: In the face of market needs uncertainty, firms that commit to a
technology and hold options on different market needs applications will
not exhibit performance extremes when compared to other firms in their
industry.
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The propositions above have considered the two quadrants of the model where
one uncertainty type is high and the other low. Firms facing an environment in which
both market needs and technologies are highly uncertain, as in the upper right hand
quadrant, will benefit from developing both market and technology options. This may be
achieved by holding multiple hybrid options, each of which represents a different
combination of commitments to market needs and technologies. Examples of such
options include ownership positions in multiple competing startup firms or equity based
investments or joint ventures with existing firms (Folta, 1998; Hurry et al., 1992). This
type of environment is complex as are the potential hybrid options. While of interest, this
quadrant does not present an opportunity to isolate and study one of the two uncertainty
types discussed here. For these reasons, detailed theorizing relating to options behavior
and performance for environments represented by this quadrant is left for future research.
This section has developed and introduced propositions based upon real options
reasoning. The empirical research in this dissertation is comprised of a historical case
study of the flat panel (FP) TV industry, for reasons discussed in Chapter two (See
Method Choice and Industry Selection Requirements sections). The FP TV industry
aligns well with quadrant C of the model. This research does not include other quadrants
of the model. The empirical research in this dissertation applies to the propositions
marked by an asterisk.
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS

The purpose of this research is to investigate how firms manage uncertainty
through the use of option-like commitments. This study includes both confirmatory and
exploratory aspects. The previous chapter presented theory suggesting firms should hold
options in the face of uncertainty. It also posited that, in the face of uncertainty, firms
mainly investing in substantial commitments rather than multiple, option-like investments
(which may also be considered partial commitments), will exhibit extreme performance
outcomes, including both very high or very low performance. Accordingly, confirmatory
questions of this study include: “Do firms generate and hold options in the face of
uncertainty?” and, “Do the firms holding options portfolios appropriate for the
uncertainties they face appear to benefit from them?” The exploratory aspect of this
research seeks to develop deeper understanding of real options based upon observations
of patterns of firm behavior relating to option-like investments over time.
This chapter begins by stating basic assumptions and reasons for choosing the
research methods and setting employed in this dissertation. It continues to introduce
details of the study approach, including data requirements, detailed description of data
sources, study management, and study scope.
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Method Choice
Based upon the questions asked and the goals of this research, an historical case
study covering a single industry is the most appropriate approach to empirical study.
This research investigates the size, nature, and frequency of incremental commitments
made by firms in a single industry over time. In doing so, it seeks to answer how, who,
why and when questions regarding options generation, options maintenance, exercise,
and abandonment. Yin (2003) suggests the case study method is suitable for research
relating to these kinds of questions. The research approach is similar that used by
Numagami’s (1999) study of the development of the liquid crystal display industry, and
can be described as an historical embedded case study. It is embedded in the sense that
both firm level and industry level are considered.
The historical, industry wide approach is particularly suited to the research
questions of this thesis because it allows investigation of firms through the entire
spectrum of performance outcomes over time. The ability to include firms that exit the
industry is a crucial requirement for this research. Firms making large commitments and
holding few options are expected to exhibit extreme performance outcomes (i.e., high
performance or organizational mortality). Therefore, to avoid producing misleading
results showing only part of the picture, this study needed to include firms that failed or
exited the industry.
The ability to handle a variety of different kinds of data is also a requirement for
this study. There are a large number of potential types of incremental commitments firms
make simultaneously relating to the same uncertainty. A study that limits itself to a
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single type may fail to capture alternative types of incremental commitments. Because
the historical case study method does not limit itself to a single type, it allows for a broad
view of the different incremental commitments that are made in the context they were
made. Importantly, it also allows for opportunistic inclusion of additional data sources
as they were identified in the course of performing the research (Eisenhardt, 2002).
As the levels of options developed or maintained are expected to change with the
degree of uncertainty, the impact of timing and sequence are important to building an
understanding of this phenomenon. Unlike some other methods, the historical industry
wide case study approach allows incremental commitments to be understood in the
relevant temporal contexts in which they were made.
Several requirements of this study are met by the focus on a single industry. First,
this study requires the entire spectrum of performance outcomes, including exit, be
observable. Focusing on a single industry enables identification of players at different
times, and therefore exiting firms. Second, firms should face similar levels of
environmental uncertainty to allow comparison between their performance outcomes.
Third, the relevance and costs of different potential option types differs across industries.
Accordingly, controlling for industry reduces potential for misinterpretation involving
comparison of investments in and management of options.
As discussed in more detail below, this study includes industry-level and firmlevel components. The industry-level component consists of an historical account of
developments in the industry, and is intended to provide a background for general
understanding of the industry including uncertainty and technological developments. The
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firm-level component tracks options and commitments developed, maintained, and
abandoned by the firm as well as performance realized, in a series of firm-level case
studies. Investment behavior and performance outcomes are analyzed at the firm (single
case) level as well as between-firm (e.g., between-case) levels.
Alternative approaches to the historical case study, including statistical analysis

of archival data, survey methodology, and simulation, were considered, however given
the questions and goals of this research, there were significant shortcomings with each of
these approaches. Statistical analysis would have required suitable archival proxy
measures for uncertainty as well as technological and customer needs options, however
suitable proxies could not be identified. Issues with a survey-based approach included
the inability to sample firms that exited as well as difficulties of identifying suitable
respondents. Finally, simulation is another alternative that has been used in prior studies
investigating organizational search (Levinthal & March, 1981 in Miller & Arikan, 2004;
Miller & Arikan, 2004). However, there is no clear way to differentiate between the
different kinds of uncertainty, market needs uncertainty and technological uncertainty,
that reflects the asymmetries between the two. Based upon an evaluation of the pros and
cons of the different potential research approaches, the historical case study approach
taken here is not only suitable for the goals and questions of this research; it stands out as
being far superior to alternatives given the situation.
The theory presented in the prior chapter considers four different types of
environments (four quadrants in the model). In light of this, the reader may be asking:
why study only one industry? Or, why limit the research to only one of the quadrants?
Obviously, it would have been better – all else equal – to have a research design that
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allowed for analysis of multiple quadrants. Unfortunately, it simply was not feasible to
do while ensuring a high quality level of data gathering and analysis. Building a deep
understanding of the industry necessary to properly analyze events is time consuming.
The resource requirements to perform this research on a single industry were quite
substantial. To put this in perspective, the entire relevant holdings of the Japanese
National Diet Library (the Japanese equivalent of the United States Library of Congress)
were examined in the course of performing this research. An approach using more
limited sources would have been possible, however, it would not have produced the rich
and thorough picture this dissertation seeks to provide. Given this situation, the author
decided to focus on performing high quality research on a single industry at the expense
of being able to talk about other quadrants in the model.
This section gave a brief overview of the method and why it was chosen. The
following section discusses general assumptions made in this research.

Methodological Assumptions
This section introduces basic assumptions behind this research and how it was
conducted. At a fundamental level, reality is assumed not to be fractured and events are
real, however observation is imperfect. This research process is, by nature, subjective
and can never perfectly objective, although the ways and degrees in which it is subjective
may differ substantially depending on the research approach taken.
This dissertation uses qualitative research methods relying heavily upon publicly
available data sources. It is assumed that data from the sources used is imperfect but in
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general reflects real events. The data sources used are likely to contain mistakes in
measurement and recording of observations. They may fail to recognize or include
observations as well. Most importantly this means that even the most exhaustive
gathering of existing data cannot be assumed to uncover all relevant observations. In
other words, a failure to observe an event cannot be construed as evidence that it did not
occur. It also implies that triangulation is useful to reduce errors in the recorded
observations. Having said that, there is no reason to expect a systematic bias in how the
data is flawed that would have impact on this study.
In addition to gathering publicly available data, interviews were also conducted.
The accuracy of interview data is assumed to be limited. In addition to errors discussed
above, informants may fail to remember correctly past events or color these events
differently.
Research can never be considered perfectly objective, but rather is always to some
degree subjective in nature. This research develops historical timelines and case studies
of events at the firm and industry levels. This process is subjective in the sense that it
requires choice of data to use and also interpretation of the data in question. Therefore,
there exists the potential for this analysis of the data to stray from reality.
This section discussed the basic assumptions behind this research. The following
section presents the reasoning behind the selection of the target industry for this research,
the flat panel TV industry.
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Industry Selection Requirements
The flat panel TV industry was chosen for study because it was suitable both with
concern to its ability to inform theory discussed above and because it met other criteria
including feasibility discussed below. To aid interpretation, an industry exhibiting high
uncertainty of one type together with low uncertainty of the other was a requirement of
this study. Over the study period, this industry was characterized by high levels of
technological uncertainty due to competing technologies, while exhibiting low levels of
customer needs uncertainty. This combination therefore meets the requirement.
Feasibility related criteria included the number of players in the industry as well
as data accessibility. This research performs analysis at the firm level as well as at the
industry level. Accordingly, an industry with a large number of players would not be
suitable, as analysis of individual firms becomes less feasible as the number of players
increases. The Flat Panel TV industry had a manageable number of players and therefore
fit this criteria. It was also judged to be suitable with regard to data accessibility. Major
players in the industry are publicly traded firms, and accordingly have to make public
financial and other information judged to be material with regard to current and future
prospects. Furthermore, the industry is followed by the business press and the
technology media, financial analysts, and market research firms. Accordingly, access to
a large variety of relevant data was judged to be feasible. In the course of discussing
industry selection requirements, this section found the flat panel TV industry is suitable
because of the pattern of uncertainty it exhibits. The following section describes the
uncertainty levels in the industry in more detail.
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Uncertainty levels in the flat panel TV industry
As discussed above, the flat panel TV industry is characterized by high
technological uncertainty and low market needs uncertainty. Over the study period, the
TV set business exhibited dramatic changes in technology, moving from TV sets based
upon a combination of CRT displays using analog circuitry to those using flat panel
displays driven by digital circuitry. The change to digital standards was made by the
industry using standards groups and with government involvement. New standards were
agreed upon and understood by industry members far in advance of their implementation.
As such, they actually may have reduced rather than increased uncertainty. Display
technology used in TV sets, on the other hand, exhibited high technological uncertainty.
Multiple display technologies, including active matrix liquid crystal, organic
electroluminescence, plasma display, and others competed to be the technology of choice
for TV sets. These technologies offered different advantages and disadvantages as TV
displays. Given these differences along with different technology development vectors
for each, it was uncertain which would become most viable in the marketplace. The
technologies are discussed in more detail in Chapter three.
Market needs uncertainty for the flat panel TV set industry was low. Incumbent
firms in the industry had produced CRT based TV sets for many years and had well
developed understanding of how people watched TV and what their needs and
expectations from TV sets were. The preference for flatter, thinner TV sets had been
known long before their introduction. Although market needs uncertainty was low, it
would be an overstatement to suggest it was zero. In particular, uncertainty remained
regarding how the market would react to different pricing levels for flat panel TVs.
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However, the flat panel TV market size was expected to be very large once production
costs fell to a level at which consumers would buy TVs. The potential for gaining access
to a very large future market may have reduced firms’ perceived uncertainty levels
toward developing flat panel technology. Indeed, uncertainty about future market size
may have mattered little to firms because it was very large in any estimation. Chapter
four provides more detail on the history of this industry’s development.
The characteristics of uncertainty identified in this industry fit the requirements of
this study. It is also worth noting, as discussed below, that this setting has the advantage
of being novel in the academic literature on strategic management.

Novelty of this research setting
Characterized by dramatic innovation and investment, the area of flat panel
displays and TVs has gathered much attention recently. Improvements in image quality,
and at the same time, dramatic increases in affordability have taken flat panel television
from novelty to mainstream status. Despite the dynamic nature of this industry, it has not
received major attention in the academic literature in the field of management. There are
as yet no articles relating to it in strategy journals, and only one academic journal article
in management more broadly (i.e., Mathews, 2005). This low level of attention to date
increases the potential novelty of the contribution of this research.
The discussion above has introduced the research setting and argued why it is
suitable for this study. The remainder of this chapter discusses how the study was
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designed and implemented, including the data requirements, data sources used, and scope
of the study.

Data Requirements
This section begins by presenting data requirements for identification of optionlike investments and commitments. Next, performance data is discussed. Finally, it
presents requirements for additional types of data used to aid interpretation of the above.
Option-like investments may be identified through direct and indirect
observations. These investments are directly observable in some cases (see Table 2-1
below), but in many cases they are not directly observable to parties outside the firm in
question. In such cases, indirect observation may be possible. For example, if a firm
does not report specific R&D streams or funding, the existence of relevant R&D may not
be directly observable, however the existence of relevant patents is observable and
implies that an investment in developing such technologies has been made. Accordingly,
this research requires data sources covering both direct and indirect observations of
option-like investments.
The ability to place option-like investments in temporal perspective is important
to this research, and therefore many of the observations are organized as events in a
timeline. Historical data on other events important in the industry development was
required in order to provide perspective. Beyond historical events, historical data trends
including production volume, investment in plant and equipment, sales, and market share
were additional requirements to further augment the historical picture.
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Table 2-1: Directly and Indirectly Observable Evidence of Real Options
Directly observable evidence
•

Indirectly observable evidence
•

Announcement of new production
plant or fabrication line (investment

•

announcements

plan and/or startup)

•

Trade show presentations

Announcement of Joint Venture or

•

Announcements of sample

other cooperative activity
•

•

Prototype development

shipments

Announcement of sourcing

•

Changes to product lineup

agreement

•

Patents

M&A activity

This research seeks to understand performance outcomes relating to the use of
option-like investments by firms. Accordingly, performance data is required. Relevant
performance data included both financial performance data and market share data.
Additionally, evidence of industry entrance and exit was required.
Additional data sources that can aid interpretation of events in this research
increase the richness of description and are therefore of considerable value. Interviews
are one suitable data source for this purpose, however additional sources (e.g., published
interviews and presentations) were also available in some cases and therefore were added
to the data requirements.
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Data Sources Used
The flat panel TV set manufacturing industry and the related flat panel display
industry are large and gather a significant amount of attention from industry players,
industry groups, industry analysts, governments, journalists and consultants. In fact, the
amount of coverage is substantial enough that it is important to narrow the sources down
to a manageable number. Data sources are classified into two groups: the main sources
used for the bulk of the data, and supplementary sources which were used to augment the
main sources. The main sources used were primarily annual publications covering the
industry, including the Sangyo Times series, the Nikkei FPD series, and the Fuji-Chimera
series introduced in more detail below. Supplementary sources of data included reports
by financial analysts, newspaper and monthly publications, and press releases.
The three annual publication series above were chosen as main data sources for
several reasons. With first issues beginning in 1990, the length of coverage over time
offered by Nikkei FPD and Sangyo Times was important. Although the length of
coverage of the Fuji-Chimera series is more limited, it was included because it contains
valuable data not available in the other two sources. More generally, there is some
overlap of data included between the different series, however each one includes
substantial unique data. All three main sources are written in Japanese.
Access to these sources was also important. The Japan National Diet Library
holdings include all issues of the Sangyo Times series as well as the majority of the
issues in the Nikkei FPD series, and Fuji-Chimera series for the period 2000 - 2007.
Finally, it is also worth noting that these sources have been cited in other academic
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research on flat panel technologies (e.g., Numagami, 1999). The three series are
examined in more detail below.
The Sangyo Times series began in 1990 and has been published annually with
the exception of 1991. It focuses on flat panel display technologies, and covers
televisions as a major application of these. Earlier issues cover only LCD, but coverage
of additional flat panel technologies commenced as soon as R&D activity became visible
through prototyping and other activities. Each issue includes an overview section at
industry level as well as firm level and plant level entries. Firm level entries cover both
past and planned R&D, cooperative arrangements, prototype exhibitions, and investments
in production. Plant level entries include location, capacity, product line, and number of
employees. Past and future changes at the plant level are also listed. Sangyo Times
Incorporated also publishes an annual semiconductor industry series and a daily
semiconductor newspaper in addition to other business related publications.
Access was arranged for all issues of this series. The firm level data gathered
from this series included: timeline event data, locations and capacities of production
facilities, and production volume and investment trend data.
Nikkei FPD series is published by Nikkei BP, and belongs to the same group as
the Nikkei Shimbun, the major Japanese daily business newspaper. Nikkei FPD is
closely related to a monthly periodical called Nikkei Microdevice, which covers
semiconductor and flat panel technology and industry developments. Nikkei FPD is also
related to an annual trade show and conference held in Japan. Each year, FPD includes
summaries of interviews with key managers in firms producing flat panel displays,
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computer monitors, televisions, and other related equipment. It also contains
presentations by industry insiders relating to the industry, applications such as television,
and new technological developments. Prototypes and new products of particular
importance are listed. Finally, FPD also provides a multi-year summary of production
capacity, investment in plant and equipment, and flat panel production revenue at the
firm level.
Access to Nikkei FPD issues including 1990 and 1994-2008 was arranged. In
2002, the series changed from having one issue per year to having several specialized
issues per year. Specialized issues were focused upon industry analysis, strategy,
technology, etc. Although the format changed to a degree and coverage increased with
this move from single to multiple issues, the portions of relevance to this research
continued to be included. Not all of the specialized issues were publicly available for
each year. However, this did not significantly impact the research. Interview summaries
were available for all years. Production, investment, and capacity data were available for
all years except 1999, as the multiyear data presented in each issue covered gaps in prior
years. The FPD series includes a list of related Nikkei Microdevice articles for the prior
year starting in 2003. It would have been convenient if this data were available for every
year, however, as these contents overlap with the firm level information in the Sangyo
Times, it wasn’t a requirement. Table 2-2 below provides a summary of the Nikkei FPD
issues used, and the contents of each. Finally, it is worth noting that additional timeline
and other data were gathered from additional articles and presentation data as it appeared
throughout the issues for which access could be obtained.
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Table 2-2: Nikkei FPD Issues Used
Year

1990
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Special issues
included

Business
Business, Strategy
Business, Strategy
Business, Strategy,
Technology
Business, Strategy
Strategy, Industry
Analysis, Television
Market, OLED,
Television
Company Analysis

Prototype,
New Products
List

Nikkei
Microdevice
Article List

Production,
Capacity, and
Investment
Data

Interview
Data

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Fuji-Chimera series is an annual publication produced by a market research
firm, Fuji Chimera Research Institute. This series is regularly used by academic
researchers in Japan 2. Access was arranged for all issues for years 1998 to 2007.
Fuji-Chimera includes detailed quantitative data on production volume, pricing,
and market share for both displays and products including televisions using displays not
available in Sangyo Times or Nikkei FPD. Data is segmented by display technology type
and application. Inside major display technology types, the data is further segmented in

2

Professor Munehiko Itoh of Kobe University.
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to different size groups. Firm level analysis, including recent developments,
performance, and future plans is included for major firms within each display technology.

Supplementary Data – Print sources
The need for performance data was mentioned in the section on data
requirements. This need is partially addressed by the market share data in the Fuji
Chimera series. Evidence of exit is also available in the three annual series introduced
above. Additional performance data was gathered from company annual reports.
Focal firms of this study are diversified and generally do not provide financial
data for the TV business on its own. Furthermore, segment naming and content varies by
firm and changes over time. For example, recent reporting of business segments
including television set business vary from Sanyo’s consumer segment to Sony’s
electronics segment to Toshiba’s digital products segment. Given these issues, this
performance data must be interpreted with care.
Other supplementary data sources included company press releases, newspaper
articles, and security analyst reports. These sources served to augment and add greater
detail to the annual series data introduced above. Although each was useful in its own
way, they all had disadvantages as well. Available and relevant press releases and
security analyst reports are all relatively new, and therefore it is difficult to gain an
understanding of events more than a few years in the past. Furthermore, an evaluation of
press release content failed to identify events that other sources had not already captured.
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Newspaper articles could have been used as the main source of timeline data in
place of the three annual series discussed above. However, for several reasons discussed
below, newspaper articles were used to supplement other sources instead. Historical
events were identified using the annual serials, and newspaper articles were used to
obtain additional details of specific events where needed. This approach was adopted for
a number of reasons. First, access to relevant daily news sources could not be arranged
consistently through the entire study period. Second, an examination of relevant English
language newspapers uncovered problems with report quality and timeliness. Third,
capturing a wide enough selection of papers to overcome quality and availability
problems resulted in unmanageably large numbers of search results, especially for articles
relating to Liquid Crystal Displays. Considering two of the annual sources are published
by firms also publishing relevant daily newspapers, focusing on the annual publications
was a more efficient way to gather the same information.
Beyond these print based data sources, patent data were gathered, interviews were
conduced, and conferences and trade shows attended. These data sources are discussed
in more detail in separate sections below.

Supplementary Data – Patents
Patent data is useful to this research, as it comprises evidence reflecting past R&D
efforts made by firms relating to the technologies in question. A stream of patents
belonging to a specific display technology can be construed as evidence the firm in
question has an R&D program in place focusing on that technology.
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Although patent data is useful, care is required in its interpretation for a number
of reasons. Patent laws differ by country, and therefore patents cannot be directly
compared between different countries. For example, Numagami (1999) notes the legal
definition of “discovery” differs in breadth between US and Japanese patent law. As a
result, the same discovery will have more patents under Japanese patent law and fewer
under US patent law (Numagami, 1999). Furthermore, patenting strategies also vary
greatly by firms. In the course of reading and interviewing it became evident that some
firms in this industry have relatively extreme approaches towards patenting. One firm,
for instance, discouraged patenting because they felt they were more effective at
protecting their intellectual property by keeping it secret. Another firm encouraged its
development staff to patent as much as possible to increase income from patent licensing.
Correct assignment of patents to the relevant display technology is another issue which
will be discussed later.
Data on display patents came from the Derwent patent database following Eggers
(2007), and examination of several sources of patent data including USPTO and Japanese
Patent Office data. Derwent’s classification system allows the layperson to search for
and select patents related to relevant display technologies. Given the significant
difficulties in separating and assigning patents, especially with regard to display
technologies, this is a valuable attribute. An additional benefit of Derwent data is that it
covers related patents in multiple countries worldwide. To enable suitable use of this
data, preparation was required.
After selecting and downloading Derwent patent data relating to Liquid Crystal
Displays, Plasma Display Panels, and Organic Light Emitting Diodes, the data was
52

manipulated and reorganized to form a relational database using Microsoft Access. This
database is capable of a variety of outputs, however the chief one for this research gives
the number of patents by firm, year, and technology type. Japanese patent data was
extracted from this database for use in this dissertation. United States patent data was
also analyzed; however it was not used in this dissertation due to anomalies in the data
that could not be resolved.
In addition to Derwent data, reports by KSR Limited (2003) and Techno
Associates (2006) on flat panel display patenting in Japan were also collected. These
reports will be discussed in more detail later where appropriate, however they warrant
mention here relating to the question of how accurately patents are assigned to display
technologies. Both reports are created by reputable research organizations in Japan, and
both include the international patent codes included in their classification schemes.
Comparison of the classification schemes used in the reports uncovered significant
differences between the International Patent Codes (IPC) assigned to each flat panel
technology (LCD, PDP, OLED) used by the different organizations. Some IPCs were
also assigned to multiple display technologies. This was true even at the more detailed
level of the IPCs. This was the case for Derwent classification as well as the
classification systems used by the Japanese firms. This should not be a surprise as many
of the patents have applications to more than one of these technologies. The most
prominent example is the thin film transistor (TFT) related technology, which is used in
both active matrix LCDs and also in active matrix OLEDs. The number of patents
counted using Derwent data is higher than those shown in patent analyses by other firms.
This is due to Derwent’s broader classification of patents compared to the other analyses.
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The issue of patents being assigned to multiple display technologies required the
decision either to proceed with all of the patents, or to exclude those that were assigned
across different technologies. The purpose of patent data analysis in this dissertation is to
understand relative focus on the different technologies at the firm level. If a firm holds
patents exclusively on a single technology, this is evidence the firm may not be holding
options on other competing technologies. If the firm has a stream of patents over time for
each technology, it appears they are developing R&D based real options on competing
technologies. Including patents assignable to multiple technologies potentially blurs the
picture. For example, a firm purely pursuing LCD technology might have patents that
databases assign to OLED as well. Accordingly, those patents assigned to multiple
technologies were excluded from the analysis. This exclusion reduced the total number
of patents in the analysis by approximately 15%.
The Derwent data gathered was for LCD, OLED, and PDP. In retrospect, it
would have been advantageous to have patent data on Field Emission Display
technology, although it has not gathered as much attention as the other technologies.
However as access to the Derwent database was no longer accessible, patents on FED
were not included in this research. This represents a limitation to this research, however
its impact is not large because other data sources used in this thesis provide non-patent
related evidence of FED-related investments and developments.
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Supplementary Data – Patent Licensing Agreements
The thesis proposal included gathering data on patent licensing agreements,
however this data was not used in the final research. The decision to drop this data was
made for two reasons: first, there are difficulties interpreting patent licensing agreements
in terms of option-like investments. Second, reporting of patent licensing is spotty,
therefore it is impossible to develop an accurate database. These are discussed in more
detail below.
In the course of performing research, it became clear that patent licensing did not
play the role expected at the proposal stage. In the proposal, licensing was considered to
be a way for firms to obtain opportunity for entry while reducing the level of
commitment required to the technology in question. Licensing was also thought to serve
as a hedge against unforeseen development of alternative technologies which the firm did
not want to develop. In other words, the proposal assumed that firms could use licensing
to keep up-to-date on a technology trajectory without investing in R&D themselves.
However, timeline data and interview data suggested this was not the case.
In the course of assembling the timeline data, firms were often found to conduct
joint development projects, which were followed by licensing agreements between the
partners. These patent agreements essentially allowed the firms to use the technology
developed. Rather than representing a new option, therefore, license agreements
appeared to represent option exercise in these cases.
To get a clearer picture, industry informants were asked questions about the role
of licensing. As with patenting in general, firms’ attitudes towards patent licensing vary
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a great deal. However, informants disagreed with the idea that licensing could be used as
a low cost way to keep current with technology. Rather, they suggested licensing as a
legal requirement that needed to be fulfilled to do something they already knew how to
do. Accordingly, licensing cannot be assumed to include some aspect of technology
transfer.
Availability of data relating to patent licensing agreements was also problematic.
A search was unable to identify any databases covering patent license agreements in the
flat panel displays and televisions. Several sources used in this research including annual
serials, newspaper articles, and press releases mention license agreements, however their
coverage is incomplete. For example, Thomson S.A. reported having over one thousand
licensing agreements, however only a small handful of these could be identified through
the other data sources.
There is little published empirical work on licensing (Anand & Khanna, 2000).
Perhaps the difficulty of obtaining good data on patent licenses has contributed to this.

Supplementary Data – Interviews
As a part of data collection, semi-structured interviews with industry insiders
were conducted in Japan. Additionally, several academic researchers in Japan who have
performed research related to flat panel displays and consumer electronics were also
interviewed. All interviews were performed in person and in Japanese.
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Even though the researcher was bilingual in Japanese and had his own social
network in Japan, arranging interviews with industry insiders was challenging. 3
Although great care was taken to explain to potential informants their rights and
protections and a Japanese translation of the invitation letter and consent form was
provided, many potential informants declined to participate because they considered the
interview topic to be too sensitive. Although the number of interviews is therefore rather
limited, the interview data gathered was of great value to this research.
Most of the informants agreeing to be interviewed stated requirements for
participation. All but one participant refused audio recording of the conversation. Also,
all but two of the participants had time limitations and also refused additional follow-on
questions after the interview. Several steps were taken to increase the accuracy of the
interview data given these restrictions. First, where suitable, charts and diagrams were
created in advance, and these were modified in front of informants with their guidance.
This allowed verification on the spot. Also, full interview notes were written up
immediately after the interview when possible, and at the earliest possible time when not.
Although the number of interviews was limited, the informants interviewed had
very relevant backgrounds and provided substantial insight to this study. Within the
limits of the ethics agreement, the informants can be introduced as follows. Informants
were with or recently retired from the following firms: Sharp, Hitachi, Panasonic, Sanyo,
and Toshiba-Matsushita Display Technology. As is common in Japanese firms,
informants had experience in a number of roles in different parts of the firm. As a group,
3

It is worth noting that several Japanese academic researchers in the field I spoke with indicated
they also had great difficulty obtaining access to informants.
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they had managerial experience in the following: flat panel screen development,
television set development, television / panel plant start up, and television set marketing.

Supplementary Data – Trade Shows and Conferences
In the process of planning and performing this research, the researcher attended
two trade shows and conferences. These included seminars on display technology,
business and investor’s conference and trade show at the Society for Information
Display’s (SID) conference in Los Angeles during May of 2008, as well as presentations
relating to the flat panel television industry, television technology, and image quality and
trade show at Flat Panel International in Yokoyama, Japan during October, 2009.
These experiences were useful in building a better understanding of both the
industry and the competing display technologies. Notes relating to specific data points
were integrated with other data discussed above. A journal was also kept discussing
experiences at these conferences.
This section has discussed the different data types used in this research. To be of
use, this data had to be suitably organized and manipulated. The next section deals with
quality and productivity issues relating to these activities.
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Quality and Data Management
Descriptive validity, in other words, factual accuracy (Maxwell, 2002), or
authenticity (Lincoln & Guba, 2002), is crucial in qualitative research studies such as this
one. Furthermore, Miles and Huberman (1994) state that study management tends to be
poor with lone researchers. Several steps were taken to assure data quality, provide
transparency, and promote efficient use of time and energy. Procedures and databases to
track and manage work progress were developed and applied (Marshall & Rossman,
2006). Database templates were developed and used to gather and input data from
different sources in identical ways. These database templates included areas to note
entries requiring further investigation or verification. Additionally, each entry has a
location to specify source, and in cases where it is important such as quotations, the page
of the source the entry is from.
With the exception of interview data, the end data used in analyses in this
research is structured in a number of databases in Microsoft Excel. This way of
managing data was chosen because it facilitated different sorting and data analysis.
Related data types from different sources were integrated to form these databases. In all
cases, the data contains records about specific sources used. Furthermore, the integrated
data in these databases was cataloged to aid in search and ease of use. For an example of
how data was managed, please see Appendix three which provides timeline data
extracted from the larger database.
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Study Scope
The section below discusses the scope of the study in terms of time frame, display
technologies included, and focal firms.
Study Time Frame. This study covers the period 1990 to 2008. Earliest mass
production of Active Matrix Liquid Crystal Displays began in the 1990-1991 period. In
this period, mass produced flat panel displays were used in laptop and other smaller
format applications, but usage in televisions was virtually nonexistent. LCD TV began to
take off commercially in the period 2000 onward. Although the study focuses on 1990 to
date, relevant historical data covering developments up to 1990 was captured as well.
For reference, Eggers (2007) studied the period from 1965 to 2005, and Mathews’ study
(2005) covers 1990 to 2004.
Technologies. This research primarily focuses upon three flat panel display

technologies that have been used in commercially available television sets, including
LCD, PDP, and OLED and their sub-technologies. The timeline data also includes

Field Emission Device technology, which has been a topic of R&D for many years but
has yet to be commercialized, as well as Plasma Addressed Liquid Crystal, which

never reached mass production but was developed with the intention of use in TV
sets. Rear projection TV is another form of large screen Television although it is

bulky and cannot be considered a flat panel TV technology. Several technological

variants use Liquid Crystal based projection, while others use CRT based and DLP
technologies. While rear projection is not a central focus of this study, events

relating to rear projection TV were included in the data collection when available.
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Efforts were made to ensure this research included all relevant flat panel

display technologies. Appendix two provides a typology of flat panel display

technologies. It serves as evidence of the thoroughness of the identification of
relevant display technologies.

Focal firms. The focal firms in this research are large Japanese consumer

television set producers. These firms had large worldwide market shares in the
television set business prior to the arrival of flat panel technologies. From the

perspective of consumer electronics companies, flat panel televisions are replacement
products (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000) for CRT based analog televisions, and therefore
flat panel technologies represent strategic options (Raynor, 2007) to these firms.
Meanwhile, opportunities in the flat panel television industry may represent a growth
option (Raynor, 2007) for flat panel display manufacturers not previously in the
television business.
The theory presented in the prior chapter is primarily about strategic

options and not growth options, therefore the focus on existing television producers

is suitable. Other reasons for focusing on these firms are that Japan was the location
where these display technologies were developed to a level where they were

practical in consumer products, and Japan was also the earliest consumer market
for flat panel television sets. Finally, because the researcher speaks and reads
Japanese local data were accessible and interviews were possible.

To build a thorough understanding of the industry development and

technology options over time, data on the activities of three other groups of relevant
Japanese firms was collected. One group was comprised of minor Japanese TV
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producers that did not have CRT production capacity or invest in flat panel

production including Funai and JVC. Another group included firms that had

significant involvement in developing flat panel display technologies but did not
have major consumer television businesses, such as Fujitsu. Finally, Canon was
included as it had publicized its intention to enter the consumer television set

business and invested in display technology for this purpose, but failed to enter in
the end.

In addition to the Japanese firms, data on other groups of firms was also

collected. These firms included large CRT based TV producers such as Thomson and
Philips in Europe, and major flat panel display and television producers in Korea

including LG group and Samsung group. Although these were not focal firms in the
study, having an understanding of their activities was important to building the
overall picture.

There are several display producers in Taiwan, including firms such as AUO

and CMO. Although data was gathered on these firms, they are not included in the
analysis in this dissertation. These firms are not TV set producers. They have

generally played a role in the more commoditized part of the market for LCDs such

as those used in personal computing applications. If the purpose of this research had
been to document the history of display panels they would surely need to be
included. However, as the focus is on flat panel TV set manufacturers, their
inclusion would not be particularly helpful in this research.

Table 2-3 below summarizes the firms in this study. For focal firms, detailed

descriptions of the option-like investments and changes in these over time as well as
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performance is provided in firm level case studies in Chapter five. The same chapter
includes simplified case studies for the non-focal firms. Data gathering approach

and content did not differ between the focal and non-focal groups, however, some of
the non-focal firms had limited coverage in the sources used.

Table 2-3: Firms Included in this Study
Focal TV Firms
Non-focal firms
Television set
Flat panel firms
manufacturers
Hitachi

Minor Japanese TV set
manufacturers:

Key developers of FP
Technologies:

Matsushita / Panasonic
Funai Electric

Fujitsu

JVC

NEC

Mitsubishi Electric
Pioneer
Sanyo

Non-Japanese TV
manufacturers:

Sharp

FP developer that failed to
enter TV business:

LG Group
Sony

Canon
Philips

Toshiba
Samsung Group
Thomson

Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the study setting and reasons for its suitability

for examining the theory introduced in Chapter one. It presented detailed
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descriptions of the data used, and how this data was managed. Finally, it clarified
the scope of this study in terms of time, firms, and technologies.

The following chapter focuses on the display technologies TV set

manufacturing firms held options on. The technologies are described and their
historical technological trajectories presented.
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CHAPTER THREE: FLAT PANEL DISPLAY TECHNOLOGY TYPES AND
THEIR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter presents background knowledge on the display technologies and
their development pathways leading up to the development of the flat panel television
industry. This background knowledge is important for understanding the nature of
uncertainty faced. It is also necessary for interpreting the analysis performed in the
subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
The characteristics of the competing display technologies vary greatly.
Accordingly, the development pathways they traveled and uncertainties they faced also
differed. Furthermore, suitability for the various non-TV display applications differed
between the technologies. Some technologies were suitable for more applications –
providing opportunity for further investment – than others. The technologies discussed in
this chapter include those that have been commercially used in TV sets as well as some
that have not but were thought to have potential to be used.

Introduction to Display Technologies for Flat Panel TV applications
This section describes the different display technologies competing for use in the
flat panel TV application over the time period of the study. The intention here is to
familiarize the reader sufficiently with the competing technologies so as to facilitate
understanding of the detailed actions of the firms over the study period. Significant effort
was made to ensure the study covered the relevant technologies. Appendix Two contains
a typology of display technologies as further evidence of this effort.
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The technologies described in this section include: liquid crystal, plasma, organic
EL, field emission display and plasma addressed liquid crystal. The most common of
these is liquid crystal.
When used in a display, liquid crystal materials work like shutters controlling
light flow. A white light source behind the liquid crystal shines through the liquid crystal
layer and a number of filters that are layered on the display glass. Applying different
levels of electricity to small areas of the crystals causes them to change their orientation,
blocking or unblocking the light from shining through. Figure 3-1 depicts the general
principle for the typically used twisted nematic liquid crystal mode.
In color LCD panels, pixels on the display are made up of different colored sub-pixels
(typically, red, green, and blue), each of which has a color filter and an associated switch
to control the liquid crystal shutter. Closing all of the shutters on the sub pixels results in
the pixel becoming black. Leaving them all open results in white. These switches used
to control the liquid crystal make up a matrix across the display.
Each LCD cell is addressed through a matrix, which can be active matrix (AMLCD) or a passive matrix (PM-LCD). However, active matrix is required for higher
quality, higher resolution applications. Passive matrix proved unsuitable for applications
like TV. Thin Film Transistor (TFT) is the primary active matrix technology, although
diodes can also be used for active matrix switching.
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Figure 3-1: Diagram of Twisted Nematic Liquid Crystal Cells

There are several sub-technologies belonging to TFT-LCD. These include:
amorphous silicon (a-Si), low temperature poly-silicon (LTPS), and high temperature
poly-silicon (HTPS). Amorphous Silicon is the predominant LCD technology today; it is
used in flat panel televisions and a large variety of other applications. LTPS is capable of
very high-resolution display, and has been used in high quality cell phones, cameras, and
laptops. It has not been manufactured for very large screen applications. HTPS is also
capable of very high-resolution display. HTPS are typically very small panels that are
used in projection systems and near eye displays. With a few minor exceptions due to
data availability issues, option-like investments in LCD are tracked at this sub-technology
level in this dissertation.
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Plasma display technology works in a way similar to florescent lighting. PDPs
are made up of many sub-pixel cells, each containing electrical connectors, a gas, and a
colored phosphor similar to those used in CRT displays. The color of the phosphor
determines the color of the sub-pixel. When electricity flows, it causes the gas to become
plasma, which in turn causes phosphors on the screen to glow. In order for the process to
occur quickly enough to be useable in a TV, all of the cells need to receive a certain level
of electricity even when they are dark. In the past, PDPs were developed using direct
current and alternate current; however, direct current panels were found to have very
short lifetimes, so this type was completely dropped by all firms in the industry.
Organic Electroluminescence (OLED) is a solid-state technology; electrical
current is run to a cell containing OLED materials, which causes the cell to emit light.
Color is achieved through one of two ways: white color OLED materials can be used
with color filters, or red, blue, and green OLED materials may be used without filtration.
One of the attractions of OLED to manufacturers has been its relative simplicity because
it requires fewer layers than LCD and does not need a backlight. Like LCD, OLED cells
are switched on and off by active or passive matrices. Active matrix is required for larger
applications. OLED technology can be divided along the different kinds of OLED
materials used: small molecule materials and large molecule materials. Kodak has key
patents for small molecule and Cambridge Display Technology (CDT) has key patents
for large molecules.
Field Emission Display (FED) is similar to having many tiny CRTs next to each
other. Each pixel has its own electron gun (emitter), which is fired across a small
vacuum to light a phosphor on the screen. A large number of emitter types have been
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developed by different firms interested in this technology. Many firms conducted R&D
on this technology. Despite announcements that it would be used in television sets this
has not happened.
Plasma Addressed Liquid Crystal (PALC) is another display technology briefly
developed with the intention of being used in television sets. The general idea of the
technology combined plasma and LCD. Plasma was used instead of TFT to drive the
system and liquid crystals worked as shutters as with regular LCD panels. Development
activities were limited to a small number of firms. Although PALC does not rank in the
top potential flat panel television technologies in retrospect, it is of interest in that several
firms did make option like investments in the technology.
This section has provided a brief introduction of the display technologies
followed in this study. The section following considers the requirements for flat panel
TV.

Potential Television Displays
There are a number of attributes of a display that make it more or less suitable for
TV applications. These include: display size, image quality, energy requirements,
lifespan, production requirements and production cost. These different requirements are
considered below with regard to the major competing technologies. The bulk of this
discussion focuses on three main competing technologies: LCD, PDP, and OLED. Each
technology has moved along a different development trajectory and has faced different
uncertainties over time.
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Data on specifications of flat panel displays was gathered as evidence of how the
different display technologies changed over time with regard to the attributes discussed
below. No single source carried panel specifications for the entire period, and there was
a period of several years in the middle of the study where data was unavailable. The
Nikkei BP series carried panel specifications for the years 1994 through 1995. The Fuji
Chimera series listed panel specifications for the years 2001 through 2007. Additional
observations outside of this time frame were available from these same sources in several
instances, allowing some observations as early as 1991. Unfortunately, there is a gap in
coverage between these sources for the years 1999 and 2000. In the charts below, years
with no data are represented by dashed lines connecting the points where data was
available. The entire database of panel specifications gathered here has over 2,800
records.
Display size. Television sets come in a variety of different sizes, however the
main TV of the household tends to be a larger one in the living room of the house. Early
TFT-LCDs were small and expensive. Limitations to LCD size were due to issues with
production quality (larger screen = higher potential for defects) and limited size of early
production equipment. Costs were also an issue. Only relatively recently has production
of large LCD panels become feasible.
PDPs did not face the same size-related technological barriers as LCD and were
produced in large sizes from early on. The situation with PDP was the opposite of LCD.
It was difficult to make large LCDs, and difficult to make PDPs small. PDPs are
comprised of many small cells each of which must hold a gas. It is more difficult to
make small pockets than large. As a result, pixel size and display size started out large.
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Chart 3-1 below depicts how the state of the art in terms of panel size changed
over the years for LCD and PDP technologies. Early PDP TVs were released in the
1998-1999 timeframe, when the technology was already capably of sizes over 40 inches,
twice the diagonal measure of the largest LCD panels at the time.
Chart 3-1: Largest LCD and PDP Panels by Year (Includes Prototypes)

Source: Nikkei BP, 1993-1997; Fuji Chimera, 2001-2007.
Commercial applications of OLED technology to date have been small. Although
OLED technology should be scalable to large sizes, there appear to be issues with
uniformity that surface with larger sizes.
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Image Quality. Experts on image quality for television displays typically look at
contrast, quality of color and black levels, off axis visibility, reflections in the screen, and
blurring (FPD International 2008 Forum Session P-22: “What High Quality Means for
Each Type of FPD?” October 30, 2008: 15:00-18:00). Of these, contrast and color
quality have improved in each of the technologies.
Black levels have been harder for LCD to achieve than the other technologies.
Because Liquid Crystals act as shutters to allow or keep out light from the backlight, they
do not readily create complete blacks. It is very difficult to keep some light from leaking
through. Many incremental developments over the years have greatly increased the black
level performance of LCDs. There was no particular turning point that can be identified
as a breakthrough in contrast capability. PDP on the other hand has had very good black
levels from an early stage in the development, as has OLED. While data exists on the
panel contrast, it is not included here for two reasons. First, it does not necessarily
address the black level, and second because contrast measurement methods used in the
industry have been inconsistent, and interpretation of the data is difficult.
Early LCDs appeared washed out and had strange colors when viewed off the
correct viewing angle. Although this was not a fatal flaw for some applications such as
personal computing, it was considered to be a major problem for television use. Chart 32 below depicts the state of the art in LCD technology with regard to viewing angle over
the period 1991 to 2004. Two major AM-LCD technologies have been developed to
ameliorate this problem: In-Plane Switching (IPS), first successfully applied by Hitachi in
1996, and Multi-Domain Vertical Alignment (MVA), originally developed by Fujitsu in
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1997. A number of variants have been developed by other firms based upon these
technologies. Viewing angle has not been an issue with other display technologies.
Chart 3-2: Maximum Viewing angle of LCD Panels

Source: Nikkei BP, 1994-1998; Fuji Chimera, 2001-2007.
Liquid crystals take time to react and change orientation after the electrical
current is applied. Earlier LCD generations could not react quickly enough for moving
pictures, resulting in a blur or trail behind parts of the image moving rapidly. As the case
with viewing angle, this did not present a problem for many applications. For example,
many computer users did not need displays to have fast reaction times. Chart 3-3 below
shows how the reaction time of LCDs, measured in milliseconds, has improved over the
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study period. Although there is some difference of opinion, response time of 10ms or
less is generally considered “good” for TV sets. Other display technologies discussed
here did not have blurring issues.
Chart 3-3: Response Times of Fastest LCD Panels

Source: Nikkei BP, 1994-1998; Fuji Chimera, 2001-2007.
PDP has been prone to picking up reflections in certain lighting conditions. This
issue appears to have been largely addressed through the application of filters on the PDP
glass.
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In the past, burn-in has been an issue in PDP and CRT technologies. Burn-in
occurs when the same image is kept on screen for very long periods of time.
Manufacturers have been able to largely eliminate this problem, and it was not really a
major issue for consumer televisions because the same image did not remain on the
screen for weeks at a time.
OLED is generally reported to have good characteristics with regard to picture
quality aspects discussed here. However, OLED materials fade as they age, and this can
have negative impact on color representation. Currently, the speed of degradation is
considered to be a major problem with OLED.
There are other important aspects of picture quality that do not depend on the
display but rather the electronics driving it. These include jerkiness in movie playback
and digital compression artifacts. These aspects of the television performance are the
result of image processing hardware and software and not the display itself and therefore
are not discussed in detail here.
Energy Requirements. Energy usage is another area of display panel
performance that matters to customers. OLED should generally require the least energy
to run of these three technologies. PDP has had much higher energy requirements than
the other technologies although it is improving. LCD requirements are in the middle.
Operating the crystals does not require large amounts of power. Backlighting requires
most of the power and approximately 90% of the light generated in the backlight unit is
lost inside the set. Companies have been working on improved optical films, lower
power backlight units using light emitting diodes instead of the conventional cold cathode
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fluorescent light (CCFL) units, and dynamic lighting which turns down the backlight in
dark areas of the screen image, to reduce energy usage in LCDs.
Lifespan. Consumers have high expectations for how long a television display
should last. Both LCD and PDP meet these expectations. PDPs have suffered from
burn-in in the past, however this was mainly an issue when used to display relatively
static images as in the case of displays used in train stations, for example. When used in
normal TV viewing conditions, burn in should not have been a major problem reducing
lifespan even with earlier models. The short lifespan of OLED materials, on the other
hand, has probably been the primary reason why OLED display usage has not become
widespread.
Production requirements. These technologies provide various challenges for
the would-be manufacturer. LCD has a large number of stages in the production process.
The cell, or sealed liquid crystal and thin film transistor matrix, must be produced under
extreme clean conditions. This process is highly capital intensive. Current state of the
art LCD fabs cost around $3 US billion to set up. The module assembly portion, where
backlights and other electronics are attached to the cell to produce the LCD module, is
highly labor intensive. It is not uncommon to see manufacturers divide the highly
capital-intensive panel fabrication activities and the highly labor intensive module
assembly activities into different locations.
PDPs are much less capital intensive than LCDs to produce (e.g., den Boer,
2005). The PDP production process has fewer steps than LCD and does not require
extremely clean production areas.
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Like LCD, OLED production requires a clean room. There are competing
production approaches including vacuum evaporation and printing which also relate to
the kind of OLED materials being used. Which, if either, approach will become
mainstream is uncertain at this time. However, OLED can be produced using LTPS and
shares some steps with LCD. It is possible for existing LCD firms to do some pilot
OLED production without major investment. As the number of steps is fewer however,
in the future, plants specifically designed for OLED production may not require as much
clean room space and therefore investment as conventional LCD plants.
Production Cost. Compared with the other technologies, LCD panels contain
more expensive materials. High quality, thin glass substrates must be used and optical
films and color filters are also relatively expensive. OLED has fewer layers than LCD,
meaning that it requires fewer materials, and also fewer steps in the production process
than are required for LCDs. Figure 3-2 depicts the different numbers of layers in OLED
and LCD. Given the greater simplicity of OLED, many observers argue it should cost
less than LCD to make if it reaches mass production.
The cost of the driving circuitry also needs to be included in the cost equation in
order to compare between the technologies. PDP panels are cheaper to produce than
LCDs, however, PDP driver circuits cost more because they have to be able to handle
higher voltages than LCD drivers.
Over the years, LCDs have become cheaper to produce due to increases in yield
and economies of scale available with the newest generation production facilities. In
addition to general cost reductions over time, the cost of producing large panels, suitable
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for living room TV applications, has decreased dramatically. PDP production cost also
appears to have gone down dramatically, however data on this is limited. As far as
production cost for TV applications is concerned there is no clear winner between the two
technologies. Amongst all of the technologies, experts suggest OLED could be the most
cost effective if it ever reaches true mass production.
Figure 3-2: Layers in Active Matrix LCD and Active Matrix OLED Panels

FED and PALC as Television Displays
Both FED and PALC have also been considered as potential television displays. 4
However, interest has been less widespread than the three main technologies above. FED
has been touted as providing high image quality, wide viewing angle, good brightness,
4

See section “Introduction to Display Technologies for Flat Panel TV applications” for a
description of these technologies.
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ability to operate in harsh environments, and energy efficiency (Komoda, 2005). FED
has yet to be introduced in a consumer product. Why it has not developed into a
television product is not completely clear, although industry followers suggest it may
have proven difficult or very expensive to mass produce (Iguchi, 2008). Prototypes of up
to 55” have been announced (Fuji-Chimera, 2007) in the past, suggesting display size is
not a barrier.
PALC was developed by a group of firms with the intention of using it as a
television display in response to arguments LCD could not be produced in large enough
sizes (Komoda, 2005). The technology is a hybrid of plasma and liquid crystal display,
using plasma to function as an active matrix without using diodes or transistors (den
Boer, 2005). Although originally touted as providing the best of Plasma and LCD, an
informant said that PALC development was doomed from the beginning because it
offered the worst of Plasma and LCD. PALC is arguably a failed technology in that
development ceased. Sony released one TV model using PALC in 1996 (Sangyo Times,
1997; Sony web site 5). The technology is complex and difficult to manufacture; in the
end PALC was never mass-produced (den Boer, 2005). Industry followers suggest that
manufacturing cost, and not problems with image quality, is the reason this technology
was dropped.

Continued Competition and Uncertainty
5

http://www.sony.co.jp/SonyInfo/News/Press_Archive/199609/96T-120/
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The discussion above describes the pros and cons of the different display
technologies that have been in the running to be used in flat panel television sets and how
they have changed over time. Although the general observations stated here are
commonly agreed upon in the industry, interpretation varies.
LCD has clearly become the most dominant of the technologies. It accounts for
the largest production volume of any of the technologies and is used in a variety of
applications including living room TV sets. However, debates by industry observers and
insiders have been going on for many years and still continue. The Society for
Information Display 2008 conference had an evening session to debate the topic, titled:
“AMLCD World Domination: Does Anything Stand in the Way?” Participants were
from firms specializing in each of the technologies, so much of the debate hinged upon
the importance of different aspects, such as cost and lifespan. As far as overall picture
quality is concerned, however, the general consensus seems to be that PDP is superior.
Asakura Reiji, Vice Chairman of the society of Picture Quality Engineers stated: “All of
the technologies have come a long way in terms of any measure of video quality;
however, Plasma still stands out as the single display technology capable of producing an
excellent picture” (paraphrased and translated from Japanese; FPD International 2008
Forum Session P-22: “What High Quality Means for Each Type of FPD?” October 30,
2008: 15:00-18:00).
The future place of OLED technology is particularly uncertain. Every year,
industry insiders joke that OLED was described as “taking off” next year (Sorin, 2008).
However, many industry participants have high hopes for OLED and think it may be
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superior in every way to the existing technologies if technological problems can be
overcome.
Although the popularity of FED research appears to have decreased, there are still
firms developing this technology. Its future use in TV set applications cannot be ruled
out.

Development History of Flat Panel Display Technologies
Up until this point, this chapter has introduced the requirements for TV displays
and the alternative flat panel display technologies that have competed or continue to
compete for use in TV set applications. It has briefly considered how the technologies
have or have not met these requirements over time. Below, the development histories of
the technologies are presented. This allows the reader to get an understanding of the
general time frames, firms involved, and applications each technology could be used for
over the time it was being developed.
The display technologies discussed above have long and complicated histories.
Not surprisingly, discoveries and breakthroughs occurred at different times, and not in
parallel between the different technologies. Each technology faced unique uncertainties
in its development and problems that had to be addressed before it could become useful.
The display applications each has been used in differ, largely due to the different
properties of the technology in question and the timing during which it was available.
For instance, while LCD has been used in a large number of products from watches and
calculators to car navigation systems, plasma display technology has not been used for
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such applications. The existence or lack of more easily achievable applications has, and
continues to have, a number of implications. These include the potential for learning and
therefore quality improvement and cost reduction over time, as well as the potential to
decrease uncertainty relating to the display technology by applying it in multiple adjacent
markets.
The different sections below each follow one of the display technologies. A
timeline is later presented to allow comparison of the development between the different
technologies over time.

LCD
The purpose of this section is to familiarize the reader with some of the key
players, including several focal firms of this study, earlier on in LCD development. It
also provides a look at how LCD technology was developed through applications before
it became a TV display. LCD’s development is long and detailed, however it is only
briefly addressed here. Other sources cover the history of LCD development and the
industry. Interested readers may consult Castellano’s 2005 book “Liquid GOLD.”
Liquid crystals were originally discovered in the 1800s but they were considered
only as a scientific curiosity until the 1930s when a patent on a liquid crystal device was
filed in the United Kingdom citing TV as one potential application (Castellano, 2005;
Murtha et al., 2001). Although LCD R&D gained some government funding during
World War II (Numagami, 1999), its potential as a viable display technology only
became clear in the 1960s.
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In 1968, RCA announced its liquid crystal display technology with much fanfare
(Murtha et al., 2001). RCA suggested wall hanging flat panel TVs could be developed
based upon the technology. A number of Japanese firms began R&D on LCDs in the
1960s and early 1970s.
As discussed in the section introducing LCD technology, it consists of a number
of sub-technologies. Early applications used a relatively simple type called a segment
LCD in products such as watches, clocks, and calculators. Sharp’s introduction of the LC
Mate EL-805 calculator with liquid crystal display in 1973 (Sangyo Times, 1993) is often
mentioned as a key development in this era. The next step in LCD development was dot
matrix display, which was introduced into products in the late 1970s. Though these
displays could display some graphics, image quality was low.
In the quest for higher quality imaging, many firms began R&D on active matrix
LCDs in the early 1980s. Canon, Fujitsu, IBM, Kyocera, Ricoh, Samsung, Sony, and
Toshiba all began major research into TFT-LCD in the early 1980s (Castellano, 2005;
Sangyo Times, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997). The technology proved difficult to
master.
Passive matrix STN-LCD technology was also developed in the 1980s. Although
STN has much lower image quality, often suffering from a washed out look, it was
relatively low cost to manufacture. Fujitsu, Sharp, Toshiba, Tottori Sangyo and others
began producing STN-LCDs primarily for computer applications in the mid 1980s
(Sangyo Times, 1992, 1993), although mass production by Japanese firms did not start
until 1986 (Numagami, 1999). Sharp, Toshiba and Seiko Epson were amongst firms
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releasing laptops with color STN-LCD screens around the late 1980s (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu-hen); Sangyo Times, 1992, 1993; Weber et al, 2008).
Fascination with television as an application is evident from these days. Even
though display quality was poor, production costs were high, and screen size was small.
Seiko-Epson commercialized the first LCD TV watch in 1982 (Aoyagi, 2000; Sango
Times, 1993). In 1984, Seiko-Epson developed a 2.1” color TFT LCD TV (Nikkei BP,
2000 (FPD 2001)). The following year, Matsushita began selling a 3” LCD TV of its
own (Sangyo Times, 1992). Sharp exhibited its first LCD TV prototype, also with a 3”
screen, at Electronics Show in 1986 (Sangyo Times, 1993). NEC exhibited a 4.3” color
LCD panel designed for television usage in 1988 (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Announcements of TFT prototypes and new products began growing in the late
1980s. However, mass production of TFT-LCD was challenging and did not start right
away. Display Technologies Incorporated (a manufacturing Joint Venture between IBM
and Toshiba), NEC, and Sharp each separately began mass production of TFT-LCDs in
1990-1991 (Murtha et al., 2001).
Large investments, scarcity, and low yields meant that these screens were very
expensive, typically costing over $1000 US each at the time (Murtha et al., 2001);
however, the new technology created possibilities for new and improved applications.
NEC announced the world’s first color TFT LCD laptop, the 9800 NC in 1991 (Sangyo
Times, 1993). Car navigation systems and Pachinko games were other applications that
began to grow around this time.
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These new applications increased the diversity of markets for LCDs, however the
laptop computer was by far the biggest application and had the most impact driving
technology and manufacturing capability development. TFT-LCD was useful to the
laptop application but the technology was not yet at a level suitable for other potentially
large applications. One informant stated that he had taken early 8-inch class TFT panels
to television set makers however they were not interested. The TV set manufacturers
said the panels were too expensive, too small, and did not have good enough image
quality to be relevant in televisions.
LCD continued to suffer from image quality problems at the time. The screens
had narrow viewing angles and slow response times – these were fatal flaws for some
applications but not for laptop usage. LCD technology was the only suitable technology
for laptop displays at the time. Laptops required a lightweight, thin display, and
preferably, low energy usage. Laptops were deigned to be used by one person at a time,
therefore viewing angle was not important. Also, computers at the time lacked sufficient
processing power to allow them to use video; hence, slow reaction time was also not a
problem. TFT image quality was much better than the competing STN technology; STNs
provided a lower cost laptop alternative while higher end laptops featured the more
expensive, better looking TFT-LCD. Plasma screens had been used in laptops by
Toshiba and Compaq, however plasma technology suffered from major drawbacks in
comparison to LCD. First, plasma displays at the time were single color units. Second,
the high energy requirements of plasma meant laptops with plasma displays could not run
on battery power.
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Around the time TFT-LCDs became available, computer processor speed was
increasing dramatically, and computer software using graphical user interfaces (GUI), in
particular Microsoft Windows 3.0, became available. These advances increased the
relative attractiveness of higher quality active matrix displays.
Chart 3-4 below shows the growth of LCD production from 1989 to 1994 by six
of the largest Japanese TFT-LCD producing firms at the time. Of the six firms, four
firms were also laptop computer manufacturers, including Hitachi, NEC, Sharp, and
Toshiba (Hitachiwebcafe.com site 6), while Hoshiden and Sanyo sold the majority of their
displays to third party manufacturers. Total LCD production included non-TFT panels
such as STN panels as well as more basic passive matrix TN panels used in calculators,
watches, and automotive applications. TFT production in 1989 was still quite limited;
mass production facilities had yet to be built and yield ratios were very low.
The growth of both LCD and TFT-LCD was quite rapid over this period,
especially when one considers that per unit prices were falling, therefore unit volume
grew more quickly than the revenue based production shown in Chart 3-4. It is hard to
gauge exactly how much of the TFT-LCD output was used in laptops, however there is
no question that it was by far and away the largest single application of the technology
during this time frame. Chart 3-5 below shows the production levels of displays
manufactured in Japan during the period 1990-1992. Interestingly, LCD surpasses CRT
around 1991, as TFT-LCD mass production was beginning.

6

http://www.hitachiwebcafe.com/siryo_prius.htm
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Chart 3-4: LCD Production by 6 Major Japanese Active Matrix LCD Firms
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Chart 3-5: Total Japanese Domestic Display Production Value, by Display
Technology Type (1980-1992)

Growth
The number of LCD applications continued to grow as the quality increased and
the cost decreased. Desktop computer monitors were another major application for LCD
once the prices became reasonable and the display sizes increased. The average size of
the panels used in many applications has also grown for similar reasons.
Ongoing incremental technological developments improved LCD technology in a
number of ways, and two large technological breakthroughs occurring in the mid-1990s
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can be identified as largely eliminating the viewing angle problem faced by the
technology. Hitachi was the first company able to produce commercial grade panels
using In Plane Switching (IPS) mode in 1996 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)). Fujitsu
developed a competing technology called Multi-domain Vertical Alignment (MVA),
which it began mass-producing in 1997 (Sangyo Times, 1999). These technologies both
substantially increased the viewing angle of LCDs, reducing uncertainty around LCD’s
suitability as a TV display.
Increasingly sophisticated, reliable, and large LCD production equipment is a
major driver of these improvements. The better equipment has reduced the level of
knowledge required for new entrants over time. There have been several waves of new
firms entering the LCD production business, including a number of Korean firms around
1995, and Taiwanese firms around 1997. Firms in Mainland China have been increasing
their TFT-LCD capabilities as well as of late.
Although the improved production equipment may have reduced costs and
increased quality, the combination of the great expense of building an up-to-date LCD
plant and the huge production capacity it entails has dramatically impacted the LCD
industry. Matthews (2005) discussed the crystal cycle – a boom and bust cycle in the
LCD industry similar to the cycle seen in the semiconductor industry.
Although a number of the flat panel display technologies have long development
histories, color TFT-LCD was the first to be mass-produced. The impact of this is
probably large as LCD had more time to reduce uncertainty related to its potential
through ongoing technological improvements and increases in cost effectiveness. The
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PDP development story, discussed below, did not offer as many similar opportunities for
application in related markets.

PDP Development
Plasma technology is not as old as Liquid Crystals. PDPs were first developed at
the University of Illinois in the 1960s (Kawamura, 2005; Weber et al., 2008). Following
some initial developments, Burroughs, Fujitsu, IBM, and Philips began R&D on PDPs
later in the decade (Nikkei BP, 1990). Although much of the early development occurred
in the United States, there is surprisingly little written about its development in English. 7
Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), the Japanese state television broadcaster, began
research on PDP as a potential next generation television display technology in 1971
(Weber et al., 2008). In the early 1970s, Fujitsu, IBM, Hitachi, Matsushita Electronics,
Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, Oki Electric, and Owens Illinois begin producing PDPs in very
small quantities. PDP faced a number of hurdles and some of the firms dropped the
technology while many others had on-again off-again research programs.
Yano Keizai (1982) documents the state of the PDP business in 1982.
Interestingly, a number of firms including Burroughs, Fujitsu, Matsushita Denshi Kogyo,
NEC, Okatani Electric, Oki Electric, and Sanya Electronics made and sold PDPs that year
(Yano Keizai, 1982). PDPs of this generation were single color, matrix displays typically
used in public areas such as train stations.

7

Weber et al.’s (2008) account of PDP historical development is in Japanese.
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Higher resolution displays useful in the computer industry did not arrive until
later. IBM developed a 17” monochrome PDP with 968X758 resolution in 1983, and
sold it to financial institutions (Murtha et al., 2001; Weber et al., 2008).

In 1985,

Matsushita Electronics began selling high resolution PDPs for laptop applications (Nikkei
BP, 1990); however, difficulties in manufacturing the panels plagued the firm (Weber et
al., 2008). Nonetheless, Toshiba began selling laptop computers with monochrome DCPDP displays in 1986 (Nikkei BP, 1996). IBM concluded that PDP was not a suitable
display technology for IT applications and exited in 1987 (Weber et al., 2008). It was the
last major U.S. firm to exit.
Plasmaco, a start-up headed by Larry Weber, a leading researcher who had
previously been a professor at the University of Illinois, began plasma development in
1987 (Murtha et al., 2001) using production equipment purchased from IBM (Weber et
al., 2008). The firm played an important role in PDP technological development,
however it never gained sufficient funding to build a mass production facility.
Panasonic purchased the firm in 1996, and made it a subsidiary, retaining Weber (Murtha
et al., 2001).
NHK established a PDP TV development program with industry players in 1994
with a plan to use the Nagano Winter Olympics in 1998 to publicly launch PDP-TV
(Kawamura, 2005). By this point, a number of firms had developed promising color PDP
technologies, but none were up to the standards required for consumer television.
Several firms invested in first generation color PDP production plant and equipment in
1995, and began pilot production in 1996 (Nikkei BP, 1998, 2002 (Senryaku hen)).
NHK’s preferred technology, DC-PDP was used as planned to show the Nagano
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Olympics in public locations, however the sets had to be replaced often as picture quality
degraded rapidly (Weber et al., 2008). Following the Olympics, the NHK project ended
and PDP players unanimously dropped DC-PDP and switched to AC-PDP (Weber et al.,
2008). Because many of the players had been developing both versions, focusing on only
one increased the speed of development. The new PDP TVs that resulted ushered in the
age of flat panel television.
Unlike LCD, PDP was used in few applications prior to the introduction of PDPTV. Those applications it was used in were either in specialized niche markets (e.g., train
station displays, financial institutions), or they were short-lived (e.g., plasma displays
were replaced by LCDs for use in portable computers several years after their
introduction). These limited opportunities for PDP may have kept uncertainty high for
some time, reducing firms’ willingness to invest in the technology.

OLED Development
Organic Light Emitting Diode technology is much younger than the other display
technologies discussed here. A technology related to OLED, Electroluminescence (EL)
was under development as early as the 1940s (Johnstone, 1999). A number of firms,
including Sharp, developed and produced EL. Some developed EL-TV prototypes,
however interest in EL as a TV display dried up many years ago, and a detailed
discussion of it is not included here.
OLED development began in the 1980s. OLED can be divided into two groups
based upon the kinds of materials used: small particle materials and large particle
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materials. Kodak researchers Tang and Van Slyke published their research on small
particle OLED technology in 1987 (Mori, 2008). Large particle materials were first
developed by researchers at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom. Cambridge
Display Technology (CDT), a spinout from Cambridge University was formed in 1992 to
develop large particle OLED technologies (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Early developers of OLED entered in the late 1980s and early 1990s and include
IBM, Idemitsu, Philips, Pioneer, and Sony (Nikkei BP, 2007 (FPD 2008 OLED)). Early
OLED displays were single color or area color (i.e., the display had several sections with
different colors in them) and were passive matrix. Tohoku Pioneer, a subsidiary of
Pioneer, was the first firm to commercially use OLED, when it included one in a car
radio in 1997 (Nikkei BP, 2007 (FPD 2008 OLED)).
The industry has gone through several attempts to move to full color active matrix
OLED, but it has not been easy going. Pioneer began mass-producing Active Matrix
OLED in 2004; however, it exited in 2005 (Sangyo Times, 2007). Sanyo and Kodak
formed a joint venture to develop and produce OLED displays including passive and
active matrix (Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, February 5, 1999). This JV was dissolved after
some degree of development success but limited production (Sangyo Times, 2007). Sony
has produced OLEDs for some time, incorporating them in PDAs in 2005, a TV in 2007,
and a personal music player in 2009 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen); Sony web site). A
number of Taiwanese and Korean firms have begun mass production of PM-OLEDs,
including Chi Mei Electroluminescence, RiT Display, LG, and Samsung. Currently,
OLEDs are being produced in limited numbers. OLEDs are mainly used in cell phone
and portable audio applications, where limited lifetime is not an issue because the
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displays are not turned on most of the time and because users tend to replace cell phones
once every several years.
For the last several years, OLED technology has been the center of a lot of hype
and OLED exhibits have been prominent at industry trade shows. Prototype
announcements are not uncommon, and yet the technology has not been used in many
consumer products. Given its significant cost disadvantage compared to LCD at this
stage, it is not surprising that OLED has yet to be used in laptop applications.
OLED TV has been the goal of a number of firms, however this goal has been
elusive. Sony has released the world’s first OLED TV with an 11-inch diagonal 3 mm
thick display in December of 2007 (Sony, 2007), and Kodak began selling a 3-inch
OLED TV in Japan in March, 2008 (Akasaka, 2008). A number of other firms have
stated they plan to begin producing OLED TV models, however these have not as yet
become reality.
OLED has been used in a number of applications through its development,
however the number of applications is lower than LCD. OLED is directly competing
with LCD in these applications. With the exception of TV, OLED has been chosen
primarily for applications where its limited lifespan will not be a problem, such as cell
phones, mp3 players, and car stereos.
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FED Development
FED has a long history even though it has not yet found its way into
commercially available consumer products. The field emission phenomenon was first
described in a patent in 1921 (Komoda, 2005). In 1968, a researcher at SRI International
in the United States, C.A. Spindt began developing an emitter type that was subsequently
commonly used in FEDs. Although this was a significant achievement, the technology
did not receive much attention until 1986 when the French Laboratory LETI (Le
Laboratoire d’Electronique de Technologie et d’Instrumentation) announced a
breakthrough 6” FED. Around this same time, Canon, Candescent (U.S.), Futaba
Electronics, Motorola, and Sony began R&D into FED (Sangyo Times, 1999, 2000,
2006; Nikkei BP, 2000). A number of other firms have performed FED research since
that time, but many of the research efforts appear to be small. Sony and Canon (and its
joint venture partner Toshiba) had relatively larger efforts compared to the other firms.
Sony announced a 13.2” color FED prototype in 2001, but later in 2006 moved the
development efforts to a separate venture company (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku hen):
Nikkei BP, 2007 (Shijo hen); Sangyo Times, 2005). Canon and Toshiba formed several
joint ventures to develop and mass-produce SED, a variant of FED technology, with the
intention of using it as a TV display. The Joint Venture announced a number of
prototypes including a 36-inch prototype in 2004, and a 55-inch in 2006 (Fuji-Chimera,
2007; Nikkei BP, 2004 (Senryaku hen)). However, the JV was later disbanded,
apparently for legal reasons. A mass production facility was never built. Futaba
Electronics, a specialty display maker not included in the target firm group, is the only
firm to be producing FED displays at this time. Its focus has been on small FEDs using
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the most conventional variants of the technology. It is unclear what applications these
displays are currently used for.

Comparing Development Pathways
The display technologies discussed in this chapter all had different development
trajectories and have been used in different applications. Figure 3-3 below depicts major
developments relating to each display technology over time, to allow comparison of the
relative stages each was at over time. For additional comparison, a short development
timeline is provided in Table 3-1 at the end of this chapter. It is worth noting that
amongst the different potential TV displays discussed, color TFT-LCD was the first to be
mass-produced. The impact of this is probably large as LCD had more time to improve
its characteristics and reduce its cost before other entrants arrived.
The applications the different display technologies have been used in differ and
have developed over time. Figure 3-4 below depicts the applications each technology
was used in over their development. These applications have provided opportunities for
firms to generate revenues justifying further investment in R&D as well as production
capabilities. This has, in some cases, provided enough resources for the technologies to
be developed to the point they can increase the scope of applications they are useful in,
either through improved performance or decreased cost.
LCD, for instance, had disadvantages including blurriness and narrow viewing
angle that made it unattractive for numerous potential applications in earlier stages,
however its use in laptop computers gave manufacturers time and resources to improve
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the technology to the point where it had much better video characteristics. Improvements
in the production methods not only increased quality, they also reduced cost and opened
the way to development of larger production scale.
Compared with LCD, competing display technologies had fewer, lower volume
applications. PDP, for example, had some early applications, however these were all
small niches such as stock price displays in financial institutions; mass production was
not feasible for the applications it could handle prior to its development as a potential TV
display.

Chapter Summary and Conclusions
This chapter provided background on the technologies and their development
histories. In presenting the development of the display technologies over time, it
described the technological uncertainty due to the competition between multiple display
technologies for TV and other applications, and how this changed over time.
Additionally, it provided a basic understanding of the relevant display technologies.
Some degree of familiarity with the technologies, their similarities and differences, and
their abbreviations is needed for interpreting the firm level case studies and subsequent
analyses presented in Chapters five through seven.
Each of the display technologies discussed faced a different set of uncertainties
over its development. These uncertainties included those regarding performance
improvements required for use in different applications, uncertainties relating to cost
reduction potential, and uncertainties due to competing display technologies. The
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following chapter discusses the television industry and the development of flat panel
television.
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Figure 3-3: Development of Display Technologies Over Time

Sources: Developed by Castellano, 2005; Fuji Chimera, 2001; Futaba web site; Komoda, 2005; Mori, 2008; Murtha et al., 2001;
Numagami, 1999; Sangyo Times, 1995, 2002, 2005, Sony web site.
Figure 3-4: Application of Flat Panel Display Technologies Over Time
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Table 3-1: Display Technology Development Timeline
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Table 3-1: Display Technology Development Timeline (Continued)
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Table 3-1: Display Technology Development Timeline (Continued)
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Table 3-1: Display Technology Development Timeline (continued)

104

CHAPTER FOUR: THE FLAT PANEL TELEVISION INDUSTRY
The previous chapter introduced display technologies competing for use in the flat
panel television industry. In addition to providing a technological background, it also
provided a basis for understanding the nature of technological uncertainty present in that
competition. This chapter discusses the television set manufacturing industry and its
evolution. The general industry background of industry and firms in it is meant to aid
interpretation of the analysis in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. It provides
evidence market needs uncertainty was relatively low in this industry during the study
period.
The TV set manufacturing industry is large and global in nature. The Japanese
TV set manufacturers that are the focal firms of this investigation have played a major
role in the industry for many years. This chapter begins by establishing a general
background of the industry and Japanese firms in it. It then looks at its evolution at the
industry level, including drivers of change such as the digitalization of television.

Japan’s Early Television Industry
The television set industry had a complex beginning, involving many people and
organizations. A full discussion of the early developments is beyond the scope of this
research, however some discussion of Japanese firms studied is warranted in order to
establish the length and extent of their involvement with the industry.
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Although early developments relating to television sets go back into the 19th
century, it took many years for television technology to develop to the point it was
practical and for broadcasts to begin. Early examples of TV sets can be found, but TV
sets only became widely owned in the 1950s and 1960s. In the United States, for
instance, less than 10% of households had TV sets at the beginning of the 1950s, but by
the end of the decade, number was over 80% (www.tvhistory.tv 8).
Many of the Japanese firms in the television industry have long histories with
television and related technologies, as shown in Table 4-1, below. A number of Japanese
firms, including Toshiba, Panasonic, and Sharp, were active in black and white TV in the
1950s.

The first color CRT was first developed by RCA in 1956, but Toshiba was quick

to catch up, building one in 1959 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Senryaku hen); Nikkei BP, 2007
(OLED hen)). Several of the firms introduced color TVs in 1960. Sony refused to use
the shadow-mask color CRT technology that was adopted by the other manufacturers;
after a failed earlier attempt, Sony successfully developed Trinitron CRT technology in
1968 (Jojima et al, 2006).

8

http://www.tvhistory.tv/Annual_TV_Households_50-78.JPG

106

Table 4-1: Events in Japanese TV development up to 1970
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Note to event timeline: Panasonic was formerly known as Matsushita. MEI and MEW
belonged to the Matsushita Group. Matsushita Electric Industry (MEI) was the central
firm in the group; Matsushita Electric Works (MEW) was a Joint Venture with Philips
making picture tubes, formed in 1952 and dissolved in 2001.

Some of the television set manufacturers had a CRT production capability, but a
number did not. CRT production was capital intensive. Many firms considered the CRT
to be a key device, i.e., one that gave the maker opportunities for differentiation or cost
leadership, in the television business. However, a number of firms never made the
investment. JVC, Pioneer, Sanyo, and Sharp did not develop their own CRT production
capability 9.
The coming of color TV in the 1960s was a major technological change, however
the combination of CRT technology and analog broadcasting remained stable until the
late 1990s. There were some technological developments relating to television, but most
of the new technologies had to do with components connected to the television, such as
set top boxes, video recorders and players.

Other Players in the TV Set Industry
Korean firms Samsung and LG have invested in flat panel technologies and have
grown their standing in the television business over the last ten years. Korean firms had
historic relationships with Japanese firms, including joint ventures and technology
transfers. Samsung and NEC established Samsung SDI as a joint venture to produce
9

Source: In person anonymous interviews, dates: November 4, 2008; March 19, 27,
2009.
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CRTs in 1969 (Sangyo Times, 2002). LG and Hitachi set up a similar Joint Venture in
1974 (Sangyo Times, 2002).
These firms began LCD R&D efforts many years behind their Japanese
counterparts, and entered into TFT-LCD production after the market had begun to grow
through the laptop computer application. Samsung began R&D on LCDs in 1984 and LG
in 1987 (Sangyo Times, 1994). Samsung built a TFT-LCD pilot line in 1991 and its first
mass LCD production line in 1993 (Sangyo Times, 1994). LG began mass-producing
TFT-LCDs for laptops in 1995 (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Samsung and LG have grown to become two of the largest LCD producers.
Samsung has grown to become respected for its advance display research and
development capabilities, technological prowess in manufacturing flat panel displays, and
financial strength that has allowed it to make bold investments in LCD manufacturing
facilities. Both firms were also CRT-TV producers and their progression of product
applications has been similar to that of other firms in the industry.
Taiwan is home to a number of large LCD producers. Taiwanese firms gained
their initial LCD capabilities primarily through technology transfers with Japanese firms.
Most of the Taiwanese LCD producers are related to computer manufacturers. Unlike
many of the Korean and Japanese firms, these producers do not belong to groups with
well-known consumer electronics companies. However, their panels are used by a
number of TV set manufacturers including famous companies and others.
Several European firms also have long TV set development and production
histories. Two have long been major global players: Philips and Thomson. Philips has
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long been involved with Asian firms. Matsushita Electronic Works, for instance, was set
up as a Joint Venture between Philips and Matsushita to produce CRTs in 1952. Philips
later entered into joint ventures on LCD with Hoshiden and LG. Thomson is a French
company that purchased the consumer electronics businesses of RCA and GE from
General Electric in 1987 (Dow Jones News Service, 1987). In 2004, it set up a joint
venture with Chinese firm TCL, and moved its television manufacturing operations to the
new firm TTE (Chiu, 2004). Since then Thomson has reduced its stake in the joint
venture and is reducing its involvement with consumer electronics in general (Palenchar
& Smith, 2007). Both firms had large worldwide market shares in the past, but have been
reducing their exposure to consumer television markets more recently.

Changes in the Television Set Industry
The Television set industry experienced only minor, gradual change between the
introduction of color TV in the 1960s and the late 1990s when digitalization and new
display technologies came onto the scene. There were many years of growth in the
industry with no discontinuous technological change during this period. With increasing
incomes in much of the world and improvements in production methods, the relative cost
of televisions went down for consumers worldwide over the period. Chart 4-1 below
depicts the size of the global TV set market. In 1997, the global market was nearly 140
million sets.
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Chart 4-1: Global TV Set Market

The following sections introduce two drivers of technological change in the
television set industry: the arrival of new display technologies and the digitalization of
content. LCDs were used in television applications prior to PDPs. In the process of
describing PDP development, the previous chapter covered the entrance of PDP into
television, which was the primary reason for developing color PDP to begin with.
Although many had considered LCD to be an attractive display technology for television,
its entrance was gradual due to technological limitations such as display size, and also
due to its high cost. After presenting the background behind introduction of LCD
technology to TV sets, the discussion moves on to consider the digitalization of content
and the industry.
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Early LCD TVs
A number of firms developing LCD technology produced small, portable LCD
based televisions in the 1980s and 1990s. These TVs attracted attention, but never
represented a large percentage of the market. Table 4-2, below, lists some of the early
LCD TV product development and introductions. A number of the firms making these
early models, namely Casio, Citizen, and Seiko-Epson, were not television set producers
prior to their entry into this segment. The products up until the late 1980s were very
small, and intended for personal use only. Beginning in the late 1980s, slightly larger
sets intended for use in automobiles started to be introduced.
Readers familiar with electronics of this time period may ask: Where was Sony?
Interestingly, Sony released a small portable black and white TV in 1982, but it was
based upon CRT technology (Sony web site 10). Color LCD models were not made by
Sony until around 1990.
Sharp’s 1995 introduction of the “Window” LCD-TV arguably marks the first
LCD-TV that could be considered to be competitive with CRT-TVs in terms of size. Its
introduction was also important because it demonstrated consumer needs for flat panel
television sets. Sharp’s initial production run of 28 thousand sets sold out in less than
three months (Nikkei BP, 1995). Sharp introduced 10.4” and 13” models in 1996, and
moved up to a 20” model in 1999 (Nikkei BP, 1996; Sangyo Times, 1995; Sangyo Times,
2000). The 10.4” model had a price tag of 170,000 yen when introduced (Nikkei BP,
1996). Assuming an exchange rate of 110 yen to the U.S. dollar, this would be the
10

http://news.sel.sony.com/en/corporate_information/company_of_firsts
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equivalent of $1545 U.S. (calculated based upon average exchange rate data from the
Bank of Japan web site).

Table 4-2: Early LCD TV Developments and Product Introductions

Around this same time period, flat screen CRTs were also coming on the market.
These screens had a flat face, but were still based upon the bulky CRT design. The
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picture quality of the flat screen CRTs was considered to be better than conventional
CRTs. Although a number of manufacturers made these products, Sony’s 32” high
resolution “Wega” branded models introduced in 1997 define this type best (Sony Web
Site 11; In person anonymous interview, March 27, 2009). Wega was a hit; competitors
introduced similar models in 1998, including Panasonic’s “Gao” and Toshiba’s “Face”
(In person anonymous interview, March 27, 2009; Toshiba Web Site 12).

Digitalization of Television
The industry began to change in the late 1990s as plasma TVs entered the market
and LCD TVs, which, although expensive, were starting to have screen sizes large
enough to be more practical. Changes in the industry went beyond the display
technology. Standards were changing, and the broadcast technology used was moving
from analog to digital.
Although interest in high definition TV was not new -- NHK began research on
high definition television in 1964 (Kawamura, 2005) -- efforts to develop new high
definition standards did not bear fruit unit the 1990s. The development and evolution of
the new high definition standard was a complex series of events, which others have
written about in depth and is beyond the scope of this research. What is relevant is that
standards were eventually agreed upon, and a transition to digital broadcasting is taking
place worldwide.
11
12

http://www.sony.co.jp/SonyInfo/CorporateInfo/History/sonyhistory-c.html
http://www.toshiba.co.jp/regza/ctv/36hd3z.htm
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The beginning of the transition to digital television fits the same general time
frame that flat panel technologies were starting to be used in home televisions. The first
exhibits of the high definition standard televisions at CES (Consumer Electronics Show)
were in 1998 (Consumer Electronics Association web site 13). This timing is close to

early introduction of plasma televisions. The digital technology did not require the new
flat panel displays; it could also be used with CRT displays. However, the new flat panel
displays may have made the digital technology more attractive to consumers.
The transition to digital television will continue for some time. According to
Izumiya et al. (2005), most countries are expected to switch from analog to digital
broadcasting (often referred to as digital TV or DTV) between 2006 and 2012. Over the
air digital broadcasting is currently available in many countries. Within the next several
years, many countries will discontinue analog broadcasting to free up the frequency range
for other uses. Analog broadcasting ceased in the US in 2009 and in Canada and Japan
will end in 2011 (Canada’s Office of Consumer Affairs, 2008; Japan Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications, 2008; United States Federal Communications Commission,
2008).
While this change is a substantial one, it has been so gradual, and standards
decided so far in advance of their implementation, that it does not appear to have
substantially influenced uncertainty levels. If anything, the switch to digital has
increased interest in new, flat panel, high definition televisions, increasing the size of the
replacement market.

13

http://www.ce.org/Press/CEA_Pubs/928.asp
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The shift towards a digital format had a major impact on the technological
capabilities required to compete in television sets. Developing and producing analog
sets required detail orientation and some degree of learning based upon trial and error.
For example, changing the location of wiring inside an analog CRT-TV could impact
picture quality. This is not true for digital. In other words, although analog products can
be tweaked to perform better through adjustments in the production process and design
without changing the parts and materials used, digital products generally cannot – they
either work or do not. The change to digital has reduced the barrier to entry into TV
assembly (Nikkei Business, 2009). On the other hand, value creation has moved from
assembly of the set to production of the devices that go into it (Osada, 2006). Relevant
devices include displays as well as other items such as digital signal processors.
If there is a change in uncertainty levels due to the adoption of digital
technologies, it would be from the new potential that non-TV set producing firms with
strong digital capabilities may enter the market. This is discussed below.

Potential for “Standardized” Digital TV Platform, New Entrants
Several new entrants have begun selling television sets that were not evident
before the change to digital and flat panel sets. Information technology firms make up
one group of these entrants. For example, Nikkei BP (2003 (Senryaku hen)) announced
planned entry into digital television markets by Dell and Microsoft. Another group of
entrants is comprised of start-up firms using contract manufacturers in Asia to produce at
a low cost using off of the shelf components. Vizio is a well-known example of this type.
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For a further example, please see the sidebar – “Nikkei Business compares two LCD
TVs,” below.
Several firms provide standardized solutions including standardized digital TV
platforms and HDTV reference designs that allow firms with little TV experience to enter
the business (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen)). Although several informants dismissed
these kinds of standardized approaches as being unsuitable for TV sets, the long-term
impact of these efforts is unclear.

Sidebar: Nikkei Business Compares two LCD TVs
Nikkei Business (May 18, 2009) compared two 32-inch LCD TVs: one from
Sony, and one sold by Dynaconnective, a Japanese start-up firm and produced by a
contract manufacturer in Asia. The Sony was priced at 119,800 yen and the
Dynaconnective at 49,800 yen. An expert on picture quality was called in and
commented that an average household TV user would not be able to discern the
difference in picture quality between the two sets. The sets were then dismantled to
compare their insides. The Sony was made with fewer, custom-made printed circuit
boards using proprietary Sony technologies. The Dynaconnective was made with off-theshelf parts. The quality of design and manufacturing was much higher on the Sony
model than on the Dynaconnective model, however, the magazine staff had to
disassemble the televisions to document the real differences.
Introduction of Flat Panel TV Brands

117

The switch from analog, CRT based television to digital, flat panel based
television has been a dramatic one. A number of TV set manufacturers have attempted to
reinvent their TV set brand image in order to achieve a better position through the
transition. Sharp became the first to introduce a full line-up of flat panel televisions when
it launched its’ “Aquos” brand in 1998. Sharp’s branding campaign was both different
and effective in the Japanese market. Sharp had hired outside designers to create a
product that was fresh and visually appealing – not just a box. The firm also hired a
Japanese actress many women looked to as a role model, Sanae Yoshinaga, to emphasize
the appeal to women purchasers (In person anonymous interview, March 19, 2009; Sharp
web site 14).
Since this time, other companies have followed suit, creating their own flat panel
television brands. Hitachi started using the “Woo” brand in Japan in 2001 (Hitachi web
site 15). Panasonic introduced its flat panel brand “Viera” in 2003 (Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic has managed to pull off a number of feats with this brand. In 2005, for
instance, Panasonic implemented it “ichiya-jo” product introduction strategy (Ichiya-jo
translates as a fortress built overnight). The firm replaced its entire line of Viera models
with a new line, changing all of the TV sales displays throughout Japan virtually
overnight. The company shipped 22,000 TVs in three days (Osada, 2006).

14
15

http://www.sharp.co.jp/products/cm/tv/tv143.html
http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2002/1017/index.html
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Sony eliminated its “Wega” TV brand in 2005 and replaced it with a new flat
panel TV brand “Bravia” (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu hen)). Toshiba announced its new
brand, “Regza,” in 2006 (Toshiba web site 16).
In terms of options and commitments, these new brands may be considered to be
customer needs commitments. These branding efforts are costly and non-reversible in
nature. In particular, Panasonic and Sony invested large amounts of money into globally
coordinated marketing and product release campaigns, which are especially expensive
and difficult to coordinate.

Growth of Flat Panel Television and Demise of the CRT in Japan
The Japanese market was an early mover to flat screen televisions. Chart 4-2
depicts the domestic shipments of TV sets in Japan based upon data from the Japanese
Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association. According to this
source, LCD-TV surpassed CRT-TV shipments in 2005. PDP TV shipments were not
tracked separately by JEITA until 2002. There were PDP units shipped and sold in Japan
prior to this date, however this data source did not capture earlier shipments.
Although sales of flat panel TVs have surpassed those of CRT TVs, replacing all
CRT-TVs will still take time. As Chart 4-3 depicts, as of 2005, fewer than 30% of all
Japanese households had flat panel televisions.

16

http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/press/2006_02/pr_j2101.html
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Chart 4-2: Japanese Domestic Shipments of TV Sets by Display Type

Chart 4-3: Household penetration of Flat Panel television in Japan
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Japanese manufacturers of CRTs were faced with falling prices and volumes.
They all stopped producing CRTs in Japan by 2006, and many stopped all CRT
production on a worldwide basis. It is difficult to accurately track withdrawal from CRT;
although data on currently operating LCD and PDP plants is available, equivalent data is
not available for CRT. However, a number of events documented in the course of
gathering other data are suggestive of the withdrawal, as shown in Table 4-3 below.
Table 4-3: Withdrawal from CRT-TV by Japanese Firms

Worldwide market trends
The television markets in other countries have experienced, or are in the process
of experiencing, similar changes to Japan although the timeline is different. Chart 4-4
below tracks actual unit sales of CRT, LCD, and PDP TV sets from 2000 to 2006.
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Chart 4-4: Worldwide TV set Market (2000 – 2006)

Chart 4-5, below, suggests LCD-TV surpassed CRT-TV production worldwide, in
terms of unit volume in 2008. This projection was forecast prior to the current economic
downturn; however, the general trends remain in-tact, even if the timing or volume have
changed to some degree.
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Chart 4-5: Worldwide TV market forecast

Behind the growth in flat panel television has been dramatic reduction in panel
costs. Chart 4-6 shows the average prices of TV display modules from 1998 to 2006.
Price reduction over the period has been dramatic. For example, 50” PDP prices for 2006
were roughly one-fifth their price in 1999.
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Chart 4-6: Average TV Module Prices (1998 – 2006)

TV Set Industry – Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the TV set industry over time and the position of the
focal firms in it. The TV industry was characterized by predictable growth prior to the
introduction of flat panel TV and digitalization, two large technological changes in the
industry occurring since the late 1990s. The Japanese TV set producers that are the focal
firms of this study were active in the industry for many years and continue to play a large
role in it. European TV set producers have been on a downward trend for some time,
while Korean TV set manufacturers have been growing and taking a more prominent
place in the industry for some time. The global market for TV sets in general is very
large and has been growing. Many firms have considered the flat panel TV market
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attractive due to its large size and relatively well-understood demand. Indeed, the very
large potential market size for flat panel TVs may have reduced firms’ perceptions of
uncertainty relating to investing in technologies to participate in this market.
The growing TV set market size as measured in unit volume has been
accompanied by dramatic decreases in TV set and panel prices. Replacement demand for
flat panel TVs has been and continues to be large. The following chapter performs firm
level analysis of display technology options developed and held by the firm and
subsequent performance in general and in the TV set industry.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS
This chapter presents firm level case studies of option-like investments by the
target firms listed in the methodology section. These firm-level studies provide the key
data for considering central questions of this thesis, “Do firms create and hold technology
options under uncertainty?” and “How do firms holding options on multiple technologies
perform compared with those making commitments to single technologies in the face of
technological uncertainty?”
Evidence of investment in technology options by each firm is examined over time
to identify patterns at the firm level. This evidence is considered in terms of a ladder of
option-like investments ranging from low cost investments that are far from the market to
large investments that are close to the market. As part of each case study, performance is
also examined. Before moving on to the case study analysis, the option ladder is
discussed in more detail.

Brief Chapter Summary
The analysis in this chapter finds target firms developed multiple display
technologies. While most firms developed and maintained technology options in parallel,
Canon stood out for developing in serial, dropping one before beginning the next.
As flat panel TV volume started to grow, the top tier incumbent Japanese TV
producers Panasonic and Sony initially lost market share as competitors introduced more
and better flat panel TVs. However, these top tier firms later regained their former place
in the industry. Several second and third tier Japanese TV firms, including Hitachi,
Mitsubishi, Pioneer, and Sharp, attempted to improve their position in the TV set industry
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through investments in flat panel technologies. Sharp was the only firm able to realize a
durable improvement in performance over the longer term.

Option Ladder
Flat panel display technology options can be placed along a spectrum of different
cost and flexibility tradeoffs, as previously discussed in Chapter One. The set of options
along this spectrum can be considered in terms of an options ladder (See Figure 1-2, page
25).
Option types range in cost and the proximity towards market entry afforded.
Options far from the market typically offer flexibility at low cost. For example, the cost
of stopping a small R&D project will be lower than the cost of shutting down a mass
production plant. Furthermore, technological progress gained through R&D offers the
firm flexibility by providing the opportunity to move higher up the ladder at a later time.
Firms not holding such options in R&D cannot easily leapfrog into a higher level on the
ladder without either pursuing their own R&D program to the point it bears fruit or
buying outside expertise and licensing requisite patents.
The higher rungs of the ladder represent increasingly commitment-like
investments and market entry. These investments are much more expensive and difficult
to reverse than those on lower rungs. For example, building a cutting edge LCD plant
currently costs billions of US dollars (e.g., Samsung, 2006; Sharp, 2008). While there is
a market for some used LCD facilities, there is no developed market for the larger and
newer plants (FPD 2008 International Trade Show).
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Intermediate ladder rungs each bring the firm closer to the market, but also
increase investment costs. Some of the costs may be impossible to know in advance, and
are not symmetrical between firms. For instance, prototyping is generally not extremely
expensive, however one informant commented his firm had spent approximately one
million dollars per PDP prototype it produced during early stages of development.
Compared with building a plant this may not represent a large investment, but it is costly
for a stage still far from the market. Asymmetry of costs at this stage can occur due to
difference in resource bundles held by the firms in question. The cost of setting up a
small LCD prototyping line will be lower for firms already possessing usable existing
clean room space than for those needing to build it, for example.

Role of Cooperation in Reducing Investment, Increasing Reversibility
Firms may increase flexibility and reduce investments required by cooperating
with other organizations. They may do so at different levels of development. Toshiba
and IBM established an R&D JV in 1986 (Murtha et al, 2001), and later incorporated a
separate JV entity, Display Technology Incorporated in 1989 for the purpose of
manufacturing TFT-LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1992). Fujitsu Hitachi Plasma Display
Limited, on the other hand, is an example of a JV that included development, production,
and sales from the beginning (Business Wire, 1998; Sangyo Times, 2000).

Informant Input Regarding the Option Ladder
In the interview process, informants’ direct experience in development and
market entry were shown the option ladder and asked for general feedback. They were
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also asked if options levels or key investments were missing. Informants expressed
general agreement with the model; several provided additional input. One informant
emphasized the importance of making customer needs commitments when moving to
higher levels on the ladder. He cited the need for display panel producers to develop
relationships with other TV set manufacturers to sell excess display production volume,
and also emphasized the idea that firms integrating TV set and panel production should
invest sufficiently in marketing at the end consumer level. Both types of marketing
activities have costs, but each reduces the market uncertainty of the investment in panel
production. Another informant emphasized the importance of management decisionmaking styles in higher-level investments in follow-on options. A further informant from
a panel producing joint venture added context to this point when he noted that the venture
partners had previously made different investment decisions while facing the same
uncertainty and despite having similar display technology capabilities.

Options ladders and Firm-Level case analysis
In the analysis below, evidence of each firm’s display technology options over
time are presented graphically. This is achieved by placing the options ladder on the
vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis of a chart for each firm. The option ladder
figure emphasize rises and falls in options levels over time; evidence of continued
investment at the same level (e.g., continuing prototypes over time) is not included due to
space limitations. Option levels are tracked over time using historical evidence. Base
data, including citations, resides in a timeline developed for each firm. The complete
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historical timelines for each firm are included as an appendix due to their length and
detail.
Ladder figures are color-coded, and have been formatted to be interpretable in
gray-scale reproduction through inclusion of different shaped markers for each color.
Generally, related technologies are coded in the same colors. Liquid crystal technologies,
including a-Si, LTPS, HTPS, LCOS, FLCD and are all coded blue, for example. These
technologies should be considered to represent different, but related, options. The more
colors on the chart, generally speaking, the broader the technologies developed by the
firm. Options on competing technologies are present only when more than one
technology is developed or utilized at or around the same time. A firm that develops,
discards, and then chooses another technology is not developing options on competing
technologies. Instead it is choosing to abandon an existing option in favor of building a
new one.
Other firm level data presented in this chapter includes Japanese patent data,
panel production volume, and production lines in operation. Data on panel production
and production lines is limited to available years, and is intended as a reference of scale
and commitment levels over time for each firm. Patent data reflects R&D investments by
firms studied. Japanese patent data was chosen because of Japan’s important role in
developing the technologies and because of data quality. Patent data gathered is divided
into LCD, PDP, and OLED. Additional limitations exist with regard to the panel data
used. Please refer to the methodology section for further information.
Performance data examined below includes financial performance, market share,
and entry/exit. Many of the target firms are large, diversified companies. Detailed long-
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term line-of-business financial performance data is limited due to periodic reorganization
of the firms in question as well as changes to the contents of existing sectors in financial
reports.
The firm level studies below include the focal firms, Japanese TV set
manufacturers, in addition to other relevant TV manufacturers, and IT related firms.
Focal firms are the major Japanese TV set manufacturers. They are presented in order of
which tier they belonged to when CRT-TV was still predominant. Panasonic and Sony
were at the top tier, with the greatest market share. A middle tier included Hitachi,
Mitsubishi, and Toshiba. These firms had their own CRT production capabilities and
considerable experience in TV sets, but lagged behind Sony and Panasonic in market
share. The third tier consists of Pioneer, Sanyo, and Sharp. These firms did not have their
own CRT production capabilities and therefore had to rely on supplies from competitors.
They had relatively low market shares (In person anonymous interviews, Dates:
November 4, 2008; March 19, 27, 2009; In person interview with Tsuyoshi Numagami,
March 13, 2009).
Abbreviated analysis of several groups of non-focal firms follows the section on
the focal firms. These include other Japanese TV set manufacturers, Funai Electric and
JVC, Korean firms producing TV sets and display panels, LG and Samsung, and Europebased TV set producers Philips and Thomson. Abbreviated analysis of IT firms Fujitsu
and NEC is also included as these firms played an important role in development of flat
panel technologies. Canon is of interest because it developed flat panel technologies but
did not enter the market and therefore is also included in this analysis.
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Firm Level Analysis – Tier One Focal Firms
Panasonic
Panasonic Electric Industry, formerly known as Matsushita Electric Industry, is
the central company in the Panasonic group, a diversified Japanese conglomerate.
Display development and production is centralized through Panasonic Electric Industry
and includes several production joint ventures: Matsushita Plasma Display (With Toray
Corporation), Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology (focusing on small displays;
consolidating with Toshiba), IPS Alpha Technology (TV use LCD panels), and
Matsushita Toshiba Picture Display Co. (CRTs). In the past, Panasonic’s display related
activities were less centralized; display development and production was pursued by
several Panasonic group companies in a way that was not always coordinated. Panasonic
Electronics (Matsushita Denshi) was a joint venture between Panasonic and Philips,
started in the 1950s to produce CRTs. The JV was involved with early DC-PDP
development, but was later dissolved and integrated with Panasonic Electric Industry.
Panasonic Electric Works has also been involved with FED development; however the
focus on FED was more as a lighting source than as a display technology.
Panasonic has a long involvement with display technologies, including LCD,
PDP, FED, and OLED. In addition to producing DC-PDPs used in early attempts at
PDP-TV in the 1990s, Panasonic group company Panasonic Denshi had also been a
major producer of single color PDPs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including those
used in portable computers in the 1980s such as those made by Toshiba (Weber et al.,
2008). At the same time Panasonic invested in LCD production lines for use in its own
products as early as 1985 (Sangyo Times, 1993).
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Panasonic has considerable experience with LCD technology, however it decided
to focus on PDP as the main display technology it uses for TV sets. It is the largest
Japanese TV maker to put a strong emphasis on PDP. Korean firms LG and Samsung are
also large PDP producers, however in addition to PDP TVs, they have LCDs in similar
size ranges. Panasonic, on the other hand, has a dividing line between LCD and PDP
TVs based upon size. The reasons Panasonic chose its PDP focus are suitability for large
size applications, visual quality, and investment efficiency. Panasonic was interested in
selling the main TV in the house – the large one typically found in the living room. PDP
was suitable for large displays from a relatively early stage, whereas LCD technology
took years to mature to the level it could be used in large displays. Panasonic believes
emissive displays like PDP and CRT provide a more comfortable viewing experience
than LCD. 1 At the same time, PDP plant investment requirements were much lower than
those for LCD for a comparable size and production volume.
Panasonic has strong operational capabilities in addition to planning involving
target market shares. Given the firm’s capabilities and size it can change markets and
impact technology adoption. Panasonic managers do not dismiss such options. 2
Panasonic has a long history as a major player in Television sets. It began TV set
production in 1955 (Hiramoto, 1994). For many years, Panasonic held the number one or
two positions in TV set market share in Japan, with Sony being its primary adversary.

Evidence of Option-like investments

1
2

In person anonymous interview: March 27, 2009.
In person anonymous interview: March 27, 2009.
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Panasonic assembled and maintained a number of display technology options. At
one time or another it has held options on EL, FED, FLCD, OLED, PDP, and a-Si as well
as LTPS LCD technologies. Panasonic appears to have some continuity of R&D
investment even in the technologies it produces; EL activities do not appear to have been
large, but they continued for a number of years (see Figure 5-1). Similarly FED
development activities also continued for some time. Another feature of Panasonic’s
technology options is that the time frames over which investments were made are largely
overlapping. PDP and LCD technologies were not at the same option levels until the late
1990s, however investment had been ongoing in both for some time prior to that point,
just at different option levels. This can also be seen in the patent data (see Chart 5-1).
Panasonic’s use of joint ventures is also of interest from an options standpoint.
According to industry press, Panasonic’s PDP joint venture was undertaken because of
unique technological capabilities of its partner Toray, a Japanese firm in the chemical
industry. Toray represented an opportunity to enter the market more quickly and
effectively than Panasonic trying to replicate the technology on its own. Panasonic’s
joint venture activities with Toshiba, on the other hand, have a very different flavor.
Generally, these joint ventures were used to integrate overlapping production capabilities
between the two firms (See Figures 5-2, 5-3 for changes to Panasonic’s production
capacity through this joint venture). Over time, the two firms changed their stakes in the
different JVs, with control of the CRT JV going to Panasonic and control of the LCD JV
to Toshiba. As a result, Panasonic exited small LCD and Toshiba exited CRT. In
essence, Panasonic and Toshiba used these to gradually re-arrange their capabilities
rather than to decrease risk.
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Finally, one way that Panasonic differs from most of its Japanese competitors is
its willingness to make large commitments. This can be seen in its willingness to buy
capabilities from other firms (or buy the other firm itself). Panasonic’s controlling stake
in IPS Alpha serves as an example. This investment comes at a point where
technological uncertainty has waned, but it still faces large uncertainty with regard to
future flat panel prices. Interviewees suggested that Panasonic uses its market power and
branding to decrease the overall uncertainty it faces (In person personal interviews, dates:
March 19, 27, 2009). This appears to allow the company to comfortably make
commitments when other firms cannot.
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Figure 5-2: Panasonic Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines

137

Figure 5-3: Panasonic Production Lines
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Chart 5-1: Panasonic Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Panasonic’s Performance
Panasonic had high market share in television sets before flat panel technologies
began to represent a significant portion of the market. Fuji Chimera (1999) estimated
Panasonic’s worldwide TV market share for all technologies at 8.4%, in second place
behind Sony. For a period, Panasonic lost market share to first movers in PDP and LCD.
For example, Panasonic held 9% of the Japanese LCD TV market in 2002 – when Sharp
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held 54% (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku hen)). Panasonic was listed in 4th place for
Japanese PDP TV shipments in the 4th quarter of 2002 with 13% of total, behind Hitachi,
Pioneer, and Sony (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Bunseki hen)). Although hardly a late mover, it
took Panasonic time to regain market share. The reason for this is not clear; perhaps
Panasonic’s prior successes in CRT TV slowed its movement into flat panel TVs. In the
late 1990s, Panasonic introduced a flat screen (not flat panel) CRT TV series. Although
not as successful as a competing flat screen TV introduced earlier by Sony, this product
line may have distracted Panasonic. In any case, Panasonic has been able to turn around
its market share. By 2005, Techno Associates Research (2006) listed Panasonic as the
leading PDP TV in worldwide share with 26%. Its LCD TV share is less impressive, but
this too has improved (Chunichisha, 2008). As of the time of writing, Panasonic had
regained its position in the industry.
Panasonic’s financial performance shows growth in revenue and profits. This is
true both for the consolidated data as well as for the Panasonic AVC Networks sector that
includes the TV business (See Charts 5-2 an 5-3). Taken together with the market share
evidence, one can see that Panasonic has recovered from the period it faltered. Not only
has it regained its strength in the TV set market, it has achieved strong financial
performance as well.
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Chart 5-2: Panasonic Sales and Net Income

Source: Panasonic annual reports

Chart 5-3: Panasonic AVC Networks, sales and operating income

Source: Panasonic annual reports
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Sony
Sony has a long history of leadership in the TV set industry. For many years,
Sony and Panasonic have battled for top position in the Japanese TV market. Whereas
Panasonic’s approach has typically emphasized efficient production of products that were
“good enough” for its target consumers, Sony emphasized unique, innovative products.
Sony was not an early mover in TV sets, but nonetheless has a long history of
technological achievements in the industry. Sony developed the world’s first transistor
TV in 1960 (Jojima et al., 2006). Unsatisfied with the shadow mask technology used by
others in color picture tubes, Sony developed its own color CRT technology. Although
an earlier attempt at development failed, in 1968 Sony introduced the color Trinitron
(Jojima et al., 2006). The Trinitron display was a key technology Sony used to develop
and maintain a strong, differentiated market position based upon superior image quality.
Arguably, the success of the Trinitron has shaped the approach Sony has taken in
subsequent display development efforts. Interviewees stated that Sony had developed
extremely high standards for display quality in television sets – these standards made it
difficult for the firm to accept display technologies such as LCD they considered to
exhibit inferior image quality (In person anonymous interview, March 18, 2009; In
person interview with Tsuyoshi Numagami, March 13, 2009). LCD TV has been a
disruptive technology from Sony’s standpoint. Informants and industry insiders
commented that Sony’s strong position with Trinitron-based CRT TVs slowed its switch
to flat panel televisions.
Sony has performed research on a large number of display technologies, including
PDP, LCD, FED, PALC, OLED, and MEMS (similar to Texas Instruments’ DLP
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technology), as shown in Figure 5-4 below. TFT-LCD development included a-Si, LTPS
and HTPS varieties. With the exception of FED, Sony used each display technology in at
least one consumer product. However, Sony’s in house production capability was limited
to HTPS and OLED, and through joint venture, LTPS (Figure 5-5). Although Sony
developed many varieties of display technologies, the firm was slow to switch from CRT
TV to FP TV. Also, the company did not invest in its own a-Si TFT production
capability, but relied on JVs with major producers including Samsung and Sharp, while
procuring addition TFT-LCD panels from other producers.

Evidence of Option-like Investments
Sony developed broad options on a number of different display technologies.
Evidence suggests investments in a number of these technologies were option-like in that
they were low cost ways to increase Sony’s flexibility. For example, Sony performed
basic research on PDP, PALC, and FED without building mass production capabilities
for any. Sony also increased flexibility and managed costs through joint R&D efforts (in
the cases of FED, PALC, and OLED) and through participation in production joint
ventures. For a-Si production, Sony partnered with Samsung in S-LCD, and is partnering
with Sharp at a new Generation 10 plant in Sakai, Japan. Sony initially outsourced LTPS
production to Sanyo, and later formed a joint venture to produce LTPS with Toyota
Loom. It plans to take over Toyota’s stake in the venture.
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Figure 5-5: Sony Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines
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Chart 5-4: Sony Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Sony’s activities relating to PALC, PDP, FED, and OLED represented
investments in options on alternative display technologies. 3 The timing of Sony’s
development activities on these technologies exhibits substantial overlap. Furthermore,
they coincide with breakthroughs by other firms in PDP as large flat panel displays
become more feasible in the mid to late 1990s. Although Sony appears to have had
3

After Sony’s PALC activities ended, Sangyo Times (2003) reported that Sony was
focusing on OLED and FED as candidates for “Post Trinitron” displays in 2002.
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limited PDP-related R&D, they did have some PDP patenting activity (see Chart 5-4
above).
In LCD, Sony’s activities focused upon LTPS and HTPS, as shown by Sony’s
annual panel production and production line charts in Figure 5-5 above. HTPS was used
in some rear projection TVs, and LTPS in smaller direct view displays including
notebook computers. It appears that Sony has some experience with a-Si design,
although it has never invested in its own a-Si production capability. HTPS did not
require major new production capability because it can be produced at a modified
semiconductor facility. LTPS required new investment. As mentioned earlier, Sony
reduced commitment by forming a JV with Toyota Loom to produce LTPS.
Sony’s exit from FED also exhibits some option-like characteristics. Sony
decided to move FED technology development outside of the firm after announcing a
number of prototypes. In 2006, FE Technologies was formed as a venture company with
Sony’s FED development capability and ownership split between Sony and an external
fund. Sony reserved the right to purchase back the fund’s stake within a predetermined
time period (Fuji Chimera, 2007; Sangyo Times, 2007). In other words, Sony retained an
option on the technology with an expiration date.
Although Sony developed and maintained a number of different display
technology options, it did not fully exercise these options. In fact, industry insiders note
how Sony fell behind competitors when flat panel TV began to grow (e.g., Jojima et al.,
2006; In person interview with Tsuyoshi Numagami, March 13, 2009). Although Sony
had developed portable TVs with LCDs (and some using miniature CRTs as well), it
announced developing its first 15” LCD TV in 1999, and began selling it in 2001. To put
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this in perspective, Sharp started selling its Window line of LCD TVs in 1995, and
released a 20” model in 1999 (Nikkei BP, 1995; Sangyo Times, 2000). In PDP TV, it is a
similar story; Sony entered PDP TV in 2001 with a 42” model, 2 to 3 years after early
movers had entered into PDP mass production.
The success of Sony’s flat screen (not flat panel) Wega brand CRT TV introduced
1997 4 is often mentioned as a factor in delaying Sony’s entry into flat panel TV. The
Wega TVs were popular, and allowed Sony to charge a premium over other CRT sets –
Compared with the prices of similar sized TVs, Wega TVs were priced twice as high in
Japan and 5 times as high in the U.S. market. Another factor often mentioned as a reason
for Sony’s late entry is the size of investment required to build a cutting edge a-Si LCD
plant. Sony’s investments in semiconductor capacity for Play Station Two (PS2)
production may have reduced its appetite for additional big-ticket plants. The timing and
scale of these investments agree with this: over the period 1999-2000, Sony invested over
200 billion yen in PS2 related semiconductor plant and equipment (Sony, 2000).

Sony’s Performance
Sony had leading market share in CRT TVs before flat panel TV started to grow.
Although Sony’s market share declined for a number of years as the flat panel TV market
was growing, it appears that Sony caught back up in terms of world wide unit market
share as of 2007, and was neck-and-neck with Sharp in LCD TVs in Japan in the same
time frame (Chunichisha, 2008; Rikku, 2008). Without a-Si production capability of its
own, Sony’s flat panel TVs used LCDs and PDPs supplied by other display producers

4

See http://www.sony.co.jp/SonyInfo/CorporateInfo/History/sonyhistory-c.html
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and the S-LCD joint venture with Samsung. Sony maintains relatively high price points
compared to many other brands (Nikkei Business, May 18, 2009), so it does not appear
that Sony is “buying” market share. Television related revenues have been growing as
shown in Chart 5-5 below. It is worth noting that Sony did well in rear projection market
share, taking first place in 1998 and staying at the top through 2005, the last year which
data is available (Fuji Chimera, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2005).
Sony has been reported to have poor profitability in its TV business
(e.g., Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu hen)), on the other hand, the Electronics Sector to which
Sony’s TV business belongs has recently been exhibiting improved operating income
(See Chart 5-6, below). Altogether, Sony appears to have suffered some performance
decline due to being late to switch from CRT to flat panel TVs; there is evidence some of
its competitors made inroads in market share for some time. However, after a number of
years, evidence suggests the firm has been able to return to higher performance again.
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Chart 5-5: Sony Electronics Sector and Television Revenues

Source: Sony Annual Reports.

Chart 5-6: Sony Electronics Sector Operating Income

Note: Electronics sector does not include Sony’s game business.
Source: Sony Annual Reports.
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Firm Level Analysis – Tier Two Focal Firms

Hitachi
Hitachi is large, highly diversified firm known as a technological powerhouse.
Japanese observers consider the firm to have top-notch technological development
capabilities but accompanied by a bureaucratic management culture.
Hitachi has long been involved with the consumer television set market. The firm
began producing TV sets in 1956 (Hiramoto, 1994). It also started LCD development
early. Although its first formally announced project began in 1971, it was performing
R&D prior to that time (Numagami, 1999).
Along the progression of LCD technology, Hitachi was at or near the forefront of
development from the 1970s until around the year 2002, when the firm stopped investing
in new plants on its own. Hitachi frequently supplied other firms with LCD panels for
use in products applications it didn’t make itself (e.g., watches and calculators) as well as
applications it did not have major market share in (e.g., laptops). Hitachi invented and
holds patents on In Plane Switching (IPS) mode for LCD; this technology has a strong
reputation based on its wide viewing angle and speed (See Chapter three for further detail
on IPS). It is preferred by numerous Japanese television set producers.
In addition to being a key player in LCD, Hitachi was also an early developer of
PDP, beginning R&D in 1970 and developing grayscale PDP technology in 1973
(Hitachi web site 5; Weber et al., 2008). It entered PDP TV at an early date as well.

5

http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/9808/0820.html
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Unlike most other firms, Hitachi invested in both PDP production and LCD
production. Hitachi built its PDP production through a JV with Fujitsu, and built its LCD
production capability on its own (this capability was later moved to a JV). Although
highly respected for its technology in both cases, an informant from a competing firm
suggested Hitachi did not invest enough in building production for either PDP or LCD,
and as a consequence was unable to fully exploit its capability in either.
In addition to PDP and a-Si LCD, Hitachi has performed R&D on a wide variety
of other display technologies including LTPS LCD, LCOS, FLCD, OLED, FED and
DLP. Although not all of these could be considered suitable for television applications,
this still indicates Hitachi’s portfolio of technology options was broad and included many
competing technologies.

Evidence of Option-like investments
Hitachi started basic R&D into LCDs and PDPs around the same time, as shown
in the Hitachi option ladder in Figure 5-6 below. However, in the case of LCD, Hitachi
invested in a rapid series of increasingly expensive higher commitment options,
beginning TFT-LCD production early on compared to other firms (see the following
chapter for timing comparison between firms). The company then paused for a number
of years before investing in the more expensive, higher volume production lines.
PDP efforts at Hitachi, on the other hand, exhibited a long period of limited and
inconsistent investment in basic R&D, followed by a series of larger investments,
including establishment of production under the FHP JV with Fujitsu. Although the
options paths Hitachi followed for LCD and PDP were very different, by the time the flat
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panel TV market was becoming significant Hitachi had considerable positions in both
LCD and PDP technologies. Investments in PDP were primarily aimed at TV
applications, although Hitachi also sold PDP monitors. Early LCD production was not
focused on TVs, with the exception of the IPS Alpha JV and its generation 6 line (see
Hitachi Panel Production and Lines, Figure 5-7).
In addition to a-Si LCD and PDP display technologies, Hitachi also invested in
LTPS and LCOS. LTPS LCDs are more difficult to produce than a-Si at the same time
they offer more opportunities to differentiate. Japanese firms have invested in this
technology to insulate themselves from swings in the crystal cycle for a-Si LCD.
Investment in LTPS was a way for Hitachi to increase the option value on existing LCD
production infrastructure up to the fifth generation. 6 Hitachi produced CRT based RP
TVs; LCOS can be considered a way to continue inside the RP TV space with an
improved display technology, thereby increasing the value of past investments in RP TV
production and distribution.
Hitachi’s OLED efforts are limited to R&D and do not exhibit high levels of
investment. Although on the increase, Hitachi’s OLED patent output is much lower than
that for LCD (see Chart 5-7). Recently, the cost of Hitachi’s OLED development has
been reduced through moving the effort to a joint venture. Given the suitability of LTPS
production for use in AM-OLEDs, this effort may increase the option value of existing
LTPS production capabilities.

Subsequent generations are not suitable for LTPS adaptation. Source: In person
interview with Tsuyoshi Numagami, March 13, 2009.
6
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Figure 5-7: Hitachi Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines

155

Chart 5-7: Hitachi Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Hitachi’s Performance
Hitachi’s technological developments have been impressive, however
performance in terms of TV set market share and financial returns have not been strong.
In the period from 2000 to 2004, Hitachi’s LCD development and production
organization lost money every year except for 2003 (Sangyo Times, 2002-2005; Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen)). Perhaps as a result, Hitachi has been slowly and methodically
exiting LCD production. In 2005, Hitachi formed the joint venture IPS Alpha together
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with Panasonic and Toshiba to develop and build large TFT-LCDs, starting with a new
generation 6 production line to be built at Hitachi’s Mobara plant. Following the
formation of the joint venture, Hitachi Displays, Hitachi’s remaining LCD organization,
refocused its strategy on smaller and more specialized displays. Hitachi reduced its stake
in IPS Alpha over time; in 2008 Panasonic purchased Hitachi’s remaining stake and
made IPS Alpha a consolidated subsidiary. Hitachi Displays also took some outside
investment and became a joint venture with Canon and Panasonic in 2008.
Evidence regarding FHP’s performance is less clear. Hitachi bought part of
Fujitsu’s stake of FHP in 2005, making it a consolidating subsidiary. However, the firm
slowed investment into PDP and through cooperative arrangements with Panasonic in
2008 began sourcing the glass panels from outside (Hitachi still attaches filters and
electronics to the glass panel to complete the PDP module). Although Hitachi has not
formally announced exit of PDP production altogether, Showa Shell (energy) is
considering buying the facility where FHP’s PDP plant is located because some of the
equipment can be used in manufacture of photovoltaic cells (Hitachi web site 7; Japan
Consumer Electronics Scan, 2009).
To summarize the evidence above, Hitachi has dramatically reduced its exposure
to LCD and PDP production, exiting the most capital-intensive portions of large display
production in both cases. Chart 5-8, below, shows operating income for Hitachi’s
Electronic Devices sector, including displays, and Digital Media & Consumer Products
sector, including TVs. Poor performance in televisions is reported to be a major factor in
the performance of the Digital Media & Consumer Products sector. Hitachi’s TV

7

http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/month/2009/04/0401a.html
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business is reported to have been a money loser since around 2005. Analysts suggest the
firm may exit the business altogether, although the company has denied having any
intention of exiting (Yamaguchi, 2009).

Chart 5-8: Operating Income of Relevant Hitachi Sectors

Source: Hitachi Annual Reports

Hitachi does not have high market share in the TV market. It was not a top
selling brand in the CRT TV market, and has not developed a strong position in LCD TV
(e.g., Rikku, 2008). In comparison, Hitachi has a much stronger position in the Japanese
PDP TV market. In 2003, Hitachi captured 35% of the Japanese PDP TV market by sales
revenue, making it the leader (Rikku, 2008). Since then, Panasonic has grown its share
dramatically, and Hitachi’s has fallen somewhat despite the fact that two other companies
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exited PDP TV. In the period 2004-2007, Hitachi’s Japanese domestic PDP TV share
was between 25-30% in unit and revenue measures (Nikkei Report, 2006, 2007, 2008;
Fuji Chimera, 2005, 2006, 2007 (Digital AV equipment marketing survey)). Given that
the market for LCD TVs has grown several times faster than that for PDP TV, this
translates to a decline in overall TV market share. In terms of unit share in the global
television market including all display technology types, Hitachi’s PDP sales are below
1% for every year which data was available (Fuji Chimera, 1999 – 2007).

Mitsubishi Electric
Mitsubishi Electric has a long involvement with LCD. It formed a joint venture
called Optrex with Asahi Glass to produce passive matrix LCDs in 1979 (Sangyo Times,
1992). Later it established a separate joint venture, Advanced Display (ADI), for active
matrix LCD development and production (Sangyo Times, 1992). In addition to a-Si
LCD, Mitsubishi also developed and produced LTPS through ADI.
Mitsubishi’s PDP involvement is also long. Evidence of basic PDP R&D by
Mitsubishi dates back to 1973 (Weber et al., 2008). It began producing PDPs in 1997
(Fuji Chimera, 2000), and shipping PDP monitors the same year (Nikkei BP, 1997).
However it rapidly about faced, ceasing PDP production in 1998, and later exiting the
market (Sangyo Times, 1999; Deutsche Bank, March 11, 2004).
Mitsubishi also made smaller investments in EL and OLED. Mitsubishi
developed a prototype EL TV in the 1970s (Numagami, 1999), however there is no
evidence of continued R&D in this area. Similarly, the firm has been involved with joint
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OLED R&D (Sangyo Times, 2004), but this did not lead to further development of an
OLED capability.

Evidence of Option-like investments
Mitsubishi developed and held options in levels up to and including production
for LCD (a-Si and LTPS) and PDP (See Figures 5-8 and 5-9). Mitsubishi invested in
brief, option like development of EL without follow-on investments. Evidence on its
development in OLED is mixed. Although Mitsubishi has participated in OLED R&D,
aside from some patenting data (see Chart 5-9), there is no evidence of output or
additional investment. Mitsubishi may be maintaining a low-cost option on the
technology.
Mitsubishi invested in production capabilities on PDP and a-Si and LTPS LCD
display technologies. Mitsubishi’s involvement with a-Si was long term and was
concurrent with development of other display technologies. However, the timing of
investments in other display technologies were more serial in nature. Mitsubishi built
PDP production and rapidly exited; after that it entered LTPS and again exited within
several years. Its option pattern differs from that of other companies in that it maintained
a-Si production for a long period of time on the one hand, while it tried and discarded
other technologies one at a time.
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Figure 5-9: Mitsubishi Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines
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Chart 5-9: Mitsubishi Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Mitsubishi’s Performance
Overall, Mitsubishi is not a large player in the TV industry. Mitsubishi had less
than 1% of Japanese LCD TV market in the fourth quarter of 2002 (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Shijo bunseki hen)). One area of the TV business where Mitsubishi has been strong is
RP TV. In 1998, Mitsubishi had about 10% of the worldwide market for RP TVs (Fuji
Chimera, 1999). In the period flat panel TV was growing, Mitsubishi had worldwide RP
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TV market shares ranging from 12% in 2002 to 6% in 2004 (Fuji Chimera, 2003-2005).
RP TV has been shrinking as a TV segment. Mitsubishi still continues to produce
although it has been hurt by the shrinking market for these TVs. 8 The RP TV
technologies Mitsubishi has used recently, DLP and LCOS, were not developed or
produced by Mitsubishi in house.
Although Mitsubishi developed flat panel technologies to a point where they
could have been used in TVs, the company was not able to leverage this into a strong
position in the FP TV market. Eventually, Mitsubishi withdrew from display production
altogether, including PDP and LCD. Given these observations, Mitsubishi’s performance
cannot be considered strong as either a TV producer or a panel maker.
Like many of the other firms, Mitsubishi Electric is a large, diversified company.
TVs are included in Mitsubishi’s Home Appliances sector, where they do not represent a
large portion of the business. This sector has had positive operating income since the
year 2000. There is no discernable degradation of profitability or revenues that appears
attributable to Televisions, as can be seen by Chart 5-10, below.

8

Mitsubishi listed impairment losses for scrapping molds previously used to make RP
TVs for the North American market in the 2008 annual report.
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Chart 5-10: Revenue and Operating Income of Mitsubishi’s Home Appliance Sector

Source: Mitsubishi Annual Reports

Toshiba
Toshiba is one of Japan’s four large general electric companies, (The others are
Hitachi, Fuji Electric, and Mitsubishi Electric). It is diversified within the electrical and
electronics areas and its businesses include semiconductors, computers, electrical
generation and transmission equipment, as well as household electronics and appliances.
Toshiba was an early mover in laptop computers, and greatly expanded its IT
business at the time. Its involvement in displays gave it an edge in portable computing.
Toshiba has a long history in display development and production. The firm
developed its first black and white CRT prototype in 1924 and its first color CRT
prototype in 1959. It has also been a major TV producer in Japan for many years.
Toshiba began work on TFT-LCD in 1980. Before producing TFTs, however, it began
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mass-producing STN-LCDs; these offered a lower cost, easier to produce but lower
quality display for laptop applications. Toshiba soon began producing TFT-LCDs as
well.
Toshiba has used cooperative arrangements in R&D and production of display
technologies from an early stage. Toshiba and IBM began cooperating on LCD R&D in
the late 1980s. The production joint venture they later formed, Display Technologies Inc.
(DTI), was successful at TFT-LCD production and provided IBM a supply of displays for
its Thinkpad line as well as supplying displays to meet Toshiba’s notebook computer
needs. DTI was dissolved in 2001 at the end of the joint venture contract.
Toshiba developed other LCD related technologies on its own outside of DTI.
Toshiba developed LTPS, beginning R&D in the mid 1990s and building a pilot line and
production line for LTPS shortly thereafter. In 2001-2002, Toshiba and Matsushita
(Panasonic) began to cooperate on LCD including LTPS. The firms agreed to build an
LTPS plant together in Singapore in 2001, and the following year established Toshiba
Matsushita Display Technology (TMDT), a joint venture with Toshiba holding a
controlling share. TMDT contained the LCD capabilities of both firms, and focused on
smaller displays and LTPS. The two firms later became involved with Hitachi to form
IPS Alpha, a joint venture focusing on larger TFT LCD panels for TV applications.
Over time, Toshiba shifted production of low margin, standardized a-Si displays
to contract manufacturers in Taiwan and Korea. In the process, Toshiba transferred TFT
technology to these firms. Toshiba’s own LCD operations became more oriented to
LTPS technology as it moved away from standard, commoditized display applications
such as laptop displays.
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The first evidence of OLED R&D at Toshiba was in 1999, when the firm
established an OLED project team (Sangyo Times, 2001). Toshiba began producing
single color OLEDs for car audio applications shortly thereafter. Development has
continued for a number of years since then, with Toshiba participating in joint
development (Nedo project, Idemitsu joint development) in the process. After TMDT
was formed, OLED activities were merged into the joint venture. TMDT has kept its
OLED options open, pursuing development of both small and large particle materials.
The majority of Toshiba’s display related activities have been focused on a-Si,
LTPS, and OLED. However, Toshiba also had exposure to several other technologies. It
has produced PDP TVs although it never made the display panels in house. In 1999,
Toshiba announced it would work with Canon to develop SED. Toshiba continued to
cooperate with Canon on SED for a number of years, however it exited after a patent
infringement lawsuit was brought against Canon. Toshiba also worked on AFLCD
technology in 1998 (Sangyo Times, 1998), and produced EL displays in 2000 (Sangyo
Times, 2001). There is no evidence these activities continued over the long term or that
any of these technologies were actually used in products.
As a television producer, Toshiba entered LCD TV with its first “Face” model in
1998. The company released PDP TVs beginning in 2001, and has built a lineup of LCD
TVs over time. In 2006, it launched a new brand of flat panel TVs called Regza
(Menzawa et al., 2008).
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Evidence of Option-like investments
Toshiba has developed and maintained options on a-Si, LTPS, OLED, and SED
display technologies. It also briefly pursued and then abandoned options on AFLCD and
EL display technologies (See Figure 5-10). Patent data suggest some PDP development
(See Chart 5-11); however this is most likely due to overlap with other display
technologies Toshiba was pursuing (e.g., SED) or development of PDP-TV, and does not
represent a concerted plasma technology effort on the part of Toshiba. There is no other
evidence suggesting such an effort. Toshiba did not have options on all major
technologies, as it never became involved with PDP, however it held a portfolio of
technology options that was wide and deep. Furthermore, Toshiba used cooperative
arrangements to simultaneously increase flexibility while limiting the size of the
investment in many cases.
The way in which Toshiba gradually changed its production focus from a-Si to
LTPS LCD also exhibits option-like characteristics (See Figure 5-11). Toshiba needed to
maintain access to substantial quantities of suitable quality displays for its own products,
but did not want direct exposure to the turbulent a-Si LCD market. 9 By setting up supply
agreements as part of a-Si technology transfers to Korean and Taiwanese firms, Toshiba
was able to guarantee supply to meet its panel needs while reducing its exposure to
uncertainty of price levels. Amorphous silicon technology was transferred to nonJapanese firms through more highly developed production equipment, formal technology
transfer agreements, and flow of Japanese engineering talent to Korean and Taiwanese
firms. The movement of technological knowledge was inevitable. Toshiba was able to

9

The crystal cycle’s primary impact is upon a-Si pricing and production capacity.
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reduce its risk by reducing exposure to a-Si and placing a stronger emphasis on LTPS.
LTPS production technology is more finicky and considered less transferrable than a-Si.
At the same time LTPS panels are often made to fit customized specifications of the
purchaser, unlike a-Si panels which tend to be standardized and treated as commodities in
many cases. Focusing on LTPS allowed Toshiba a greater possibility of protecting
profitability through customization and reducing its exposure to the commoditized LCD
market.

Chart 5-11: Toshiba Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.
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Figure 5-11: Toshiba (TMDT) Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines
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Toshiba’s Performance
Toshiba does not appear to have benefited in terms of market share from the
growth of flat panel TV. Toshiba’s share of the overall Japanese domestic TV market
share was as low as 2% during the fourth quarter of 2002 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Bunseki
hen)). For the same period, Toshiba had 5% of the Japanese PDP TV market (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Bunseki hen)). Toshiba’s position in the LCD TV market has recovered
significantly. Chart 5-12, below, shows the market share for the period 2003-2007. For
most of these years Toshiba was in fourth place behind Sharp, Sony, and Panasonic.
Toshiba is relatively weak outside of Japan. Fuji Chimera (2001) reported Toshiba’s
global TV market share for all technologies to be 3.1%. Techno Associates Research
(2006) reported Toshiba’s global LCD TV market share for the second quarter of 2005 to
be 3.8%. These data points suggest that Toshiba’s overall position in the TV market has
not changed dramatically before and after flat panel TV became prominent. Toshiba also
produced RP TVs. In 1998, Toshiba was number two in world market share with 10%;
this decreased to 8% in 2004 (Fuji Chimera, 1999, 2005).
Financial performance in the Digital Products Segment, which includes Toshiba’s
television set business, is shown in Chart 5-13, below. The segment is relatively large
and includes mobile communications, digital media network (TV and related AudioVisual products), and personal computers. Toshiba reports that LCD TV sales have
increased revenues for its digital products segment, although price pressures have
negatively impacted the profitability of this sector. Operating income in the segment has
been decreasing since 2006, but remains positive.
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Chart 5-12: Toshiba Domestic Japanese LCD TV Market Share

Source: Rikku, 2008.
Chart 5-13: Toshiba Digital Products Segment, Sales and Operating Income

Source: Toshiba annual reports.

By selling its stakes in IPS Alpha and SED, Toshiba has essentially exited the
large display panel business. Although Toshiba never became a leader in TV displays, it
still has a meaningful place in the broader display business. Toshiba remains a major
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player in LTPS and continues to invest in OLED. Toshiba is considered to be relatively
strong in digital image processing chips. It has an agreement with Sharp under which
Sharp is to supply Toshiba with LCD TV panels and Toshiba to supply Sharp with image
processing chips, leveraging the strength of each. Altogether, Toshiba’s performance
data suggests that although it has not made major gains from the switch to flat panel
television, at the same time it has not found itself at a particular disadvantage either.

Firm Level Analysis – Tier Three Focal Firms

Pioneer
Pioneer is smaller and less diversified than many of the other firms in this study,
however it has made an impact on flat panel technologies and the FP TV business.
Pioneer did not have a CRT production capability, and was a minor TV producer prior to
FP TV’s rise. Pioneer’s TV business also included both CRT and projection based TVs.
Pioneer started research on OLED and PDP in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as
depicted in Figure 5-12. Evidence suggests Pioneer performed some limited work on
FED, however this must have been a small effort as no prototypes were identified. Patent
data shows a strong emphasis on PDP (See Chart 5-14), as do the production line and
production volume data (see Figure 5-13). The small number of LCD patents shown is
likely spillover from OLED development and noise in the data source. Through the
1990s and into the early 2000s, Pioneer consistently invested in PDP and OLED
technology. The firm’s Tohoku Pioneer subsidiary produced the world’s first
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commercial OLEDs. Later, Pioneer became recognized for its PDP technology and its
critically acclaimed Kuro line of PDP TVs.

Evidence of Option-like investments
Pioneer invested chiefly in two display technologies: PDP and OLED. The two
technologies pursued by Pioneer were developed in parallel, however they should not be
considered competing technologies in this case, as the aims of development were quite
different. The PDP effort was largely focused upon television, whereas the OLED effort
was focused on small displays. Furthermore, when Pioneer encountered difficulty in
finding customers for AM-OLEDs it was starting to produce, it exited AM-OLED to
remain in the PM-OLED area it had already developed. Given that OLEDs need to have
active matrices in order to be use in reasonably sized TV sets, exiting AM-OLED was
also giving up on the idea of producing an OLED TV. Meanwhile, Pioneer’s investments
in its PDP capability grew increasingly commitment-like over time. PDP production
became integrated with TV set manufacturing. One could say that Pioneer made
commitments to PM-OLED and PDP and held an option on AM-OLED which it later
exited. It did not hold options on other technologies.
One instance of option-like investment exists in Pioneer’s ELDIS JV. Rather than
build LTPS equipment on its own for AM-OLED, ELDIS allowed Pioneer enter AMOLED for a low cost and using partner LTPS capabilities. Pioneer opted to go it alone
in many other circumstances, however. As shown in Figure 5-13, Pioneer invested in its
own OLED and PDP lines, even buying the PDP capability of its competitor, NEC.
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Figure 5-13: Pioneer Panel Production and Production Lines
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Chart 5-14: Pioneer Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Pioneer’s Performance
Pioneer increased its share in the TV market with the introduction of flat panel
TV, but could not maintain this position for long. As the market grew and TV set prices
declined, Pioneer implemented a differentiation strategy for its PDP TV offering on the
basis of image quality. This was successful in that experts identified Pioneer plasma TVs
as having superior image quality than their competitors. However, Pioneer was not so
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successful in the marketplace. Pioneer sets were expensive, and competing LCD TVs
improved in affordability and image quality rapidly.
Pioneer’s market share declined as the FP TV market grew. Techno System
Research (Sangyo Times, 2002) estimated Pioneer had a 19.3% share of the combined
market for PDP TVs and monitors in the fourth quarter of 2000, and 11.9% that time in
2001, ranking first and second respectively. Techno Associates Research (2006) reported
Pioneer’s worldwide 2005 PDP TV market share to be 7.4% and PDP panel share to be
10.4%, placing Pioneer in 5th and 4th place respectively. Nikkei Report (2008) listed
Pioneer’s Japanese domestic PDP TV market share as 2.5%, or last place. When one
considers that total PDP TV growth was much slower than growth of LCD TV over this
period, it becomes clear that Pioneer’s overall TV market share has declined even more
dramatically.
Financial performance has also not been good for Pioneer. Chart 5-15 shows
revenue and operating income for Pioneer’s Home Electronics Sector, which includes its
PDP-TV business. Overall, the firm is reporting a loss for the period 2002-2008.
Finally, Pioneer’s performance was low in terms of survival. Pioneer exited PDP
production in 2008, transferring many of its PDP resources, engineers, and know how to
Panasonic. Pioneer planned to shut down its TV operations and exit TV altogether in
2009.
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Chart 5-15: Pioneer Home Electronics Sector Revenue and Operating Income

Source: Pioneer Annual Reports

Sanyo
Sanyo has a long history in the consumer electronics business. 10 It began TV
assembly in the 1950s (Hiramoto, 1994), however it never established its own CRT
production capability. Without this capability, the company found itself unable to make
high value, differentiated television sets. 11
Sanyo has been involved with several display technologies, but its main focus was
LCD. Sanyo began developing LCDs in 1970, and has worked on a number of LCD
technology types including early segment displays, TN mode LCD, a-Si TFT LCD and

10
11

Sanyo was started by a relative of Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of Panasonic.
In person anonymous interview: November 5, 2008.
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LTPS. LCD development has been relatively centralized at times, and at other times
divided between subsidiaries and group companies. Group company Tottori Sanyo has
played a major role in LCD and OLED development and production. Sanyo was the first
to develop a low temperature process for producing poly-silicon TFT-LCDs (LTPS) in
volume (Sangyo Times, 2001). For a period, Sanyo was also a prominent OLED
developer and producer. Its joint venture with Kodak, SK Display developed and
produced PM-OLED and AM-OLED panels. Additionally, Sanyo performed some joint
development work on EL display technology, but this did not result in further
investments.
Sanyo developed some small LCD TV sets early on. For example, Sanyo
developed the world’s first black and white TV using an active matrix LCD in 1982.
However Sanyo’s LCD operations were not focused on TV. Instead Sanyo developed
small, high-resolution displays for applications such as digital cameras. Sanyo entered
into market for large LCD TVs later, however it did not produce these larger panels itself.
Given Sanyo’s limited market share and financial resources, investment required to make
the large LCD TV panels was unattractive. Furthermore, smaller size displays fit with
Sanyo’s strengths in cell phones and digital cameras, where it produced both under its
own brand and as a contract manufacturer. Sanyo LCD TVs made in house used panels
purchased from other producers; some LCD TV production was outsourced to Taiwanese
firms (In person anonymous interview, November 4, 2008). TV was considered an
attractive potential application when Sanyo began working on OLED, however this was
not a central goal or focus of the OLED activities. 12

12

In person anonymous interview: November 5, 2008.
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Sanyo merged its LCD capabilities with Epson’s in 2004. In 2006, Sanyo exited
LCD. In the same year, Sanyo exited OLED after the SK-Display joint venture was
dissolved.

Evidence of Option-like investments
As Sanyo’s option ladder shows (See Figure 5-14), the company’s display efforts
have focused on LCD and OLED. Sanyo had brief involvement with EL, but did not
maintain an option on this technology. Patenting data shows activity for LCD and OLED
(See Chart 5-16). The rapid fall in LCD patents appears to coincide with the movement
of Sanyo’s LCD capability into a joint venture with Epson. Sanyo’s LTPS technology
was a strongpoint for the company, however its production capability was relatively
modest (see Figure 5-15). In addition to the TFT-LCD production shown, Sanyo also had
several passive matrix LCD production lines.
Sanyo’s LCD and OLED developments were sequential; Sanyo only became
involved in OLED after it had built a production capability for LTPS. From a real
options perspective, OLED made LTPS options more valuable as Sanyo could use them
to pursue either of the two technologies. Sanyo maintained both OLED and LCD for
some time at mass production levels. These could be considered to be options on
competing display technologies.
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Figure 5-15: Sanyo Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines
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Chart 5-16: Sanyo Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Sanyo used cooperative arrangements in LTPS and OLED. In the case of LTPS,
Sony cooperated on development and Sanyo agreed to supply Sony with LTPS displays.
This arguably decreased uncertainty for Sanyo in that Sanyo was guaranteed sales to a
degree. Sanyo’s OLED development and production was done in cooperation with
Kodak, the holder of important patents on small particle OLED. The arrangements
included a production joint venture, SK Display. Kodak’s involvement in the joint
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venture provided basic technology and a ready customer when the display technology
matured. It also reduced Sanyo’s investment requirements. The JV may also have given
Sanyo more flexibility because it allowed Sanyo to buy Kodak’s share in the venture.

Sanyo’s Performance
The impact of Sanyo’s display operations on its TV business is not
straightforward. Sanyo did not invest in display technologies to improve its TV business;
the focus of display development and production was small screen displays. Sanyo never
invested in the kinds of manufacturing plants required to produce displays in sizes large
enough for use in TVs. Although Sanyo entered the LCD TV market it did so with
supply from other panel makers and in some cases by purchasing TVs from ODM
makers.
Sanyo’s TV business has been concentrated at the lower end of the market. It has
a long-standing relationship with Wal-Mart, which represents a large portion of Sanyo’s
TV set sales. Wal-Mart’s sales have substantially contributed to revenues, but TV set
business has not been a major source of profits for Sanyo. 13
Although data limitations make it difficult to precisely evaluate Sanyo’s
performance in the TV market, it is clear that Sanyo has not dramatically improved its
situation as sales of flat panel televisions grew in the market. Sanyo continues to be an
also-ran in the industry. Generally, its share was so low it was included in the “Others”
category of available market share data. Fuji Chimera (1999, 2001) reports Sanyo had
4% of the worldwide unit share in 1998 and 2000. Sanyo has been weak in Japanese

13

In person anonymous interview, November 4, 2008.
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domestic TV market. In 2004, Sanyo had 2.3% of the Japanese domestic PDP TV
market, putting it in last place (Fuji Chimera, 2005 (Digital AV)).
Sanyo’s overall financial performance has been low. In the period 2000-2008, net
sales were flat, and the company had a cumulative loss of 388 billion yen (See Chart 517, below). An earthquake hit one of Sanyo’s production facilities in 2004, causing 73
billion yen in losses including damage to plant and equipment and opportunities lost
(Sanyo 2005 Annual Report). Performance of Sanyo’s Consumer Business sector, which
includes TV sets shows declining sales and profitability over the years 2004 to 2008 (See
Chart 5-18, below).
In terms of survival, Sanyo’s performance has also been poor. Sanyo and Epson
integrated their LCD operations in a joint venture in 2004 (Sanyo, 2006). Sanyo exited
displays altogether in 2006, transferring its LCD operations to Epson (Sanyo, 2007). In
December of 2008, Panasonic and Sanyo agreed (Sanyo, 2008) Panasonic would conduct
a tender offer for all outstanding shares of Sanyo. Although the deal is still in process at
the time of writing, it appears that Sanyo will become a part purchased and integrated
with Panasonic in the near future.
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Chart 5-17: Sanyo Net Sales and Net Income

Source: Sanyo Annual Reports

Chart 5-18: Sanyo Consumer Business sector: Net Sales and Operating Income

Source: Sanyo Annual Reports
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Sharp
Sharp has become closely associated with LCD technology. It has focused a great
deal of energy and money on the technology since the late 1960s (Numagami, 1999).
Sharp’s growth as an LCD producer has occurred largely in parallel to its development
from being an also ran electronics manufacturer to a respected firm known for “Only
one” products (Miyamoto, 2007).
While Sharp has developed and in some cases produced other display
technologies, LCD has taken a unique place in the firm. It may not be an overstatement
to say Sharp’s overall competitiveness rests on its LCD capability 14. Sharp manufactures
a large variety of consumer and business electronics, most of which incorporate an LCD
display in some form. Sharp has also actively pursued sales of LCD panels to other firms
for many years. Sharp invests early in new generation LCD plants, and for the last
several generations has been going to extreme lengths to keep the internal workings of
these plants secret. In addition to LCD products and manufacturing plants, Sharp has
also developed a strong reputation in the industry for its overall LCD knowledge base and
related training capability. It has an internal LCD technology school that is reputed to
have the deepest, most thorough training of its kind in the world.
Sharp’s LCD focus has been emphasized by top management on several
occasions. President Tsuji, who had risen through the sales ranks and did not have a
technical background, was a strong promoter of LCD, pressing it to be developed for TV
applications in the 1980s. 15 In 1997, President Machida stated that all TV sets Sharp
produced would use LCDs by the year 2005 (Miyamoto, 2007). This statement is famous
14
15

In person anonymous interview: March 19, 2009
Ibid.
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in the display and TV set industries and has become known as the “Machida
Declaration.” Sharp’s rank and file employees were also big believers in LCD
technology; one reason Sharp had not been involved with joint ventures in LCD (until
recently) lied in their assumption that potential partners would not share their passion for
the technology.

Evidence of Option-like investments
Sharp’s option ladder exhibits a breath of different display technologies at a low
level and a strong emphasis on LCD technologies at higher options levels (See Figure 516). Sharp has developed large varieties of LCD technologies, but its involvement with
other displays has been limited (See Appendix for additional evidence of Sharp’s
involvement with LCD varieties). There is evidence that Sharp developed options on
FED, OLED and PALC without making investments into production capabilities. Sharp
also produced EL for a number of years. However, EL volumes appear to have been low.
With the exception of EL, Sharp’s short and limited involvement with non-LCD display
technologies suggest it did not hold significant options on alternative display
technologies. The degree of emphasis in LCD is evident from Sharp’s production
volume and production line data (Figure 5-17) and patent data (Chart 5-19). Although
Sharp does have some patents coded as belonging to OLED or PDP, LCD patent volume
is overwhelming.
To put this in a fuller perspective, Sharp had been interested in displays prior to
learning of RCA’s success with LCD. Evidence suggests it was working on EL display
technology at the time (Numagami, 1999). PALC and OLED efforts began after Sharp
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was already mass-producing a-Si LCDs, and therefore may have been defensive moves in
case LCD proved to be less suitable for large display applications. Development of
PALC, in particular, was stopped after Sharp management came to the conclusion it
would never work as well as LCD (In person anonymous interview, March 19, 2009).
Several characteristics of Sharp’s involvement in LCD are worthy of note here.
First, Sharp developed a large number of LCD related technologies whereas most
competitors did not. Arguably, Sharp’s involvement with LCD overall was both broader
(number of related technologies) and deeper than its competitors. To rephrase this point,
Sharp has a strong strategic commitment to LCD in general, and has developed and help
options on a large variety of LCD related sub-technologies.
Sharp’s aggressive stance in investing in new generation production capabilities is
another key point, as mentioned above and further discussed in the following chapter.
Sharp has been willing to make large investments, commitments in the true sense of the
word, to be the first firm to have new generation technology. Amongst the firms studied,
only Samsung, LG, and Panasonic have been willing to make investments in display
panel production facilities on similar scales to those of Sharp.
Analysis of the panel specifications data discussed in Chapter Three provides a
mixed picture of technology in Sharp’s LCD panels. In terms of viewing angle, Sharp
has arguably the strongest record of any firm. Although Sharp did not always have
panels with the widest viewing angle specification, it had panels with one of the three
widest viewing angle specifications of the year in seven out of the eleven years covered.
Using this metric, Fujitsu and Panasonic were immediately behind Sharp but only had
panels with one of the three widest specifications in 4 out of the 11 years. On the other
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hand, similar investigation of response speed puts Sharp behind a number of competitors.
Panasonic, Samsung, and NEC, had LCDs with one of the three fastest specifications in
six or more years out of 15, whereas Sharp and Toshiba had panels with one of the three
fastest specifications of the year in 5 years. Other firms trailed. In terms of response
speed, Sharp did not show the kind of clear leadership it had in viewing angle.
Panel size data also did not show consistent leadership by Sharp, however this
needs to be interpreted with care. In the early 1990s, Sharp deliberately focused on
making smaller panels efficiently. Although the idea of having large panels on laptops
sounded good, the high cost of such panels limited the market for such products for many
years. Rather than expend resources on large but difficult to sell panels, Sharp put its
emphasis on the smaller panels (In person anonymous interview, March 19, 2009). Sharp
has changed its emphasis with regard to size in relation to market opportunities,
developing and producing relatively large displays as opportunities presented themselves.
In this sense, Sharp’s approach to LCD exhibits considerable discipline.
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Figure 5-17: Sharp Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines
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Chart 5-19: Sharp Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Sharp’s Performance
Sharp’s performance has been strong in terms of market share, sales and
profitability. While a minor CRT TV player, Sharp did not have a CRT production
capability and relied on CRT supplies from competing consumer electronics firms. It
was not a top Japanese TV manufacturer until LCD became prominent. With the growth
of LCD TV, Sharp became a top TV manufacturer and for a period outsold even its
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largest traditional competitors, Panasonic and Sony. Over time, Sharp has been willing to
make major LCD plant investments and had used these to strengthen its position in the
TV set business. Although the advantage Sharp had in flat panel televisions is
decreasing, it continues to be a major player. Sharp stands as the only firm that was able
to effectively leverage its technological superiority to dramatically improve its position in
the TV set industry over the long term. Other firms tried, but none was able to realize a
lasting benefit of the technology (See the following chapter for a more thorough
comparison). Sharp’s long-term share gains appear to have been largely at the expense of
firms originally in the second and third tiers of the industry.
Sharp’s financial results reflect its strong position in LCD. Chart 5-20 shows
substantial increases in consolidated sales and net income since 2002. Chart 5-21 shows
increasing sales revenues in Sharp’s audio-visual and communications segment as well as
growth of LCD panel sales to external customers. Compared to other Japanese firms,
Sharp has generally been more effective at protecting its margins in the face of falling
LCD and LCD TV prices. Sharp’s consistent investment in leading generation
production capabilities has allowed it to produce larger and larger sets and capture more
value amongst the high-end product segments. Meanwhile, Sharp’s proprietary low cost
production methods also helped it maintain profitability.
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Chart 5-20: Sharp sales and net income

Source: Sharp Annual Reports

Chart 5-21: Sharp Corporation external revenues of LCD, Audio Visual and
Communication Equipment Sectors

Source: Sharp Annual Reports
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Firm Level Analysis – Other Japanese TV Set Manufacturers

Funai
Funai Electric is an efficient, low cost competitor that produces low-end
consumer electronics products. In addition to selling its own brand of electronics, it is
also a contract producer for other well-known Japanese consumer electronics firms.
Funai has not built a flat panel production capability and there is little evidence of
Funai developing display technology in house (accordingly, there is no option ladder for
Funai). Instead of building its own production capability, Funai has searched for low cost
partners to buy display panels from. Since 2001, Funai has developed and invested in a
relationship with Taiwanese LCD panel producer CMO. In return for receiving
assurances of access to panel supply, Funai has made several small investments in CMO
(e.g., Sangyo Times, 2003, 2008; Techno Associates, 2008).
Recent patent data indicates Funai is working on LCD and OLED (See Chart 5-22
below). The increased patenting coincides with Funai’s growth in LCD TV. Funai first
decided to produce LCD TVs in 2002, and created a LCD TV business organization in
2007 (Funai, 2007).
Funai’s approach to technological uncertainty has been to wait until it is resolved
and not hold options. Funai’s relationship with CMO is practical. It guarantees future
supply of LCD panels in a way similar to a futures contract. Prices are sometimes lower
on the spot market than what Funai pays CMO. Although the arrangement reduces
uncertainty about pricing and volume of panels Funai will purchase, it does not provide
an option for Funai to enter LCD production.
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Chart 5-22: Funai Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Funai’s Performance
Funai entered the LCD TV business, and has been increasing its unit sales (See
Chart 5-23, below). However, Fuji Chimera data suggests Funai’s worldwide LCD TV
market share is low. In 2005 and 2006, Funai had 0.3% and 1.5% unit share, respectively
(Fuji Chimera 2006, 2007). By comparison, Funai’s worldwide unit share of CRT TVs
ranged from 8% to 4.3% over the period 2000 to 2005 (Fuji Chimera, 2001-2006).
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Overall, this suggests Funai’s position in the overall TV Set market has deteriorated as
flat panel TV has grown.

Chart 5-23: Funai LCD TV Unit Sales

Source: Funai Annual Report, 2008.

The financial data appears to agree with this analysis. According to its 2009
annual report, Fuani’s financial performance has suffered as the CRT TV market shrank.
Revenues for Funai’s AV sector, which includes televisions, has not grown over the
period 2003-2008, as shown in Chart 5-24, below. Decreasing sales of CRT TVs were
not sufficiently made up for by LCD TV sales. Funai’s limited ability to ship LCD TVs
was cited as a reason. Furthermore, Tomonori Hayashi, Funai’s President and CEO,
cited insufficient procurement of LCD panels in FY2008 as a source of operating loss in
the LCD TV business (Funai Annual Report). Funai posted net losses for 2007 and 2008.
Although other factors may also be at play, company reports suggest the TV business
performance has had a major negative impact on profitability for Funai.
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Chart 5-24: Funai Revenues and Net Income

Source: Funai Annual Reports

JVC
Compared with other firms in the television business, JVC is relatively small.
Formerly part of the Panasonic group, it is currently part of JVC Kenwood Holdings.
JVC produced CRT TVs, but was not a major player. It has not become a major flat
panel TV manufacturer. JVC has had a small involvement with display technologies, as
can be seen from the option ladder in Figure 5-18, below. Its focus has been D-ILA, a
proprietary version of LCOS, and a liquid crystal technology. It has used this technology
in RP TVs. JVC also briefly worked with Canon developing FED technology, prior to
Canon’s cooperative arrangement with Toshiba. In addition to RP TV, JVC also entered
the flat panel TV market with panels sourced from other firms. It has since exited RP
TV, however it continues to use D-ILA in front projectors. It has exited the Japanese TV
market altogether.

201

202

Chart 5-25: JVC Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Evidence of Option-like investments
JVC focused efforts and resources on D-ILA rather than developing a portfolio of
options on competing display technologies. The LCD patents shown in Chart 5-25
(above) are presumably related to D-ILA. The other display patents JVC holds may have
been spill over from D-ILA activities and JVC’s work with Canon on FED or patents
related to implementation of display panel technology in products but not the basic
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display technologies themselves. The firm’s involvement with Canon provided a low
cost option on FED. However, JVC did not maintain the option for long. Considering
JVC’s size, most display technologies may have required production investments that
were too large for the company. Given the small size of D-ILA devices, large plants
were not required, keeping investment requirements more reasonable for a company with
JVC’s resources.

JVC’s Performance
JVC’s market share in TVs was not large prior to the introduction of flat panel
TVs, and it did not grow large through FP TV. Accordingly, JVC is generally included
in the “Other” section of available market share data. JVC was active in LCD TV, PDP
TV, and RP TV. Fuji Chimera lists JVC’s RP TV market share in only one year, 2004,
for which JVC had 1% of the worldwide RP TV market (Fuji Chimera, 2005). In the 4th
quarter of 2002, JVC had 4% of Japanese PDP TV market by units (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Bunseki hen)), however it was not listed in subsequent periods. Data is not available for
other TV types. In 2008, JVC exited RP TV worldwide and the Japanese TV market
across all TV display technologies, shutting down related production facilities. From the
standpoints of market share and survival, JVC’s TV business performance is low.
JVC’s overall financial performance has been generally deteriorating in terms of
sales and profitability since 2003. Chart 5-26 depicts sales and operating income of
JVC’s Consumer Electronics business, of which the TV business is a part. As with the
company wide data, sales have decreased since 2003. Operating income for this sector is
off of its highs, but there is little overall trend. D-ILA’s impact on financial performance
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appears to have been negative, at least in the recent past; company reports describe the
display business as the source of more than ten billion yen in losses during the 2008 fiscal
year. The financial performance data agrees with the low performance in terms of market
share and market exit.

Chart 5-26: JVC Consumer Electronics Business Sector Sales and Operating
Income

Source: JVC Annual Reports

Firm Level Analysis – Korean Firms

LG
LG is a diversified Korean Chaebol group. LG Electric is a major flat panel TV
set manufacturer and PDP producer. LCD displays are produced by LG Display, which
was formally LG Philips LCD, prior to Philips selling most of its stake in the operation.
LG Electronics is the largest shareholder of LG Display, holding 37.9% as of March 2008
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(LG Display, 2006 (SEC Form 20-F)). Display related development and production have
not always been centralized, and sometimes occurred in different group companies
simultaneously. This has been the case mostly with earlier stage development and
technologies comprising of divisible parts with different capabilities required for the
different pieces (e.g., PDP). However, competition does not occur between these
different groups, and capabilities are often integrated later. This has been the case for
PDP, LCD, and OLED, which are now each integrated into a single member of the LG
Group (Sangyo Times, 2008, 2009).
LG has not been a developer of new-to-the-world technology, but does have a
track record of incremental improvements to existing technologies. It has a large appetite
for risk and large-scale investments into production capabilities. LG’s aggressive
investment stance has helped to make it a leading volume producer of both PDP and LCD
panels.

Evidence of Option-like investments
LG group has a broad and deep portfolio of display technology options, covering
a-Si LCD, LTPS, PDP, and OLED (see Figure 5-19). LCD started before OLED and
PDP development, however they have been concurrent most of the time. Patent data
shows active R&D in LCD, PDP, and OLED (see Chart 5-27). LG has typically taken
some time to go from developing initial options to increasing investment to mass
production levels. However, when LG exercises an option and increases the level of
commitment, it does so boldly (see production data, Figure 5-20). With the exception of
LG Philips, it has not looked to joint ventures to build production capabilities. On the
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other hand, it has used cooperative arrangements for development, including those with
Alps in TFT LCD and Thomson in PDP.
LG continues to pursue options in all of the display technologies it entered. It has
slimmed down its PDP production capacity in line with market requirements, but has not
exited.

Chart 5-27: LG Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.
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Figure 5-20: LG Panel Display Production Volume and Production Lines

209

Performance
LG’s flat panel TV and related display businesses have been growing, and this
growth has been profitable for the most part. Chart 5-28 shows an upward trend in sales
of LG Displays, with mixed net income results. The highly volatile nature of markets for
LCD displays impacts sales price but has smaller impact upon production cost,
amplifying variability in profitability. Chart 5-29 depicts LG Displays’ sales by segment.
LCD TV panels represent a growing portion of LG Displays’ overall sales.
LG Electronics (see Chart 5-30) shows rapidly growing sales, but a large
variability in net income. As LG Electronics display business is focused on PDP, results
for this sector shown in Chart 5-31 are impacted by PDP prices.

Chart 5-28: LG Displays Sales and Net Income

Source: LG Displays SEC filings
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Chart 5-29: LG Displays Sales Revenue by Display Segment

Source: LG Displays SEC filings

Chart 5-30: LG Electronics Consolidated Sales and Net Income

Source: LG Electronics Consolidated Financial Statements
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Chart 5-31: Sales and Operating Income, LG Electronics Digital Displays Sector

Source: LG Electronics Consolidated Financial Statements

Samsung
Samsung is a diversified Korean Chaebol. Samsung Electronics is one of the
central companies in the Samsung group and also one of the largest. Samsung
Electronics is a flat panel TV set manufacturer and parent of Samsung LCD, a panel
producer. Samsung SDI is a publicly traded Samsung group company that produces
displays. It focus is on CRTs, PDPs, and mobile displays including LCD and OLED.
Since 2000, Samsung Electronics has reported holding stakes in Samsung SDI in the
range of 19% and 20% (Samsung Annual Reports, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007).
Samsung flat panel development has not always been centralized. At times,
Samsung LCD and Samsung Electronics have developed technologies concurrently; the
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same is true with Samsung Electronics and Samsung SDI. However, intra-group
competition has not lasted for long; group companies have settled on a central location
for each technology before large production infrastructure investments became necessary.

Evidence of Option-like Investments
As a group, Samsung held options on a-Si and LTPS LCD, LCD, FED, and
OLED technologies (See Figure 5-21, below). Samsung Electric focused its investment
into a-Si TFT, rapidly entering and building up production capacity after entering the
TFT-LCD business. Samsung SDI, which was a major CRT producer, focused on PDP
and to a lesser extent OLED. In the case of PDP, Samsung held low cost options for a
longer time than LCD, waiting to make investments in production. OLED development
has taken place in several parts of the organization, and is currently in a JV between
Samsung Electronics and Samsung SDI.
Samsung’s significant investments in LCD production reflect a major
commitment by the firm. The company has publicized its very aggressive stance towards
investment in a-Si production. Samsung’s production capability has grown accordingly
(see Figures 6-22, 6-23). At the same time, Samsung has maintained PDP production
capacity. Samsung does not appear to have had long and continued development in
LTPS or FED. Although it continues to build its portfolio of display options, recently
investing more heavily in OLED options (see patenting data, Chart 5-32), it is focusing
its investment into three technologies – a-Si LCD, PDP, and OLED.
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Figure 5-22: Samsung Display Panel Production Volume
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Figure 5-23: Samsung Production Lines
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Chart 5-32: Samsung Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Samsung’s Performance
Samsung has performed well in terms of flat panel TV market share. In 2007,
Samsung’s worldwide TV set market share was 17.8% by sales (Samsung Annual Report
2007). In 2008, Samsung ranked number one in LCD TV share worldwide, and number
two for PDP TV (Samsung Annual Report, 2008). As an LCD producer, Samsung
Electronics has held the top share worldwide for large panels for most of the 2000s.
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Samsung’s financial performance has also been strong. Due to reorganization and
changes in segment reporting, performance of Samsung Electronics’ TV business is
difficult to analyze over time. However, Samsung Electronics is profitable and has been
growing at the firm level as can be seen from Chart 5-33. Recent data on the LCD
business suggest it has also been growing profitably although profits have not been
steady. Samsung’s Digital Media sector, which includes Samsung Electronics’ TV
business, is growing but lost money in 2007 and 2008.

Chart 5-33: Samsung Electronics Performance

Source: Samsung Electronics Annual Reports

Samsung SDI has not fared as well as Samsung Electronics. Its PDP business
stopped growing in revenue terms in 2005 due to deterioration in the price of PDPs (see
Chart 5-34). Overall, Samsung SDI’s total revenues have been shrinking since 2004 (see
Chart 5-35, below). As CRT sales declined at SDI, PDP sales increased, however so did
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LCD sales, which were at Samsung Electric and not SDI. SDI has several other
businesses, however the impact of CRT decline on the firm was substantial.
Chart 5-34: Samsung SDI PDP Sales

Source: Samsung SDI web site 1
Chart 5-35: Samsung SDI Consolidated Sales and Net Income

Source: Samsung SDI web site

1

http://www.samsungsdi.com/eng/ivt/ir_2_1_2t_2008.jsp
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Firm Level Analysis – European Firms

Philips
Philips has been involved with a number of display technologies, including PDP,
PALC, a-Si LCD, LTPS, liquid crystal based micro displays, and OLED (see Figures 524 and 5-25, below). Philips has reported joint R&D participation in PDP, PALC, and
OLED, however it has announced relatively few prototypes or other developments
publicly. Philips has been active in LCD through joint ventures with Hoshiden and LG.
Generally, LCD research results have been reported by the JVs and not by Philips. Still,
some patent activity attributed to Philips can be observed in each of the display
technologies (see Chart 5-36). Philips’ OLED development has a different pattern from
that of other technologies; development has been done at Philips’ headquarters and more
prototypes have been announced (Fuji Chimera, 2002; Sangyo Times, 2002).
Philips has invested in production for LCD and OLED. Philips entered into a JV
with Hoshiden on small to mid sized TFT-LCDs in 1996 (Sangyo Times, 1997; Jiji Press,
1996), and later bought out Hoshiden’s share, making it a wholly owned subsidiary in
2000 (Sangyo Times, 2001). Philips and LG established a joint venture in 1999, “LG
Philips LCD” for mass production of LCDs including large displays (Nikkei BP, 2006
(Gyokai bunseki hen)). Philips stayed with this JV for a number of years. However,
after several quarters of significant losses, it exited the JV, selling its stake to LG.
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Figure 5-25: Philips Display Panel Production Volume and Flat Panel Lines
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Philips OLED production has been in house. 2 The displays have been used in
shavers, an application where short lifetime PM-OLED would be sufficient. Production
investment does not appear to have been substantial.

Chart 5-36: Philips Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

2

Hoshiden-Philips was also involved with OLEDs after it became a consolidated
subsidiary of Philips and renamed Philips Mobile Display Systems.
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Evidence of Option-like investments
Figures 5-24 and 5-25 suggest Philips made small, option-like investments in a
variety of different technologies. Philips pursued low cost basic R&D options, on its own
(e.g., PDP, OLED) and through participation in joint development projects (e.g., PDP
with Fujitsu, Pioneer; PALC with Sharp and Sony). Philips participation in these joint
development programs was generally short. At the same time, recurring basic research
developments on PDP suggest the firm may have also pursued longer term R&D at
modest scales. Patent data agrees with this observation. Taken together, this indicates
Philips had a broad portfolio of options, although there may have only been a few that
were actively maintained at any given time.
Exercise of options through mass production and market entry was limited.
Philips exercised its option on the Hoshiden Philips JV and purchased Hoshiden’s stake
in the business. Philips also developed and for a time maintained an option in larger
LCD panel production through its investment in LG Philips LCD, although it later sold
its stake and exited. Philips has exercised options on OLED by beginning production of
small PM-OLEDs for shaver applications. This leaves Philips holding options for further
OLED development and entry into production of AM-OLEDs in the future.

Philips’ Performance
Philips has been decreasing its exposure to LCD TVs. It sold its stake in LG
Philips LCD in 2007 (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Gyokai bunseki hen)), and its TV brand rights in
North America in 2008 (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo bunseki hen)).
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Philips had high market share in CRT TV sets, and has been able to continue to
maintain sizeable market share in flat panel TV as well. Over the period 1998 to 2004,
its worldwide unit market share for CRT TV was in the range of 6-7% (Fuji Chimera
1999-2004). Techno Systems lists Philips share of PDP TVs and Monitors at 8.6% and
5.3% for the fourth quarter of 2000 and 2001, respectively. Techno Associates Research
(2006) listed Philips share of the worldwide LCD TV market at 11.1%, and PDP TV at
8.4% in the second quarter of 2005. LG Philips was a very large LCD producer. In
2005, the joint venture was the world’s largest supplier of LCD TV panels, with 24.2%
market share (Techno Associates Research, 2006).

Chart 5-37: Philips Sales and Net Income

Source: Philips Annual Reports
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Philips performance was low by a number of other measures. Sales of its
Consumer Electronics sector have not been growing. Philips consolidated results reveal a
downward trend in sales and volatile net income (see Chart 5-37). Philips has not
reported TVs separately in most years. For the three years it was available, EBITDA for
TVs was negative for 2007 and 2008, and positive for 2006 (See Chart 5-38).

Chart 5-38: Philips Television Sales and EBITDA

Source: Philips Annual Reports

Thomson
Thomson has had limited involvement with flat panel technologies, and therefore
has not been rigorously covered by the Japanese sources. Thomson was a major CRT
and CRT TV producer, selling Thomson and RCA brands. Thomson’s 2000 annual
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report lists the company as the 2nd largest producer of large and very large sized color TV
picture tubes, with a 20% share of the global market.
Thomson performed some basic R&D on both LCD and PDP, but details are
sketchy. The company has not exhibited prototypes at the major trade shows, nor is there
evidence of direct investment in production facilities.
Figure 5-26 below shows Thomson’s option ladder. Thomson had an LCD
subsidiary, however this subsidiary does not appear to have had a significant production
capability of its own. 3 Thomson sold it off in 1999 (Thomson Annual Report, 1999).
Thomson performed Plasma related research in Moirans, France (Thomson Annual
Report, 2000). Thomson has developed a business in licensing LCD and PDP related
patents. Some of these were the results of internal R&D (see patent data, Chart 5-39),
however Thomson also reports it purchased patents relating to LCD and Plasma, some of
which were originally from Xerox’s PARC (Thomson Annual Report, 2004).
Thomson has produced PDP TVs. The company began cooperating with NEC on
plasma in 1998 (Fuji Chimera, 1999). Thomson used NEC panels in its PDP TVs. In
2001, Thomson and NEC announced plans to form a joint venture to further develop,
produce, and distribute PDPs (Sangyo Times, 2002). However, the joint venture was
never established (Fuji Chimera, 2002). Thomson also had a joint agreement with LG
covering PDP, which started in 2003 ((Sangyo Times, 2004).

3

Nikkei BP series lists small and pilot lines even outside of the Asia region, but has not
identified one directly owned by Thomson.
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Thomson exited both CRT production and TV set manufacturing. The company
sold CRT and related glass activities in 2005, and shut down activities relating to tube
components during the 2007-2008 period (Thomson Annual Report, 2008). The
company deconsolidated its TV set related business in August 2004. This business was
contributed to joint venture with TCL of China called TTE. Thomson originally had a
33% stake in the JV, but later changed this to a 29% stake in TTE's Chinese parent
company in 2005. Since then, Thomson has been reducing this stake; it was 19.3% in
2006, 2.4% in 2007, and 0.14% in 2008 (Thomson Annual Report, 2008). Effectively,
Thomson has exited the TV set business.

Thomson’s Options portfolio and Performance
Thomson developed basic technology options relating to LCD and PDP. Through
a cooperative agreement with NEC, it increased its access to PDP technology and panels.
However, the firm never developed production capabilities of its own. The levels of
investment Thomson put into its options appear to be relatively small compared with the
costs of setting up mass production of cutting edge panel production for TV applications.
This may have been due to lack of resources or it may have been a strategic choice.
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Chart 5-36: Thomson Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

In the early 2000s, it became increasingly clear that flat panel televisions would
replace CRT TVs. As time passed, the urgency for Thomson to take action with regard to
its TV business must have risen. The company made several LCD and rear projection
models during 2004, using panels made by other companies. Of the different flat panel
technologies, Thomson developed larger options on PDP than the other technologies.
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However PDP was looking relatively less attractive compared with LCD by this point.
The joint venture with TCL was an exit strategy.
Thomson has changed its focus over the period, moving away from TV set
hardware manufacturing and into media and services areas. In the process of exiting TV,
Thomson realized a string of losses stemming from its previous CRT manufacturing
business. Chart 5-40, below, shows these losses. From the perspectives of financial
performance and survival, Thomson’s TV business performance is low.

Chart 5-40: Thomson’s Losses Relating to Exiting CRT Production

Source: Thomson Annual Report, 2008.

Firm Level Analysis – IT Firms
Fujitsu
Fujitsu is an information technology firm that has played a significant role in
LCD and PDP research and development, although it eventually exited display
production in both cases. As a firm without a meaningful TV business, the company is
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not one of the target companies for this research. However, a brief discussion of the firm
is appropriate here because of the technological breakthroughs it achieved. It is also
worth considering because Fujitsu is an example of a firm with strong technology options
that did not enjoy the full benefits possible from fully exercising these options.
The focus of Fujitsu’s development activities was on displays for use in computer,
office automation, communication, and factory automation applications, and not for use
in entertainment purposes (Sangyo Times, 1994). Nonetheless, Fujitsu was a pioneer in
PDP development. The firm played such a prominent role that Japanese national
Television broadcaster NHK even produced a documentary on it (i.e., NHK, 2003). It
was the first firm to exhibit a video capable color PDP, and it also developed Alternative
Lighting of Surface (ALIS), a major PDP technology used later by all major PDP
producers. In the area of TFT LCD, Fujitsu was the first to develop vertical alignment
(VA), one of the two major LCD modes used in LCD TVs to enable wider viewing
angles. It later followed this up with MVA, an improved version that has become widely
used in the industry.
Fujitsu did not have a television set business, but is affiliated with another firm,
Fujitsu General, that had a domestic Japanese TV set manufacturing and sales business.
Fujitsu General was a very small player in the market, both before and after flat panel
displays were introduced, but it was an outlet for PDPs when Fujitsu first began
production. Fujitsu General became the first company to begin selling PDP TVs in 1996.
As is shown in Figure 5-27, below, Fujitsu began working on PDP before LCD.
However, it began producing both technologies around the same time and also exited
both in the same year. Patent data shows patenting levels of PDP and LCD were in the
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same magnitude for most years (see Chart 5-41). Fujitsu formed a joint venture with
Hitachi to develop PDP technology, produce and sell PDPs. However it did not work
with a partner in LCDs. Fujitsu’s investment in LCD production was limited to a pilot
LTPS line, and two mass production a-Si lines (see Figure 5-28, Fujitsu Panel Production
and Production Lines): one generation 1 and one generation 2.5 line (Fuji Chimera, 19992007). These lines used small substrates, and had low production capacities. They
would not have been cost competitive for larger displays.

Chart 5-41: Fujitsu Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.
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Figure 5-28: Fujitsu Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines
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It may appear puzzling that Fujitsu exited both PDP and LCD businesses given
the firm’s strong technology development capability. 4 However, these technologies
represented growth options for the firm and not strategic options because Fujitsu did not
have a major TV business. In other words, Fujitsu’s existing businesses were not
threatened by display technology uncertainty. The company may not have had sufficient
manufacturing know-how to be an efficient producer, or marketing presence to sell its
output. Alternatively, continued large investments in production capability may have
been unattractive, especially since displays were outside of the company’s core business
areas. In 2005, Fujitsu sold most of its stake in Fujitsu Hitachi Plasma to Hitachi. In the
same year, it sold its LCD operations to Sharp. Fujitsu’s 2005 annual report suggests it
exited displays where margins were deteriorating rapidly in order to shift resources to its
LSI device business that had a more favorable financial outlook.

NEC
NEC is an information technology company that has developed LCD, PDP, and
other display technologies. The company had some CRT capabilities before it began
working on flat panel technologies. In the past, NEC had a small exposure to TV sets
through its consolidating subsidiary NEC Home Electronics. NEC was never a major
player in the TV business, and exited the business in 2000. NEC introduced PDP TVs in
the late 1990s through this subsidiary prior to exit.

4

One informant suggested that several companies, including Fujitsu had gotten into flat
panel displays because of strong technology capabilities to find they were out of their
league in terms of management capabilities.
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NEC has a long history with both LCD and PDP, as is shown in NEC’s option
ladder in Figure 5-29. It started LCD R&D in 1969, and began producing single color
plasma displays in 1971 (Numagami, 1999; Fuji Chimera, 2003). NEC continued to
work steadily on plasma technology. In 1981, the company had top market share in
plasma displays (Yano Keizai, 1982). As early as 1993, the company was considering
establishing a color PDP business (Nikkei BP, 1994). NEC established a display
development department in 1987 to focus on developing TFT-LCD for office automation
applications (Sangyo Times, 1990; 1993). From this point, it proceeded rapidly,
developing TFT displays, building a prototype production line, and investing in a mass
production line by the end of 1990 (see Figure 5-30, Production Capacity and Production
Volume). It was the first company to sell a laptop with a color TFT screen (Sangyo
Times, 1993).
NEC appears to have dabbled with FED for a brief period in the late 1990s,
around the time it closed its CRT operations and began work on OLED (Nikkei BP,
1999, 2000, 2005 (Kihon gijutsu hen)). NEC and Samsung SDI later formed a joint
venture to develop and produce OLED 5 (Sangyo Times, 2001). In 2004, NEC exited
PDP and OLED, selling its PDP operations to Pioneer, and its stake in the OLED joint
venture to Samsung (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen); Sangyo Times, 2005). NEC
continues to compete in LCDs. It reduced its exposure to standardized a-Si LCDs
through sourcing agreements with CMO (Taiwan) and a TFT-LCD production joint
venture with SVA (China) (Sangyo Times, 2003, 2004). With such arrangements in
place in 2002, NEC set up a separate subsidiary for its LCD operations, NEC LCD
5

Samsung SDI was originally a joint venture between NEC and Samsung Electronics
established to produce CRTs.
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Technologies, and changed focus from office automation displays to high-end niche
displays, such as those used for medical applications (Sangyo Times, 2003).

Evidence of Option-like investments
NEC’s involvement with PDP and LCD were ongoing and overlapped heavily,
and represent options on competing technologies. As NEC was not a major TV producer,
options on display technology were not strategic for TV; however LCD and PDP
technologies represented strategic options for NEC’s substantial CRT monitor business.
Patenting data (see Chart 42 below) provides evidence of ongoing R&D investments in
the two that are of similar magnitudes.
NEC’s options on other technologies were less ongoing. NEC developed an
LTPS option early on, but did not produce LTPS during the timeframe for which
production data is available; at the same time, evidence suggests it has continued
developing the technology. NEC’s FED options appear to have consisted of very low
cost research on the part of a handful of NEC engineers. The short involvement with the
technology was evidently enough to convince the firm the option was not worth further
involvement. The relatively rapid increase in option levels relating to OLED suggests
NEC was planning to enter the market for OLED displays. However, by establishing a
joint venture with Samsung, NEC’s investment was option-like with relatively low cost
and high flexibility. It was therefore relatively simple for NEC to exit OLED once the
decision was made.
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Figure 5-30: NEC Display Panel Production Volume and Production Lines
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Chart 5-42: NEC Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.

Canon
Canon is relevant to this research because it planned to enter TV manufacturing
but did not, even though it developed SED display technology chosen for its suitability
for the TV application. Canon has spent substantial time and resources over the years
developing display technologies but has yet to build a large-scale production line or make
a large-scale market entry using any of them (see Figure 5-31). It is interesting that
Canon never developed a TFT-LCD capability despite the fact the firm had knowledge

241

about the mainline LCD technologies. Canon is one of two or three firms producing
exposure equipment for LCD production lines (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen)).
Canon’s patenting data exhibits a focus on LCD in the past (See Chart 5-43, below).
There is a mixture of several things driving this, including the patents related to LCD
production equipment, patents relating to their FLCD efforts (likely represented by the
middle peak), and potentially patents overlapping from OLED activities.

Chart 5-43: Canon Patents

Note: does not include patents from Joint Ventures.
Source: Extracted from Derwent patent data.
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Canon’s efforts to develop FLCD technology were aimed at office applications.
The goal was to develop a display technology having the benefits of TFT-LCD, but
which could be made with lower cost, simpler manufacturing techniques. The display
was first used as part of a Japanese word processing system, and was planned for general
computer monitor usage (Sangyo Times, 1998, 1999). Canon was successful at
producing high-resolution displays with the technology, but it still suffered from short
lifespan and limited ability to display gradation (Sangyo Times, 1998; Fuji Chimera,
2000). In 1998, in the face of these limitations together with rapidly declining prices for
its competing technology, TFT-LCD, the company discontinued FLCD (Fuji Chimera,
2000).
Canon’s experience with SED (surface-conduction electron-emitter display), a
type of FED, was focused upon TV applications. Although a number of Japanese firms
were interested in FED variants, Canon put more effort into this technology, partnering
with JVC, Noritake, and Nippon Sheet Glass, and later Toshiba. Although Canon and
Toshiba were able to exhibit a number of successful prototypes, their JV was dissolved
after Canon was sued over patent licensing related to the technology. Canon never massproduced SEDs. Developing SED does not appear to have been a low cost effort; Canon
had invested $1.8 billion in SED technology development and manufacturing facilities by
2006 (Consumer Electronics Daily, February 7, 2006).
Canon has also been working on OLED technology. Most recently Canon has
started joint work with Hitachi Displays on the technology. Canon’s OLED efforts are
aimed at small displays.
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Canon’s efforts to develop these technologies should not be considered to be
investments in competing technology options. Investments in the technologies were not
parallel, but closer to serial in their implementation. For instance, investment in SED
picked up after FLCD had been developed and its future was being called into question.
Furthermore, the technologies were not competing for the same (television) application.
Although OLED’s target is vague, Canon had specific target applications for both SED
and FLCD.
Behind Canon’s SED development was a strong wish to enter the TV business.
Canon CEO Fujio Mitarai stated Canon planned to enter TV manufacturing because of
convergence, which would result in the television set being the heart of a networked
home. Another reason given was that Canon wanted to leverage its strength in other
imaging related products (cameras, etc.) that can be connected to the TVs (Sangyo
Shimbun, 2004). Interviewees did not discuss Canon in particular, but did stress the
importance of television for consumer electronics companies. They typically believe
television is the “face” of the company to consumer households.
Canon had another approach to television that is less well known. Canon is
reported to have developed LCOS technology to use in rear projection televisions
(Sangyo Shimbun, 2005). Canon exhibited a 64" RPTV in 2005, but stated in 2006 it was
reconsidering its plan to enter the market for rear projection television, as the future for
RPTV appeared questionable (Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 2006). Canon did use the LCOS
technology for front projectors – typically for business applications.
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Canon’s technology options and performance
Canon did not invest in multiple competing display technologies in the face of
technological uncertainty. Rather, Canon identified technologies it believed would be
optimal for a specific applications, and focused its investments on these. It appears that
Canon tried to outsmart uncertainty. Unfortunately for Canon however, both FLCD and
SED appear to be failed technologies at this point in time.
Although Canon made use of joint R&D and manufacturing JVs it is not apparent
flexibility was the motivation for these arrangements. Rather, it may have been reduction
of required investment and or access to capabilities of the partner firms. This
interpretation would certainly fit for Canon’s partner in SED, Toshiba. With no
experience in building a TV set, Toshiba’s TV background would have obvious value to
Canon.
In Canon’s case the relevant performance metric is market entry. Canon failed to
enter the TV set market even though it had intended to do so and had specifically
developed SED technology for this purpose. Canon’s SED bet was unlucky. The firm
invested heavily and was unable to commercialize the display technologies it developed
or enter the market it had targeted.

Chapter Conclusion
This chapter presented firm level case studies analyzing historical evidence of
option-like investments in display technologies by the firms studied. It also evaluated
performance data for each of the firms. Although between case analysis is performed in
the following chapter, there are several observations that can be made at this point. First,
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none of the firms focused exclusively on one technology over the study period. Second,
although a number of firms appear to have tried to use investments in display
technologies to become more prominent players in the industry, this strategy does not
appear to have worked over the longer term, with the single exception of Sharp.
The following chapter investigates aspects of the options portfolios held by the
firms and searches for evidence of performance implications. It also performs pairwise
analysis of several firms of interest. In particular it tries to identify what made Sharp the only firm to realize long term performance benefits based on its investments in
display technologies – different from other firms.
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CHAPTER SIX: BETWEEN CASE ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to compare the firms studied in the previous chapter
to uncover patterns of difference and commonality between the firms’ option portfolios,
commitments, and the outcomes achieved. In examining patterns in the data, this chapter
searches for evidence the firms studied as a group did or did not behave as real options
logic suggests they should. It also examines performance outcomes coinciding with
different patterns of option like investments across firms.
Variation observed between firms studied ranged from the readily apparent to the
nuanced. On the most basic level of real option related behavior, one TV set producing
firm did not develop any display technology options at all, but rather waited for
uncertainty to resolve itself. Three firms developed options on seven display
technologies and committed to production of several. The rest of the sample exhibited
behavior between these two boundaries.
Option portfolios and management of options differed along several dimensions
in the firms studied. Firms that developed options exhibited differences in the breadth
(number of technologies developed) and depth (levels in the option ladder) of the options
portfolios they developed and maintained. Timing of option development, exercise, and
abandonment also differed between the firms.
Single-firm options ladders presented in the prior chapter provide visual
representation of options depth and breadth. This chapter develops summarized data
based upon that in the prior chapter to allow more ready comparison. The following
discussion begins with breadth of the options portfolios, and then building on this,
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examines depth of the portfolios. Having considered these two dimensions, the chapter
discusses the aspect of timing. Timing is considered in terms of option execution timing
as well as the pathways followed in developing technology options – serial and parallel.
In the process of examining these different aspects of options behavior, breadth, depth,
and timing, patterns of performance are searched for and the observed behavior is
compared with that predicted by real options logic. Finally, the top incumbent Japanese
TV set manufacturers are compared, in pair-wise fashion, with competitors that attempted
to dramatically improve their positions in the TV set business through applications of flat
panel technologies.

Brief Chapter Summary
Overall, the analysis in this chapter suggests firms behaved as predicted by real
options reasoning, however performance benefits were difficult to observe. Target firms
of this study developed options on more than one display technology, in agreement with
the predictions of real options reasoning. In terms of the breadth of options portfolios, or
number of technologies developed, those firms with the broadest option portfolios were
also high performing firms. However, other high performing firms had narrower
portfolios. If there is a relationship between number of options held and performance, the
direction of causality is unclear. Analysis of the depth of options portfolios – deeper
options being those including investments higher up on the options ladder – did not
uncover a relationship between option portfolio depth and performance. Timing of
option exercise was also analyzed, however no relationship between timing and firm
performance was identified.

249

Analysis of outliers found top incumbent firms Panasonic and Sony suffered
temporary performance decreases as flat panel TVs started to grow in the market,
however both firms were able to regain their positions later in the study. The strong
market power of these firms appears to have facilitated their recovery. Pioneer and Sharp
were notable challengers to the incumbent top firms. Pioneer committed to PDP
technology, and enjoyed a period of strong performance but was unable to compete in the
long run and eventually exited PDP and TV set manufacturing. Sharp stood out as the
only firm able to turn its technological advantage into a durable performance
improvement. Sharp had a significant lead in LCD technology compared with
competitors, and also stood out for regularly making large investments in cutting edge
production facilities, unlike its Japanese competitors.

Option portfolio breadth
The breadth of options portfolios developed by companies studied varied greatly.
On the low end, one firm developed no options. On the high end, three firms developed
options on seven display technologies, including different Liquid Crystal related subtypes (e.g., a-Si, HTPS, LTPS, LCOS). These sub-types are related, but differ enough
that they should be considered distinct for this analysis. Some knowledge and production
capabilities are relevant to more than one of these subtypes, but each requires some
distinct knowledge and at least some specialized production equipment. To get a full
picture of breadth of technology options held by each firm, two measures are required –
one counting each technology and the Liquid Crystal sub-technologies, and another of the
total non-liquid crystal technologies. It is possible to have a portfolio of display
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technology options appear broad in number but entirely liquid crystal-related. On the
other hand it is also possible to hold a portfolio of options on display technologies that
share little in common. Such a portfolio might include only one or no liquid crystal
related technologies. These approaches are different; therefore, the ability to compare the
two provides a clearer picture of the relative breadth.
Table 6-1, below, lists both portfolio breadth measures and summaries of
performance in TV and display businesses for each of the firms studied. Note that these
measures do not provide information about the depth of the options in question, which
will be discussed later in this chapter. Also note that some of the options represent very
small investments whereas some are very large.
The firms developing the largest number of options by either measure were
Panasonic, Sharp, and Sony. Each of these firms has exhibited growth in the TV and
display businesses, although in different ways. Sony and Panasonic initially lost market
share to other firms that moved more quickly into flat panel TV, however, both firms
regained their positions in the market. Sharp was a small player in CRT TV, but has
emerged as a major LCD TV player and display manufacturer. Sharp has played a
pioneering role in development and growth of LCD TV. It no longer commands the TV
market share it did earlier as other firms have entered, or as in the case of Sony and
Panasonic, existing firms have greatly strengthened their product offering and branding
activities. Nonetheless, Sharp stands out as the only firm in the study that was able to
parlay its technological capability into lasting increase in market share.
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Table 6-1: Option Portfolio Breadth
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Firms other than these three exhibit the entire spectrum of performance outcomes.
Thomson and JVC had relatively narrow options portfolios and exited or partially exited
the TV business. On the other hand, NEC and Philips also exhibited similar performance
outcomes despite having much broader portfolios. LG Group had a relatively narrow
portfolio but has exhibited strong performance in TV and display businesses.
Taken together, firms with the widest option portfolios exhibited high
performance, but there is no discernable relationship between option portfolio breadth
and performance for the rest of the sample. Also, several high performing firms such as
Samsung and LG had high performance with narrower options portfolios than Panasonic,
Sharp, and Sony.
The nature of the relationship between option breadth and performance is unclear.
Panasonic, Sharp, and Sony may have managed their technology options well and
benefitted from the flexibility. On the other hand, it may simply be coincidence that the
firms holding the widest portfolios all had high performance. Alternatively, prior high
performance may have fueled the ability to develop broader than average portfolios. It
appears logical that firms that had suitably-timed options on a-Si technology should have
performed well even if their portfolios were not wide. However, Sony’s experience
questions this line of thinking. Sony only developed access to a-Si production well after
the market had already grown and did so through joint venture arrangements. Sony’s
performance suffered for some time before it entered these arrangements, but appears to
have rebounded.
Several other points are worth discussing before proceeding to the next section.
First, it is interesting that Sharp should be in the group of firms with the broadest
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portfolios given its strong commitment to LCD. Sharp’s public image as the LCD
company and its aggressive investments in a-Si production – where Sharp is often the
first firm to build a new generation line – would appear to imply the firm is not involved
in other display technologies, but this has not been the case. Sharp held options on FED,
OLED and PALC, and produced EL displays for a number of years. Second, in contrast
to Sharp, Sony’s wide portfolio seems to “fit” with its approach to flat panel displays.
Sony has been critical of the quality of several technologies including a-Si. Sony has
kept its options open. Its investments in a-Si have been limited to JVs, with a clear focus
on reliable procurement of high quality LCDs for its TV business. Sony appears to have
been actively searching for a display technology superior to a-Si that would also provide
it the opportunity to develop and maintain a proprietary capability.
This section examined and compared the breadth of technology options portfolios
held by the firms studied. Another important aspect of options is their level, or depth, in
terms of their position on the options ladders discussed in the prior chapter. The next
section considers the depth of options portfolios held by firms.

Option portfolio depth
The firms studied exhibited large variation in the depth of options portfolios in
addition to breadth discussed above. The option ladder graphically depicts the depth
levels of options. To allow for ready comparison, the depth data shown in each firm’s
option ladders must be simplified and summarized. The number of technology options
can be measured at a number of different levels on the option ladder. However, counting
the number of technologies a firm has invested in mass-producing is a readily
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interpretable measure of depth when considered in conjunction with the total number of
technology options developed by the firm. Table 6-2, below, provides the number of
technologies in which each firm invested in mass-production capabilities for (including
investments in production joint venture). It also shows how many of the technologies
each firm exited production. The total breadth, as well as TV and Display business
performance data is identical to that in Table 6-1 and is included to aid interpretation.
There is no readily identifiable pattern between number of technologies massproduced and performance. Firms with broader options portfolios have opportunities to
invest in producing in greater numbers of technology types; accordingly there is some
correlation between these two measures. However, high and low performing firms are
interspersed without relationship to the relative depth of the options held by the firm in
question.
Real options logic suggests firms hold options open under uncertainty, but
execute or exit options as uncertainty decreases. As uncertainty decreases, some options
lose value and others gain value. Those gaining would be more likely to be executed and
those losing would be candidates for abandonment. Through this process, real options
logic suggests holding many lower cost options, and executing only a relative few. Real
options logic would therefore predict options portfolios be characterized by being broad
at the low levels, and deep for only a small subset of the total options the firm holds. Of
all the firms holding options, none committed to as many technologies as it held options
on. This is in agreement with real options logic. As far as performance goes, however,
no pattern could be identified. There was no discernable relationship between the
tendency to make commitments and performance.
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Table 6-2: Depth of Technology Options
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The value of an option changes with the level of uncertainty and therefore is not
constant over time. In the next section, time will be considered further.

Timing of options
Timing has a large impact on the value of real options. To obtain maximum
benefit from developing and maintaining options, firms need to execute them at the most
opportune time and in the right scale.
Figures 6-1A and B show building, startup, and shut down of a-Si LCD lines over
time by focal firms by line generation. To simplify presentation, middle generation lines
were grouped together with the earlier generation (for example generation 7.5 was
included in generation 7). Figures 6-2A and B provide similar data for PDP lines of focal
firms. Unlike LCD, PDP production lines do not have defined generations. Figure 6-3
shows production start dates of PDP plants by substrate size, providing some indication
of production capability. In both LCD and PDP, data on new line startup is publicly
available, and final shutdown of production lines is generally clear from the historical
record as well. Announcements of construction starts and plant modification are not
always made public and are therefore imperfect. Data is limited for a small number of
early LCD lines that were started in the late 1980s through 1992. These lines are
depicted in a section below Generation one on Figure 6-1A. Such lines were generally
prototyping and R&D lines and were not capable of large-scale mass production.
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Early LCD entrants were generally from one of two industry backgrounds: IT and
consumer electronics. IT firms included Fujitsu, NEC, and Toshiba. These firms were
interested in obtaining sources of displays for laptops. Consumer electronics firms
appear to have had different reasons for entering; some had longer-term TV aspirations.
Several firms were active in both IT and consumer electronics, including Hitachi and
Mitsubishi. As the industry developed, panel types used in very large volume, in
particular those found in computing applications, became commoditized. Over time, the
production of such commodity LCD panels moved largely from Japanese firms to other
producers, in particular Taiwanese and Korean firms. The reasons for this shift appear to
include both size of investment requirements and willingness to take risk in the face of
the crystal cycle. Computing firms have either exited flat panel production or focused
upon developing displays that meet the needs of small niche applications.
Early generations of LCD production had option value relating to capability
development and product output. Some generations provided more flexibility in potential
product markets than others. The earlier generation plants run by Japanese firms were
incapable of making large displays. On the other hand, the latest generations using
largest substrate are only suitable for making very large displays. In particular,
generation ten lines are only suitable for TV production. 1 The middle generations
provide the greatest variety of potential applications. Investments originally intended for
laptop display production were also used to produce displays used in portable TVs, music
players, cell phones, navigation systems, and many other applications.

1

In person interview with Tsuyoshi Numagami, March 13, 2009.
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LCD plants up to and including generation 5 provide additional flexibility
because they can produce LTPS as well as a-Si panels with modifications. Larger
generation plants do not have this flexibility because some of the required equipment has
been deemed too large and difficult to make by production equipment manufacturers. 2
While middle generations allow display makers to keep options open in terms of display
application markets, later generations are increasingly committed to the TV market.
Plants integrating panel and TV set production, such as Sharp’s Kameyama plant, are
evidence of TV set commitments. These newer generation plants capable of producing
with large substrates also require much greater investment than earlier generations.
The only Japanese firms investing in a-Si production capacity past generation 5
were Sharp and IPS Alpha. Korean and Taiwanese firms have invested much more
aggressively in newer generations. In the midst of strong competition from Korean and
Taiwanese firms, Sharp moved to a closed innovation model with the goal of developing
proprietary technologies to reduce production cost.
The historical development overview depicted in Figures 6-3 and 6-4 fails to
uncover a clear relationship between investment timing and performance. Many but not
all early movers exited the market. Firms surviving in the end were a mixture of early
movers and followers.
To further examine the data, firms were placed into three groups based upon
timing of a-Si entrance and compared using option data discussed in the sections above.
The first group included early entrants into a-Si production defined as those firms that

2

Ibid.

264

invested in Generation one or early production facilities. The second group was
comprised of firms that entered a-Si in later generations. The third group of firms did not
enter a-Si. Table 6-3, below, provides means of the number of technology options
generated and technologies mass produced for these three groups.
The groups differed in a number of ways including the mean number of
technology options held, the propensity to produce flat panel displays through joint
ventures, the likelihood of exiting production, and performance. Firms that developed or
obtained a-Si TFT LCD production capabilities had larger mean numbers of display
technology options than those that did not regardless of the measure used. With the
exception of Sharp, firms that produced a-Si all had joint venture arrangements relating to
flat panel display production. 3 On the other hand, firms without a-Si TFT LCD
production were much less involved with joint ventures; Pioneer was the only firm in this
group to have related JV arrangements. These arrangements were limited and not central
to large flat panel production. Late movers mass produced, on average, more types of
display technologies, but were less likely to exit production. The reduced likelihood of
exit makes sense as these firms waited until uncertainty levels fell before investing.
Performance in the TV set business and display business of those firms having no
a-Si production exposure was low across the board. However, it was mixed for the early
and late mover groups. Based upon this data, it is difficult to say what timing would have
been ideal even in retrospect. However, the evidence here does not suggest early movers
outperformed late movers.

3

At the time of writing, Sharp and Sony have entered into a joint venture agreement, but
production has not yet commenced.
265

Table 6-3: Comparison of Groups with Early, Late, and no a-Si TFT LCD Production Entry
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The PDP story is different from a-Si. PDP has been capable of large applications
(those requiring around 50” diagonal size) from the early days of production, however the
number of applications it is suitable for is also limited because it is not effective at
smaller, high resolution applications and has higher energy requirements than a-Si LCD.
Although several firms briefly made large computer monitors using PDP displays, these
were always niche products. The only two applications PDP was really suited for were
TV sets and public information displays such as those found in airports, railway stations,
and hotels.
From a real options perspective, PDP had less option value than LCD because the
potential market applications were more limited. LCD technology was potentially
valuable in many market applications; if it proved to be unsuitable for one it would still
have value in another. Even in earlier stage single color segment type panels, LCD’s
potential for low power, portable applications was clear. In the 1970s LCD became a
calculator display technology. As the technology progressed it was used in an increasing
number of low power, portable applications (see Chapter Three). What probably could
not be foreseen was LCD’s entrance into applications where size and power consumption
mattered less, such as automotive displays and pachinko machines. Since LCD was
suitable for more markets, the total market uncertainty it faced was lower than was the
case for PDP. The large number of potential applications meant it offered greater
flexibility and therefore had higher value. This is not to say it was clear that LCD was
more or less suited to TV set usage than PDP at any point in time. Rather, the flexibility
offered by the technology made it a palatable investment even in the event it should not
work out as a TV display.
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The PDP production line investments depicted in Figures 6-4 A&B show firms
developing options on low volume prototype lines and executing production options by
follow up investments in mass production lines. Points denoting the start of joint
ventures are shown at the top of these figures.
Table 6-4 compares mean numbers of options, technologies produced and exited
for early movers into PDP production with those for late movers and firms that never had
a PDP production capability. Early entrants were defined as those having a production
capability running by the end of 1996. No pattern of performance is apparent between
the different groups in Table 6-4 with respect to either the TV business or the display
business. Late movers exhibited a lower rate of production exit than the other groups, as
was the case in the above analysis of the a-Si TFT LCD groups.
Theory emphasizes the relationship between timing and the value of options.
However, the analysis above failed to identify a relationship between long-term
performance and the timing of option exercise (entry into mass production). Failure to
uncover such a relationship does not mean that it does not exist. The relationship may be
complex or it may not be discernable without controlling for other factors. The question
of timing will be reconsidered in the pairwise comparison of cases appearing later in this
chapter.
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Table 6-4: Comparison of Groups with Early, Late, and no PDP Production Entry
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Serial and Parallel Options Pathways
Another aspect of timing has to do with how options are developed and
maintained, either in serial or parallel. Canon’s option ladder (Figure 6-32) in the prior
chapter shows a clear serial pattern. One display technology option is pursued and
abandoned, to be followed by another. Other firms studied exhibited more parallel
options maintenance than Canon. While development may not be undertaken
simultaneously on multiple display technologies, most firms keep more than one
technology “in-play” at a time.
Serial options pathways, where one technology is abandoned before the next is
invested in, have less flexibility compared with parallel pathways. Part of the value of
the abandoned option may be retained, but it cannot be easily executed once abandoned.
When uncertainty is high, then, real options logic suggests parallel paths to be superior to
serial. Most firms developed and maintained options in parallel. Canon’s serial pattern
was unusual.
Canon made bets on one technology at a time. In effect, Canon appears to have
thought it could outsmart uncertainty, but it did not. Its resulting performance has been
poor with regard to TVs and display technology in general. Although the company
announced its intention to enter the TV business several times since the year 2000 it has
yet to do so. It has also not become a major display producer.
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Integrating Options Pathway Type and Strike Timing Aspects
Investments required to enter mass production of flat panels are large by any
measure, including requirements for managerial and engineering talent as well as
financial resources. Parallel development of technologies at lower levels requires fewer
resources than those needed to build new production capabilities simultaneously.
Keeping options open at lower levels on the option ladder is easier than doing so at
higher levels, suggesting that parallel pathways should be prevalent at lower level.
Investments at higher levels should be more serial in nature. This is not to say firms
should not or cannot invest in production capabilities associated with more than one
display technology; rather, they should not attempt to simultaneously build new
production capabilities for two alternative technologies. Although building two
capabilities at the same time might increase flexibility of the firm, at the same time it
would put extreme pressure on the financial and managerial resources of all but the
largest firms. For example, limitations to financial resources might result in building
production capabilities inferior to competitors across multiple display technologies. In
this case, the new production capabilities would begin with a handicap. Another
possibility is that stress on managerial attention and technological capabilities would
limit the speed and effectiveness of development of the production capability, in which
case the firm would fall behind competitors focusing on single technologies.
Interestingly, two firms that pursued simultaneous development of two new production
capabilities were also, for a time, cutting edge developers of PDP and LCD technologies,
Hitachi and Fujitsu.
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Hitachi and Fujitsu played key roles in developing LCD and PDP technologies.
Hitachi was the first to successfully develop the In-Plane Switching mode of LCD, and
Fujitsu discovered Multi-Domain Vertical Alignment (Sangyo Times, 1995, 1998).
These two modes were breakthrough improvements allowing increased viewing angles
and therefore increasing the suitability of LCD to TV applications. Both firms also had
leading PDP technologies. Fujitsu developed Alternative Lighting of Surface technology,
which became widely used in PDPs (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Despite having the technologies at early stages, these two firms exited large panel
display production and neither became a major player in the TV business. The inability
to focus on a single technology at the right time has been suggested as a reason for the
poor performance. To paraphrase the comments of one informant: “We have a lot of
resources compared with other firms, but we can’t support more than one large display
technology development and production in house… They (Hitachi) wouldn’t be able to
do a good job of that either. 4”
Samsung and LG appear to have followed a similar path to that of Fujitsu and
Hitachi but with very different results. Two things make the experiences of these Korean
firms different from Hitachi and Fujitsu. First, the technologies were more mature when
the Korean firms entered, increasing the availability of know how and other resources
outside the firm. Second, the Korean groups did not pursue multiple new display
technologies simultaneously inside the same company. Samsung SDI, a Samsung group
company with experience in CRTs, concentrated on building a PDP capability. Samsung
Electric, a focal group company with experience in LCDs, focused upon LCD
4

In person anonymous interview: March 27, 2009.
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capabilities. These made sense from the standpoint of leveraging existing capabilities as
PDP uses phosphors like CRTS and LCD production shares communalities with
semiconductor production. Similarly, LG group divided LCD and PDP between different
group companies. Fujitsu and Hitachi, on the other hand, built the capabilities first
internally and then made separate entities. The Fujitsu Hitachi Plasma display joint
venture integrated capabilities the firms already had. Another difference between Fujitsu
and Hitachi and the Korean firms was branding and marketing capability. Neither Fujitsu
nor Hitachi can be considered to be major consumer electronics brands (Hitachi is
arguably strong in consumer appliances in Japan). LG and Samsung have built stronger
brands and better market positions than Hitachi and Fujitsu.

Pairwise comparison
The purpose of this section is to compare several dramatically different cases in
the sample to isolate variation and mechanisms that are difficult to observe when all of
the cases are considered simultaneously. To achieve this, the two top incumbent
Japanese TV set manufacturers, Sony and Panasonic, are each compared against a
company that attempted to dramatically improve its position in the TV set industry
through exercise of display technologies options. Table 6.5 below divides the focal firms
by the tier they belonged to in the TV set industry before flat panel TV became prevalent
and at the end of the study. Of the firms attempting to improve their place in the
industry, Sharp and Pioneer exhibit the greatest variance in outcomes. Furthermore,
when compared with the larger group of firms studied, Sharp and Pioneer are particularly

273

salient because they have been regarded as leaders in the display technologies they
specialized in during the period flat panel TV was becoming prevalent. 5 Sharp is of
particular interest because it is the sole firm that was able to leverage its display
technology capability into a long-term performance improvement in the TV set industry.
As Sony has focused its flat panel TV set business primarily on LCD technology, Sharp
and Sony form a suitable comparison. Pioneer’s case is interesting because it was
considered by critics to have the best screens and TV sets in the business. As Pioneer and
Panasonic both focused primarily on PDP technology for their TV set businesses, these
two firms form the second pair for analysis.

Table 6-5: Japanese TV Set Makers by Tier

Note: Firms in bold are those attempting to use technological capability to improve
position in TV set industry.
Sources: Author analysis based upon Fuji Chimera (1998-2007), in person interviews
anonymous informants (Interview dates: November 4, 2008; March 11, 18, 19, 27, 2009)
and an in person interview with Tsuyoshi Numagami (March 13, 2009).

5

Fujitsu and Hitachi were known for key technological breakthroughs, these
achievements occurred earlier.
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Sony and Panasonic had been the top two Japanese TV set manufacturers for
many years before flat panel display technologies became feasible for use in TV sets.
They had developed strong market power, strong brands, and highly effective distribution
networks. By comparison, Sharp and Pioneer were not strong players in the industry
before flat panel TV. Sharp had built a third tier TV business that relied on others to
supply cathode ray tubes for set production. Pioneer was a small niche player in the TV
industry prior to entering flat panel TV.
Although the strengths of Sony and Panasonic did not directly reduce the market
uncertainty faced by these firms, the market power they held reduced uncertainty about
these firms’ future positions in these markets. Furthermore, past performance in the CRT
TV market is evidence these firms had developed powerful ways of ascertaining
customer needs accurately and meeting these needs effectively. While other firms may
have had superior display technology options, those may have not provided sufficient
advantage to successfully challenge Sony and Panasonic, given their existing strengths.

Sharp-Sony comparison
Prior to the introduction of flat panel television, Sharp was far behind Sony in the
TV set industry. While Sony had market power, Sharp did not. This difference in market
power meant that Sharp needed to have a major advantage over Sony in technology in
order to actually compete. Evidence suggests LCD technology provided such an
advantage in this case.
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Sharp entered flat panel television early with its 8 and 10-inch models in 1995
(Sangyo Times, 1995). It released a bold new line of LCD TVs in 2000 under the subbrand “Aquos” (Sangyo Times, 2001). Sony, on the other hand, was slow to enter flat
panel television. Sony first used an LCD in portable a video tape player in 1990 (Sony
web site). While Sony released a PALC based TV in the late 1990s, this was not massproduced (Sangyo Times, 1997). First evidence of a consumer LCD TV by the brand
was the release of a 15” wireless model in 2000 (Nikkei BP, 2000). In 2002, Sony began
selling LCD TVs using its main TV sub-brand, Wega (Sony web site). Trying to identify
exactly how far behind of Sharp Sony was is tricky. Sharp’s first consumer LCD TV
went on sale a full five years before Sony’s. Furthermore, Sharp already had a dedicated
LCD TV brand in 2000, but Sony only began adding flat panel products to its main TV
line in 2002. Sony introduced its Bravia sub-brand for flat panel TVs in 2005, a full five
years after Sharp had similarly developed a FP TV brand (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
As flat panel TV grew into a meaningful part of the TV market, Sony lost share to
competitors, including Sharp and others that leapfrogged it into flat panel TV. However,
Sony was able to recover its position a number of years after changing its TV focus to flat
panel. Sharp was an early winner in flat panel TV and maintained a much stronger
position than it held previously, even after Sony (and its rival Panasonic) reestablished
their strength in the market. How was this possible for Sharp when other companies with
strong display capabilities failed to maintain positions in the TV set business?
Figure 6-4 below compares the timing of entry into a-Si LCD mass production
between Sharp and Sony. Sharp began producing a-Si more than 10 years before Sony.
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Chart 6-1 depicts the cumulative number of Japanese patents on LCD technology held by
Sharp and Sony beginning in 1990. This data shows a large and expanding gap, with
Sharp far in the lead ahead of Sony in patenting. Chart 6-2 examines the total TFT-LCD
production of Sharp and Sony. Comparison of a-Si production does not provide much
additional information over what was shown in Figure 6-6, as Sony entered a-Si only
recently and only through a joint venture. Accordingly, the data used for the comparison
covers LCD technology relatively broadly. Again, this data shows Sharp years ahead of
Sony across the study time frame.
The different data comparing Sony and Sharp all suggest that Sharp had a very
large lead on LCD technology compared with Sony. This lead gave Sharp the time it
needed to build its brand and establish a strong place in the industry.
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Chart 6-1: Sony and Sharp - Cumulative LCD Patents Starting 1990
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Chart 6-2: Sony and Sharp – Annual LCD Production Value, All TFT Types
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Pioneer – Panasonic Comparison
Like Sony, Panasonic had a strong market position in CRT television. Panasonic
has historically focused on cost efficiency and wide distribution. Although Panasonic’s
brand may not have been as strong as Sony’s, Panasonic was arguably stronger than Sony
in these other areas. Like Sony, Panasonic had strong market power. Its strength and
control in the Japanese domestic distribution network was unparalleled by competitors.
This had virtually guaranteed sales, reducing the risk of production investments
compared to that faced by competitors.
Like Sharp, Pioneer was highly regarded for its flat panel display technology.
However, the Pioneer story is quite different from that of Sharp. Pioneer’s PDP TVs
were lauded by experts for having deeper blacks and generally better picture quality than
TVs made by other manufacturers. However, the empirical evidence in this study does
not suggest Pioneer actually had a large lead on Panasonic in PDP technology. Indeed,
Panasonic appears to have entered into mass production of PDP before Pioneer (See
Figure 6-5), although Pioneer and Panasonic began releasing PDP TVs in the same time
frame, around 1997-1998. Data on cumulative Japanese patents on PDP technology for
the two companies suggests Pioneer lagged Panasonic in terms of PDP patents over the
entire study period (See Chart 6-3). Chart 6-4 examines cumulative PDP production by
the two firms. Here, it appears Pioneer produced more than Panasonic early on, but was
overtaken by Panasonic. It is difficult to say whether Pioneer initially benefited from
proceeding along the learning curve in front of Panasonic, however any advantage it
might have had does not appear to have been major, and was certainly short-lived.
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Panasonic’s approach to the TV market was to fill different TV size needs in the
market using display technologies suited for them. As the technologies matured, the size
ranges each covered changed. This strategy initially divided the market into three
groups: small LCD TVs, mid-size CRT TVs, and large PDP TVs. Panasonic produced
all three.
Panasonic was not one of the first into the LCD TV market, but not one of the last
either. In 1999, it introduced a 15-inch LCD TV and in 2000, a 22-inch model (Sangyo
Times, 2001). Panasonic’s market entry was after Sharp, but before Sony.
In comparison, Pioneer limited its approach to large sized TVs; it did not attempt
to become a full line TV manufacturer. The emphasis on larger sized TVs may have
contributed to Pioneer’s poor performance as it reduced Pioneer’s chance of reaching
Panasonic’s scale and the resulting cost competitiveness in non-production activities.
Altogether the data suggests Pioneer never had a significant lead against
Panasonic, and may have trailed it the entire study time frame. To be successful in
competing with Panasonic, Pioneer would have needed a large enough advantage to
compensate for its relative weaknesses in other areas such as distribution and efficiency.
This was not the case.
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Chart 6-3: Pioneer and Panasonic - Cumulative PDP Patents Starting 1990
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Chart 6-4: Pioneer and Panasonic – Annual PDP Production Value
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Panasonic, on the other hand, had sufficient market power it did not have to rush
into large scale adoption of a new display technology. Its sales might be reduced
temporarily if it did not have suitable investments in the newly dominant technology, but
market power bought it time. By comparison, smaller firms gaining a significant position
in the TV industry may have been able to launch successful niche products, but building
sufficient market share and scale was difficult and took many years if even possible.
However, with such strong market power, and large market position, a firm such as
Panasonic could make rapid, bold commitments in production capacity as uncertainty
decreased. Panasonic’s investments in PDP plants with the world’s largest capacities
(see Figure 6-3) and purchase of a controlling stake in IPS-Alpha, are evidence of such
commitments.

Comparison between Sharp and Pioneer
Sharp’s approach to LCD differed from Pioneer’s approach to PDP in several
ways. Perhaps the most important was the way Sharp reduced its total exposure to
market uncertainty by developing a variety of adjacent markets for LCD displays. The
number and variety of products incorporating Sharp-made LCDs is truly astounding 6.
Examples include laptops and computer monitors, portable game machines (e.g.,
Nintendo DS), commercial pachinko machines, cars, cell phones, PDAs and many more.
By comparison, Pioneer PDPs were really only suitable for two major applications: TV
and public displays such as those used in airports and train terminals.

6

Evidence suggests Hitachi followed a similar approach early in LCD’s development
(1970s – mid 1980s), but this did not continue. Other focal firms may have started with
similar intentions, but later focused on certain display size ranges or sub-technologies.
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Sharp’s approach allowed it to commit resources on LCD knowing that it held or
could develop market options in a large number of different application markets. In
effect, by holding a large number of market options, Sharp was able to reduce its total
exposure to market uncertainty to a greater degree than its competitors.
Pioneer’s PDP focus limited its ability to reduce the total market uncertainty it
faced because PDP had few other potential applications beyond TV and public displays.
Coupled with the lack of a significant technological lead, this may have made it difficult
for Pioneer management to make the continued large investments required to build and
maintain a strong position in the industry. Given the situation, it most likely would not
have been reasonable for Pioneer to try to continue to maintain these large investments.
Pioneer would not necessarily have done much better if Panasonic had put its
main emphasis on LCD instead of PDP. Pioneer might have enjoyed a short-term
technological advantage that could have given it some time to increase its efficiency,
build its brand, and develop its distribution. However, in the longer term, it is
questionable whether Pioneer would have been able to become competitive enough fast
enough to match the already strong firms focusing on LCD, especially as LCD costs and
sizes improved so rapidly over time.

The Relevance of Options and Uncertainty for Panasonic, Pioneer, Sharp, and Sony
Although the exogenous uncertainty faced by these firms may have been the
same, the potential impact of this uncertainty differed amongst the firms. Prior to the
development of the flat panel display technologies discussed here, none of the players
would have known which technology would become dominant. They also could not have
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known if holding options on the dominant one would necessarily translate into
competitive advantage. However, the potential impact of holding or not holding options
was different between the firms.
Panasonic and Sony had established positions in the market. Technology options
represented a way to defend these established businesses. In the end, the advantages
these two firms had – other than display technology – were strong enough they could
return to high performance even after failing to invest heavily in the technology that
became dominant. Neither Panasonic nor Sony had made big bets early on a-Si LCD;
Panasonic even transferred most of its LCD capability to a JV majority controlled by
Toshiba, effectively increasing its emphasis on PDP. Later, after uncertainty declined,
Panasonic bought its way into control of IPS Alpha to obtain a production capability for
large a-Si LCDs. Panasonic managed to rebound despite having guessed wrong.
Sony appears to have been searching for a display it could use to differentiate
itself as it had done with the Trinitron in CRT TV. It did not develop a large-scale a-Si
production capability, and has relied on sourcing from other firms and joint ventures with
competitors. Like Panasonic, it has bought access to a-Si production.
For Sharp, LCD was a technology suitable for a broad variety of applications, and
one it had unusually strong capabilities in. The TV set industry represented an
opportunity for Sharp to further apply this capability. Sharp had a goal of becoming a
strong, respected TV producer. However, when it bet on LCD, Sharp was making a
much more general bet – that LCD would be an attractive display technology for a
variety of different applications. Sharp’s position as an “also ran” in TVs meant that it
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had little to lose in this respect. Where LCD was concerned, Sharp would have probably
continued to bet on LCD even if it were clear it would not work in TVs.
Although most of Sharp’s investments in display technology were related to LCD
it developed a few other display technology options. Paradoxically, developing these
options may have increased Sharp’s awareness of LCD’s capabilities and Sharp’s strong
position with regard to LCD technology.
Pioneer, on the other hand, was clearly betting on TVs when it invested in PDP
technology. Public displays were the only other application PDPs really worked for,
although they were briefly sold as computer monitors. Pioneer had been a small producer
of TVs, relying on other firms for tubes, and focusing on large sized sets. It had not been
involved in industries that used PDPs for other applications. PDPs represented a way for
Pioneer to enter the mainstream TV industry if the bet worked for them. Note that
Pioneer’s bets in OLED were made by a subsidiary firm and were focused on small
displays. OLED output used in house went into producing car stereos. Pioneer’s bet
relied on several things going right. First, PDP had to become a dominant display
technology for TV sets, and second Pioneer had to be able to become a competitive PDP
producer in terms of quality, efficiency and distribution.

Performance revisited
The interpretation above presents the opportunity to reevaluate the performance
question within a more nuanced understanding of the options held. Both Pioneer and
Sharp were third tier TV producers that attempted to use flat panel display technologies
to improve their position in the industry. Although both firms had options on more than
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one display technology, when it came to a display to use in televisions, they had far fewer
options. Pioneer was betting exclusively on PDP for TVs; Sharp had a long history
developing EL and subsequent brief work on FED and PALC, in addition to its strong
commitment to LCD.
When it comes to TV displays, Sharp and Pioneer had narrower options portfolios
than Sony or Panasonic. Further, the investments made in production capabilities made
by Sharp and Pioneer represented much larger bets for them than would have been the
case of similar investments by Panasonic and Sony, which were much larger firms. In
other words, production investments that might have been option-like for Panasonic or
Sony may have been closer to commitments for Pioneer and Sharp.
Put in this context, Sharp could be considered as “lucky” and Pioneer as
“unlucky.” The technology Sharp bet on became dominant, and the technology Pioneer
bet on did not. Theory suggested firms with narrow portfolios were likely to exhibit
more extreme outcomes than those with wide portfolios. This reevaluation of
performance is in agreement with theory.
However, there appears more to this than luck. Certainly, Sharp was lucky that
LCD became dominant in the TV set application. However, Sharp had also been adept at
reducing its overall uncertainty by developing a large variety of alternative applications.
In the case where technological uncertainty was high and market needs uncertainty low,
real options theory suggested firms should hold technology options and commit to market
needs. This is what Panasonic and Sony did. Both firms may have been slow to
recognize the change in the market and switch over from CRT to flat panel, however they
both had broad technology options portfolios.
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Sharp and Pioneer did not follow real options logic in the same way as Panasonic
and Sony. Sharp, it appears, did something near the opposite of what theory suggests.
Sharp committed to LCD and developed options on a large number of product markets
for LCDs. In some, it competed on the level of finished goods, and for others was a
panel supplier. Pioneer meanwhile, took the risky approach of committing to both a
product market it was weak in, TV sets, and an unproven technology it did not have a
lead in, PDP.

Chapter Conclusion and Implications for Real Options Reasoning
This chapter analyzed differences of breadth and depth of options portfolios held
by firms, and timing of options exercise. It searched for patterns and relationships
between option-related behavior and performance outcomes. It also performed pairwise
analysis of four firms exhibiting large variance in the sample.
The firms with the broadest options portfolios were all high performing firms.
This observation does not suggest causality; indeed, these firms may simply have had
enough resources to pursue more options. Other analysis presented here were unable to
identify any relationship between options portfolios or timing of exercise and
performance. While it appears that firms in the industry generally behaved as expected
by real options reasoning, they did not necessarily benefit from developing and
maintaining options on alternative technologies. Top-tier incumbent firms suffered shortterm performance decreases despite holding large portfolios of technology options.
Market power enabled these firms to regain their positions once they obtained access to
sufficient production capability. Second and third-tier incumbent firms, with the single
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exception of Sharp, were unable to turn investments in leading display technology into
durable improvements in their market positions. This was true both for those following a
more commitment-like investment approach such as Pioneer as well as those with
broader portfolios such as Hitachi.
The following chapter discusses the findings of the study in terms of theory and
the propositions developed in Chapter one. Additional theorizing took place over the
course of the research and analysis. Post hoc analysis relating to this theorizing is also
included in the following chapter.

292

CHAPTER SEVEN: RELATING STUDY FINDINGS TO THEORY

This chapter has two purposes: first it weighs evidence from the study regarding
the propositions developed in Chapter one. Second, it performs post hoc analysis based
upon theorizing that occurred over the course of this research. This post hoc analysis
considers broadly how and whether firms dynamically react to discontinuous changes to
uncertainty levels. Whereas the prior chapter examined the data broadly, the emphasis of
this chapter is on considering specific questions.

Option-related Behavior
One question this research asked was: do firms behave as real options logic
suggests they should? The flat panel TV set industry studied herein was characterized by
low market needs uncertainty and high technological uncertainty. In an environment
with this profile of uncertainty levels, real options logic suggests firms should hold
options on technologies. P1 argued that in the face of technological uncertainty, firms
will develop and hold technology options. Display screens are considered key devices in
TV sets. Historical analysis of the industry suggests that firms with strong display screen
technologies have been able to leverage this to effectively differentiate their products or
reduce costs in the past. Accordingly, if there is a high level of uncertainty regarding
which display technology will be used in television sets in the future, real options
reasoning suggests firms should hold options on more than one display technology.
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The evidence from this study is in agreement with P1. All focal firms developed
and held options on more than one display technology 7. Amongst the non-focal TV set
producing firms, Funai Electric, a firm that never had its own display mass production
capability to begin with, was the single exception. There was variation in the number of
technologies firms invested in. Several firms developed as many as 7 technologies.
Furthermore, these technology options were developed and held largely in parallel and
therefore represented competing options on multiple technologies.
Although not a TV set producer, Canon is worthy of note because it was the only
firm in the study that did not develop display technologies in parallel. Canon developed
them in serial form, giving up on one before starting work on the next. Other firms with
minor or no TV set production capability held options on multiple competing
technologies. This suggests in the face of high technological uncertainty but a large
certain potential market (TV sets), firms generally hold options on multiple alternative
technologies, as predicted by real options logic.
Moving beyond P1 but continuing with the same general question of behavior,
real options logic implies firms should not commit to all of the technologies they develop
options on. Compared with low cost, easily reversed investments like R&D, investment
in mass production capabilities is less option-like in that it is more costly and may be less
reversible. Accordingly, if real options logic accurately predicts how firms act, firms
should develop and hold options on more technologies than they develop mass
production capabilities for. The analysis contained in Chapter six found that none of the
firms entered mass production of all of the technologies which they held options on.
7

Some of the display technologies developed may not have been intended for TV
applications, as was the case with Pioneer’s OLED development.
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Therefore, in this case as well, the firms studied behaved as real options logic would
predict. Post hoc analyses were performed to ascertain if firms changed their options
portfolios dynamically in response to significant changes in uncertainty levels, as real
options logic predicts they should. This analysis is contained at the end of this chapter.
Some observations included in the analysis agree with the predictions of real options
reasoning, and some are ambiguous. No findings appear to contract theory, however.
Altogether, these different analyses discussed above find general support for the
behavioral predictions of real options logic. In the next section, the research questions
related to performance predictions of real options logic are examined.

Performance and options
Performance implications of option-like investment were also proposed in
Chapter One. The general notion of P3 and P4 is that in the face of technological
uncertainty, firms making commitments to single technologies will experience extreme
performance outcomes, whereas those holding options on numerous alternative
technologies will not exhibit such extreme outcomes.
This logic argues that some firms would make a winning bet by committing to a
single technology, and obtain a high payoff without the cost of developing and holding
multiple options. However, when the firm did not place a winning bet, it would exhibit
low performance. Although both high and low performance outcomes are expected in
general, the odds of identifying both outcomes are not symmetrical. A very large sample
may be required to find “lucky” firms that made singular commitments that turned out to
be winning bets, and obtained high performance. Accordingly, failure to identify a high
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performing firm making the “winning” bets does not invalidate the theory but fails to
offer support.
The industry studied has a relatively small number of competitors and they
generally held options on multiple technologies. Given this situation, it first appears that
P3 and P4 cannot be evaluated using the data herein, but with some interpretation and
adjustment it is possible to evaluate the general line of thinking involved in these two
propositions.
Initial analysis indicated all of the focal firms developed and held options on
display technologies. In this sense, no firm was identified as having a pure commitment.
On the other hand, subsequent additional analysis of Pioneer suggested its development
of OLED, taken on by a subsidiary and focused on small displays for car audio, and later
cell phones, could be considered as a separate operation without specific relevance for
Pioneer’s TV set business. Reconsideration of other firm’s portfolios failed to uncover
other firms making commitments similar to Pioneer.
However, it is also possible to commit while still holding options. In other words,
a firm may make a major commitment to a single technology while developing and
holding options on alternatives. This is what Sharp did. Sharp committed to LCD
technology, investing heavily in LCD and numerous liquid crystal related display
technologies. Over the study period, it also developed, maintained, and in most cases
abandoned options on alternative display technologies.
Amongst the focal firms, Sharp and Pioneer stand out as making commitments.
Other firms made major investments, but these weren’t commitments in the face of
uncertainty to the extent of those made by Sharp or Pioneer. For example, Panasonic has
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made large investments in PDP production; however early investments were small given
Panasonic’s size and later commitment-like investments were made as uncertainty
declined.
The performance of Pioneer and Sharp exhibit both high and low extremes.
Pioneer has experienced significant financial losses relating to its PDP and TV set
businesses. It has already exited PDP and is in the process of exiting the TV industry
altogether. As such, it serves as an example of extreme performance by a firm
committing to a single technology.
Sharp’s case is more nuanced, but supports the notion that firms committing to
winning bets will have high performance. Sharp had a strong, historical commitment to
LCD. Sharp used the technology (or produced it for other firms) for every application it
was suitable for. Sharp also had options on other display technologies, however many of
Sharp’s options were on variants of LCD, and the relative size of the commitment to
LCD and its variants was overwhelming in comparison to the size of the investments it
made options on alternatives. Sharp was lucky in the sense that LCD became the
dominant flat panel TV display technology. On the other hand, given the number of nonTV applications Sharp’s LCDs successfully competed in, Sharp would probably have
exhibited respectable performance even if LCD had lost out in the TV set business.
Sharp can be considered as a high performing firm with a large LCD commitment.
Altogether, the findings are in agreement with P3 and P4. The data do not offer
perfect examples of commitments to single technologies used in theorizing behind the
propositions, however both Sharp and Pioneer clearly made commitments to display
technologies, and exhibited performance extremes.
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The implicit idea behind real options logic is that firms should - on average enjoy performance benefits through practicing it when compared to those that do not
practice real options logic. Firms making commitments in the face of uncertainty would
have the highest performance if they made the winning bet, but accompanying this would
be long odds. Firms holding options might not have such high performance, but theory
suggested they would be less likely to exhibit very low performance, or exit.
However, with the exception of the performance outliers Sharp and Pioneer, one
thing striking about the industry is how little technology options portfolios seem to have
mattered to performance of the other players. While some players attempted to use
technology to improve their positions, Sharp was the only one to gain durable
improvement.
Hitachi kept options open in both LCD and PDP, even investing in production
facilities for both. Despite the fact Hitachi’s technology was advanced it was unable to
improve its place in the TV market. Canon tried to outsmart uncertainty investing in
SED as its plan to enter the TV business. SED never entered mass production and Canon
failed to enter the market. In terms of the TV industry, both Hitachi and Canon remained
essentially on the same trajectory as they had been prior to the development of flat panel
display technology. This was also the case for the other firms in the study.
This section discussed evidence relating to propositions developed in Chapter
one. Evidence was in agreement with real options reasoning’s predictions of firm
behavior under uncertainty. Evidence regarding the performance implications
hypothesized was also supportive with some interpretation. The section below on post
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hoc analysis returns to the question of whether firms behave as predicted by real options
reasoning, but with a more dynamic viewpoint.

Post Hoc Analysis
This section contains post hoc theorizing and analysis regarding changes to
uncertainty levels as antecedents of changes in options portfolios. The analysis contained
here makes opportunistic use of data gathered in the course of conducting research for
this dissertation.
One of the broad, central questions of this dissertation was: do firms behave as
real options reasoning predicts? Analysis focused on relatively static observations of
firm option portfolios. Although firms’ technology options portfolios were charted over
time in Chapter Five, to facilitate further analysis these options portfolios were simplified
in terms of width and depth in Chapter Six.
The purpose of this section is to consider whether firms behaved as real options
reasoning predicts in a more dynamic way. In other words, to evaluate whether firms
changed their options portfolios in response to changes in uncertainty levels, as predicted
by real options reasoning.
Several notable changes to uncertainty levels taking place during the study period
are identified below. Uncertainty of market needs changes with feedback. R&D
outcomes may change technology uncertainty levels. Evidence regarding subsequent
changes to options portfolios of firms in the industry is presented and discussed.
Real options logic suggests that firms should adjust their options portfolios in
response to changes in the level of uncertainty. Firms are expected to hold options under
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uncertainty, but to execute or abandon them when there is little or no uncertainty. It
follows there must be some adjustment process as firms modify their options portfolios in
response to changes in uncertainty levels.
Increases and decreases to uncertainty levels can be slow and continuous or rapid
and discontinuous in nature. Technological uncertainty may increase slowly as a
technology emerges to compete for a particular application resulting from incremental
R&D. Similarly, incremental R&D can reduce technological uncertainty over time if one
technology starts to gain a lead on alternative technologies over time. A sudden major
breakthrough, on the other hand, may result in a rapid, discontinuous change in
uncertainty. Breakthroughs can increase or decrease uncertainty. If the breakthrough
strengthens the dominant technology, overall technological uncertainty is reduced as the
dominant technology becomes more certain. If the breakthrough strengthens a competing
technology, overall technological uncertainty is increased.
As uncertainty increases, the value of flexibility rises. Accordingly, holding
options becomes more attractive. Events increasing technological uncertainty can be
expected to lead to increases in the number of technological options developed and
maintained.
On the other hand, when uncertainty is resolved, some options lose relevance and
become “out of the money.” The costs associated with maintaining options further
reduce their net value over time. Although real options do not have a clear expiry date,
they in essence do expire as at some point even when uncertainty remains high as the cost
to maintain and hold them eventually exceeds the benefit from the flexibility they
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provide. When uncertainty levels fall, this point is reached earlier as the benefits from
flexibility decrease due to the change in uncertainty.
As dominant technologies emerge, the value of options on alternative
technologies lose value. When a technology’s chance of achieving dominance increases,
so do the value of options on it and therefore investments in it. At the same time,
competing technologies become less attractive. Events that reduce technological
uncertainty through strengthening the dominant technology can be expected to be
followed by increases in options held on that technology and decreases on the options
held on competing technologies.

Changes to Technological Uncertainty Levels Over the Study Period
Over the study time frame, the level of technological uncertainty regarding flat
panel displays changed both incrementally and discontinuously. Incremental
improvements in display technologies were evident throughout the study period and were
discussed in Chapter Three. Discontinuous changes to technological uncertainty were
also observed for LCD and PDP during the study period.
A number of drawbacks to TFT-LCD technology made it initially unsuitable for
TV applications. Generally, these drawbacks were reduced through incremental
improvements over time. For example, for many years, LCDs could not be produced in
sizes large enough for typical living room TV usage. Gradual improvement and
introduction of newer generation production facilities supporting larger substrates
gradually eliminated this drawback. Some of the technological progress was less
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incremental in nature. In particular, the invention of MVA mode and IPS mode increased
viewing angle dramatically, making a large step towards elimination of another drawback
of LCD for TV applications.
Hitachi was the first to make commercial grade IPS panels, with small production
beginning in 1996 and mass production after (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen)). Fujitsu
was the first to develop MVA, shipping monitors in 1997 (Sangyo Times, 1999). These
events dramatically reduced LCD’s technological uncertainty as a TV display. Evidence
relating to firm investment in LCD following these developments was ambiguous. It
does not show any discernable pattern of firms increasing or decreasing the weight of
their investments in LCD vis-à-vis the other technologies.
PDP also exhibited discontinuous changes in its technological uncertainty.
Although there have been a number of breakthroughs in PDP development, none stands
out to the same degree as IPS or MVA. The largest single discontinuous change to
technological uncertainty was not an invention, but rather the failure of a technology to
perform well in a large-scale trial.
Japanese broadcaster NHK was involved with development of DC-PDP for TV
applications, and used the Nagano Olympics as an opportunity to highlight the
technology by setting up locations throughout Japan with PDP TVs connected to live
feeds of Olympic events. Although intended to gain customer interest and help launch
PDP TV in general, NHK’s promotion also served as a trial of DC-PDP technology in a
real world TV application. The displays rapidly failed and had to be constantly replaced
during the promotion time period. Prior to the Olympics, technological uncertainty had
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existed between two kinds of PDP. Many firms had worked on developing both DC-PDP
and AC-PDP. DC-PDP’s failure during the Olympic promotion reduced technological
uncertainty by documenting DC-PDP’s weakness. Poor performance reduced the value
of DC-PDP options and increased those of AC-PDP. Real options logic would suggest
increasing the weight of AC-PDP options, which is in fact what happened. All firms
dropped DC-PDP development (Weber et al., 2008). As uncertainty between DC and AC
versions of PDP was resolved, the level of technological uncertainty relating to PDP in
general was reduced. Faced with this reduction in uncertainty, more expensive less
flexible option like investments become increasingly attractive. Evidence of investments
made after Nagano appears to agree generally with the prediction of real options logic.
Firms increased their level of commitment to the technology. Two manufacturers entered
mass production of PDPs in 1998, and two more in 1999. 8

Changes to Market Needs Uncertainty Levels Over the Study Period
The discussion above focused on changes to technological uncertainty. Similar
patterns of changes to options portfolios can be hypothesized for changes in market needs
uncertainty. Most relevant to this research is the reduction in market needs uncertainty
resulting from market feedback to early product introductions. As market needs
uncertainty for a specific value proposition are reduced, the value of options on the
technologies embedded in that value proposition increase.

8

It should be noted that one firm exited in 1999.
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Although the level of market needs uncertainty was low in the TV set industry,
several specific developments reducing it during the time frame were identified. In
particular, set makers lacked data on how much consumers would value flat screen over
CRT. How much more would they be willing to pay? Perhaps consumers would balk at
high prices needed in the initial stages of production. It was possible that FPTVs could
end up a niche item for many years if consumers weren’t willing to pay a significant
premium to CRTs. The events reducing consumer needs uncertainty were evidence,
through market reactions to FPTV product introductions, of how consumers valued flat
panel TVs.
Sharp’s unexpected success with its “window” line of LCD TVs in 1995 (Sangyo
Times, 1995), demonstrated that demand existed for LCD TVs even if they were small
and expensive. Other manufacturers had sold LCD TVs before the “Window,” but they
were small gadgets, whereas this was a more useable set. Sharp’s case is interesting
because they misjudged demand for their 10.4-inch sets at first and ended up selling out
of their entire production run in three months despite the relatively high price of 150,000
yen, approximately $1600 US at the time (oanda.com, 2009; Sangyo Times, 1995).
Sharp’s experience was evidence that consumers valued the flat panel models even
though small and expensive. Evidence from this time frame suggests continuing
investment in R&D and new plants throughout the target firms. Although Sharp was
increasing its focus on LCD TV at the time, evidence of rapid entry into LCD TV from
other firms could not be identified. Taken together, this data is ambiguous – it neither
supports not calls into question the predictions of real options logic.
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The announcement of successful early PDP sales circa 1998 provided feedback on
market needs similar to the introduction of Sharp’s “Window” line. The sets introduced
early on were large and expensive. However, they found receptive audiences with
organizations needing large information displays and wealthy individuals. Customers,
primarily industrial users, reacted positively despite high pricing (Fuji Chimera, 1999).
This reduction of market needs uncertainty should have increased the relative
attractiveness of more expensive less flexible option like investments (higher levels on
the option ladder). As discussed above, several firms entered mass production of PDPs in
1998 and 1999. This evidence is in agreement with the predictions of real options logic.
Table 7-1 below summarizes the changes to uncertainty levels and evidence
regarding changes to options portfolios discussed above. Much of the data is ambiguous.
Several of the events occur nearly simultaneously, further complicating interpretation.
None of the data appears to refute the predictions of real options logic, however it does
not strongly support it either.

Post Hoc Analysis - Discussion
This dissertation includes theory and analyses regarding the question of whether
firms behave as predicted by real options logic. Both the theory and data analysis are
relatively static in nature. This static analysis has generally found firms develop and
maintain options as predicted by theory. The purpose of the analysis presented here was
to further consider this question but by looking in a more dynamic manner. Changes in
uncertainty levels were identified over the study time frame, and evidence of
modifications to options portfolios following such changes were searched for.
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Table 7-1: Changes to uncertainty levels and changes in options portfolios

In several instances, observations were found to be in agreement with theory.
However as a group, evidence was inconclusive. No evidence contrary to theory was
uncovered.
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The data used for this analysis was gathered in the course of performing research
for this dissertation. Accordingly there were several drawbacks in its use, especially the
similar timing of numerous uncertainty-reducing events.

Chapter conclusion
This chapter consisted of two sections. The first section weighed evidence
regarding propositions developed in Chapter one. The evidence supported the notion
firms generally behave as predicted by real options logic. With interpretation, it also
agreed with theory that firms making commitments to single technologies under
uncertainty would exhibit extreme performance outcomes.
The second section of this chapter discussed post hoc theorizing centering on the
question of whether the way firms react to changes in uncertainty over time agrees with
what real options logic would predict. Findings either agreed with the predictions of real
options or were ambiguous in nature.
The following chapter further discusses the findings of this research overall and
presents implications for managers. It also presents limitations of this study and
opportunities for future research.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter discusses the findings of the study and develops implications for
theory and practitioners. It presents the contributions of this research, examines
limitations, and offers opportunities for future efforts. The discussion section below first
considers the behavior of firms studied then moves on to develop an understanding of the
performance implications uncovered by the study. It also addresses the aspect of timing
and how national culture and values may impact the way and degree options are
developed and pursued.

Discussion
The industry studied in this research was chosen because it exhibited high levels
of technological uncertainty while simultaneously appearing to have low levels of
customer needs uncertainty. Real options reasoning predicted firms would hold options
on technologies in the face of technological uncertainty. The results of this study are in
agreement with this prediction. The focal firms in this study all held options on more
than one display technology 9.
There are costs associated with developing and holding options in addition to the
benefits gained from increased flexibility and reduction of risk. Theory suggested firms
that made commitments to technologies instead of holding options would exhibit extreme
performance outcomes. Those betting on a losing technology would have poor
performance whereas those guessing correctly would have the benefit of the technology

9

Although in Pioneer’s case, OLED options may have not represented alternative to PDP
as discussed in Chapters six and seven.
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without the costs associated with developing and holding additional technological
options. Because the firms in this study held options on alternative technologies, testing
this notion required further interpretation. Pioneer and Sharp were found to have made
commitments, even if they held options in addition to the commitments.
Analysis of Pioneer and Sharp uncovered performance extremes predicted by
theory. Pioneer exhibited very low performance. After sustaining significant losses,
Pioneer exited PDP production and is in the process of exiting the TV set industry
altogether. Sharp, on the other hand, stood out as the only firm in the study able to
leverage its investments in flat panel display technology into a lasting improvement in its
position in the TV set industry.
While these findings are in agreement with theory presented, the details behind
them do not necessarily fit with theory well. Both Pioneer and Sharp took betting
strategies theory did not recommend for an environment such as the flat panel TV
industry. Pioneer committed to both a market need, TV sets with large flat screen and
high image quality, and simultaneously also committed to PDP. Theory suggests this to
be a long odds wager, and Pioneer did not make the winning bet.
Sharp committed to a technology and developed market needs options. By
developing options on a large number of applications (markets) for LCD, Sharp was able
to reduce its overall exogenous uncertainty. Sharp’s high performance in the TV industry
was in large part due to its “lucky” bet on LCD. Sharp’s lead in LCD was what allowed
it to move from an “also ran” TV producer building a durable major position in the TV
market. However, Sharp would likely still have exhibited strong performance even if
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LCD had not become the dominant TV display because of the large number of
opportunities LCD provides it.
Returning to the question of performance discussed above, Sharp’s approach was
arguably different from that which theory suggested the “lucky” high performer would
follow. Theory suggested the lucky firm would commit to a technology and customer
needs for TV sets. By not spending money on other options, theory argued, firms would
invest less in total than those developing options portfolios including technologies later
abandoned. Sharp essentially made a major commitment but also developed a few
display technology options distinct from LCD. The cost advantage argument, therefore,
has limited relevance in Sharp’s case. Instead, what made Sharp’s strategy successful
was its ability to develop LCD capability and decrease the total uncertainty it faced by
applying LCD in many product markets.
When compared with competitors, Sharp had a major lead in LCD according to
numerous measures, however Sharp’s ability to continue to make large scale investments
in modern LCD production capacity is particularly salient. Each new facility brought
significant risk and exposure to falling LCD prices; at the same time, cutting edge LCD
plants always had better economic performance than plants one or more generations old.
Sharp was the only Japanese firm willing to regularly make these investments, allowing it
to maintain advantage in cost and panel size.
One can view these investments as a series of commitments to LCD on the part of
Sharp. Note that only Sharp’s most recent G10 plant is completely dedicated to LCD-TV
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panel production. 10 Although the Kamayama plants had integrated LCD TV production,
the LCD output from these plants could have been sold for a variety of different
applications. Cutting the LCDs into panel sizes needed by different applications was
feasible for these plants.
These extreme performance cases of Pioneer and Sharp aside, the relationship
between options portfolios and performance was not clear. In the study, firms with high
performance generally developed and held large numbers of options, although this was
not the case for all high performers. Multiple potential interpretations exist, however the
idea that organizational slack enabled high performing firms to develop more options is
particularly salient. Generating and maintaining real options is costly (Reuer & Tong,
2007). Firms with past high performance may have had sufficient resources to enable
investment in many different display technologies, even those that may have appeared at
the time to have had low likelihood of succeeding. If this is the case, prior performance
may have been a predictor of options portfolio width. Accordingly, the performance
outcomes of these firms cannot be attributed to options management on their part.
There may be a minimum price of entry to enable options generation that any firm
with more than a certain level of resources can achieve (e.g., McGrath & Nerkar, 2004).
However, the observations of firms’ option portfolios do not suggest the firms studied
were below such a level. However, examination of the data suggests that there is not a
single threshold of resources that, when met, will allow all firms to develop the any of the
options in question, and when not met, not to develop any. Smaller firms may have been
limited to which options they could take. For example, while JVC could afford to work
10

The substrate is so large that it is not economical to cut panels smaller than TV size
from it. Source: interview with professor Tsuyoshi Numagami, March 13, 2009.
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on LCOS, a-Si LCD would probably have been too costly for it to become very involved
with. With this observation in mind, the options portfolios held by firms seemed to have
at least as much to do with their resource levels and past performance as they did with
subsequent performance. Accordingly, this study cannot argue there were performance
benefits associated with developing and holding options on display technologies in this
industry.
Given how much change has occurred in the TV set industry over the study
period, it is surprising how little has changed about the relative positions of the players in
it. Even though this industry experienced a period of high technological uncertainty and
dramatic change from CRT to flat panel, the relative rank and performance of the firms in
it have not changed drastically. The strongest Japanese firms, Panasonic and Sony,
continue to be very large players. Smaller Japanese players including Toshiba,
Mitsubishi, Sanyo are still in the industry but have not become major players. Korean
firms Samsung and LG were on a growth trajectory and have continued on it through the
period of uncertainty. Philips and Thomson were on a shrinking trajectory and remained
on it.
Although display technology was the source of high uncertainty, it was not the
only source of major technological change to occur in the industry over the study period.
Digital technology and standards were adopted across the industry replacing analog
technologies of the past. This migration from analog to digital technologies was a very
large change for the industry. It increased the importance of electronic and digital
devices while it decreased the importance of nuanced analog engineering and
manufacturing (Osada, 2006). Whereas seemingly minor aspects of TV set design, such
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as the positioning of wiring inside the set, could have major impact on the quality of
analog sets, digital either worked or it did not. Accordingly, technological capabilities
required for success in digital were very different from those needed in analog.
Electronic and digital device production also required larger investments in plant and
equipment and had much larger minimum efficient scale of production than that required
for analog TV set assembly. One might expect these changes to shake up the industry,
giving advantage to firms like Toshiba that had significant information technology
capabilities and experience in device production. However, as stated above, surprisingly
little changed. Toshiba, for example, was unable to take its digital capabilities and turn
them into durable market share gains in the flat panel TV market.
Extrapolating this to the larger industry, the rapid technological development in
FP TV made it difficult for most firms to develop and maintain leads in flat panel display
technologies. Not only was the market uncertainty low for flat panel televisions, it was
certain that the market size, once the right feature mix and pricing was achieved, would
be very large. The size of this market increased its attractiveness to potential entrants,
and increased technological investment and competition between firms. In an
environment characterized by such strong technological competition, Sharp’s early
strength in LCD made it an outlier. Differences between technological abilities of other
players at any point in time were small by comparison. If technology had a small impact
on differentiation, the importance of existing market position and branding grew, giving
the leading incumbent players a strong position.
The development of the digital photography industry shares some aspects in
common with that of FP TV. Many firms with some relation to photography or consumer
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electronics could tell with certainty there would be a large market for digital cameras,
well before the technology was developed. Perhaps not surprisingly, many firms
developed digital photography options and later entered the market. Not only did
traditional camera companies target digital photography, firms from other areas including
film manufacturing, consumer electronics and information technology entered into the
market. Prior to the switch to digital, Canon and Nikon were the top incumbents. As
digital technology grew to take a larger place, the market appeared unsettled and up for
grabs. Today, after it has matured substantially however, Canon and Nikon remain the
top players. Other players have changed their positions in the industry somewhat,
however not a single firm was able to leverage options on digital photography technology
to move from being an “also ran” into a major position in the digital camera market.

Timing Implications
One of the difficulties behind using real options as a heuristic is the problem of
when to exercise. In order for the value of options to be realized, the firm must at some
point commit. Theory suggests options portfolios adjust as uncertainty levels change
over time. Evidence uncovered in this study is limited as far as this is concerned; while
data does not disagree with this notion, it does not strongly support it either as discussed
in Chapter Seven.
Several additional observations about exercise timing can be made from this
research. First, in this industry, firms with very strong market power were able to
postpone making technology commitments until uncertainty declined. Panasonic made
continuing investments in PDP over the years, but as technological uncertainty declined,
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Panasonic dramatically increased the size of its commitments both to PDP and, through
its investment in IPS-Alpha, in LCD. Sony, on the other hand has managed to largely
reclaim its position in the TV industry without building its own a-Si LCD production
capacity.
Second, it is difficult to see a pattern between exercise timing and performance,
leaving open questions such as: what is a good time to commit and how should firms
know when they arrive? Interestingly, there seems to be an almost herd-like rush into
initial production in LCD and PDP, but follow on investment was varied. In the flat
panel display industry, firms need to make ongoing large-scale commitments in order to
stay in the game. In LCD in particular, the newest production technology always has the
lowest unit production cost. At the same time, each subsequent generation has
dramatically larger production scale. Each new cutting edge plant can flood the market
with production, causing price erosion, particularly where the more generic panel types
are concerned. The dynamics behind this has resulted in a game theoretic feel to
investment in production capacity in the later LCD generations, especially G5 and later.
Investments in LCD production have specific economics that differ from
investments in many other industries. Accordingly, the impact of exercise timing may be
largely industry specific in nature. Arguably, semiconductors, in particular memory
chips, may exhibit similar dynamics.
Finally, there is a question of what time should firms switch from a real options
logic heuristic to a focused commitment heuristic. Several firms simultaneously
developed mass production capabilities for multiple display technologies. In other
words, they maintained a real options reasoning heuristic into the mass production stage.
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Hitachi and Fujitsu both developed LCD and PDP production capabilities, however, their
long-term performance in both displays and TV sets was poor. Each of these firms were
trying to develop two production capabilities simultaneously using the same set resources
(and attention). Korean firms LG and Samsung were able to develop strong capabilities
in both LCD and PDP. However, in each of these cases, the Korean organizations put
PDP and LCD capabilities into different Chaebol group companies. In a sense, the
separate companies could each commit to one technology, but the group held options.
This organizational approach is in agreement with the prescriptions of Raynor (2007).
This analysis suggests that while ideal commitment timing may not be identifiable,
maintaining the option heuristic for too long may harm performance unless the option can
be moved to a related, but separate organization.

National Culture and Real Options Reasoning
The study covered an industry that is primarily Japanese. Japanese firms may be
more likely than firms from other, especially non-Asian, countries to develop and hold
options. Japanese culture has been characterized by strong uncertainty avoidance
(Hofstede, 1991). Therefore Japanese managers may be more inclined to hold options
than managers from other countries. There are additional reasons why Japanese firms
may develop and hold more technological options than Western firms, discussed below.
Japanese firms often exhibit more involvement of middle and lower hierarchical
levels in decision-making processes than their Western counterparts (Nonaka &
Takeuchi, 1995). Low cost R&D investments may begin organically and spontaneously
as lower and middle level managers commit small amounts of resources to options they
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and the engineers they work with identify. While this is not restricted to Japanese firms
(3M is well known for bottom-up investments of this type), this phenomenon is more
common in Japanese firms than Western firms. This may increase the number of low
cost R&D options held by Japanese firms.
Although some observers note that lifetime employment is becoming less
common in Japan, it is still clear that Japanese society expects firms to provide stable
employment. Laying off workers is frowned upon. The need for firms to reduce
uncertainty around their ability to provide employment may have broad impact on
options holding and exercise. Indeed, one informant in this study suggested the need to
maintain the employment of Japanese workers at a CRT-TV plant as a major reason the
firm decided to enter FP TV when it did.
Governance of Japanese firms may also increase the likelihood they hold onto
options when compared with western counterparts. Stockholders are less important to
Japanese firms than to their western counterparts. Shareholder militancy is rare and the
market for control very limited in Japan. Japanese firms have little reason to pursue
profit maximization to satisfy shareholders. Other stakeholders such as employees,
banks, and group companies have more clout than shareholders and these stakeholders
are more interested in stability than profitability.
There is reason to believe that Japanese firms (and firms from some other East
Asian countries) may retain greater option value from abandoned technologies than their
Western counterparts. Research on the Hard Disk Drive (HDD) Industry found Japanese
firms tended to retain engineering talent after abandoning technologies, whereas talent in
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the U.S. tended to move outside the firm in such situations (Chesbrough, 2003;
Christensen, 1997). Japanese firms could later apply this talent if and when the firm
decided to resuscitate the technology option in question or invest in technologically
related options, whereas Western firms may have already lost the capability in question
by such a time. In this study, Canon is an exemplar of applying options from abandoned
technologies. Canon abandoned its development of FLCD display technology, however
it later was able to apply knowledge developed through the FLCD efforts in digital
radiography 11. This suggests good reason for Japanese firms to develop options more
broadly than their western counterparts.
However, Japanese firms are not generally good at exiting businesses or closing
operations, and therefore may have tendencies to overinvest in an existing option or to
maintain it even after it loses value. Indeed, it often takes a crisis or the appointment of a
leader with significant non-Japanese experience for firms to take on such restructuring.
For example, Canon’s president Fujio Mitarai, an executive with long experience in the
United States, became well known precisely because he dramatically reshaped Canon,
closing or exiting unattractive businesses and increasing profitability (Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, 2004).
Whether using a real options approach is more or less suitable for a Japanese firm
than a Western one is difficult to say. On one hand, the ability to retain option value may
make investment in technology options by Japanese firms relatively more attractive than
would be the case for their Western counterparts. On the other, the inability to rationalize
11

With regards to Canon’s display technology development however, no evidence was
found suggesting engineers formerly working on abandoned technologies were involved
in subsequent display development.
318

unnecessary activities related to options that are out of the money may be a significant
drag on financial performance.
This consideration of national culture concludes the discussion section of this
chapter. Next, limitations are presented.

Limitations
This research has a number of limitations. First, there are limitations to its
generalizeability. This study focused on an industry in an environment characterized by
high levels of technological uncertainty and low levels of market needs uncertainty.
Accordingly, it is not generalizeable to industries that do not exhibit these attributes.
Theory developed in the second chapter discussed other combinations of technological
and market needs uncertainty, however, this study was only able to address one. This
was a conscious tradeoff made in favor of depth and quality in this study.
Real options reasoning is a managerial heuristic. There may be more or less
effective ways to apply it. One limitation of this research was the inability to uncover
more or less effective ways of applying real options reasoning.
Market power had an effect on long-term performance outcomes in this industry.
Accordingly, another limitation of this research is the ability to completely isolate the
impact of technology options from market power in the industry studied.
As discussed in the previous section, the industry studied in this research is
primarily Japanese. This represented a strength of the study but at the same time may
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have limited its generalizeability to other geographies, especially those beyond East Asia.
Japanese firms may have systematic tendencies toward developing and holding more
options than their Western counterparts.
The data used in this study also had several limitations. First, available financial
performance data did not always align well with the industry segments of interest. Firms
in this industry were large and diversified. As a result, financial data covering only the
flat panel display and TV set parts of the business were not available in most cases.
Segment reporting changed over time, limiting the possibility of long-term analysis.
Additionally, available data on TV set market shares were limited. In particular, data on
firms with smaller market shares were frequently included in the “other” category of
available data. Although private sources of high quality market share data do exist, the
cost of obtaining access to this data was prohibitive. 12 Finally, panel specification data
was not available for all years of the study.
Lastly, the post hoc analysis of firms’ reactions to changes in uncertainty levels
also suffered from limitations. First, the situations chosen for analysis were not ideal for
this type of analysis. In particular, several developments reducing uncertainty for
alternative technologies occurred nearly simultaneously, aggravating interpretation of
subsequent events. Second, the data used were not as fine grained as desirable for such a
study and were not available for several important years.
Next, while I have taken a variety of measures to ensure data quality and
reliability as discussed in Chapter Two, this study is undoubtedly affected by my prior

12

Academic researchers studying this industry in Japan typically use the same sources as
this dissertation for this reason.
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beliefs and experiences due to its qualitative nature. I present the statement of reflexivity
below to alert the reader to the potential areas where my background may have
influenced this research.

Reflexivity statement
I am a white American male and have spent over 8 years living in Japan although
not all at once. Shortly after beginning my study of Japanese over 20 years ago, I moved
in to the home of a Japanese host family, where I remained for 3 years. My exposure to
Japan at this point was as a young adult foreigner however I learned about the country
and language much the same way as a child, by watching others and tentatively trying to
use things I had observed. Since the point I moved away my host family, I have spent
years as a management consultant working in the Japanese language both in Japan and
overseas. Many of my clients were Japanese firms or Japanese subsidiaries of nonJapanese firms. As the result of these experiences, I find I have a mixture of Western and
Japanese attitudes and values.
In my experience, Japanese managers have a tendency to emphasize rigor and
quality of factual data and are somewhat uncomfortable about what they view as
speculating beyond what can be seen in the data. Through my experience working with
these managers, I may have developed this tendency. As a result, my research may put
more emphasis on data and less on interpretation moving beyond the data itself. This
bias may be considered as one instance of a general tendency to avoid risk common in
Japanese society. Here again, through my exposure to Japanese firms and the society at
large, I have developed the tendency to consider uncertainty avoidance and reduction as
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prudent. In this research, this may have translated into a bias in favor of firms that sought
to hedge their bets through investing in multiple technologies.
This study may have been shaped by my long held interest in technological
development. I generally have a positive view of firms that are considered technological
leaders.
It is possible this study has been impacted by my prior experience with companies
in it. As an amateur photographer, I have been a customer of Canon cameras for many
years. It would not be surprising if my positive opinion of the firm’s cameras had some
impact on my analysis of their efforts in other areas. I have also had a professional
consulting relationship with one of the tier two Japanese TV firms, although I cannot
disclose which because of a confidentiality agreement. While the work I conducted with
the company had nothing to do with displays or televisions, the relationship may have
caused me to form preconceptions about the firm’s capabilities.
Additionally, I have friends who currently work for or have in the past worked for
Canon, Panasonic, and Sanyo. Although none had any relationship with displays or TV
sets, it is nonetheless possible accounts of their work experiences have had some effect
on my research.
Maintaining the above limitations and he potential for bias in mind, contributions
and managerial implications are discussed below.

Contributions
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This research contributes to the real options logic literature through theory
development and empirical examination. The real options literature includes many
theory papers but few empirical studies. This study contributes to the real options
literature by empirically studying real options under uncertainty.
This research studied the question of whether firms behave as real options logic
would predict. It finds support for the notion that firms keep options open in the face of
uncertainty, and behave in accordance with the predictions of real options reasoning.
Following calls from extant literature, this research developed real options
reasoning theory under multiple types of environmental uncertainty. It proposed and
tested performance outcomes of holding and not holding technology options in the face
of technological uncertainty. The identification of a low performing firm which had
made commitments in the face of uncertainty serves as evidence of the downside of not
holding options. Beyond this, the study failed to identify performance improvement
associated with holding options. Analysis of the Sharp case, a pattern of investment and
high performance not predicted by theory, contributes by adding to existing theory.
In terms of methodology, this research contributes by introducing the concept of
an options ladder to visually present and analyze options at different levels of investment
and reversibility. This analytic method can be used in future qualitative empirical studies
of real options.
This research also contributes to the academic literature through its study of the
flat panel TV set industry. This contribution is novel as little work on this industry has
been published in academic press on management (Mathews, 2005). Furthermore, extant
research on the development of display technologies, including academic and
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practitioner, has been focused primarily on LCD. Through its inclusion of multiple,
competing display technologies over time, this research contributes to the literature on
the development of display technologies.
Finally, this research contributes by developing data based upon original Japanese
sources. Comparison of Japanese and Western sources uncovered significant limitations
to Western coverage. Not only does the quality of this study benefit from using the
Japanese data, its usage is novel for a dissertation written in English. The timeline data in
the appendix, in particular, allows English readers access to this data.

Managerial Implications
This research found evidence that firms in the flat panel TV industry behaved as
predicted by real options reasoning. However, the study did not identify clear-cut
performance benefits of developing and maintaining options. Given these findings, is
real options logic valuable to managers?
In the case of the flat panel TV industry, applying real options reasoning may
have reduced downside risks for firms, but it not have additional positive impact on
performance. In industries similar to FP TV, managers can use real options reasoning as
a defensive measure. Based upon the findings of this study, managers should not expect
applying real options reasoning will increase the likelihood of improving their firm’s
position in the industry.
This study suggests there are serious difficulties in effectively applying a real
options reasoning heuristic regardless of whether performance benefits exist or not. One
crucial problem relating to display technologies is that in order to benefit from prior
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option like investments, the firm at some point in time must make a large commitment to
production capacity. However, there is no heuristic to tell the manager when to do so. If
he waits until uncertainty has largely declined, the benefits of the investment may
dramatically decrease. On the other hand, early commitment does not agree with real
options reasoning.
To make matters worse, one can imagine the difficulty a single manager might
have in making a decision to switch heuristics as they are almost polar opposites. Can
the cautious manager who wants to keep options rapidly change to a commitment
mindset? Perhaps the answer lies in different levels of management – one layer could be
more inclined to keep options open while another commit. But this, too, presents its own
difficulties. In the Japanese sample, it appears the R&D groups almost naturally analyze
and develop technology options. Higher level managers decide to make commitments
based upon output from R&D. However, as Raynor (2007) points out, to effectively hold
competing options at higher investment levels, such as mass production capabilities, the
options need to be held in separate group firms or subsidiaries. Hitachi and Fujitsu serve
as examples of the downside of not following this prescription. For real options
reasoning to work as it should at higher levels then, substantial organizational changes
may be required.
Managers can learn several things from the Sharp case. The Sharp experience
emphasizes the importance of using multiple mechanisms to reduce overall uncertainty.
Sharp was able to lower its total uncertainty, which in turn facilitated decisions to make
large, ongoing investments, and maintain a competitive lead. Sharp reduced uncertainty
relating to LCD by aggressively identifying and competing in applications for LCD
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technology, regardless if the end product was made by Sharp or not. This reduced
Sharp’s reliance on any single product market, but also built a larger base for sales.
Sharp could make large plant investments because it knew where the new production
would go. Its competitors may not have been able to do so precisely because they did not
know in advance. Sharp consistently invested in LCD in more ways than just production
capacity however, and the outcome of these investments was a major, long term
technological lead in LCD. Together, Sharp could identify new markets for LCD and
enter them before competitors had the ability to compete. One could say that investing
more in LCD reduced Sharp’s uncertainty level because it helped the company maintain a
significant competitive advantage. Not many firms will find themselves with advantages
as large as Sharp in LCD, however, the Sharp experience does serve as an example of the
potential benefits of extending a capability across multiple application markets. A
relatively small and unattractive application market may provide substantial uncertainty
reduction if several such markets are developed.
The potential for use in multiple application markets should also be given
thorough consideration when making investment decisions between different
technological options. Although there have been many supporters of PDP technology in
general and Pioneer’s application of this technology, PDP ended up becoming a less
important display technology than LCD, and Pioneer was forced to exit the market. One
major difference between PDP and LCD was that due to advantages and disadvantages of
the two technologies, LCD appeared to have nearly endless potential applications, while
PDP’s were very limited. LCD could be made in many sizes, had low energy
requirements, and was reliable, making it suitable for a large variety of applications.
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PDP on the other hand was difficult to produce in small sizes and consumed a great deal
of energy; few display applications existed for this combination. PDP development, for
this reason, arguably faced higher levels of uncertainty than did LCD. When making
investment decisions between alternative technologies, managers should thoroughly
consider possibility for applications of these technologies outside of the target application
for which investment is being made.
Another managerial implication from this study is that in industries where
technological development is hyper-competitive, non-technological advantages may play
a larger than previously expected role in success. In the case of a new to the world
product types, technological advantage may play a large role. However, for industries
where technological uncertainty is high but customer needs uncertainty is relatively low,
strong existing commitments to the customer needs, including those represented by brand
and market power, may contribute more greatly to competitive advantage than the
difference in technological options held. Accordingly, managers of firms with low
market power should exercise caution when considering opportunities to leverage
technological capabilities into improved standing in markets characterized by low
customer needs uncertainty.
Firms with strong technological capabilities but limited market power may have
systematic decision making biases that result in a tendency to over invest in technological
development in industries characterized by low market needs uncertainty. Faced with a
potentially very large market, engineers may systematically overestimate the firm’s
technological capability relative to the importance of other factors, including market
power and minimum competitive scale requirements, in being successful in the market.
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If this is the case it would not be surprising to see firms develop and hold low level
options even if they do not have what it will take to be successful in the market once
technological uncertainty is resolved. As technological uncertainty is resolved and the
market grows, managers with business backgrounds (as opposed to engineering
backgrounds) are likely to play a larger role in decision-making. Such managers may be
less concerned about the technology and be more concerned about business issues such as
investments required for efficient scale production and requirements for building market
presence.
The biases discussed above are consistent with observations of this research as
well as interviewee comments. In this study, firms with strong technology options but
limited market power often stopped making follow-on investments in market
development or cutting edge production capabilities required for cost competitiveness.
Managers of firms with low levels of market power should be careful not to overestimate
the potential for new technologies to provide opportunities to gain large positions in
markets characterized by low market uncertainty. Accordingly, even in the face of
technological uncertainty, investments in technology options may be inappropriate for
firms significantly lagging strong incumbents in an established marketplace.

Opportunities for Future Research
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A number of opportunities for future research exist based upon this study. First,
this study focused on an industry characterized by high technological uncertainty and low
market needs uncertainty. A tradeoff between depth and breadth of this research was
made, with the result that while propositions for industries with low technological
uncertainty and high market needs uncertainty were proposed, such an industry was not
investigated. Accordingly, one research opportunity is to perform a similar study on an
industry of that nature.
Another opportunity is to examine the situation in an environment characterized
by simultaneous high levels of customer needs uncertainty and technological uncertainty.
Such research would be complex but offers the potential for rich exploration.
The flat panel TV industry was characterized by very rapid technological
development and very large potential market size. It is possible that performance due to
developing and maintaining options in an industry with similar uncertainty to FP TV but
smaller market size and lower competition may differ from this study. Accordingly,
future research should identify and investigate such an industry.
As noted above, national culture may play a role in options related behavior.
Firms in Japan may maintain option value of R&D more readily than western firms
because engineering talent does not often leave the firm. Risk aversion is another factor
that varies according to national culture and may play a role in the tendency of managers
to make commitments of hold options. Future research should further develop and test
cultural drivers of option related behavior.
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In addition to the main study, the post hoc analysis of firms reactions to changes
in uncertainty levels suggests opportunities for future development as well. Future
research should identify and analyze dynamic changes in options portfolios relating to
specific changes in uncertainty levels. Isolating one change in uncertainty from others is
difficult if, as in this case, the changes occur in rapid succession. To offer easily
interpretable results, future studies should consider one time, discontinuous changes in
uncertainty because they are often readily identifiable. Ideally, such studies should
include several different types of uncertainty changes occurring in different industries.

Conclusion
This dissertation studied real options reasoning under technological uncertainty in
the flat panel TV industry. An underlying question in this research has been: is it
possible to “outsmart” uncertainty? Based upon this research, firms appear to try to do so
in one of several ways. First, they try to make “smarter” decisions. Canon developed
technology options in serial. Reading past interviews of Canon managers, it appears each
time that Canon was convinced they had logically arrived at “the best” technology for the
application. As discussed in the firm level case of Canon, they were unable to outsmart
uncertainty in that way. Pioneer is probably another example of this approach.
A second approach firms took was to hold options. While firms doing this didn’t
often build large investments in technologies that were abandoned, evidence of positive
outcomes from this approach was not identified.
The third approach was to decide to drive uncertainty out through action. This
was not discussed in detail in the dissertation for a number of reasons. However,
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Panasonic seems to have been using this sort of a thought process at least some of the
time. As uncertainty relating to LCD declined, Panasonic actually escalated its
commitment to PDP. Through market power and financial strength, Panasonic appears to
have been able to force PDP to work. This kind of a strategy is only possible for a very
limited number of firms with extraordinary resources. This research did not seek out
firms with such an approach nor was it designed with them in mind. Whether and under
what circumstances it might work are a topic for further investigation.
Sharp’s approach represents another alternative. Sharp found a technology it had
real competitive advantage in, LCD, and committed to it while also developing
technology options on alternative display types. Rather than facing one large uncertainty
– will LCD become competitive as a TV display – Sharp’s approach searched for
potential LCD applications across many different product categories. Although each
category had uncertainty associated with it, as a group, the diversified applications
reduced uncertainty around LCD for Sharp. The lower uncertainty, in turn, made it easier
for Sharp to continue to make further LCD related investments.
Of these four approaches, the first two failed to outsmart uncertainty in this study.
The third approach, taken by Panasonic, remains a question mark, however its potential
usefulness appears very narrow even if it is effective. Finally, Sharp’s way of managing
uncertainty is interesting, but appears only useful to a few firms having particularly
strong technological capabilities. If the flat panel TV industry is at all representative,
there is no simple way to outsmart uncertainty, although real options reasoning offers a
way to limit the downside potential. A few firms may be able to use strategies followed
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by Panasonic and Sharp, however the nature of resources required to pursue these
strategies suggest they will not be feasible for most firms.

332

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Where Japanese language sources were used, the original name of the work is in
parenthesis following its English translation.
Sources used in the timeline appendix but not in the main document marked with an
asterisk.

Abernathy, W. J. 1978. The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the
Automobile Industry. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Adner, R. 2004. A DEMAND-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON TECHNOLOGY LIFE
CYCLES. In J. A. C. Baum & A. M. McGahan (Eds.), Advances in Strategic
Management, Vol. 21: Business Strategy Over the Industry Life Cycle: 25-43.
Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI.
Akasaka, M. 2008. 8mm thick 3" OLED TV, shipments stargting in late March (厚さ
8mm のワンセグ用 3 インチ有機 EL テレビ，3 月下旬に出荷), Nikkei Tech-On!
Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Anand, B. N. & Khanna, T. 2000. The structure of licensing contracts. The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 48(1): 103–135.
Anand, J., Oriani, R., & Vassolo, R. S. 2007. Managing a portfolio of real options. In J. J.
Reuer & T. W. Tong (Eds.), Real Options Theory - Advances in Strategic
Management, Vol. 24: 275-303. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Anderson, P. & Tushman, M. L. 1990. Technological discontinuities and dominant
designs: A cyclical model of technological change. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 35(4): 604-633.
Aoyagi, K. 2000. The whole unknown story of Seiko-Epson (セイコーエプソン
ざる全貌). Tokyo: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun.

知ら

Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of
Management, 17(1): 99-120.
Bowman, E. H. & Hurry, D. 1993. Strategy through the option lens: An integrated view
of resource investments and the incremental-choice process. Academy of
Management Review, 18(4): 760-782.
Bowman, E. H. & Moskowitz, G. T. 2001. Real options analysis and strategic decision
making. Organization Science, 12(6): 772-777.
Business Wire. 1998. Fujitsu and Hitachi to Jointly Develop Next-Generation PDP
Technology, Business Wire. Tokyo: Dow Jones*.

333

Business Wire. 2000. Silicon Light Machines and Sony Corporation Work to Advance
the Development of Grating Light Valve -- GLV -- Technology, Business Wire. New
York: Dow Jones*.
Canada's Office of Consumer Affairs; Digital Television: Consumer
Notice; http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/oca-bc.nsf/en/h ca02319e.html; June 20, 2008.
Carpenter, G. S. & Nakamoto, K. 1989. Consumer preference formation and pioneering
advantage. Journal of Marketing Research, 26(3): 285-298.
Carpenter, G. S. & Nakamoto, K. 1990. Competitive strategies for late entry into a
market with a dominant brand. Management Science, 36: 1268-1278.
Casio; Chronology of main
products; http://world.casio.com/corporate/history/chronology.html; June 10, 2009.
Castellano, J. A. 2005. Liquid gold: The story of liquid crystal displays and the creation
of an industry. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.
Chi, T. & Levitas, E. 2007. An examination of options embedded in a firm's patents: The
value of dispersion in citations. In J. J. Reuer & T. W. Tong (Eds.), Real Options
Theory - Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 24: 405-427. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Chiu, A. 2004. TCL seals asset deal on Thomson venture, South China Morning Post.
Hong Kong.
Christensen, C. M. 1997. The innovator's dilemma. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business
School Press.
Chunichisha. 2008. Electronic device almanac, 2009 (電子機器年間、２００９年版).
Tokyo: Chunichiska.
Consumer Electronics Association; Digital America:
HDTV; http://www.ce.org/Press/CEA Pubs/928.asp; June 11, 2009.
Consumer Electronics Daily. 2004. Canon Bests Hitachi, Buys 'FED' Patents in
Bankruptcy Auction.*
Consumer Electronics Daily. 2006. Displays.
Daewoo Securities. 2003. TFT-LCD Industry: Impact of Samsung Electronic's 7G TFTLCD line.*
Daewoo Securities. 2007. LCD Equipment.*
den Boer, W. 2005. Active matrix liquid crystal displays: Fundamentals and
applications. Burlington, MA: Newnes.
Deutsche Bank. 2004. FHP to build new PDP plant.

334

Deutsche Bank. 2004. May sales at Taiwan tech firms.*
Deutsche Bank. 2004. Sharp files LCD patent suit.*
Deutsche Bank. 2004. CY04 TFT-LCD industry outlook.*
Deutsche Bank. 2004. JV for large TV-use panels.*
Deutsche Bank. 2006. Industry Alert: Investigation of TFT-LCD makers. *
Dierickx, I. & Cool, K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competitive
advantage. Management Science, 35(12): 1504-1513.
Dixit, A. K. & Pindyck, R. S. 1994. Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Dow Jones News Service. 1987. General Electric, French Firm Complete Acquisitions,
Dow Jones News Service.
Duncan, R. B. 1972. Characteristics of organizational environments and perceived
environmental uncertainty. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(3): 313-327.
Economist, The. 1996. Flat-Screen Technology, The Economist. London: The Economist
Newspaper Limited.*
Eggers, J. P. 2007. Falling flat: Failed technologies and investment under uncertainty.
Working paper. Wharton School.
Eisenhardt, K. M. 2002. Building Theories for Case Study Research. In A. M. Huberman
& M. B. Miles (Eds.), The Qualitative Researcher's Companion: 5-36. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Feehery, W. 2008. Turning solution-processed OLED displays into reality, SID 2008. Los
Angeles.
Folta, T. B. 1998. Governance and uncertainty: The trade-off between administrative
control and commitment. Strategic Management Journal, 19(11): 1007-1028.
Fuji Chimera. 1998. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 1998
world market edition (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 1998 世界市場編).
Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera. 1999. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 1999
(液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 1999). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera. 2000. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2000
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2000 上巻). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.

335

Fuji Chimera. 2001. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2001
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2001 上巻). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera. 2002. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2002
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2002 上巻). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera. 2003. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2003
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2003 上巻). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera. 2004. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2004
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2004 上巻). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera. 2005. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2005
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2005 上巻). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera. 2005. Digital AV equipment marketing survey 2005 (デジタル AV 機器市
場マーケティング調査要覧. 2005 年版). Tokyo: Fuji Chimera.
Fuji Chimera. 2006. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2006
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2006 v.1). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera, S. 2006. Digital AV equipment marketing survey 2006 (デジタル AV 機器
市場マーケティング調査要覧. 2006 年版). Tokyo: Fuji Chimera.
Fuji Chimera. 2007. Current situation and future outlook for LCD-related markets, 2007
Volume 1 (液晶関連市場の現状と将来展望. 2007 v.1). Tokyo: Fuji-Chimera
Research Institute.
Fuji Chimera, S. 2007. Digital AV equipment marketing survey 2007 (デジタル AV 機器
市場マーケティング調査要覧. 2007 年版). Tokyo: Fuji Chimera.
Fujitsu General; Our company's history: 2000s (当社のあゆみ：２０００年代）
; www.fujitsu-general.com/jp/history/2000/index.html; December 10, 2009.*
Funai Electric. 2004. Annual Report 2004. Tokyo: Funai Electric.
Funai Electric. 2005. Annual Report 2005. Tokyo: Funai Electric.
Funai Electric. 2006. Annual Report 2006. Tokyo: Funai Electric.
Funai Electric. 2007. Annual Report 2007. Tokyo: Funai Electric.
Funai Electric. 2008. Annual Report 2008. Tokyo: Funai Electric.
336

Geroski, P. A. 2003. The evolution of new markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ghemawat, P. 1991. Commitment: The dynamic of strategy. New York: Free Press.
Guler, I. 2007. An empirical examination of management of real options in the U.S.
venture capital industry. In J. J. Reuer & T. W. Tong (Eds.), Real Options Theory Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 24: 485-506. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C. K. 1991. Corporate imagination and expeditionary marketing.
Harvard Business Review, 69(4): 81-92.
Hammack, W.; The greatest discovery since fire: There's a lot more to the story of the
microwave oven than a melted candy
bar; http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2005/4/2005 4 48.shtml;
8/28/2007, 2007.
Helfat, C. E. & Raubitschek, R. S. 2000. Product sequencing: Co-evolution of
knowledge, capabilities and products. Strategic Management Journal, 21(10/11):
961-979.
Hiramoto, A. 1994. Japan's TV industry: Structure of competitive advantage (日本のテ
レビ産業 : 競争優位の構造). Kyoto: Minerva Shobo.
Hitachi. 1996. Annual report 1996. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 1997. Annual report 1997. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 1998. Annual report 1998. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2000. Annual report 2000. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2002. Annual report 2002. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2003. Annual report 2003. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2004. Annual report 2004. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2005. Annual report 2005. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2006. Annual report 2006. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2007. Annual report 2007. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi. 2008. Annual report 2008. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Hitachi History: 1960-1979 (沿革と歴史:1960〜
1979); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/about/corporate/history/1960.html June 9, 2009.
HItachi; About the use of Hitachi Plasma's Miyazaki Facility (日立プラズマ宮崎工場の
有効活用について
); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/month/2009/04/0401a.html; April 19, 2009.
337

Hitachi.; News release: Prototype of 13.3" LCD for TV and Computer Applications (テ
レビ・パソコン対応「１３．３型液晶ディスプレイ」を試作
); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/9512/1226.html; April 19, 2009.*
Hitachi; News release: Beginning to sell full color 37" XGA plasma display (フルカラ
ー対応３７型XGA プラズマディスプレイを発売
); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/0003/0330b.html; April 19, 2009.*
Hitachi; News release: Beginning to sell the world's first home use 32 and 37" digital
high vision capable plasma TVs (世界初、家庭用３２／３７型デジタルハイビ
ジョンに対応するプラズマテレビ
); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/0009/0928b.html; April 19, 2009.*
Hitachi; News release: Beginning to sell the 15" LCD TV Prius View allows you to see
glossy video (艶のある映像を楽しめる１５V 型液晶テレビ「プリウスビュー
」を発売 ); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2001/1114/index.html; April, 19,
2009.*
Hitachi; News release: Three new TVs go on sale including world's first 37" and 42" PDP
TVs with BS digital receivers (世界初、３７V型BSデジタルハイビジョンプラ
ズマテレビを製品化４２V型BSデジタルハイビジョンプラズマテレビと併せ
て３機種発売); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2001/0830/index.html; April
19, 2009.*
Hitachi; Introducing a new LCD TV model with a high resolution panel that eliminates
blurring in moving images (動画表示の残像感を解消した新開発高精細液晶パ
ネル搭載テレビを発売
); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2002/1017/index.html; April 19, 2009.
Hitachi; Regarding joint development of the next generation plasma display panel (次世
代プラズマ・ディスプレイ・パネルに関する共同開発について
); http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/9808/0820.html; April 19, 2009.
Hitachi Web Cafe; Reference library: Hitachi's personal computer history (資料館：日
立パソコンの歩み); http://www.hitachiwebcafe.com/siryo prius.htm; December 8,
2009.
Hofstede, G. 1991. Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. London:
McGraw-Hill.
Hurry, D., Miller, A. T., & Bowman, E. H. 1992. Calls on high-technology: Japanese
exploration of venture capital investments in the United States. Strategic
Management Journal, 13(2): 85-101.
Iguchi, Y. 2008. Prospect for high picture quality FED monitors. (高画質 FED モニタ
ーの展望) Presentation in FPD International 2008 forum session P-22. . In Z.
Tajima & S. M. P. Chairs) (Eds.). Yokohama, Japan.
338

Izumiya, W., Kudoh, Y., Sasakura, S., & Yamagami, T. 2005. This is the whole story of
displays! (これがディスプレイの全貌だ！). Tokyo: Kanki Publishing.
Japan Consumer Electronics Scan. 2009. Showa Shell planning to buy Hitachi Plasma
Display plant. , Showa Shell planning to buy Hitachi Plasma Display plant. . Tokyo:
Kyodo.
Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Japan Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications. 2008. The Current analogue TV broadcast will end on
24th July 2011.; http://www.soumu.go.jp/joho tsusin/whatsnew/digital-broad/index
en.html; June 20, 2008.
JEITA; JEITA Web Site (Multiple pages in the Domestic Shipments Statistics
Section); www.jeita.or.jp; June 9, 2009.
Jiji Press. 1996. Hoshiden, Philips eye LCD JV in Japan, Jiji Press English News Service.
Johnstone, B. 1991. We were burning: Japanese entrepreneurship and the forging of the
electronic age. New York: Basic Books.
Joujima, A. 2006. The Sony syndrome. Tokyo: Yosensha.
JVC. 2002. Annual report 2002. Tokyo: JVC.
JVC. 2003. Annual report 2003. Tokyo: JVC.
JVC. 2004. Annual report 2004. Tokyo: JVC.
JVC. 2005. Annual report 2005. Tokyo: JVC.
JVC. 2006. Annual report 2006. Tokyo: JVC.
JVC. 2007. Annual report 2007. Tokyo: JVC.
JVC; Company Information: History (会社情報：歴史
); http://www.victor.co.jp/company/profile/innovative.html; December 9, 2009.
JVC-Kenwood Holdings. 2008. Annual report 2008. Tokyo: Hitachi.
Kaldor, A. G. 1971. Imbricative marketing. Journal of Marketing, 35(2): 19-25.
Kawamura, M. 2005. Plasma TV (プラズマテレビ). Tokyo: Denpa Shimbun Sha.
Kerin, R. A., Varadarajan, P. R., & Peterson, R. A. 1992. First-mover advantage: A
synthesis, conceptual framework, and research propositions. Journal of Marketing,
56(4): 33-52.
Kim, K. 2008. Global Display Market Dynamics & Perspective, SID 2008 Business
Conference.
Knight, F. H. 2006. Risk, uncertainty and profit. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

339

Kogut, B. 1991. Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire. Management
Science, 37(1): 19.
Kogut, B. & Kulatilaka, N. 2001. Capabilities as real options. Organization Science,
12(6): 744-758.
Komoda, T. 2005. Field emission display ga wakaru hon (FED がわかる本）. Tokyo:
Kogyo Chosakai Publishing, Inc.
Kotani, T. 2005. Hitachi and Matsushita agree to cooperate on PDP operations (【速報
】日立と松下が PDP 事業の包括的協業で合意), Nikkei Tech-On! Tokyo: Nikkei
BP*.
KSR, L. 2003. Flat Panel Display. Tokyo: Patenttec Inc.
Levinthal, D. & March, J. G. 1981. A model of adaptive organizational search. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 2(4): 307-333.
Levinthal, D. A. 1991. Random Walks and Organizational Mortality. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 36(3): 397-420.
LG Display Co. 2008. United States Security and Exchange Commission Form 20-F.
Seoul: LG Display.
LG Display Co. 2009. United States Security and Exchange Commission Form 20-F.
Seoul: LG Display.
LG Electronics Inc. 2000. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Electronics Inc. 2001. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Electronics Inc. 2002. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Electronics Inc. 2004. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Electronics Inc. 2005. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Electronics Inc. 2006. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Electronics Inc. 2007. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Electronics Inc. 2008. Annual report. Seoul: LG Electronics.
LG Philips LCD Co. 2005. United States Security and Exchange Commission Form 20-F.
Seoul: LG Philips LCD.
LG Philips LCD Co. 2006. United States Security and Exchange Commission Form 20-F.
Seoul: LG Philips LCD.

340

Li, Y., James, B. E., Madhavan, R., & Mahoney, J. T. 2007. Real options: Taking stock
and looking ahead. In J. J. Reuer & T. W. Tong (Eds.), Real Options Theory Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 24: 31-66. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Lieberman, M. B. & Montgomery, D. B. 1988. First-Mover Advantages. Strategic
Management Journal, 9: 41-58.
Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E. G. 2002. Judging the quality of case study reports. In A. M.
Huberman & M. B. Miles (Eds.), The Qualitative Researcher's Handbook: 205-215.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.
Lineback, R. 1993. Philips, Matsushita to end venture, Electronics News.*
MacMillan, I. C. & McGrath, R. G. 2002. Crafting R&D project portfolios. Research Technology Management, 45(5): 48-59.
Maritan, C. A. & Alessandri, T. M. 2007. Capabilities, real options and the resource
allocation process. In J. J. Reuer & T. W. Tong (Eds.), Real Options Theory Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 24: 307-332. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. B. 2006. Designing qualitative research (4th ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.
Mathews, J. A. 2005. Strategy and the crystal cycle. California Management Review,
47(2): 6.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2001. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2002. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2003. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2004. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2005. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2006. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2007. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 2008. Annual report. Osaka: Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.

341

Maxwell, J. A. 2002. Understanding and validity in qualitative research. In A. M.
Huberman & M. B. Miles (Eds.), The Qualitative Researcher's Handbook: 37-64.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
McGrath, R. G. 1997. A real options logic for initiating technology positioning
investments. The Academy of Management Review, 22(4): 974-996.
McGrath, R. G. 1999. Falling forward: Real options reasoning and entrepreneurial
failure. The Academy of Management Review, 24(1): 13-30.
McGrath, R. G., Ferrier, W. J., & Mendelow, A. B. 2004. Response: Real options as
engines of choice and heterogeneity. Academy of Management Review, 29(1): 86101.
McGrath, R. G. & Nerkar, A. 2004. Real options reasoning and a new look at the R&D
investment strategies of pharmaceutical firms. Strategic Management Journal, 25(1):
1 - 21.
Menzawa, J., Ohnishi, K., & Takahashi, J. 2008. Toshiba. Tokyo: Shuppan Bunka Sha
Corporation.
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded
sourcebook (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Miller, K. D. 2002. Knowledge inventories and managerial myopia. Strategic
Management Journal, 23(8): 689-706.
Miller, K. D. & Arikan, A. T. 2004. Technology search investments: Evolutionary, option
reasoning, and option pricing approaches. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 473485.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2001. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2002. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2003. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2004. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2005. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2006. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2007. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Mitsubishi Electric. 2008. Annual report. Tokyo: Mitsubishi Electric.
Miyamoto, A. 2007. The secret of Sharp's creativity: why they can continue to develop
"only one" products (シャープ独創の秘密：なぜ“オンリーワン商品”を出し続
けられるのか). Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihon sha.

342

Moore, G. A. 2005. Dealing wih darwin: How great companies innovate at every phase
of their evolution. New York: Portfolio.
Mori, T. 2008. Really easy to understand OLED book (トコトンやさし有機 EL の本).
Tokyo: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun Sha.
Murtha, T. P., Lenway, S. A., & Hart, J. A. 2001. Managing new industry creation:
Global knowledge formation and entrepreneurship in high technology. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Nelson, R. R. 1961. Uncertainty, learning, and the economics of parallel research and
development efforts. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 43(4): 351-364.
NHK. 2003. Project X challengers: Plasma TV started with the character "Ai" (Project X
challengers: プラズマテレビ 愛の文字から始まった). Japan.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Translated by Mark Schreiber and Aaron Martin Cohen). 2004.
How Canon got its flash back: The innovative turnaround tactics of Fujio Mitarai.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun. 1999. Sanyo Electric, cooperating on OLED development with
Kodak (三洋電機、有機ＥＬディスプレー開発で米コダックと提携), Nikkan
Kogyo Shimbun.
Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun. 2006. Canon, starting a new organization with President
Uchida: putting emphasis on building displays (キヤノン、内田社長トップに新
体制スタート−ディスプレー分野育成に力 ), Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun.
Nikkei BP. 1990. Flat Panel Display 1990. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1991. Flat Panel Display 1992. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1993. Flat Panel Display 1994. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1994. Flat Panel Display 1995. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1995. Flat Panel Display 1996. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1996. Flat Panel Display 1997. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1997. Flat Panel Display 1998. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1998. Flat Panel Display 1999. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 1999. Flat Panel Display 2000. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2000. Flat Panel Display 2001. Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2001. Flat Panel Display 2002, Business Volume (Jitsumu-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.

343

Nikkei BP. 2002. Flat Panel Display 2003, Strategy Volume (Senryaku-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2002. Flat Panel Display 2003, Business Volume (Jitsumu-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2003. Flat Panel Display 2004, Business Volume (Jitsumu-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2003. Flat Panel Display 2004, Strategy Volume (Senryaku-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2004. Flat Panel Display 2005, Business Volume (Jitsumu-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2004. Flat Panel Display 2005, Strategy Volume (Senryaku-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2004. Flat Panel Display 2005, Technology Volume (Gijutsu-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2005. Flat Panel Display 2006, Business Volume (Jitsumu-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2005. Flat Panel Display 2006, Strategy Volume (Senryaku-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2006. Flat Panel Display 2007, Strategy Volume (Senryaku-hen). Tokyo:
Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2006. Flat Panel Display 2007, Industry Analysis Volume (Gyokai Bunsekihen). Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2006. Flat Panel Display 2007, Television Technology Volume (Terebi
Gijutsu-hen). Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2007. Flat Panel Display 2008, Market Volume (Shijo-hen). Tokyo: Nikkei
BP.
Nikkei BP. 2007. Flat Panel Display 2008, OLED Volume (OLED-hen). Tokyo: Nikkei
BP.
Nikkei BP. 2007. Flat Panel Display 2008, Television Technology Volume (Terebi
Gijutsu-hen). Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2008. Flat Panel Display 2009, Company Analysis Volume (Kigyo Bunsekihen). Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Nikkei BP. 2009. FPD 2008 International Trade Show. Yokohama, Japan: Nikkei BP.

344

Nikkei Business. 2009. Special report: The threat of low cost digital: How to make a
50000 yen TV set (特集激安デジタルの脅威：５万円テレビはこう作る). Nikkei
Business (1491): 26-31.
Nikkei Electronics. 1974. Technology news: TV images displayed using passive matrix
LCD (技術速報：単純な X−Y マトリクス電極構造の液晶でテレビ画像が表示
した) Nikkei Electronics. Tokyo.*
Nikkei Report. 2006. Market Share: Plasma TVs, Nikkei Report. Tokyo: Nikkei Keizai
Shimbun, Inc.
Nikkei Report. 2007. Market Share: Plasma TVs, Nikkei Report. Tokyo: Nikkei Keizai
Shimbun, Inc.
Nikkei Report. 2008. Market Share: Plasma TVs, Nikkei Report. Tokyo: Nikkei Keizai
Shimbun, Inc.
Nikkei Techon; Toshiba-Matsushita Display Technology exhibits world's largest OLED
panel at EDEX 2002 (東芝松下ディスプレイテクノロジー，世界最大の有機EL
パネルを「EDEX 2002」で展示
); http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/members/01db/200204/1003265/?ST=print; June 23,
2009*.
Nishikubo, Y. 2006. You can understand everything about flat panel displays with this! (
これで薄型ディスプレイのすべてがわかる！). Tokyo: Shuwa System.
Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. 1995. The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese
Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Numagami, T. 1999. The history of technological revolution of liquid crystal displays (液
晶ディスプレイの技術革新史). Tokyo: Hakuto-Shobo Publishing Company.
Oanda.Com; FX History: historical currency exchange
rates; http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory; August 24, 2009.
Old-Computers.com; Compaq portable III. http://www.oldcomputers.com/museum/computer.asp?c=1064&st=1.
Oriani, R. & Sobrero, M. 2008. Uncertainty and the market valuation of R&D within a
real options logic. Strategic Management Journal, 29: 343-361.
Osada, T. 2006. The Panasonic way. Tokyo: President Inc.
Palenchar, J. & Smith, S.; Audiovox to buy RCA A/V
businesses; http://www.twice.com/article/CA6491801.html?q=rca+audiovox.
Panasonic; Regarding the basic agreement with Hitachi, Canon, and Matsushita on
display operations (液晶ディスプレイ事業における日立、キヤノン、松下の基

345

本合意について); http://panasonic.co.jp/corp/news/official.data/data.dir/jn0712251/jn071225-1.html; December 9, 2009. *
Panasonic; Innovative Products 1952: 17-inch monochrome
TV; http://panasonic.net/history/corporate/products/inp1952.html; June 9, 2009.
Panasonic; Innovative Products 1960: Color
TV; http://panasonic.net/history/corporate/products/inp1960.html; June 23, 2009.
Philips. 2000. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2001. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2002. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2003. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2004. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2005. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2006. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2007. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Philips. 2008. Annual report. Eindhoven, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Philipls
Electronics N.V.
Pioneer. 2002. Annual report. Tokyo: Pioneer Corporation.
Pioneer. 2003. Annual report. Tokyo: Pioneer Corporation.
Pioneer. 2004. Annual report. Tokyo: Pioneer Corporation.
Pioneer. 2005. Annual report. Tokyo: Pioneer Corporation.
Pioneer. 2006. Annual report. Tokyo: Pioneer Corporation.
Pioneer. 2007. Annual report. Tokyo: Pioneer Corporation.
Pioneer. 2008. Annual report. Tokyo: Pioneer Corporation.
Raynor, M. E. 2007. The strategy paradox: Why committing to success leads to failure
(and what to do about it). New York: Doubleday.
346

Reuer, J. J. & Tong, T. W. 2007. How do real options matter? Empirical research on
strategic investments and firm performace. In J. J. Reuer & T. W. Tong (Eds.), Real
Options Theory - Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 24: 145-173. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Reuters; Sony latest to quit rear-projection
TVs; http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUST20453620071227; June
23, 2009. *
Rikku. 2008. Home electronics distribution data overview 2008 (家電流通データ総覧
２００８). Tokyo: Rikku.
Roberts, J. L. 1986. As Pocket TVs Catch On, Owners Adopt Some Unconventional
Viewing Habits. The Wall Street Journal.
Saccocio, D. 1994. Strategy and new business development: The case of the missing U.S.
display industry. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY.
Samsung Electronics. 2001. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2002. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2003. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2004. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2005. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2006. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2007. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2008. Annual report. Seoul: Samsung Electronics.
Samsung Electronics. 2008. Samsung LCD (Pamplet received at FPD International 2008
trade show)*.
Samsung SDI. 2006. Sustainability report. Suwon, South Korea: Samsung SDI.
Samsung SDI. 2007. Sustainability report. Suwon, South Korea: Samsung SDI.
Samsung SDI; Samsung SDI Financial Info; http://www.samsungsdi.com/eng/ivt/ir 2 1 2t
2008.jsp
(And related pages); July 14, 2009.
Sangyo Shimbun. 2002. Sony not entering PDP, choosing future generation displays (ソ
ニー ＰＤＰ参入見送り 次々世代ディスプレー選ぶ), Sangyo Shimbun.
Tokyo.*

347

Sangyo Shimbun. 2004. Striving for Revolution - Top Interview: Canon President Fujio
Mitarai(【改革に挑む トップインタビュー】キヤノン・御手洗冨士夫社長 ),
Sangyo Shimbunsha. Tokyo.
Sangyo Shimbun. 2005. Canon to start selling rear projection TVs next spring - starting
up its audio visual business (キヤノン、リアプロＴＶを来春発売−映像事業一気
に立ち上げ ), Sangyo Shimbun. Tokyo.
Sangyo Times. 1990. LCD maker planning overview (液晶メーカー計画総覧). Tokyo:
Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 1992. LCD maker planning overview 1992 (液晶メーカー計画総覧.
1992 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 1993. LCD maker planning overview 1994 (液晶メーカー計画総覧.
1994 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 1994. LCD maker planning overview 1995 (液晶メーカー計画総覧.
1995 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 1995. LCD maker planning overview 1996 (液晶メーカー計画総覧.
1996 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 1997. LCD and PDP maker planning overview 1997 (液晶・PDP メー
カー計画総覧. 1997 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 1998. LCD and PDP maker planning overview 1998 (液晶・PDP メー
カー計画総覧. 1998 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 1999. LCD and PDP maker planning overview 1999 (液晶・PDP メー
カー計画総覧. 1999 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2000. LCD and PDP maker planning overview 2000 (液晶・PDP メー
カー計画総覧. 2000 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2001. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2001 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2001 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2002. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2002 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2002 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2003. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2003 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2003 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2004. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2004 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2004 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.

348

Sangyo Times. 2005. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2005 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2005 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2006. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2006 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2006 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2007. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2007 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2007 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2008. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2008 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2008 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sangyo Times. 2009. LCD, PDP, EL maker planning overview 2009 (液晶・PDP・EL
メーカー計画総覧. 2009 年度版). Tokyo: Sangyo Times.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2001. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2002. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2003. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2004. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2005. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2006. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2007. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Sanyo Electric Co. 2008. Annual report. Osaka: Sanyo Electric Co.
Schaller, R. R. 1997. Moore's law: Past, present and future. Spectrum, IEEE, 34(6): 5259.
Schilling, M. A. 1998. Technological Lockout: An Integrative Model of the Economic
and Strategic Factors Driving Technology Success and Failure. The Academy of
Management Review, 23(2): 267-284.
Sharp. 2000. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp. 2001. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp. 2002. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp. 2003. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp. 2004. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp. 2005. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp. 2006. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
349

Sharp. 2007. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp. 2008. Annual report. Osaka: Sharp Corporation.
Sharp; Company history 1960-1961: The begininng of color TV mass production (社史
1960〜1961：カラーテレビの量産開始
); http://www.sharp.co.jp/corporate/info/history/h company/1960 1961/index.html;
June 9, 2009.
Sharp; TV Commercial: Aquos http://www.sharp.co.jp/products/cm/tv/tv143.html; June
12, 2009.
Sherden, W. A. 1998. The fortune sellers: The big business of buying and selling
predictions. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Sony. 2000. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2001. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2002. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2003. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2004. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2005. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2006. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2007. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony. 2008. Annual report. Tokyo: Sony Corporation.
Sony; Corporate Information: Company of Firsts; http://news.sel.sony.com/en/corporate
information/company of firsts; June 10, 2009.
Sony; History of products: Television sets (商品のあゆみーテレビ
); http://www.sony.co.jp/SonyInfo/CorporateInfo/History/sonyhistory-c.html; June
10, 2009.
Sony; New product announcement: World's first OLED TV to go on
sale; http://www.sony.jp/CorporateCruise/Press/200710/07-1001/, 2008.
Sony; Press release: New product. 25-inch Plasmatron
TV; http://www.sony.co.jp/SonyInfo/News/Press Archive/199609/96T-120/;
December 8, 2009.
Sony; Press release: New product: Sony Walkman NW-X1000
series; http://www.sony.jp/CorporateCruise/Press/200904/09-0414/; December 10,
2009.

350

Sorin, G. 2008. OLED: from hype to business, SID 2008 Business Conference. Los
Angeles.
Stuart, T. E. & Podolny, J. M. 1996. Local search and the evolution of technological
capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 17(Special Issue: Evolutionary
Perspectives on Strategy): 21-38.
Tajima, Z. & Chairs), S. M. P. 2008. FPD International 2008 forum session P-22: What
high quality means for each type of FPD? (それぞれの FPD における高画質とは
). . Yokohama, Japan.
Techno Associates. 2006. Digital home electronics: patent map of display technology (デ
ジタル家電・特許マップ. ディスプレイ技術編). Tokyo: Techno Associates.
Techno Associates. 2008. Research on strategies of LCD panel makers, 2008 (LCD パネ
ル・メーカーの事業戦略研究. 2008 ). Tokyo: Nikkei BP.
Techno Associates Research. 2006. Nikkei market access separate volume display market
overview 2006 (日経マーケット・アクセス別冊ディスプレイ市場総覧２００
６). Tokyo: Nikkei BP Consulting.
Tegarden, L. F., Hatfield, D. E., & Echols, A. E. 1999. Doomed from the start: What Is
the value of selecting a future dominant design? Strategic Management Journal,
20(6): 495-518.
Television Academy, テ. 1974. Recent display devices (最近のディスプレイ装置).
Tokyo: NHK.
The Wall Street Journal. 1995. Business Brief -- EASTMAN KODAK CO.: Pioneer Sets
License Pact For Display Technology. The Wall Street Journal.*
Thomson. 2001. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Thomson. 2002. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Thomson. 2003. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Thomson. 2004. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Thomson. 2005. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Thomson. 2006. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Thomson. 2007. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Thomson. 2008. Annual report. Boulogne-Billancourt, France: Thomson.
Tong, T. W. & Reuer, J. J. 2007. Real options in strategic management. In J. J. Reuer &
T. W. Tong (Eds.), Real Options Theory - Advances in Strategic Management, Vol.
24: 3-28. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

351

Toshiba; Hi-Vision Face 36HD3Z 32HD3Z (Production
Ended); http://www.toshiba.co.jp/regza/ctv/36hd3z.htm; June 10, 2009.
Toshiba; Press Release: Regarding the development of the new flat panel TV brand
"Regza" (プレスリリーズ：薄型テレビ新ブランド「REGZA（レグザ）」の
展開について); http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/press/2006 02/pr j2101.htm; April,
19, 2009.
Toshiba; Project technology history: The first Japanese-made color television
set; http://museum.toshiba.co.jp/history/1goki/1958tv.html; December 10, 2009.
Toshiba Corporation. 2001. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba Corporation. 2002. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba Corporation. 2003. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba Corporation. 2004. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba Corporation. 2005. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba Corporation. 2006. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba Corporation. 2007. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba Corporation. 2008. Annual report. Tokyo: Toshiba Corporation.
United States Federal Communications Commission; United States Federal
Communications Commission. 2008. The Digital TV Transition: What you need to
know about DTV http://www.dtv.gov/; June 20, 2008.
Vassolo, R. S., Anand, J., & Folta, T. B. 2004. Non-additivity in portfolios of exploration
activities: A real options-based analysis of equity alliances in biotechnology.
Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1045-1061.
Weber, L., Kurashige, H., & Wani, K. 2003. Impact! Plasma TV changes society:
Delivering hit products Japanese style entrepreneurs dream of (衝撃！プラズマテ
レビは社会を変える：日本型起業家スピリット夢の大ヒット商品を生む）.
Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihon Sha, Ltd.
Yamaguchi, Y. 2009. Flat Panel Report: Hitachi needs to review its TV ops strategy,
Dow Jones International News: Dow Jones Newswires.
Yano Keizai Research. 1982. Display industry current situation and demand forecast (デ
ィスプレイ市場の実態と需要展望). Tokyo: Yano Keizai Research.
Yin, R. K. 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.

352

APPENDIX ONE: ETHICS APPROVAL

353

APPENDIX TWO: TYPOLOGY OF DISPLAY TECHNOLOGIES
This appendix presents a typology of display technologies in order to establish the
importance of those included in this research and to provide further background for the
curious reader. The typology presented below in Figure A-1 is modified from one
appearing in Den Boer (2005). Technologies not described in the main text (see Chapter
4) are briefly described below in the course of explaining the typology.
Den Boer (2005) divides display technologies first into projection and direct view
types. Projection displays can be rear or front projection. Rear projectors are large boxes
with a screen on the front to which images are projected from the back. Front projectors
require a separate screen and are generally smaller boxes. Rear projection has been used
in consumer television sets for many years, but front projection is much less commonly
used for television.
Projection displays can be can be based upon a number of technologies, namely:
cathode ray tube, Texas Instruments Digital Light Processing (DLP) technology, Liquid
Crystal on Silicon (LCOS), or LCD. Each of these technologies has been used in rear
projection television systems. CRT projectors use tubes that are technologically similar
to those used in conventional CRT based televisions. CRT projectors have three cathode
ray tubes, one each for red, green, and blue. Light is projected through lenses at the end
of each tube and onto the screen. DLP technology uses an array of very small mirrors
mounted on a silicon chip that adjusts the angle of each mirror continuously. Light is
bounced off of these mirrors and through a rotating color filter wheel and onto the display
screen. LCOS and LCD both use small, liquid crystal based devices through or off of
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which light is projected. As a group, rear projection systems have been lower cost than
other technologies that also provided large screen, however earlier models were bulky
and suffered from dark pictures.

Figure A-1: Typology of Display Technology

Direct view displays are categorized into emissive and non-emissive types.
Emissive displays light up on their own, whereas non-emissive require a separate light
source. This difference is an important one for some of the firms in the television
industry. Informants interviewed had different opinions on whether emissive or nonemissive is more suitable for TV applications, however. One informant commented a
reason his firm had invested in PDP because it was emissive and therefore caused less
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eyestrain for users. Another informant discussed the benefit of LCD, saying it was easier
on users’ eyes because it was non-emissive.
Non-emissive display types include LCD and e-paper (also called e-ink). E-Paper
refers to a group of display technologies that are reflective and appear to be paper-like to
the viewer. The technology is not currently relevant to televisions as its ability to display
moving images is limited. LCD technologies are discussed in the main text and therefore
are not described again here.
There major categories of emissive display technologies include: cathode ray tube
(CRT), electroluminescence (EL), Organic Light Emitting Diode (OLED), and Plasma
Display Panel (PDP). CRT refers to the large tube technology used until recently in the
vast majority of television sets. CRTs have an electron gun that shoots electrons through
a vacuum and to a phosphor dot (or pixel) inside the tube, causing it to light up. The
phosphor is red, green, or blue. The technology has been developed highly over many
years and provides a very good image quality. However, it has drawbacks including
weight, size, and high power consumption. These limitations made it impractical to
produce CRT TVs with very large diagonal dimensions screen size (NHK, 2004).
EL technology includes several sub-categories. Although each has gone through
significant amounts of R&D over the years, OLED is the only one to have received a
serious following as a potential display for television applications. OLED is described in
detail in the main text (see Chapter 5).
The remaining technologies are also described in the main text. PDP and FED are
emissive display technologies that have competed for use in TV sets. PALC is a hybrid
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technology using Plasma and LCD technologies. Den Boer (2005) did not include it in
his typology; perhaps because development ceased a number of years before he wrote the
book.
This appendix has presented a typology of display technologies. Some display
technologies were not discussed in the main text as they did not have a discernable
impact or position relating to the flat panel TV industry. The inclusion of the typology
here is meant to provide evidence of the thoroughness of investigation of display
technologies performed in this study.
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APPENDIX THREE: FIRM LEVEL HISTORICAL TIMELINES
LIST OF FIRM TIMELINES

Firm name
Fujitsu
Hitachi
JVC
LG
Mitsubishi
NEC
Panasonic
Philips
Pioneer
Samsung
Sanyo
Sharp
Sony
Thomson
Toshiba

Page
359
365
372
374
380
384
392
403
408
414
425
431
444
455
456
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1966

X

1967

X

1970

X

1970

X

1972

X

1972

X

1980
1980

X
X

1981

X

1982

X

1982
1983

X

1986

X

1988

X

1989

X

1989

X

1989
1990

X
X

1990

X

1990

X

1990

X

Other

OLED

PDP

Year

LCD

Fujitsu
Event

Fujitsu, IBM buy rights to Illinois University's PDP patents (Nikkei
BP, 1990).
Monochrome AC-PDP research begins in Fujitsu research lab in
Akashi, Hyogo (Kawamura, 2005).
Fujitsu begins research on FLCD (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Fujitsu develops Magnesium Oxide protection film for AC-PDP,
enhancing product life (Weber et al., 2008).
Fujitsu begins selling AC memory type plasma display (Nikkei BP,
1990).
NHK Broadcasting Technology Research Lab and Fujitsu begin to
work together on development of monochrome PDP (Kawamura,
2005).
Fujitsu changes focus to large LCD displays (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Fujitsu announces color PDP (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Fujitsu has second place market share for PDP in 1981, with 31%.
Fujitsu uses PDPs in computers and in IT applications for financial
services companies (Yano Keizai, 1982).
PDP makers as of 1982: Okatani Electric, Oki Electric, NEC, Fujitsu,
Matsushita Denshi Kogyo, Sanya Electronics, Burroughs (Yano
Keizai, 1982).
Fujitsu had a small CRT tube production capability as of 1982 (Yano
X
Keizai, 1982).
Fujitsu begins TFT LCD R&D (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Fujitsu begins making B&W STN-LCD displays for use in monitors
for its computer line-up (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Fujitsu develops 3 color PDP for stock price display (Sangyo Times,
1997).
Fujitsu begins shipping samples of 9.8" multicolor STN-LCD panels
(Nikkei BP, 1990).
Fujitsu develops 640X400 16 gradations DTSN panel (Sangyo Times,
1990).
Fujitsu beings mass producing 3 color AC-PDP (Kawamura, 2005).
Fujitsu opens LCD Development Department (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Fujitsu exhibits laptop computer with 640X400 16 gradation DSTN
panel at Business Show (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Fujitsu develops ADS (Address and Display Separation) method for
controlling light gradations of AC-PDP (Kawamura, 2005).
Fujitsu develops 16 gradation 640X480 pixel AC PDP
(FPF8060HRUS) (Sangyo Times, 1990).
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1991

X

1991

X

1991
1991
1992
1992

X
X
X
X

1992

X

1992

X

1992

X

1993

X

1993

X

1994

X

1994

X

1994

X

1994

X

1995

X

1995

X

1995

X
X

1995

X

1996

X

Fujitsu develops 40" PDP prototype (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu develops world's first 42" wide color PDP (Sangyo Times,
1995).
Fujitsu licenses TFT-LCD technology to Samsung Electronics
(Deutsche Bank, August, 2004).
Fujitsu begins production at Yonago facility number one LCD line
with 7500 300X400 sheets per month capacity (Sangyo Times, 1997).

1995

1995

Fujitsu emphasizes video applications for FLCD (Sangyo Times,
1992).
Fujitsu is producing FLCD samples, but has no mass production
facility for FLCD production (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Fujitsu makes 31" PDP prototype, it was taken to Electronics Show.
Fujitsu also shows prototype at Ceatec. Problems occur with the
displays including black lines and discoloration (NHK, 2003).
Fujitsu sells NYSE full color 21" PDPs (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Fujitsu begins pilot production of TFT-LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1994).
Fujitsu publishes paper on PDP stripe architecture (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Fujitsu returns to Ceatec with the new PDP panels resolving earlier
problems, and display it as a TV. This was world’s first plasma TV
(NHK, 2003).
Fujitsu General begins selling 21" VGA PDP monitor with 260K
colors (Kawamura, 2005; Nikkei BP, 1998).
Fujitsu General begins selling Plasmavision-T21 TV with VGA
resolution. Price is 1.25 million yen (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Fujitsu announced it will build an LCD mass production facility at
Yonago (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Fujitsu begins mass production of 21" VGA AC-PDP (Weber et al.,
2008).
Fujitsu continues FLCD R&D (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Fujitsu finishes building LCD development and production facility in
Yonago (Sangyo Times, 1994).

Fujitsu constructs number two line at Yonago (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Fujitsu develops 42" AC-PDP with 852X480 resolution for TV
applications (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Fujitsu invests 20 billion yen in PDP production facility at Kyushu
Electronics Miyazaki plant (Sangyo Times, 1994, 1997).
Fujitsu introduces color TFT projector (FM-LCP2) capable of 200"
X
image (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Fujitsu develops 15" XGA TFT LCD for monitor applications (Nikkei
BP, 1996).
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X

1997

X

1997

X

1997

X

1997
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Fujitsu begins production at number two LCD plant with a 30 billion
yen investment. The line uses 400X500 substrate and has 26K sheets
per month capacity (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Fujitsu develops 3.2" SXGA (1280X1024) resolution high density
TFT using LTPS (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Fujitsu develops Vertical Alignment (VA) LCD display technology
(Sangyo Times, 1998).
Fujitsu develops new liquid crystal material together with Japan
Merck. The new material is used in Fujitsu's VA technology allowing
for wider viewing angle (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Fujitsu ends production on its first generation line at Yonago because
it cannot efficiently make panels sizes Fujitsu wants (Sangyo Times,
1997, 2002).
Fujitsu beings producing color filters at its Yonago location (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
Fujitsu begins production at world's first PDP mass production facility
in Miyazaki. Production capacity is 10k panels/ mo. 42" WVGA is
first product (Kawamura, 2005).
Fujitsu General announces it will begin selling 42" 852X480 pixel
PDP TV. Price is 1.2 million yen (Nikkei BP, 1996).
As of 1996, Fujitsu does not plan to develop displays for TV or
Audio, but will focus on computer, office automation,
X
communication, and factory automation application use displays
(Sangyo Times, 1996).
Fujitsu develops MVA mode TFTs for monitors (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Fujitsu installs prototype LTPS line at its Yonago plant, integrates
LTPS research from central labs and Yonago (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Fujitsu develops Multi-Domain Vertical Alignment (MVA) LCD
display technology, an improvement on VA technology. Viewing
angle is over 160 degrees from left, right, top, bottom (Sangyo Times,
1998).
Fujitsu begins producing 15" MVA mode monitor (Sangyo Times,
1999).
Philips is receiving PDP supply from Fujitsu as of 1997 (Nikkei BP,
1997).
Fujitsu develops 25" PDP TV panel with 1280X1024 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1997).
Fujitsu develops 42" PDP TV panel with 1024X1024 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1997).
Fujitsu develops 50" full color AC-PDP for full resolution high vision
(Kawamura, 2005).
Fujitsu develops 21" full color PDP (Sangyo Times, 2008).
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1998
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1998

X

1998

X

1998

X

1998
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X
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X
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X

1999

X

1999

X

2000

X

2000

X

2000

X

2001

X

2001

X

2001

X

2001
2002

X

Fujitsu develops 12.1" TFT LCD with 800X600 resolution for NBPC
applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Fujitsu develop ALIS (Alternative Lighting of Surface) technology
for PDP (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Fujitsu and Philips agreed to cooperate on technologies used in
developing PDP for television applications. Improving Fujitsu's 42"
PDP for market entry is a focus of the cooperation (Fuji Chimera,
1999).
Fujitsu and Hitachi announce they will establish a JV called FujitsuHitachi Plasma Display with 50%-50% equity, covering PDP
development, manufacturing, and sales, and moved both companys'
large PDP businesses into the new company (Fuji Chimera, 1999;
Sangyo Times, 2000).
Fujitsu is researching FED at the Fujitsu Research Lab (Fuji Chimera,
X
1999).
Chi Mei Optronics and Fujitsu enter into contract manufacturing
agreement for TFT-LCDs (Deutsche Bank, June 2004).
Fujitsu develops 23.1" New MVA mode TFT panel with UXGA
resolution (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Chi Mei Optronics (CMO) of Taiwan receives technology transfer of
MVA from Fujitsu (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Fujitsu agrees to transfer its monochrome PDP business of Okaya
denki. Okaya has produced DC monochrome PDPs, but with the
addition of Fujitsu's business, it will add AC PDPs (Sangyo Times,
2000). Fujitsu never reached profitability in the business (Weber et
al., 2008).
Fujitsu begins selling 42" VGA PDP (FP-4200) and 25" SXGA PDP
(FP-2500) for computer applications (Sangyo Times, 2000).
CMO and Fujitsu enter additional contract manufacturing agreement
(Deutsche Bank, August, 2004).
Fujitsu's LCD production is 70-80% 15" panels in 2000 (Nikkei BP,
2000).
Fujitsu does not have plans to enter LTPS yet (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Fujitsu exhibits 23.1" MVA mode TFT panel with UXGA resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu continues to develop FLCD technology (Fuji Chimera, 2001).
Fujitsu has outsourced production of 15" and 17.4" MVA mode LCD
panels to CMO. Fujitsu has plans to focus on product development
and outsource more volume production (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Fujitsu General develops full digital video processor for PDP TV
X
(Fuji Keizai, 2005).
Fujitsu exhibits 20.1" UXGA with MVA model panel at EDEX
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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X

2002

X

2002

X

2002

X

2002

X

2002

X

2003

X

2003

X

2003

X
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X

2004

X

2004

X

2004

X

2004

X

2005

X

Fujitsu's LCD revenues are 60-70% from internal customers as of
2002 (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Fujitsu merged its LCD operations and Yonago Fujitsu into a new
entity called Fujitsu Display Technologies Corporation (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
AUO of Taiwan takes a stake in Fujitsu Display Technologies.
Fujitsu headquarters holds 80% stake and AUO 20%. AUO will
benefit from Fujitsu's advanced display technology, and Fujitsu from
AUO's production capability (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Fujitsu reduces investment in PDP production equipment and states
that demand will not grow so quickly (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Fujitsu General begins selling 61" PDP monitor (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu begins selling cell phone with PM OLED panel (Nikkei BP,
2007 (OLED Hen)). Panel sourced from outside.
AUO enters into cooperative agreement with Fujitsu Display
Technologies. Fujitsu provide technological support on MVA panel
development and production, and also receive production from AUO
(Fuji Chimera, 2004)
Fujitsu exhibits 4" field sequential TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu begins selling 17"and 19" MVA panels for TV and monitor
applications. Panels are produced by CMO (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Fujitsu Display Technologies exhibits 20.1" TFT panel with LED
backlight and 100% NTSC gamut (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu exhibits semi transparent MVA panels at FPD 2004 (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu announces the next generation of MVA, MVA-Superior, at
FPD international (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Fujitsu sues Samsung SDI over PDP patent infringement (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu General releases 55" HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
As of 2005, 80% of Fujitsu's LCD unit sales are external - the weight
of internal sales has dropped dramatically (Sangyo Times, 2005).
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2005

X

2005

X

2005

X

2005
2007
2008

X

Sharp acquired Fujitsu Display Technology and Fujitsu Research
Lab's LCD business - effectively all of Fujitsu's LCD related business.
Fujitsu Display Technologies became a wholly owned Sharp
subsidiary called Sharp Yonago, possessing a 405 X 515 mm
substrate LCD line. According to Sangyo Times (2006), Sharp
purchased it in order to gain additional LCD technicians and obtain
Fujitsu's MVA technology. Sharp also plans to develop closer ties to
Fujitsu as a supplier. The plant has been losing money recently (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
Fujitsu sold 30% ownership (retaining 20%) in FHP to Hitachi and
handed Hitachi the Patents as well. Fujitsu is effectively exiting PDP
(Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Fujitsu General sources plasma display panels from Pioneer,
Panasonic (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Fujitsu sells its display fabrication equipment business to Ulvac
X
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Fujitsu General begins selling Aviamo series of Full HD PDP TVs
and TV monitors for US and EU (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Fujitsu General exits consumer Audio Visual business
X
(http://www.fujitsu-general.com/jp/history/2000/index.html)
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X
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1998

X
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X
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OLED

PDP

Year

LCD

Fujitsu
Event
Hitachi introduces 10" color TFT to the market (Sangyo Times,
1992).
Hitachi is rumored to have halted PDP technology development
temporarily (Economist, 1996).
Hitachi begins producing TFTs on new production line V1. Substrate
is 470X370mm (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Hitachi develops 10.4" color TFT LCD with SVGA resolution, 12.1"
color TFT LCD with XGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Hitachi develops "Super TFT" technology using In-Plane Switching
(IPS) allowing for wider viewing angles than existing TFT technology
(Sangyo Times, 1995).
Hitachi develops 13.3" XGA TFT LCD panel for computer monitor
and TV applications
(http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/9512/1226.html)
Hitachi reaches full 100K units / month production level at new
Mobara V1 TFT production line (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Hitachi announces its first IPS mode panel (Nikkei BP, 2005(Jitsumu
Hen)). Production begins (Nikkei PB, 2007 (TV Hen)).
Hitachi establishes New Display Business Promotion Center in its
home and information Media Division, begins concentrated effort on
developing large color AC-PDPs (Sangyo Times, 1997)
Hitachi builds prototype line for PDPs at its facility in Yokohama,
invests 3 billion yen (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Hitachi exhibits Japan's first 25" color XGA resolution AC-PDP at
Electronics Show 1996. It is intended for computer monitor
applications (Nikkei BP, 1996; Sangyo Times, 1997).
Hitachi begins TFT production on line V2 (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Hitachi begins shipping samples of XGA 25" PDP (Sangyo Times,
1999).
Hitachi develops 41" XGA PDP panel (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Hitachi develops 18" XGA color TFT with wide viewing angle and
using IPS mode (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Hitachi is operating experimental LTPS line, but has no formal plans
yet for mass production line (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Hitachi begins selling 25" XGA PDP monitor (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Fujitsu and Hitachi agree to establish Fujitsu Hitachi Plasma
Displays. The large PDP businesses of both firms are to be integrated
into FHP (Business Wire, 1998; Sangyo Times, 2000).
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Hitachi begins construction of V3 line at Mobara. It will handle
730X920mm substrate (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Hitachi begins LCOS development (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Hitachi moves LTPS sample / prototype line from its research lab to
the Mobara production facility (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Hitachi begins selling RPTV with 800X600 resolution using 1.6"
LTPS microdisplay (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Hitachi begins selling 25" SXGA display, 41" XGA display, and 42"
high vision plasma display panels (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Hitachi develops 19" TFT panel with 1600X1200 resolution (Nikkei
BP, 2000).
Hitachi's main customer base for 2000 was Taiwanese notebook
assemblers (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
In FY 2000, Hitachi's display group has loss of 10. billion yen
(Sangyo Times, 2002).
FHP develops new driving circuitry TERES which will be lower cost
and require less energy (Sangyo Times, 2000).
FHP exhibits 32" PDP with XGA resolution and 37" PDP with
1024X1024 resolution at Ceatec (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Sony takes an equity stake in Fujitsu Hitachi Plasma Display. Fujitsu
42.5%, Hitachi 42.5%, Sony 15% is the new stake percentages
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Hitachi begins selling 37" XGA monitor for commercial applications
(http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/0003/0330b.html)
Hitachi begins selling 42" PDP TV with ALIS technology and BS
digital capability in November 2000 (Nikkei BP, 2000). The price is
1.35 million yen
(http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/0009/0928a.html).
Hitachi builds pilot line for LTPS in Mobara (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Hitachi exhibits 15" IPS mode impulse type TFT LCD (Nikkei BP,
2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi exhibits 15" LCD TV with XGA resolution and IPS mode
panel (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi's V3 TFT line (650X830mm substrate) in Mobara begins
production (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Hitachi begins selling multimedia PC with TV function called Prius
Deck (Sangyo Times, 2002). It later offers the same display with a
built in tuner as a stand alone TV
(http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2001/1114/index.html)
In FY 2001, Hitachi's display group lost 47 billion yen (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
FHP exhibits 32" PDP using Alis and Teres technologies (Nikkei BP,
2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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FHP begins PDP production aimed at consumer TV applications at its
Kyushu No. 2 plant (Sangyo Times, 2003). Total investment is 45
billion yen (Sangyo Times, 2001). Capacity is 30 thousand panels per
month (Kawamura, 2005).
Hitachi releases 42" PDP TV with 852 x 1024 resolution and ALIS
panel (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)). This is a "Hi Vision" (analog
high definition) television meant for Japanese household consumption
(Kawamura, 2005).
Hitachi launches Woo line of PDP-TVs with models in 42" and 37"
sizes (http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2001/0830/index.html).
FHP enters into JV with Formosa Plastics and AUO in Taiwan. The
JV purchases the production equipment from Kyushu FHP's number 1
plant and creates a new production plant. Stakes in the JV are:
Formosa plastics 55%, AUO 22.5%, FHP 22.5%. (Sangyo Times,
2002).
Hitachi launches Woo brand of flat panel TVs
X
(http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2001/0830/index.html).
Hitachi displays announces it wants to support the spread of IPS
mode as the de facto technology for LCD TV, and is encouraging
licensing activities for this reason (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Hitachi agreed to license technology and provide technological
assistance relating to AS-IPS technology and TFT Color Filter
Technology to HannStar of Taiwan (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Hitachi begins prototype LTPS production at Mobara V3 line (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
Hitachi invests an additional 23 billion yen in V3 line to increase
production capacity from 20K sheets/mo to 40K sheets/mo. Volume
increase expected in 2004. Target is TV market (Sangyo Times, 2004;
Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu hen)).
Hitachi develops 20" LCD TV with super impulse drive to reduce
blurring, exhibits at Ceatec 2002 (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen);
Sangyo Times, 2003). Goes on sale later in the year as first LCD TV
in Woo series
(http://www.hitachi.co.jp/New/cnews/2002/1017/index.html)
HannStar begins producing AS-IPS (Advanced Super In-Plane
Switching) 20" wide TV LCD panels with Hitachi technology
(Sangyo Times, 2003).
Hitachi moves display group to separate subsidiary, Hitachi Displays.
Hitachi Displays has two Japanese subsidiaries: Hitachi Display
Technologies and Hitachi Display device (Sangyo Times, 2003;
Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
In FY 2002, Hitachi Displays lost 15 billion yen (Sangyo Times,
2004).
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Hitachi releases 32" PDP TV with 852X1024 resolution (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
FHP exhibits 42" 1024X1024 pixel PDP with ALIS (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
FHP brings online additional production capacity to reach 70k panels
/ month (Kawamura, 2005).
Hitachi begins selling 10 PDP TV models using high brightness ALIS
panels (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi agrees to do joint R&D on OLED with Rohm, Kyoto
University, Pioneer, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Chemicals, NTT (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
As of 2002, Hitachi is reported to be making good progress on full
color OLED development (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
Hitachi central research lab announced it had developed driver
circuitry that dramatically improved visual quality of OLED displays
(Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Hitachi Displays exhibits 32" IPS mode HD TFT LCD panel (Nikkei
BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi releases 32" LCD TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi displays develops IPS mode small panels for cell phone
applications (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Senryaku Hen)).
Hitachi starts LTPS pilot mass production line at V3 building.
Substrate is 730X920mm (Sangyo Times, 2004).
In FY 2003, Hitachi Displays had a profit of 5.8 billion yen (Sangyo
Times, 2005).
FHP exhibits progressive scan 55" PDP (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku
Hen)).
FHP develops A1 Series PDPs in 32, 37, and 42" sizes (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
Hitachi releases 42" PDP TV with 1024 X 1024 resolution (Nikkei
BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi Research Lab is working on OLED R&D, has not decided to
focus on large or small particle (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Hitachi Displays announces 3.5" QVGA AM-OLED display using
small molecule materials at SID 2003 (Fuji Chimera, 2003; Nikkei
BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi exhibits new AS-IPS2 panels, an improved version of IPS, at
trade show IDW '04. The firm has already begun production (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Production of IPS-Pro begins. This technology is first used in 32" TV
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (TV Hen)).
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Hitachi displays makes additional 10 billion yen investment in LTPS
production capacity (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen)).
Hitachi Displays begins project to develop TFTs for automotive
applications (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Hitachi displays obtains license on FFS technology from BOE Hydis.
This technology increases viewing angle of LCD displays (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
LG Philips LCD and Hitachi cross license IPS technology (Techno
Associates, 2008).
Hitachi, Toshiba, Panasonic sign formal agreement to JV, will name it
"IPS Alpha Technology." (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi Displays expects to lose money in FY 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
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FHP announced it will invest 75 billion yen in new plant "Sanbankan"
to begin mass production in 2005. (Deutsche Bank. March 11, 2004.
FHP to build new PDP plant; Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen)).

X

Hitachi begins selling 55" PDP-TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu hen)).
Hitachi exhibits 2.5" AM-OLED at SID 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi tries to buy FED related patents from Candescent, but Canon
X
beats them (Consumer Electronics Daily, August 31, 2004).
Hitachi Displays and Chimei agree to cross license some LCD related
technologies. IPS related technologies not included. (Techno
Associates, 2008).
Hitachi Displays, Panasonic, Toshiba established IPS Alpha
Technology as earlier planned. Original ownership is 50% Hitachi
Displays, Toshiba 22%, Panasonic 22%, and Nihon Seisaku Toshi
Ginko (a bank) and others 6%. Initial investment totals 70 billion yen
(Sangyo Times, 2007). It plans to make 23" IPS panels starting in the
second quarter of 2006 (Fuji Chimera, 2005). With Hitachi's large
LCD production capability moving to IPS Alpha, Hitachi Displays
will refocus its strategy upon small-mid size displays (Sangyo Times,
2006).
As of 2005, Hitachi displays sells LCD TV panels to Sony, Toshiba,
and Panasonic (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
As of 2005, HannStar has sold LCD TV displays to Hitachi, TVE,
Compal and Benq (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Hitachi releases 37" HD LCD TV with IPS mode and HD recorder
built-in (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Hitachi acquires additional 30% stake in FHP from Fujitsu (Fujitsu
retains 20% stake), makes the firm a consolidated subsidiary. Fujitsu's
Plasma patents were also included in the deal. (Fuji Chimera, 2005;
Sangyo Times, 2006).
Hitachi and Panasonic agree to cross license PDP patents, cooperate
on marketing and standardization of PDP materials and production
equipment. Hitachi and Panasonic have announced they plan to
cooperate on development, production, marketing, and intellectual
property management related to plasma displays. They do not plan to
integrate operations at this time, however. (Kotani, 2005 (Hitachi to
Matsushita ga PDP Jigyou no hokatsukyogo de goi)). Hitachi Plasma
Patent Licensing is established with both Hitachi and MEI taking
stakes (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend hen)).
FHP loses money in the first half of 2005 (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
Hen)). FHP takes on organizational changes to improve profitability
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku Hen)).
FHP exhibits world first 42" full HD module (Sangyo Times, 2006).
Hitachi releases 55" full HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
hen)).
Hitachi Displays develops 2.5" QVGA AM-OLED panel using small
particle materials (Fuji Chimera, 2005; Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Hitachi Displays exhibits 7" OLED panel for automotive applications
at Tokyo Motorshow (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Hitachi displays moves all TV use LCD organization to IPS Alpha,
focuses on small LCDs (Sangyo Times, 2009).
IPS alpha develops 32" FHD IPS panel (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market
Hen)).
IPS Alpha begins producing 37" Full HD IPS panels (Sangyo Times,
2008).
IPS Alpha JV gets additional 30 billion yen investment. New stakes
are Hitachi Displays 50%, Toshiba 15%, Panasonic 30%, and others
5%. (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Panasonic is planning to take a majority stake in IPS Alpha (Sangyo
Times, 2008).
Hitachi Displays enters markets for cash machines, vending
machines, medical applications and other industrial applications with
several different sized displays from 9" to 17" all using IPS
technology. (Sangyo Times, 2008)
FHP's San Ban Kan, 3rd plant, in Miyagi begins production -- initial
investment is 75 billion yen (750 oku), with an additional 10 billion
(100 oku) planned. Plans were pushed forward due to growing
demand (Sangyo Times, 2006).
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Canon and Panasonic announce they will each take 24.9% stakes in
Hitachi Displays by the end of March, 2008. (announcement date =
12/2007). Canon plans to increase its investment to take a controlling
stake in the future. Canon hopes to work on OLED technology with
Hitachi.(http://panasonic.co.jp/corp/news/official.data/data.dir/jn0712
25-1/jn071225-1.html).
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X

2007
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FHP begins mass production of 60" FHD PDP (Nikkei BP, 2006
(Senryaku Hen)).
Hitachi exhibits 7" OLED at CES (Sangyo Times, 2006).
Hitachi exhibits 1.9cm deep 32" ultra-thin LCD TV at Ceatec 2007
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend hen)).

X

Panasonic and Hitachi agree to supply each other with PDPs. Hitachi
can use MEI's 103" and MEI can get Hitachi's 85" PDP, in addition to
other sizes. (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend hen)).
Hitachi announces it will procure PDP glass panel materials from
Panasonic, moving away from its previous philosophy of producing
PDP TVs from end to end. However, Hitachi will not completely exit
PDP production. (Sangyo Times, 2009)
FHP ends production at Nibankan PDP plant, plans to centralize all
PDP production at Sanbankan in Miyazaki (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market
hen)).
Hitachi displays continues OLED R&D, but no major developments
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
Panasonic buys Hitachi's stake in IPS Alpha, makes it a consolidating
subsidiary (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Hitachi and Canon begin joint work on OLED development (Nikkei
BP, 2008 (Sangyo doko hen)).
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X JVC begins TV assembly (Hiramoto, 1994).
JVC begins R&D into light valve technology (JVC, 1999).
JVC and Hughes Aircraft form joint venture to develop ILA (JVC,
1999).
JVC acquires controlling interest in Hughes-JVC (JVC, 1999).
JVC begins selling video cameras with LTPS screens (Nikkei BP,
1998).
JVC develops SXGA D-ILA element, enters projection market with a
projector using this LCD panel. Production volume is low, and JVC
limits itself to Japanese domestic market at first (Sangyo Times,
2001).
Canon and JVC cooperate on basic research related to SED.
X Materials suppliers Nippon Sheet Glass and Noritake Company
Limited also participate in basic research (Sangyo Times, 1999).
JVC begins selling HD rear projection TVs using D-ILA device. DILA is a version of LCOS developed by JVC (Nikkei BP, 1999).
JVC develops QXGA (2048X1536 pixel) reflective LCD (LCOS) for
projector applications. D-ILA (Sangyo Times, 2002).
JVC develops 4K X 2K LCOS device - this meets standards
Hollywood studios are pushing for in their Digital Cinema Initiative
(Sangyo Times, 2005).
JVC releases 15" LCD TV with VGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 200
(Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC begins selling 35" and 42" PDP TVs (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
JVC releases 26" LCD TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC releases 42" PDP TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC introduces 3 new D-ILA devices to bring its line up to 6 models.
These range from 0."7 to 1.7" in size and cover SXGA to 720p in
resolution (Sangyo Times, 2004).
JVC releases 32" HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC releases 50" HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC re-enters the RPTV business, starting with 61" in the US market
X
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC releases 70" HD RPTV with LCOS (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
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JVC begins selling full HD front projector (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
JVC beings selling 52" and 62" RPTVs in the North American
Market using D-ILA liquid crystal device they developed in house
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku Hen)).
JVC releases 40" full HD LCD TV with 32-bit processing (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2005, JVC was acquiring PDP supply from Pioneer (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
JVC develops full HD D-ILA LCD device for projection applications
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku Hen)).
JVC releases 70" D-ILA LCD based RP TV (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC begins selling 61" and 52" 720p rear projection TVs in Japan
(Sangyo Times, 2006).
JVC develops full HD rear projection TV product (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
JVC exhibits "Super high vision theatre" at Aichi Banpaku with NHK
X
(Sangyo Times, 2007).
JVC exhibits LCD panel with 180hz drive at Ceatec (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
JVC develops 3.7cm deep 42" LCD TV. (Backlight portion was
developed by JVC.) (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
JVC plans to sell 3.7cm deep 42" LCD TV in Spring 2008 (Nikkei
BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
JVC announces it has developed 12 bit color LCD TV (prior
technology was 10 bit) (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
JVC begins selling 110" rear projection TV (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market
Hen)).
JVC changes its projector strategy to move away from rear projectors
and focus on front projectors, home theatre. Drop in prices of large
Plasma and LCD is given as reason. The firm's D-ILA LCOS device
is suitable for either (Sangyo Times, 2008, 2009).
JVC exits RP TV (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Funai Electronics and JVC agree to cooperate. Funai will market
LCD TVs produced in Victor's North American plant, and JVC will
X
market LCD TVs produced in Funai's Poland plant (Nikkei BP, 2008
(Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
JVC announces it will exit the Japanese TV business and focus on
X
overseas markets (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
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X LG and Hitachi enter into JV on CRTs (Sangyo Times, 2002).
LG Central Labs begin TFT LCD research (Sangyo Times, 2008).
LG Group enters LCD business (Sangyo Times, 1994).
LG establishes an LCD Business Unit inside of LG Electronics
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
LG Electronics and Alps Electric (Japan) establish a Joint Venture
named "Frontec" and located at Alps' central research lab, to perform
R&D on TFT-LCD technology (Deutsche Bank, August, 2004).
LG Electronics develops 12.1"color XGA TFT LCD (Nikkei BP,
1995).
LG Electronics begins mass production of TFT LCDs on 365 X 465
substrate mm line (Sangyo Times, 1995).
LG Electronics develops 12.1" LTPS panel with 800X600 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1997).
LG Electronics develops 13.3" XGA TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 1997).
LG Electronics installs prototyping line for PDP (Nikkei BP, 1997).
LG Electronics develops 14.1" XGA TFT LCD for NBPC
applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
LG Electronics develops 18.1" XGA TFT panel with wide viewing
angle (Nikkei BP, 1998).
LG Groups' LCD perorations are merged into LG LCD from LG
Electronics and LG Semiconductor (Fuji Chimera, 1999).
LG LCD has IBM as a client (Fuji Chimera, 1999).
LG Electronics beings research into OLED technology (Sangyo
Times, 2006; Techno Associates, 2008).
LG Electronics develops 4" OLED (Sangyo Times, 2003).
LG Electronics and Philips Electronics form LG Philips LCD, a 5050 JV focusing on LCD production. (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Gyokai
Bunseki Hen)).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 18.1" XGA TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
1999).
LG Electronics develops 8" OLED (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Alps and LG JV Frontech is not renewed at the end of the contract
(Sangyo Times, 2002).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 15" TFT LCD panel with 1600X1200
resolution (Nikkei BP, 2000).
LG Philips LCD develops first 20.1" LCD TV panel (Nikkei BP,
2006 (Gyokai Bunseki Hen)).
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LG Philips LCD begins mass producing 20.1" VGA LCD panels for
a Japanese TV maker (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Philips and Toshiba cross license patents on display cells, circuits,
extend this to LG Philips LCD (Techno Associates, 2008).
LG Electronics develops 60" PDP TV use panel with HD resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2000).
LG Electronics develops 1.8" full color moving picture OLED
display with 20 research staff and 200 million yen budget. LG
Electronics gets 40 patents for this effort (Sangyo Times, 2003).
LG Electronics invests 10 billion yen in production equipment for
OLED at Kumi (Sangyo Times, 2003).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 20.1" TFT with VGA resolution (Nikkei
BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD develops 30" TFT for digital TV (Sangyo Times,
2003).
LG Japan enters the LCD TV market (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
LG Electronics begins PDP production in March, 2001 (Nikkei BP,
2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
LG Electronics begins selling 60" PDP (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku
Hen)).
LG Electronics begins OLED production in September 2001 (Nikkei
BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 42" HD TFT LCD panel - (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD announces it has developed 52" full HD display for
TV applications - this is world's largest (Fuji Chimera, 2003). It was
developed by 25 specialists in approximate 10 month development
program (Sangyo Times, 2003).
LG Philips develops 20.1" QUXGA LTPS display (Sangyo Times,
2002).
LG begins shipping 50" HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
LG Electronics develops 60 HD PDP panel (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics produces cell phone with OLED display -- display is
from Tohoku Pioneer (Sangyo Times, 2003).
LG begins shipping Korea's first 52" LCD projection TV (Nikkei BP,
X
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics release 30" LCD TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 55" IPS mode FHD TFT LCD panel
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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As of 2003, LG Philips LCD is Sony's lead TV Panel vendor (LG is
using IPS technology) (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
LG Philips LCD begins mass production on its 1100X1250mm line
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD signs agreement with Korean government to
develop major LCD producing industrial park in Paju (Sangyo
Times, 2004).
LG Philips LCD is the largest LCD manufacturer in the world in
2003 (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Gyokai Bunseki Hen)).
LG Electronics and Thomson partner on PDP technology
development. Agreement is valid until 2005 (Sangyo Times, 2004).
LG develops 50" PDP TV with built-in digital tuner (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics releases 60" PDP TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics develops 71" PDP (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics announces world's largest PDP TV - 76"and FHD
compatible (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics begins production on Kumi #2 PDP line. Investment
is 13.5 billion yen; it can produce 35K 50" PDP panels/month
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
LG Electronics finishes construction of first line for PM-OLED
production (Sangyo Times, 2006).
LG Electronics has 258 billion Korean Won profits in second quarter
X
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 32" TFT with backlight control to
improve dynamic range (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 42" TFT panel with impulse drive
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics releases 30" HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
LG Philips LCD begins construction on world's largest display
cluster (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD and Hitachi cross license IPS technology (Techno
Associates, 2008).
Sony stopped sourcing LCD TV panels from LG-Philips and moved
business to Samsung LCD (Fuji Chimera, 2004).
LG Philips develops 3 mask process for TFT production - this
reduces steps, improves yield from existing methods that used more
masks (Sangyo Times, 2005).
LG Electronics begins shipping 71" PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
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Panasonic Electric Industry requests Japanese government prevent
PDP imports due to patent infringements by LG Electronics (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 20.1" AM-OLED with 1280X800
resolution on LTPS (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen); Sangyo Times,
2005). It is developed together with LG Electronics.
LG Electronics begins mass producing PM-OLED panels (Sangyo
Times, 2005).
LG Electronics is selling 200K OLED panels / month, making it a
major player (Sangyo Times, 2005).
LG Electronics began mass production of PM-OLEDs using
370X470mm substrate for 1.77" displays to be used in GSM phones
sold in China (Sangyo Times, 2007).
LG Electronics releases 60" FHP RPTV with LCOS (Nikkei BP,
X
2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
For the year 2004, Sharp is #1, LG #2, and CMO #3 in LCD
X
production volume (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
LG Philips / LG Electronics shows 20.1" WXGA small molecule
OLED on LTPS (using RGB) (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Gijutsu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD achieves 85% yield ratio in first quarter 2005 for P6
sixth generation plant which started production in August of 2004
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 42" TFT TV use panel with 12 bit color
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 47" full HD LCD TV use panel with
LED backlight and area control (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 55" FHD IPS mode LCD TV panel (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD is investing 530 billion yen in a Generation 7 line in
Paju (Sangyo Times, 2005).
LG begins mass production on A3 PDP line (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Electronics' PDP module business becomes profitable - it was
loss making from mid 2004 (Sangyo Times, 2006).
LG Electronics begins making AM-OLEDs using LTPS backplane
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
US DOJ begins joint investigation with Japanese and Korean Fair
Trade Commissions on alleged anti-competitive actions from major
LCD producers including Sharp, Samsung Electric, LG Philips, and
others (Deutsche Bank, December 2006).
LG Philips LCD begins mass production of 42" LCD panels for LCD
TV applications on P7 line (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
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LG Philips LCD develops 100" LCD panel - world's largest (Nikkei
BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
LG announces 3D LCD monitor (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Philips LCD loses money in 2006 and Q1 2007 (Nikkei BP, 2007
X
(Trend Hen)).
Samsung Electric and LG Philips LCD have agree to cross
purchasing between their equipment makers (buy from each others
equipment makers), a practice previously avoided. Now suppliers of
one are no longer excluded from being suppliers of the other
(Daewoo Securities, October, 2007).
Philips sells its stake in LG Philips LCD back to LG (Nikkei BP,
2006 (Gyokai Bunseki Hen)).
LG Electronics finishes construction on LG Poland cluster which
includes assembly from LCD module to TV (Nikkei BP, 2007
(Market Hen)).
LG Philips LCD develops flexible full color LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Philips LCD begins shipping 19.8mm thick 42" TV panels
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Philips LCD announces it will invest 2.5 trillion Korean Won in a
new Generation 8 production line (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
LG Electronics begins production on new PDP line that allows 8
displays / sheet (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Electronics reduces 71" plasma TV price by 80% (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Electronics integrates the Plasma Rear Panel operation of LG
Micro to integrate PDP operation altogether (LG Micro had been
producing PDP backplane) (Sangyo Times, 2008).
LG Electronics shuts down production on Kumi A1 PDP line
(Sangyo Times, 2009).
LG Philips LCD to source OLED materials from UDC (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Philips LCD develops 2.4" and 3" AM-OLED prototypes
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
LG Philips LCD loses 177 billion Korean Won in the fourth quarter
X
of 2006 (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Electric sues China's largest TV maker, TCL Thomson
X Electronics (TTE) for patent invasion (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market
Hen)).
LG Display is the new name of the LG Philips LCD entity after
Philips liquidated its share of the JV (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo
Bunseki Hen)).
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LG Display Co begins installing generation 8 equipment at P8 plant
(Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
LG Group merges PDP related businesses into LG Electronics' PDP
business unit (Sangyo Times, 2009).
LG Electronics changes over Kumi PDP module Line (A1) to solar
panel production. It plans to retain 2 PDP lines (Sangyo Times,
2009).
LG's OLED business is moved from LG Electronics to LG Philips
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
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X Mitsubishi Electric begins TV assembly (Hiramoto, 1994).
Mitsubishi began LCD research program with longer term goal of
television application. The firm had been doing some LCD work in a
wall hanging TV development group at the central research lab. This
research had also developed EL, PDP, and flat CRT technologies
(Numagami, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits small EL TV prototype at the 1970s
X
Japan World Exposition (Numagami, 1999).
Hitachi and Mitsubishi develop grey scale technologies for AC-PDP
(Weber et al., 2008).
Mitsubishi announces LCD TV 6400 dot LCD TV in academic
conference (Nikkei Electronics, 1974).
Mitsubishi sells neon orange type PDP on make-to-order basis
(Nikkei BP, 1990).
Optrex is formed as a JV between Asahi Glass and Mitsubishi
Electric to produce LCDs for calculators and clocks (Sangyo Times,
1992). Optrex remains in PM-LCD domain, and does not enter AMLCD or Television applications.
Mitsubishi Electric establishes LCD Device Development Center at
its materials research lab in Amagasaki (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Mitsubishi Electric successfully develops 5 and 10" color TFT
displays (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Mitsubishi Electric begins shipping samples of its 5" color TFT to
Mitsubishi auto for consideration for in-car TV applications (Sangyo
Times, 1990).
Mitsubishi Electric develops DC PDP (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric begins selling Maxy line of computers with color
TFT displays (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Mitsubishi and Asahi Glass establish joint venture called Advanced
Display to develop TFT LCD. Mitsubishi has 80% share and Asahi
20%. Located in Kumamoto (Sangyo Times, 1992).
ADI builds TFT-LCD prototype development line (2 P line) in
Mitsubishi Kumamoto plant (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Advanced Display starts operation. ADI's initial equipment includes
a pilot line for improving yield, reducing cost and fabricating
samples. It is not meant for mass production. Focus is completely
large TFT-LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Advanced Display begins sample production (Sangyo Times, 1992).
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ADI demonstrates 9.5 and 12" TFT LCDs at 1993 Electronics Show
(Sangyo Times, 1993).
ADI builds additional line (4P line) at Kumamoto plant (Sangyo
Times, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric stops DC PDP development, focuses only on AC
PDP (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric (ADI) began mass production of amorphous
silicon TFTs in 1995 (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
ADI changes from development company to manufacturing company
(Sangyo Times, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric successfully developed 20" PDP, began shipping
samples (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Mitsubishi Electric develops, begins shipping samples of 15.1" XGA
TFT LCD for monitor applications (Nikkei BP, 1996; Sangyo Times,
1997).
Mitsubishi develops 40" VGA resolution PDP for TV applications
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
Mitsubishi Electric begins construction of PDP pant in Nagaoka
(Sangyo Times, 1999).
ADI plans to begin shipping LTPS panels in 1998 (Nikkei BP, 1997).
ADI transfers LCD technology to CPT (Taiwan), assists in
construction of line at CPT (Nikkei BP, 1998). ADI will provide CPT
with LCD production technology relating to 12.1" SVGA, 12.1"
XGA, and 15.1" XGA displays. CPT will build a plant using the
same technology as existing ADI 410X520 mm plant. Mitsubishi
will have right to purchase one third of CPT's production (Sangyo
Times, 1998).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 12.1" TFT panel with 800X600
resolution (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Mitsubishi Electric begins mass production of PDPs at its Nagaoka
plant (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Mitsubishi begins shipping 40" VGA PDP (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric begins selling 46" PDP monitor with 852X480
resolution (Nikkei BP, 1997).
ADI develops 15" XGA color TFT for monitor applications (Nikkei
BP, 1998).
Mitsubishi Electric decides to stop PDP production and freeze further
investment into PDP. Unclear what the firm will do with the business
(Sangyo Times, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric discusses how it has increased its production
capacity through its relationship with CPT. It also says it will focus
on non-commodity types of displays for large customers (Nikkei BP,
1999).
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Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 15" 1280X960 resolution (Quad VGA)
LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Mitsubishi Electric bought out ADI JV partner Asahi Glass to make
ADI a wholly owned subsidiary (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Mitsubishi Electric agrees to jointly develop PDP with Taiwan's CPT.
Mitsubishi plans to buy PDPs from CPT once production can begin
(Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Mitsubishi ceases production of PDPs, and continues with R&D only.
Smaller than expected market size and inability to break even are
given as reasons (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
CPT begins producing LCDs using Mitsubishi Electric's technology.
Mitsubishi is contracting production - main focus is 14.1" (Sangyo
Times, 2001).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 2.15" LTPS display with DRAM on
board (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 15" XGA LCD TV panel with overdrive
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric begins LTPS production at Shizui plant (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
Mitsubishi Electric develops memory embedded LCD using LTPS
(Sangyo Times, 2002).
Mitsubishi Electric plans to produce LTPS for cell phone applications
(Sangyo Times, 2002).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 18.1" XGA TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 22" Overdrive TFT LCD panel (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi establishes MELCO Display Technology - this will focus
on developing, producing, and selling small and mid-sized TFTLCDs (Fuji Chimera, 2002; Sangyo Times, 2003).
Mitsubishi Electric ceases OEM LCD purchasing from CPT (Fuji
Chimera, 2003).
Mitsubishi Electric begins selling DLP based rear projector (Sangyo
X
Times, 2003).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 22" LED backlit TFT LCD panel with
105% NTSC Gamut (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits XGA resolution OCB LCD prototype
with 4ms response speed at FPD International 2003 (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric releases 30" LCD TV with HD resolution for US
market (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Mitsubishi Electric's LCD business returns to the black. The change
is driven by refocusing from commodity items such as monitors to
niches such as POS, ATM, cameras, auto, industrial, medical, etc.
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
Mitsubishi Electric is developing small particle OLED at their
research lab and an outside partner (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Mitsubishi Electric introduces 82" FHD rear projection TV with
X
LCOS (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 22.2" TFT with adjusted backlight
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric releases 37" FHD LCD TFT TV (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric continues to work on Feed Forward Driving and
Natural Color Matrix video processing technologies for driving LCD
TVs and other multimedia displays (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Mitsubishi Electric announces it does not plan to make large LCD
panels, and will transfer OCB technology to other firms when it
finishes development (currently expected in 2007) (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric confirms it has exited the PDP market (Deutsche
Bank, March 11, 2004).
Mitsubishi Electric exhibits 23" TFT TV use panel with 6 color
backlights (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric decides to stop developing its LTPS business
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
Mitsubishi continues to purchase Plasma display panels from Pioneer
to use in TV sets (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Mitsubishi Electric releases 62" DLP based RP-TV (Nikkei BP, 2005
X
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Mitsubishi Electric exits LCD monitor panel production (Sangyo
Times, 2009).
Mitsubishi exits flat panel display (Fuji Chimera, 2006).
Mitsubishi develops xvYCC color laser based projection TV. World's
X
first. (Fuji Keizai, 2007 (Denki Maker R&D Survey)).
Mitsubishi Electric sells entire 40% stake in Optrex to fund Nihon
Sangyo Partners (Sangyo Times, 2008).
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LCD

Kahn, a recent PHD from the US begins working on LCD technology
at NEC (Numagami, 1999).
Samsung and NEC set up joint venture on CRTs; this later becomes
X
Samsung SDI (Sangyo Times, 2002).
NEC begins single color PDP production (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
NEC begins selling AC-PDPs (Nikkei BP, 1990).
NEC has top market share for PDP in 1981 with 35%. It is strong in
segment displays and competes with Fujitsu in POS, ECR (Yano
Keizai, 1982).
PDP makers as of 1982 included Okatani Electric, Oki Electric,
NEC, Fujitsu, Matsushita Denshi Kogyo, Sanya Electronics, and
Burroughs (Yano Keizai, 1982).
NEC establishes Electric Display Development Department, begins
R&D on TFT-LCD for office automation applications (Sangyo
Times, 1990; 1993).
NEC develops prototype 4.3" portable LCD TV panel (Sangyo
Times, 1990).
NEC develops prototype 9" laptop LCD display (Sangyo Times,
1990).
NEC decides that AC-PDP is the most promising large flat panel
technology and starts R&D with aim to create wall mounted TV at
the NEC central research labs (Kawamura, 2005).
NEC begins research on color PDP (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
NEC develops 9.3" prototype a-Si TFT LCD (Nikkei BP, 1990).
NEC Home Electronics enters LCD TV business (Nikkei BP, 1990).
NEC begins mass producing 4.3" a-SI TFT panels (Nikkei BP, 1990).

1989 X
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Year

LCD

Fujitsu

X

NEC is using a prototype LCD line at Tamagawa for development
(Nikkei BP, 1990).
NEC develops 26 inch PDP with 576X256 resolution (Nikkei BP,
1990).
NEC starts color LCD development promotion office and new
development project (Sangyo Times, 1994).
NEC decides to build color TFT LCD mass production line in
Kagoshima, invests 10 billion yen (Sangyo Times, 1990).
NEC exhibits the world's first laptop with color TFT (PC-9801 model
F5) at Business Show in Tokyo (Sangyo Times, 1990).
TFT-LCD mass production begins at Kagoshima plant (Sangyo
Times, 1992).
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NEC develops 10 inch prototype PDP with 120X160 resolution
(Kawamura, 2005).
NEC fully enter into LCD business (Sangyo Times, 1992).
NEC begins large scale production of 10" color TFT (Sangyo Times,
1993).
NEC introduces laptop using 10" color TFT screen - world's first
(Sangyo Times, 1993).
NEC announces it can make full color AC-PDP at academic
conference (Kawamura, 2005).
NEC exhibits 19 inch plasma display with 240X320 resolution and
128 gradation levels (Kawamura, 2005).
NEC establishes color PDP development center (Sangyo Times,
1995).
NEC develops 100" color TFT LCD projector using 4.2" XGA a-Si
panel (Nikkei BP, 1993).
NEC begins selling TFT projector for engineering work station
applications. It is priced at 10 million yen (Nikkei BP, 1993).
NEC develops 10.4" XGA TFT LCD panel for portable workstation
applications (Nikkei BP, 1993).
NEC develops 13" XGA panel for office automation applications
(Nikkei BP, 1993).
NEC develops 6.5" VGA TFT LCD for sub-notebook applications
(Nikkei BP, 1993).
NEC is developing polysilicon TFT technology (Sangyo Times,
1993).
NEC invests 30 billion yen, begins ramping up production at second
line (K2) in Kagoshima (Sangyo Times, 1993, 1997).
NEC is considering establishing a PDP business within the next 2 to
3 years (Nikkei BP, 1994).
NEC installs PDP production line at its development center
(Kawamura, 2005).
NEC develops 10.4" VGA TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 1994).
NEC develops 9.4" TFT LCD with 800X600 resolution (Nikkei BP,
1994).
NEC develops 12.1" XGA TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 1994).
NEC begins full production at new line (K2) in Kagoshima (Sangyo
Times, 1994).
Production begins at new line (A-1) in Akita (Sangyo Times, 1994).
NEC Home Electronics introduces 9.5" TFT LCD TV (Sangyo
Times, 1994).
NEC develops 40" AC-PDP for AV applications (Nikkei BP, 1994).
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NEC exhibits 40" WVGA panel at Electronics Show. This was the
largest AC-PDP ever made at the time. It features 256 gradation
levels (Kawamura, 2005).
NEC develops 12.1" TFT LCD with 800X600 resolution (Nikkei BP,
1995).
NEC develops Super Fine Technology LCDs with IPS mode
technology at its core (Sangyo Times, 2004).
NEC establishes a special project to promote color PDP business
development (Sangyo Times, 1995).
NEC develops 33" AC PDP with 840X480 resolution for TV
applications (Nikkei BP, 1995).
NEC begins construction of PDP production line at Tamagawa
facility. PDP line investment is 6 billion yen. Initial production to be
one thousand panels per month (Sangyo Times, 1995, 1997).
NEC develops 13.3" XGA TFT for NBPC application (Nikkei BP,
1996).
NEC develops 14.1" XGA TFT LCD for monitor applications
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
NEC develops 20.1" 1280X1024 (SXGA) TFT LCD display for
monitor applications (Nikkei BP, 1996).
NEC begins construction of new 550X650 line (A2) in Akita. Total
investment is 24 billion yen (18 equipment, 6 building) (Sangyo
Times, 1997).
NEC develops Super Fine TFT (SFT) technology that increases
viewing angle to 160 degrees vertical and horizontal (Sangyo Times,
1997).
Tamagawa office ramps up PDP production (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
NEC Home Electronics announces it will begin selling 42" 852X480
pixel PDP TV. Price is below 1.2 million yen (Nikkei BP, 1996).
NEC begins shipping sample plasma display panels to Japanese TV
manufacturers (Sangyo Times, 1997).
NEC begins construction of new plant in Kagoshima to produce
color PDPs. It will be world's first to produce two 42" screens per
substrate. Investment is 25 billion yen (Sangyo Times, 1999).
NEC develops 15" XGA TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 1997).
NEC develops 20.3" TFT with 1600X1200 resolution (Nikkei BP,
1997).
NEC is working on developing LCDs for projection applications
including both a-Si and LTPS (Sangyo Times, 1997).
NEC is purchasing 11.3" LCDs from Hoshiden, because Hoshiden's
substrate dimensions produces this size more efficiently than NEC's
(Sangyo Times, 1997).
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NEC begins shipping samples of three new ultrathin (6.4mm) ultra
light TFT modules for notebook computer applications (Sangyo
Times, 1998).
NEC beings LCD production at A2 line in Akita (Sangyo Times,
1998).
NEC develops 50" PDP TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP, 1997).
NEC begins selling 50" plasma High Vision (Japanese high definition
standard) TV (Sangyo Times, 1999).
NEC Home Electronics begins selling 42" and 33" plasma TVs
(Sangyo Times, 1999).
NEC begins producing Plasma TVs at NEC Nagano location (Sangyo
Times, 2000).
NEC develops 15.4" XGA TFT LCD for monitor applications
(Nikkei BP, 1998).
NEC develops prototype 11.3" color TFT LCD with 1600X1200
resolution (Nikkei BP, 1998).
NEC begins shipping samples of 15.4" full color SXGA
(1280X1024) panels (Sangyo Times, 1999).
NEC Home Electronics ships 20.1" full color TFT LCD monitor with
wide viewing angle technology (Sangyo Times, 1999).
NEC begins mass producing PDPs at Kagoshima (Nikkei BP, 1997).
NEC and Thompson announced they agreed to cooperate on
development of PDP, PDP-TV, and PDP monitors. NEC will also
supply Thomson with Plasma panels (Fuji Chimera, 1999).
NEC develops high resolution 42" PDP (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Takemura et al paper on FED technology is presented at IEDM
X
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Kihon Gijutsu Hen)).
Yoshiki et al paper on FED technology presented at IVMC (Nikkei
X
BP, 2005 (Kihon Gijutsu Hen)).
NEC announces it will invest 10 billion yen in a used 370X470 LCD
line - this investment is meant to be a stop gap until they make an
investment in a major new line (Nikkei BP, 1999).
NEC builds additional color TFT volume production line at
Kagoshima with used equipment to keep cost down and get the
production running quickly (Sangyo Times, 2000).
NEC develops 9.4" 1600X1200 LCD resolution panel for photo
viewing applications (Nikkei BP, 1999).
NEC develops color a-Si TFT display with double the pixel density
of prior a-Si TFTs. 9.4" display has 211 pixels/inch (Sangyo Times,
2000).
NEC develops 5.7" OLED prototype with 320X240 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1999).
X NEC closes its CRT business (Nikkei BP, 2000).
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NEC develops 20.1" LCD TV panel with VGA resolution (Nikkei
BP, 2000).
NEC develops 20" UXGA LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 2000).
As of 2000, NEC has a focus on amorphous silicon TFT for three
uses: monitors, notebook PCs, and industrial usage (Fuji Chimera,
2000).
NEC develops 20" a-Si TFT display capable of high vision content
with 1920X1200 pixel resolution (Sangyo Times, 2001).
NEC is investing 3 billion yen at NEC Akita to build a line capable
of making reflective LCDs. This will be used in cell phones (Sangyo
Times, 2001).
NEC develops 42" PDP TV use panel with 853X480 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2000).
NEC is first to introduce a 42" plasma TV with a list price below 1
million yen. (Plasma X PX-42VT) (Sangyo Times, 2001).
NEC exhibits full color OLED prototype (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Samsung SDI and NEC agree to cooperate on OLED (Sangyo Times,
2001).
Samsung SDI and NEC jointly develop 2" OLED for cell phone
application (Sangyo Times, 2001).
NEC says that it is no longer developing FED technology (Nikkei
X
BP, 2000).
NEC loses 12 billion yen on display business during 2000. It had
X
profits of 10 billion yen in 1999 (Sangyo Times, 2002).
NEC Home Electronics exits TV business (NEC Annual Reports,
X
1999, 2000).
NEC exhibits 2.5" reflective TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC exhibits 23" TFT panel with IPS mode and HD resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC exhibits impulse type TN mode TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC begins shipping samples of 23" wide XGA for multimedia
monitor (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
NEC and CMO of Taiwan enter into alliance. They will cooperate on
developing TFT-LCDs for notebooks and monitors. NEC will
outsource 14.1" LCD manufacturing to CMO (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Senryaku Hen)).
NEC exits market for LCDs used in notebooks and common
computer monitors after obtaining supply agreement from CMO
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
NEC exhibits 61" PDP TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitsumu Hen)).
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NEC decides to build a new PDP line at Kagoshima. It will invest 27
billion yen in the project (Sangyo Times, 2002).
NEC introduces the world's largest commercial PDP - 61" (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
NEC and Thomson Multimedia agree to establish a 50-50 JV to
develop, produce, and sell PDP globally (Sangyo Times, 2002). This
never materializes.
NEC begins selling cell phone with PM OLED panel (Nikkei BP,
2007 (OLED Hen)).
Samsung and NEC establish Samsung NEC Mobile Displays in
Korea to develop and produce OLED displays (SDI 51%, NEC 49%)
(Sangyo Times, 2001). Note: As of 2001, NEC owns 4.4% of
Samsung SDI (Sangyo Times, 2001).
NEC and SVA (China) agree to form color TFT producing JV in
Shanghai. SVA will take 75% and NEC 25% stake. Total planned
investment is 50 billion yen (Sangyo Times, 2003).
NEC and SVA (China) enter into contract manufacturing agreement.
SVA is to manufacture LCDs for NEC beginning in 2004, in its 5G
plant (Deutsche Bank, August, 2004).
NEC develops 5.24 megapixel 20.1" TFT LCD with super wide
viewing angle (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC has decided to establish a new company, NEC LCD
Technologies, to focus on LCD market and develop NECs strategic
shift from computer-related displays to high end niches (e.g., FA,
Medical, CAD). LCD capability will be transferred to the new firm
(Sangyo Times, 2003).
NEC announces it will divide the TFT business group and PDP
operations (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC announces it will spin off PDP operations into new subsidiary
called NEC Plasma Display (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony is negotiation with NEC on cooperation in PDP (no details
given) (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC Plasma Display ramps up second generation PDP line (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
NEC announces 1.9" AM-OLED with 6 bit color (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC successfully puts OLED driver on display glass making first
system on glass OLED (Sangyo Times, 2004).
NEC and Samsung SDI jointly invested in LTPS pilot line for OLED
applications (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
NEC establishes separate company for LCD, called "NEC LCD
Technology" as previously announced (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
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NEC LCD develops 21.2" super high resolution QXGA TFT panel
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC has stopped OEM purchasing from CMO because of LCD
prices have fallen and it is no longer attractive (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
NEC Plasma develops 61" PDP with 45mm depth, digital processing
circuitry built in the module (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC Plasma reaches full production at its second generation PDP
lines (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
NEC Plasma says it is only firm to be able to reliably ship 61" VGA
PDP panels (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
NEC receives 5 billion yen capital from Sony to pay for part of
investment in new TV PDP production line (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
As of 2003, NEC was selling PDPs to Sony, TCL (CHINA), and
Daewoo (Fuji Chimera, 2004).
NEC and SVA's JV is building a 5th generation (1100X1300 mm )
plant in Shanghai (Sangyo Times, 2004).
NEC-SVA JV begins production using 5th generation substrate at
location in Shanghai. This is the first plant in China to include the
front end LCD processing (Sangyo Times, 2005).
NEC LCD Technologies exhibits energy efficient LTPS panels at
FPD 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC LCD Technologies exhibits 21.3" TFT with LED backlight and
104% NTSC gamut (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC develops special use medical LCDs with high resolution, LCD
backlights, SA-SFT, and 3070 gradations (Sangyo Times, 2005)
Pioneer acquires NEC's PDP operations - Pioneer's existing
organization is called Pioneer Display Products, and the formerly
NEC organization is renamed Pioneer Plasma Display. Pioneer pays
40 billion yen. Pioneer gains NEC's color filter technology and
ability to manufacture multiple PDPs per substrate, also PDP patents
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC sells its stake in Samsung NEC mobile display to Samsung SDI
along with NEC's OLED patents, exits OLED (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen); Sangyo Times, 2005).
NEC LCD Technologies exhibits 21.3" TFT with LED backlight for
TV use (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC to invest 5 billion yen in NEC Akita plant to begin LTPS TFTLCD production in 2006 (Sangyo Times, 2006).
NEC begins producing color filters at its Kagoshima plant (Sangyo
Times, 2006).
NEC begins selling 5.5" and 12.1" Super-Transmissive Natural Light
TFTs (Sangyo Times, 2006). They can be veiwed eve in bright
places.
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NEC begins selling 2.7" QVGA with touch panel for PDA and smart
phone applications (Sangyo Times, 2006).
NEC has developed 19" monochrome LCD for CT Scans, MRI, and
other medical applications. The 19" display has SXGA resolution,
high contrast and wide viewing angle (Sangyo Times, 2006).
NEC has developed worlds fastest A-Si TFTs, both 10.4" - one is
VGA and one XGA (Sangyo Times, 2006).
NEC develops 3.5" SOG LCD (LTPS) with 100% coverage of NTSC
colors and QHD resolution (960X540 dots). This is over 300 PPI.
Plans to be used in professional video cameras and other
broadcasting applications (Sangyo Times, 2007).
NEC LCD installs LTPS-TFT manufacturing equipment at its Akita
Plant, using an existing 370X470 mm line (Sangyo Times, 2007).
NEC LCD Technology ships samples of displays with Horizontally
Double-Density Pixels - which allow mixed 2D and 3D
images(Nikkei PB, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
NEC has developed technology that allows the visible angle of a
screen to be controlled or modified using signals. It has to do with
modifying backlight, and is used in applications where privacy is
needed, for instance, in ATM machines (Sangyo Times, 2008).
NEC LCD has integrated DRAM memory directly on the glass
substrate of an LCD module - this is a world's first (Sangyo Times,
2008).
NEC LCD integrates subsidiaries NEC Akita and NEC Kagoshima
into a single entity (Sangyo Times, 2008).
NEC LCD Technologies develops 12.1" SVGA LCD display with 3D
that can be see without special glasses (Sangyo Times, 2009).
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Event
Panasonic develops 17" monochrome TV set
(http://panasonic.net/history/corporate/products/inp1952.html)
Panasonic Electric Industry and Philips establish joint venture
called Panasonic Denshi (Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic begins TV assembly at Kadoma plant (Hiramoto,
1994).
Panasonic develops its first color TV set. The 21" set had a CRT
designed by Panasonic
(http://panasonic.net/history/corporate/products/inp1960.html)
Panasonic Electric Industry began research on LCD technology,
initially focusing on TN-LCD for calculator applications (Sangyo
Times, 1993).
Panasonic Denshi begins selling DC-PDPs (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Panasonic exhibits prototype DC EL TV (Television Kyokai,
1974).
Panasonic Denshi announces research in color PDP (Nikkei BP,
1990).
Panasonic Electric Industry began research on color TFT at the
central research lab (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Panasonic Denshi announces 3-cathode PDP research (Nikkei
BP, 1990).
Panasonic Denshi enters the PDP business, kicks off with exhibit
at electronics show 1981.(Yano Keizai, 1982)
Panasonic Denshi begins selling 600X400 orange monochrome
PDP (Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic Electric Industry begins selling a 3" portable LCD TV
(Sangyo Times, 1993).
Panasonic Electric Industry establishes the Ishikawa LCD plant
(Sangyo Times, 1992).
Panasonic Denshi begins selling high resolution PDPs for laptop
applications (Nikkei BP, 1990). Group company Panasonic
communications recieves order for PCs with PDP displays from
Ericsson (Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic Denshi agrees to supply Toshiba with PDPs for
Toshiba portable computers. This continues to the early 1990s
(Weber et al., 2008).
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Panasonic Denshi supplies PDPs to a number of computer
manufacturers, including Compaq, and becomes the leader of
monochrome PDP production, passing Fujitsu (Weber et al.,
2008).
Panasonic Electric Industry builds an a-Si TFT LCD TV (Nikkei
BP, 2000).
Panasonic Denshi exhibits green PDP (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Panasonic Denshi begins selling high contrast 3-cathode PDPs
(Nikkei BP, 1990).
Panasonic develops prototype 40" EL LCD TV (Nikkei BP,
X
1990).
As of 1989, Panasonic Electric Industry considers Flat CRT and
LCD to be potential next generation technologies for AV
applications (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Panasonic Denshi is reported to be considering entering into
polysilicon TFT (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Panasonic Denshi exhibits 17" multicolor DC-PDPs (Nikkei BP,
1990).
Panasonic Denshi plans to begin shipping samples of 17"
multicolor PDP with VGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Panasonic Denshi's single color PDP business reaches 20 billion
yen in annual revenue (Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic Denshi announces sample shipments of 6" flat screen
X
CRTs (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Panasonic Electric Industry establishes a LCD Strategic Business
Unit to develop large LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Panasonic Electric Industry producing 1-3" AM-LCDs for video
cameras, small TVs, and passive matrix panels up to 10" (Sangyo
Times, 1992).
Panasonic Electric Industry develops 15" high resolution full
color LCD for workstation applications (full color was a world's
first) (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Panasonic Denshi begins DC-PDP development with Japanese
National Broadcaster, NHK (Kawamura, 2005).
Panasonic Electric Industry develops 10.4" VGA TFT LCD for
office automation applications (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Panasonic begins production of 0.7" polysilicon TFT color
viewfinder (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Panasonic Denshi develops a 26" PDP with 896X512 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1993).
Panasonic Electric Industry begins selling 14" flat CRT based
X
"Color Flat Vision" TV. Price is 288,000 yen (Nikkei BP, 1993).
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Panasonic Electric Industry acquires Philips Electronics' share in
the Panasonic Denshi JV (Lineback, 1993).
Panasonic Electric Industry develops 10.4" TFT LCD with
SVGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 1994).
Panasonic Electric Industry plans to develop and produce FLCD
(Sangyo Times, 1993).
Panasonic Electric Industry releases LCD Digicam video camera
with 4" TFT LCD screen (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Panasonic develops 26" DC-PDP with 896X512 resolution for
TV applications (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Panasonic begins shipping 26" color PDP samples (Sangyo
Times, 1995).
Panasonic Electric Industry and Plasmaco agree to joint
development (Weber et al., 2008).
NHK and Panasonic show jointly developed 40" high vision PDP
(Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic develops 14" XGA TFT LCD for monitor applications
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
Panasonic invests additional 5.3 billion yen in B1 Line to enable
LTPS-TFT production (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Panasonic starts production on new 370X470mm B2 LCD line in
Ishikawa (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Panasonic successfully develops 42" wide AC-PDP with
combined efforts from Plasma Co, Panasonic Denshi and
Panasonic Electric Industry (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Panasonic acquires Plasmaco for around 2 billion yen, gets ACPDP technology from the deal (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Panasonic begins selling 26" "Plasma View" TV (Sangyo Times,
1997; Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic plans to create LTPS display products in the 3-5"
range (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Panasonic exhibits 15" XGA TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Panasonic builds new B3 line 550X670mm at Ozu plant (Sangyo
Times, 1998).
Panasonic introduces 42" PDP TV with 853X480 resolution (Fuji
Chimera, 2000; Nikkei BP, 1997).
Panasonic installs PDP line at Takazuki location (Sangyo Times,
2000).
Panasonic Denko announces good emission quality using silicon
X
FEDs (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Panasonic Electric Industry develops 2.5"LTPS for digital
camera applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
X
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Panasonic Electric Industry develops 19" XGA TFT for monitor
applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Panasonic achieves 35% share in 15" monitor market, giving it
leading share status. Panasonic considers the monitor business to
be an important step towards a new LCD TV market (Sangyo
Times, 1999).
Panasonic signed contract to provide technology (license) and
technological assistance relating to large TFT LCD display
production to UMC Group's Unipac (Taiwan) (Fuji Chimera,
2000; Sangyo Times, 1999).
Panasonic Electric Industry is the first to successfully develop
42" FHD PDP for TV applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Panasonic begins selling 42" Plasma Tau TV (Sangyo Times,
1999).
Panasonic establishes Plasma Display Panel Business Unit
reporting directly to President Morishita (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Panasonic Electric Industry begins selling 56" RPTV with HD
X
capabilities based upon CRT projection (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Panasonic Electric Industry begins selling 36" HD capable CRT
X
based TV (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Panasonic announces it will sell 15.2" LCD TV (Nikkei BP,
1999).
Panasonic invests 32 billion yen in new TFT facility (C1) at
Ishikawa using 550X670mm substrate to produce panels for
monitors and TVs (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Panasonic developed a prototype 22"TFT for TV application
with fast response speed color gamut greater than that from CRT
(Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Panasonic develops prototype 23" wide LCD UGA display with
wide viewing angle (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Panasonic develops Advanced IPS technology for wider viewing
angle, increased brightness compared to IPS (Sangyo Times,
2000).
Unipac plans to begin production at new TFT line with
Panasonic assistance (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Unipac (Taiwan) became a supplier of LCD panels to Panasonic
in 1999 (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Panasonic introduces 37" PDP TV adding to Plasma Tau lineup
(Nikkei BP, 1999; Sangyo Times, 2000).
Panasonic reduces price of 37" PDP TV from 1.2 million yen to
1.1 million, and price of 42" PDP TV from 1.5 million to 1.3
million yen (Nikkei BP, 1999).
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Panasonic introduces 60" HD PDP for TV application (Nikkei
BP, 1999).
Panasonic develops 2.6" prototype FED using silicon emitter
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Panasonic Denko is working with Tokyo Noko University on
BSD, a form of FED (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Panasonic begins selling 22" TFT LCD TV with 854X480
resolution for 480,000 yen in July 2000 (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Panasonic begins construction of C1, C2 buildings, and
foundation for C3 all at Ishikawa location. The additional
production capacity is planned for increasing monitor and TV
applications (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Panasonic exhibits 50" PDP TV use panel with HD resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2000).
Panasonic begins selling improved 42" W PDP TV with real
black drive in July 2000 for 1.1 million yen (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Panasonic and Toray establish production JV, Panasonic Plasma
Display (Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic established a with Shanghai SVA JV to produce and
sell PDPs as well as related products and parts (Sangyo Times,
2001).
Panasonic Denko announced the development of Ballistic
electron Surface-emitting Display (BSD - a form of FED)
together with professor from Tokyo Noka University. It is
presented as the net generation flat panel low energy display.
Panasonic Denko made a 2.6" prototype of the display but has no
display manufacturing expertise (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Panasonic and TI agree to work together on developing HDTV
X
using rear projection with DLPs (Sangyo Times, 2001).
X Nakamura Kunio becomes president of Panasonic (Osada, 2006).
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Panasonic exhibits 11" OCB mode impulse type TFT TV LCD
panel (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Panasonic releases 15.2" and 11" LCD TVs with 854x480
resolution (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Matsushita began producing 22" and 15" high speed LCD panels
for TV use (Fuji Chimera, 2001).
Unipac is supplying Panasonic with 14.1 and 13.3" displays for
notebook computers (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Panasonic begins PDP production at Ibaragi and Takazuki plants
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Panasonic begins PDP production at Shanghai plant (Nikkei BP,
2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
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Panasonic begins selling 42" PDP TV with BS Digital tuner in
Japan for 800,000 yen (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Panasonic Plasma Display invests 35 billion yen in first PDP
line. Plant will produce TV panels and finished TV sets (Sangyo
Times, 2001).
Panasonic develops process to make BSD on silicon wafer,
announces full color panel prototype (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market
Hen)).
Panasonic Denko has over 100 patents relating to BSD in EU,
US, Japan (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Panasonic Electric Industry absorbs Panasonic Denshi (Osada,
X
2006).
Toshiba and Panasonic establish Toshiba Matsushita Display
Technology JV, integrating LCD operations from bother firms.
60% Toshiba, 40% owned by Panasonic. From Development to
Sales - all are integrated in the new JV. OLED development will
also be included in the new firm (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
TMDT develops 14" VGA LTPS-TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Panasonic exhibits 17" LCD TV using LTPS panel (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT exhibits 229ppi LTPS panel at Ceatec (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology announces that it plans
to enter TV with LTPS, and will continue work on developing
OCB technology (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba and Panasonic's JV "Advanced Flat Panel Display" plant
in Singapore begins mass production - it is the largest LTPS plant
in world (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Panasonic introduces 42" HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Panasonic Plasma Displays announced its decision to build a new
PDP plant with 60 billion yen investment (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT exhibits 2.2" 176X220 128pp large particle OLED panel
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT announces world's largest OLED panel prototype at
EDEX 2002. The 17" XGA wide full color OLED prototype was
made using inkjet printing on a LTPS backplane. Development
work was done at Fukaya ((Nikkei BP, 2005 (Oyo Gijutsu Hen);
Sangyo Times, 2003;
http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/members/01db/200204/1003265/)
397

Fujitsu
2002

X

2002

X

2002

X

2002

X

2002

X

2002

X

2002
2002
2003 X
2003 X
2003 X
2003 X
2003 X
2003

X

2003

X

2003

X

2003

X

2003

X

TMDT has an OLED pilot line at its Fukaya plant (Fuji Chimera,
2003).
As of 2002, Toshiba-Matsushita Display Technology is planning
to supply OLEDs for TV applications in the 2005-6 time frame
(Fuji Chimera, 2002).
As of 2002, Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology is following
both large and small OLED types, expecting one of the two to
emerge as a prevalent type, but unsure of which at this point
(Fuji Chimera, 2002).
Panasonic Group successfully develops BSD prototype on glass
(2.6", 168X126 resolution) (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Panasonic develops full color panel prototype BSD (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
Panasonic Denko finishes basic research on BSD, but is still
working on manufacturing process, size, and lifespan issues
(Sangyo Times, 2003).
Panasonic takes controlling stake in new CRT JV with Toshiba
X
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
X TMDT has loss for year (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Panasonic Electric Industry releases 32" LCD TV with HD
resolution (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT says plans to develop OCB, OLED, SOG panels in 2004
have a high priority (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
TMDT exhibits LCD Panel that can also function as scanner
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT begins selling lead free industrial use TFT panels
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
TMDT says it hopes to achieve profitability at its Singapore
plant in 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
Panasonic Electric Industry has been selling about 10% of its
PDP to other firms, but plans to increase this to 30% after it gets
the second plant running (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
Panasonic 's Shanghai JV Plant begins shipping PDPs (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
TMDT's Ishikawa plant has a prototyping line for large and small
particle OLED, but production plans have yet to be made
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
TMDT exhibited 2 small particle AM-OLEDs at EDEX 2003.
One is a 2" QCIF+ (176X220) and 3.5" QVGA (Sangyo Times,
2004).
Panasonic develops 7" full color prototype BSD on glass (Nikkei
BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
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Panasonic Electric Industry launches new flat panel TV brand
"Viera" (Weber et al., 2008).
Panasonic begins shipping TVs with new image processing
X
system called PEAKS (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Hitachi, Toshiba, Panasonic sign formal agreement to JV, will
name it IPS alpha technology (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2004, Panasonic is sourcing some LCD TV panels from
Samsung (Fuji Chimera, 2004).
TMDT begins mass production of OCB TFT panels for TV
applications (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT exhibits 23" and 32" OCB LCD panels. 32" is HD
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT wins advanced display of the year award for 0.3mm thick
polysilicon display at Flat Panel Production Technology show in
Tokyo (Sangyo Times, 2005).
TMDT develops 32" wide LTPS panel (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
TMDT develops LTPS prototype TV panel with LTPS for TV
applications (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT develops LCD panel which has variable (controllable)
viewing angle for ATMs and other applications where privacy is
an issue (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Panasonic begins selling a 65" PDP TV model - it is the world's
largest (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Panasonic will invest 95 billion yen to build a new PDP plant
with 250K sheets / month capacity and will begin production in
late 2005 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen); Sangyo Times, 2005).
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TMDT exhibits 3.5" AM-OLED using small particle materials at
Ceatec Japan 2004; plans to begin mass producing it in 2005 for
portable AV applications (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen);
Sangyo Times, 2005).
TMDT plans to begin mass production of AM-OLEDs using
small particle materials in 2005 (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Hitachi Displays, Panasonic Electric Industry, Toshiba
established IPS Alpha Technology. It is planned to make 23" IPS
panels starting in q2, 2006 (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
TMDT develops LCD panel with driver circuitry on the glass
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT increases LTPS production at Ishikawa plant, increasing
its focus on LTPS and decreasing a-Si focus (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Senryaku Hen)).
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TMDT begins construction of 3rd line at Ishikawa plant. New
line is 730X920mm substrate; LTPS (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Panasonic Plasma's 3rd plant begins production in Amagasaki,
two months earlier than planned. Substrate sizes are 1664X1961
and 1329X2332 mm. Together line 1 and 2 at Plant number 3
represent 95 billion yen investment ((Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku
Hen); Sangyo Times, 2006).
As of 2005, Panasonic sells PDPs to Sanyo, Toshiba, JVC,
Fujitsu general, TCL, B&O, Philips, etc. (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Hitachi and Panasonic agree to cooperate on PDP TV (Nikkei
BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
Hitachi Plasma Patent Licensing is established with both Hitachi
and Panasonic taking stakes (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
TMDT exhibited prototype 20.8" OLED with large particle
materials from CDT on LTPS (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT beings producing small volumes of 3.5" small molecule
OLEDs for personal music players. Production is at Ishikawa
plant, where OLED development also is. Backplane is produced
at Fukaya (Sangyo Times, 2006).
TMDT states it plans to mass produce OLEDs in 2008 (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Senryaku Hen)).
Panasonic introduces its final 2 CRT TV models for the Japanese
X
market (Fuji Chimera, 2000 (Digital AV Market)).
Panasonic launches a new line of Viera FP TV models in
overnight display changes through retail stores in Japan.
X Company ships 22 thousand sets in 3 days. The strategy is called
ichiya-jo, meaning to build a fortress overnight, following a
historical event in Japan (Osada, 2006).
TMDT announces it will invest 30 billion yen to build an
additional LTPS line at Ishikawa - it is planned to enter
production in late 2007 (Sangyo Times, 2007).
TMDT develops 0.99mm thick LTPS LCD for cell phone
application - world's thinnest. Samples are planned to ship in
4/2007 (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Panasonic develops a 103" FHD plasm display (Nikkei BP, 2006
(Senryaku Hen)).
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Panasonic Plasma announces it will begin construction on a 4th
Plasma plant near the Amagasaki #3 plant (Sangyo Times, 2006).
X

Panasonic Denko begins working on BSD for applications in
lighting and displays (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Panasonic releases 37" LCD TV, reversing its statement that 37"
and larger will all be PDP (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
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Matsushita, Hitachi, and Canon agree to work together on LCD
panels (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).

2007 X

Canon and Panasonic announce they will each take 24.9% stakes
in Hitachi Displays by the end of march, 2008. (announcement
date = 12/2007). Canon plans to increase its investment to take a
controlling stake in the future. Canon hopes to work on OLED
technology with Hitachi (Sangyo Times, 2008).
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Panasonic is planning to take a majority stake in IPS Alpha
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
Panasonic begins selling new 42" Plasma Full HD TV. Prior 42"
were 768p and not 1080p (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Panasonic Plasma decides to begin production at Number 4 PDP
plant one month earlier than planned, increases its annual
production target (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Panasonic is worldwide share leader in PDP TV for 2007
according to DisplaySearch (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki
Hen)).
Panasonic and Hitachi agree to supply each other with PDPs.
Hitachi can use Panasonic 's 103" and Panasonic can get
Hitachi's 85" PDP, in addition to other sizes (Nikkei BP, 2007
(Trend Hen)).
Panasonic Plasma announces it will its fifth PDP plant - this one
also will be in Amagasaki. Total investment is planned to be 280
billion yen. Substrate will be similar size to Gen 10 LCD
(Sangyo Times, 2007).
TMDT develops 21" prototype large particle AM-OLED, shows
it at Display 2007 in Tokyo. The display uses inkjet printing on
LTPS, with OLED materials from CDT. Resolution is WXGA.
This display was part of project funded through NEDO ((Nikkei
BP, 2007 (Market Hen); Sangyo Times, 2008).
Panasonic buys Hitachi's stake in IPS Alpha, makes it a
consolidated subsidiary (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
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Panasonic and IPS Alpha begin construction of an LCD panel in
Hyogo, but reduce investment from initially planned 300 billion
yen to 235 billion yen (Sangyo Times, 2009).
Panasonic agrees to joint PDP design, production, and supply
with Pioneer (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
Panasonic announces NEO PDP line at 2008 International CES
(Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
Panasonic exhibits 150" PDP at 2008 International CES (Nikkei
BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
401

Fujitsu
2008

X

2008

X

2008

X

2008

X

2008

X

Pioneer decides to obtain PDP supply from Panasonic and end in
house production (Sangyo Times, 2009).
Pioneer's PDP technical staff who produced Kuro Panels are
moved to Panasonic (Sangyo Times, 2009).
Hitachi announces it will procure PDP glass panel materials from
Panasonic, moving away from its previous philosophy of
producing PDP TVs completely in house starting with the panels
(Sangyo Times, 2009).
TMDT announces it will make a 16 billion yen investment in its
Ishikawa line to mass produce OLED using part of the existing
LTPS line (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
TMDT announces it plans to begin shipping small partial OLED
displays in October, 2009. Production will be done at a new line
at the Ishikawa plant (Sangyo Times, 2009).
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Philips announces DC-PDP concept design (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Philips performs trial sales of LCD TVs (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Philips commences R&D on OLED technology (Sangyo Times,
2005).
Hoshiden and Philips agree to form JV on TFTs, with Hoshiden's
TFT capacity inside the new firm (Sangyo Times, 1997, Jiji Press,
1996).
Philips announces it will begin selling a 42" 852X480 pixel PDP TV
model. The price is 22,000 gilder or approximately 1.4 million yen
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
Hoshiden and Philips establish TFT producing JV as agreed in prior
year; Hoshiden puts TFT capacity into this JV. Both partners take
equal equity stakes (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Hoshiden Yonago and Hoshiden Kobe R&D subsidiary become
wholly owned subsidiaries of JV between Hoshiden and Phillips.
Kobe center is Hoshiden-Phillips Display (HAPD) head office
(Sangyo Times, 1998).
Hoshiden-Philips develops 22.9" TFT with 1600X1200 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1997).
Philips is receiving PDP supply from Fujitsu as of 1997 (Nikkei BP,
1996).
Philips joins existing cooperative R&D arrangement between Sony
and Sharp to develop PALC and production technology related to
X PALC. The joint project is planned to last until September of 1999.
Focus is on 40" class screen (Fuji Chimera, 1999, 2001; Sangyo
Times, 1997, 1999).
Sony, Sharp, and Philips successfully develop prototype 42" PALC
X with wide view area -- ASM (Axiallly Symmetric aligned Micro Cell
mode) (Sangyo Times, 1999, 2007).
Philips increases stake in Hoshiden Philips from 50% to 80%, also
takes all of the firm's panel production output (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Hoshiden Philips focuses on 15" XGA TFT for Philips monitors
(Nikkei BP, 1999).
Pioneer agrees to joint development of PDP with Philips (Sangyo
Times, 1999).
Fujitsu and Philips agreed to cooperate on technologies used in
developing PDP for television applications. Improving Fujitsu's 42"
PDP for market entry is a focus of the cooperation (Fuji Chimera,
1999).
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Sony, Sharp, and Philips successfully develop prototype 42" PALC
HDTV display and 42" VGA PALC display (Sangyo Times, 1999,
2001).
Hoshiden Philips achieves single month profitability (Nikkei BP,
1999).
Hoshiden-Philips develops 3.8" reflective TFT with 320X240
resolution and COG (Nikkei BP, 1999).
LG Electronics and Philips Electronics form LG Philips LCD, a 5050 JV focusing on LCD production. It is the largest LCD
manufacturer in the world in 2003 (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Gyokai
Bunseki Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 18.1" XGA TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
1999).
Philips begins selling 42" PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Philips is developing micro display technologies based upon liquid
crystal (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Contract to cooperate on PALC ends, Philips does not renew (Sangyo
Times, 2000).
Philips Mobile Display Systems (PMDS) Kobe, formerly HoshidenPhilips Display, is taken over by Philips with Hoshiden selling its
entire stake, and exiting TFT (Sangyo Times, 2001).
PMDS focuses on 10" and smaller LCDs and functions as a globally
TFT development center for Philips (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Philips and Toshiba cross license patents on display cells, circuits,
extend this to LG-Philips LCD (Techno Associates, 2008).
LG Philips LCD begins mass producing 20.1" VGA LCD panels for
a Japanese TV maker (Nikkei BP, 2000).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 15" TFT LCD panel with 1600X1200
resolution (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Philips ended its PDP relationship with Pioneer in 1999, and has not
decided to mass produce PDPs as of 2000 (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Philips exhibits 1.4" yellow-green OLED display at Ceatec. It was
produced in research lab in Heerlen Netherlands. Appears to use
large molecule materials (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Philips is reported as not undertaking FED development (Nikkei BP,
2000).
PMDS Kobe exhibits 3.1" translucent LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitusmu Hen)).
Philips mobile and ADI (Mitsubishi) sign a supply contract and agree
to jointly design LTPS (and for ADI to be a contract manufacturer for
this) (Sangyo Times, 2002).
LG Philips LCD develops 30" TFT for digital TV (Sangyo Times,
2003).
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Philips working on developing large molecule OLED panels at its
headquarters in Holland using organic materials from Covion
Organic Semiconductor (Fuji Chimera, 2002; Sangyo Times, 2002).
Philips components exhibits prototype area color OLED made with
inkjet printing process and large particle materials (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitusmu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD develops 20.1" QUXGA LTPS display (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
LG Philips LCD develops 42" full HD LCD TV panel - world's
largest (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips develops 52" full HD TFT LCD for TV applications World's largest. It was developed by 25 specialists in approximate 10
month development program (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Philips announces it is world's first large particle OLED supplier
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitusmu Hen)).
Philips exhibits 1 micrometer thickness large particle OLED display
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitusmu Hen)).
Philips exhibits 1.18" LCOS projector panel (Nikkei BP, 2002
X
(Jitusmu Hen)).
Philips begins selling 44" RPTV using LCOS panel (Nikkei BP, 2002
X
(Jitusmu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 2.2" field sequential QVGA TFT LCD
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 55" IPS mode FHD TFT LCD panel
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD begins mass production on its 1100X1250mm line
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2003, LG Philips LCD is Sony's lead TV Panel vendor (Fuji
Chimera, 2003).
LG Philips signs agreement with Korean government to develop
major LCD producing industrial park in Paju (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Philips develops PDP with improved brightness (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitusmu Hen)).
Philips obtains a license from CDT on large molecule OLED
technology (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Philips develops 2.6" full color AM-OLED (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Philips is mass producing OLED displays, using inkjet printing, for
use in shavers (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Philips releases 55" FHD rear projection TV with LCOS (Nikkei BP,
X
2003 (Jitusmu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD develops 3 mask process for TFT production - this
reduces steps, improves yield from existing methods that used more
masks (Sangyo Times, 2005).
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LG Philips LCD exhibits 32" TFT with backlight control to improve
dynamic range (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 42" TFT panel with impulse drive (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony stopped sourcing LCD TV panels from LG-Philips and moved
business to Samsung LCD (Fuji Chimera, 2004).
LG Philips LCD and Hitachi cross-license IPS technology (Techno
Associates, 2008).
LG Philips LCD begins construction on world's largest display
production cluster (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Philips Electronics releases a 42" FHD PDP TV model (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitusmu Hen)).
Philips research developed a 10" 576X324 pixel large molecule
OLED prototype panel (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Philips develops 13" large particle AM-OLED panel, emphasizes
target is TV application (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitusmu Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 20.1" AM-OLED with 1280X800
resolution (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Philips Mobile increases production capability for semi transparent
LCDs for cell phone applications (Sangyo Times, 2005).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 42" TFT LCD TV use panel with 12 bit
color (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips Displays exhibits 47" full HD LCD TV use panel with
LED backlight and area control (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD exhibits 55" FHD IPS mode LCD TV panel (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips LCD achieves 85% yield ratio in first quarter 2005 for P6
sixth generation plant which started production in August of 2004
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
LG Philips is investing 530 billion yen in a generation 7 line in Paju
(Sangyo Times, 2005).
As of 2005, Matsushita sells PDPs to Philips amongst others (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
LG Philips LCD begins mass production of 42" LCD panels for LCD
TV applications on P7 line (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
LG Philips LCD develops 100" LCD panel - world's largest (Nikkei
BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
LG Philips LCD loses 177 billion won in the fourth quarter of 2006
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Philips and Novaled jointly develop longer life OLED (Sangyo
Times, 2007).
LG Philips LCD continues to lose money in first quarter of 2007
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
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LG Philips LCD develops flexible full color LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Philips LCD begins shipping 19.8mm thick 42" TV panels
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Philips announces it will invest 2.5 trillion Korean Won in a new
Generation 8 production line (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
Philips sells its stake in LG Philips LCD to LG (Nikkei BP, 2006
(Gyokai Bunseki Hen)).
LG Philips LCD to source OLED materials from UDC (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
LG Philips develops 2.4" and 3" AM-OLED prototypes (Sangyo
Times, 2008).
Philips and Epson announce they have jointly developed a fanless
X
small projector technology (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
Funai acquires Philips' North American TV unit (Nikkei BP, 2008
X
(Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
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Event
Pioneer enters TV business with CRT based and rear projection
models (Kawamura, 2005).
Pioneer begins research on OLED at its Main R&D lab in Saitama
(Sangyo Times, 2000).
Tohoku Pioneer begins research on OLED technology (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
Pioneer decides to focus on color AC-PDP as next generation display
technology (Kawamura, 2005).
Pioneer establishes display research lab and begins work on PDP
technology (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Pioneer establishes display committee with members from projection
TV plant, Pioneer video, and Pioneer precision (Kawamura, 2005).
Pioneer develops 8" AC PDP which clears the brightness problem
Pioneer had identified with PDPs (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Pioneer discovers first green OLED material (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Pioneer exhibits 40" VGA AC-PDP for TV applications at
Electronics Show 1995 (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Pioneer successfully develops OLED display using Kodak
technology (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Tohoku Pioneer obtains license from Kodak (Fuji Chimera, 2003;
Wall Street Journal, October, 1995).
Pioneer transfers OLED to Tohoku Pioneer from HQ. This is for
manufacturing purpose, it is said (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Tohoku Pioneer exhibits green OLED at EL Show (Sangyo Times,
2002).
Pioneer increases the importance of Plasma in the firm by turning its
Display Research Center into a Plasma Display Division (Sangyo
Times, 1997).
Pioneer invests 5 billion yen in PDP production capability at facility
in Kofu. Plant can produce 10K panels/month when it achieves full
production (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Pioneer develops 3.5" single color OLED display for automotive
applications (Nikkei BP, 1996).
Pioneer has begun making white OLED for backlighting applications
to be used in combination with LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Pioneer begins production of first generation PDPs (Nikkei BP, 2008
(TV Hen)).
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Pioneer begins shipping 40" VGA PDP samples (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Pioneer develops HD compatible 50" PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Pioneer begins selling 50" HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Pioneer is first in world to use T character independent cathode
design (Nikkei BP, 2008 (TV Hen)).
Pioneer exhibits OLED panel for automotive applications with
256X64 resolution - no size given (Nikkei BP, 1997).
PM OLED manufactured by Tohoku Pioneer is used in world's firs
commercial OLED application, a Pioneer car radio (Nikkei BP, 2008
(OLED Hen); Sangyo Times, 1999).
Pioneer announces MIS type FED emitter (Komoda, 2005; Nikkei
x
BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Pioneer begins selling 50" XGA plasma display (PDP-501MX)
(Sangyo Times, 1999).
Pioneer begins selling a 40" PDP for commercial applications
(Sangyo Times, 1998).
Pioneer agrees to joint development of PDP with Philips (Sangyo
Times, 1999).
Tohoku Pioneer begins mass production of OLEDs; it is first in the
world to do so (Sangyo Times, 1999, 2001).
Tohoku Pioneer announces it has made 5.2" 320X240 pixel PMOLED prototype display capable of displaying 260 colors using 3
color sub-pixels per pixel (Sangyo Times, 2000, 2002).
Pioneer begins production of second generation PDPs 502 (Nikkei
BP, 2008 (TV Hen)).
Pioneer is first in world to use waffle structure to replace rib
structure in PDP (Kawamura, 2005; Nikkei BP, 2008 (TV Hen)).
Pioneer exhibits 50" HD PDP for TV application (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Pioneer begins selling a new 50" HD plasma display. The price is
1.7yen, a reduction from the 2.5 million yen price of the prior model
(Sangyo Times, 2000).
Philips ended its PDP relationship with Pioneer in 1999 (Nikkei BP,
2000).
Tohoku Pioneer ships first OLEDs from mass production facility
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp begins receiving PDPs from Pioneer, and selling them in TVs
in North America (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Pioneer begins construction of a new PDP production line in
Shizuoka. Investment is 15 billion yen. The facility will produce
both panels and fully assembled TV sets (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Tohoku Pioneer exhibits 1.6" full color OLED panel for cell phone
applications (Nikkei BP, 2000).
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Tohoku Pioneer increases size of clean room for OLED production
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Motorola begins selling cell phones using OLED displays produced
by Tohoku Pioneer (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Tohoku Pioneer purchases automated integrated OLED production
equipment from Tokki (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Tohoku Pioneer develops prototype 3" AM-OLED jointly with
Semiconductor Energy Lab, using small particle materials (Nikkei
BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen); Sangyo Times, 2002).
Pioneer begins production of third generation PDPs (Nikkei BP,
2008 (TV Hen)).
Pioneer is first in world to use high Xenon gas in PDP (Nikkei BP,
2008 (TV Hen)).
Tohoku Pioneer, SEL and Sharp form JV "ELDis" to produce CG
Silicon TFTs for use in AM-OLED displays. Capital is 10 billion
yen; Stakes are 45% each for Tohoku Pioneer, SEL, and 10% for
Sharp (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Tohoku Pioneer builds full color OLED production facility (Nikkei
BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Pioneer begins selling 30" LCD TV using Sharp ASV panel (Nikkei
BP, 2002(Jitsumu Hen)).
Pioneer delays sales of 30" LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Pioneer begins construction of third PDP production line earlier than
planned, will increase annual capacity to 150K units. Total new
investment will amount to 16 billion yen (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen); Sangyo Times, 2003).
Pioneer says it will focus on 43" and 50" PDPs and not follow the
industry movement into 37" panels (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku
Hen)).
Pioneer begins selling 60" PDP TVs in US on a trial basis (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Pioneer announced it will build a fourth PDP line - investing 26-7
billion yen, with plans to begin construction in 2003 and begin
production in 2005 (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Rohm, Kyoto University, Pioneer, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Chemicals,
NTT agree to do joint R&D on the next generation of OLED
electronics devices (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Tohoku Pioneer begins shipping OLED displays for use in car
stereos and cell phones to Fujitsu, Kenwood, and LG (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
Pioneer begins production of fourth generation PDPs (Nikkei BP,
2008 (TV Hen)).
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Pioneer releases 50" PDP TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2003, Tohoku Pioneer has invested a total of between 50-60
billion yen in OLED, including R&D, production facilities, etc.
(Sangyo Times, 2003).
Tohoku Pioneer exhibits 2.1" OLED prototype with one side top
emission and another side bottom emission at FPD International
2003 (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Tohoku Pioneer exhibits 2.4" color OLED panel with 170 PPI
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Tohoku Pioneer exhibits 4.3" VGA OLED prototype using top
emission at FPD International 2003 (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Pioneer developed three dimensional OLED panel (Fuji Keizai,
2005).
Tohoku Pioneer begins selling full color PM-OLED products
(Sangyo Times, 2003).
Tohoku Pioneer has 2 PM-OLED and 1 AM-OLED lines (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
Pioneer begins production of fifth generation PDPs (Nikkei BP, 2008
(TV Hen)).
Pioneer releases 61" HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Pioneer acquires NEC's PDP operations - Pioneer's existing
organization is Pioneer Display Products, and the formerly NEC
organization is renamed Pioneer Plasma Display. Pioneer pays 40
billion yen. Pioneer gains NEC's color filter technology and ability
to manufacture multiple PDPs per substrate. NEC's patents are also
included in the deal (Kawamura, 2005; Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Pioneer is first in world to use direct color filter in PDP (Nikkei BP,
2008 (TV Hen)).
Pioneer makes 2.6 billion yen in operating income in FY 2004,
including 10.2 billion yen of revenue from patent licensing activities
(Sangyo Times, 2006).
Pioneer exhibits an OLED panel prototype using an organic TFT at
SID 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Tohoku Pioneer will begin mass producing AM-OLEDs staring with
2.4" cell phone display in 2005 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Tohoku Pioneer is in the process of adding another AM OLED line
(Sangyo Times, 2005).
Pioneer exhibits 50" FHD PDP at Ceatec 2005 (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
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Pioneer states that it will not pursue market share with PDP TVs, but
will seek high end market segments (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).

x

x

Pioneer begins production of sixth generation PDPs (Nikkei BP,
2008 (TV Hen)).
Pioneer shuts down two PDP lines after revising down expected PDP
sales (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2005, Pioneer (after acquiring NEC's plasma business) was
shipping panels to Hitachi, Sony, JVC, Conrac, View sonic,
Thomson, NEC, Fujitsu General, Mitsubishi, TCL Marantz and
Daewoo (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
As a part of restructuring, Pioneer is reducing its contract production
of PDP TVs for other companies (Sangyo Times, 2006).
Tohoku Pioneer decides to exit AM-OLED production (Sangyo
Times, 2007).
Pioneer begins production of seventh generation PDPs (Nikkei BP,
2008 (TV Hen)).
Pioneer reorganizes its PDP business, reducing related headcount by
700 (Fuji Chimera, 2006).
Pioneer's financial performance rebounds, increasing sales and
profitability in Q1, 2006 (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
Pioneer is cooperating with Sharp, and planning to use LCD in 40"
and smaller TV lineup. They each purchase equity stakes in each
other, but Pioneer's stake in Sharp is less than 1%, and Sharp's stake
in Pioneer is 14% (Sangyo Times, 2009).
Pioneer begins production of eight generation PDPs. This includes
the Kuro panels (Nikkei BP, 2008 (TV Hen)).

Pioneer introduces new KURO line of PDP TVs with high contrast
and high quality images (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Pioneer has frozen its plans to build a new PDP facility in the
southern Japanese Alps due to decrease in demand, and sales
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
Pioneer decideds to stop some PDP production after disappointing
results in TV business (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Tohoku Pioneer develops touch panel PM-OLED for Factory
Automation applications (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Pioneer signs joint PDP design, production, and supply arrangement
with Panasonic. Pioneer will obtain PDP supply from Panasonic and
end in house production. Pioneer will close its Kofu plant in 2008
and its Kagoshima plant in 2009 after production from Panasonic
begins (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen); Sangyo Times,
2009).
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Pioneer's PDP technical staff who produced Kuro Panels are moved
to Panasonic (Sangyo Times, 2009).
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Samsung and NEC set up joint venture on CRTs. It is called
Samsung SDI (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Samsung Electronics begins selling TV sets (Nikkei BP, 2006
X
(Gyokai Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung begins LCD development (Castellano, 2005).
Samsung Electronics builds pilot production line for TFT-LCD
(Sangyo Times, 1994).
Samsung moves TFT LCD business to Samsung Electronics (Sangyo
Times, 1994).
Samsung Electronics develops 1.4" color LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2006 (Gyokai Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung Electronics begins construction of first mass production
LCD line (Sangyo Times, 1994).
Samsung Electronics develops 10.4" VGA TFT LCD panel (Nikkei
BP, 1994).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 4 TFT panels in the 7-10" range, and
one workstation-sized 14" TFT panel at LCD International in
Makuhari, Japan (Sangyo Times, 1994).
Samsung Electronics begins TFT mass production on 300X400mm
line (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Fujitsu licenses TFT-LCD technology to Samsung Electronics
(Deutsche Bank, August, 2004).
Samsung Electronics develops 22" color XGA TFT panel for monitor
applications (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Samsung Electronics enters into a strategic partnership with the
Liquid Crystal Institute at Kent State University to jointly develop
display technologies (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Samsung and Corning establish Samsung Corning Precision Glass
JV to produce LCD substrate glass. The two firms previously
cooperated on CRT glass (Techno Associates, 2008).
Samsung SDI begins PDP R&D in mid-1990s (Jiang, Lim & Oh,
2002).
Samsung develops 15.1" XGA TFT LCD for monitor applications
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
Samsung begins LCD production at Line 2 (Giheung) (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 22" TFT LCD monitor prototype
(Sangyo Times, 1997).
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Samsung Electronics develops 30" TFT with 1600X1200 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1997).
Samsung Electronics obtains top share in large LCD panel market
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung LCD begins production at line 3 (Cheonan) (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung Electronics develops 24" 1920X1200 resolution TFT LCD
(Nikkei BP, 1999).
Samsung Electronics continues to hold top share in large LCD panel
market (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung receives $100 million investment from Apple (Fuji
Chimera, 2000).
Samsung receives $200 million investment from Dell with 5 year
TFT panel supply agreement (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Samsung begins selling 15" LCD TV. It is priced at 108,000 yen in
Japan (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Samsung Electronics develops 15" TFT LCD panel with 1400X1050
resolution (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Samsung Electronics develops 15, 17, and 24" LCD TV panels
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung Electronics continues to hold top share in large LCD panel
market (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung LCD begins production at line 4 (Cheonan) (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung SDI begins research into AM-OLEDs (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Gijutsu Hen)).
Samsung SDI and NEC begin joint development of full color OLED
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Samsung SDI and NEC jointly develop 2" OLED for cell phone
application (Sangyo Times, 2001).
X Samsung SDI starts research on FED (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Hitachi exhibits 40" PVA mode HD LCD TV panel (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics begins production on new 730X920 mm LCD
line (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung Electronics continues to hold top share in large LCD panel
market (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung begins producing panels for 40"TV it developed using PVA
(Patterned Vertical Alignment) (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
Samsung SDI begins PDP production at its first plant in July 2001; it
is the world's largest PDP plant at the time (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung SDI enters PDP market (Sangyo Times, 2008).
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Samsung SDI develops 3.6" QVGA AM-OLED prototype (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Gijutsu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 8.4" color OLED with SVGA resolution using
small particle materials (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops the world's largest full color AM-OLED
(15.1"). Resolution is XGA class (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Samsung and NEC establish Samsung NEC Mobile Displays in
Korea to develop and produce OLED displays (SDI 51%, NEC 49%)
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Samsung SDI exhibits 4.9" color FED using carbon nanotubes.
Samsung plans to develop 32 and 38" models by 2004, and produce
X
at $20US/inch (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen); Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI is developing FED, LCOS, 3D displays as of end of
X
2001 (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung begins selling lightweight and thin LCD projection TV
X
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung exhibits 40" LCD TV at LCD/PDP International 2001
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Japan Samsung releases 40" LCD display; it is priced at 990,000 yen
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung releases photographs of its newly developed 46" PVA mode
LCD panel - world's largest (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Japan releases 40" HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Samsung Electronics continues to hold top share in large LCD panel
market (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung Electronics announces goal to produces 40" panel module
at $1000 USD at FPD International 2002 (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung LCD begins production at line 5 (Cheonan) (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung SDI announced its PDP production volume grew from 4K
units in 2001 to 60K in 2002 (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 63" HD PDP panel (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI increases PDP production capacity at Tenan plant
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI and Fujitsu begin negotiating PDP patent licensing
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI announces large polymer AM-OLED panel
development (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Samsung SDI begins mass producing 256 color OLED panels
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops AM-OLED for IMT-2000 (cell phone)
application (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 2.2" color OLED using thermal transfer
production technique (prototype) (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
NEC and Samsung SDI jointly invested in LTPS pilot line for OLED
applications (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung NEC mobile display obtains a production license from
Kodak (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Samsung NEC began production of 1" OLED for cell phone sub
panels, to be sold to Samsung Electronics (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Samsung begins selling DLP based projection TV (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 5.2" color CNT FED with 240X320 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI announced it developed a 32" 480X720 FED prototype
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)). It is exhibited at IMID 2002
(Komoda, 2005).
Samsung SDI completes construction of new cutting edge research
central lab - it will conduct OLED and FED research amongst other
things (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)). Investment is 15 billion yen
(Sangyo Times, 2005).
Samsung Electronics announced its plans to build a 7G TFT LCD
line (Daewoo Securities, May, 2003).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 32" IPS mode HD TFT LCD panel
with EEFL (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung (Japan) release 32" HD resolution LCD TV (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung develops first 46" FHD TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung announces it has developed 54" TFT LCD panel - world's
largest (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)), exhibits it at 2003
International CES (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Samsung develops 3.83" VGA LTPS panel (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 17" LCD panel with different
arrangement of color filters, higher brightness (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 21.3" TFT with SLS (resolution 1600X1200) (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics develops 57" HD TV panel with S-PVA LCD
(Sangyo Times, 2005).
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Samsung Electronics successfully ramps up production on 5th
generation line (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung developed PVA mode on a patterned ITO; This improved
image contrast (Nikkei BP, 2008 (TV Hen)).
Sony And Samsung agree to form JV S-LCD to produce a-Si TFTs
for TV applications. The JV will build a generation 7 plant in Korea
(Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Samsung LCD begins production on line 6 (Cheonan) (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung SDI exhibits 2.3" field sequential LCD with 205 PPI
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung becomes the share leader for PDP TVs in the US market
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics releases 63" PDP TV with HD resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI becomes world leader in PDP production in October
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 70" PDP - world's largest (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI reaches monthly breakeven level on PDP production
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI invests 583 billion Won on PDP capacity increase
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 37"Full HD PDP (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Samsung SDI is first maker to have all HD PDP line up (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 15.5" OLED using small particle materials
on LTPS (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops transparent OLED (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Samsung SDI is working together with Vitex Systems (US) on
mobile OLED displays using Vitx's thin film coating technology
(Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Samsung NEC invested 10 billion yen in new production equipment
for OLED (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Samsung SDI achieves 32% share of the world wide market for PMOLEDs in 2003 (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Samsung Electronics introduces 61" HD rear projection TV with
X
DLP (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI announces it has developed a 38" FED capable of HD
X
TV applications (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics develops S-PVA mode LCD. This improves
viewing angle (Nikkei BP, 2008 (TV Hen)).
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Samsung develops 2.6" VGA a-Si TFT panel; this is high resolution
for a-Si (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics proclaims a-Si can be used in applications with
up to 350 PPI resolution (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung continues to have largest share of large size LCD panel
market (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 32" TFT panel with S-PVA mode, LED
backlight and 102% of the NTSC gamut specification (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Japan releases 46" FHD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics plans to begin production on LCD line
specifically making panels for TV applications (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung and Sony establish JV S-LCD (Techno Associates, 2008).
Samsung Electronics and Sony agree to sign cross licensing
agreement covering over 10,000 patents (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Construction of S-LCD plant at Tajeon is finished; test production
begins (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Sony stopped sourcing LCD TV panels from LG-Philips and moved
business to Samsung LCD (Fuji Chimera, 2004).
Samsung Electronics produced over 2 million LCD TVs in 2004
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
As of 2004, Panasonic is sourcing some LCD TV panels from
Samsung (Fuji Chimera, 2004).
Samsung exhibits 80" PDP TV at CES - world's largest (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI achieves number one market share (shipment based) in
PDPs in the first quarter of 2004. FHP is second, LG Electronics is
third, and Matsushita is 4th in share (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Samsung SDI announces it has developed 102" PDP (Nikkei BP,
2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 1.8" 256K color OLED for main cell phone
display use (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Samsung SDI exhibits 2.0" AM-OLED prototype with 520X220
resolution at IDW 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Gijutsu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 2.2" QVGA AM-OLED panel prototype with
top emission at SID 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Gijutsu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 2.5" AM-OLED prototype with system on
panel at SID 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Gijutsu Hen)).
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Samsung Electronics exhibits 14.1" and 7" a-Si OLEDs at Asia
Display/IMID 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 17" UXGA AM-OLED prototype panel made
using Laser Induced Thermal Imaging (LITI) at SID 2004 (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Gijutsu Hen)).
NEC sells its stake in Samsung NEC mobile display to Samsung SDI
along with NEC's OLED patents. Samsung SDI also gets Korean
plant in deal (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen); Sangyo Times, 2005).
Samsung NEC is renamed "Samsung OLED" proclaims goal to be
global no. 1 in OLED (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung OLED begins production with 2.5M units/month capacity
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops vacuum deposition system for AM-OLED
fabrication (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 2 kinds of differently driven OLED panels at
IDW '04 (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI's subsidiary Samsung OLED begins mass production
of OLEDs for main displays in cell phone applications (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
Share of OLED market in 2004: Samsung SDI: 38%; RiT: 23%
(Sangyo Times, 2006).
Samsung begins selling 50" and 56" DLP based slim RPTVs (Nikkei
X
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung makes 6 base color LCD and 5 base color DLP products
X
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI enlarges patent management function (originally
started in 1999), applies for approximately 1400 PDP patents in
X
Korea and other countries in 6th month period (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 46" LCD TV with 120hz frame rate at
IMID 2005 (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 32" TFT with field sequential LED
backlight control (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 57" FHD VA mode LCD TV panel
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 82" FHD LCD TV panel - World's
largest (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 5" LCD panel of flexible plastic world's largest of this type (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung finishes pilot test runs on its new 7th generation 7-2 line
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Samsung introduces LED backlight LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung develops 32" LCD Panel that does not have color filter
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics is first to start shipping a-Si TFT with the
driver circuitry on glass (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku Hen)).
S-LCD begin production on world's first G7 line (Fuji Chimera,
2005).
As of 2005, Samsung SDI is the largest producer by volume of
displays for cell phones (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Samsung and Sony agree to joint development of LCD panels using
Samsung's mass production knowledge and Sony's video
technologies (Techno Associates, 2008).
Samsung reports LCD business performance improving, and
companywide increase in revenues and profitability in the third
quarter compared with the previous quarter (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 102" PDP for TV use at CES (Nikkei BP,
2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 50" full HD PDP TV use panel (Nikkei BP,
2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI's PDP business achieves number 1 share position, is on
chart to be profitable (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 2.65" OLED panel with VGA resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 14.1" OLED using large particle materials
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 17" OLED TV use panel prototype
1600X1200 resolution (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 17" UXGA AM-OLED using super grain
silicon (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 21" WXGA small molecule OLED on
a-SI (using RGB) for TV applications (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Gijutsu
Hen); (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 40" OLED prototype - world's largest.
It was exhibited at SID 2004 and made using small molecule
materials (Fuji Chimera, 2005; Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops flexible OLED display on stainless (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits world's highest density OLED panel - 302ppi
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Samsung SDI begins construction of LTPS AM-OLED line using
generation 4 substrate. Investment total 57 billion yen (Sangyo
Times, 2006).
Samsung SDI announces record revenue and profitability (Nikkei
X
BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
US DOJ begins joint investigation with Japanese and Korean Fair
Trade Commissions on alleged anti-competitive actions from major
LCD producers including Sharp, Samsung Electronics, LG Philips,
and others (Deutsche Bank, December, 2006).
Samsung Electronics continues to have top LCD panel market share
(Nikkei BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung Electronics makes 1.98" VGA screen - first to achieve
400ppi on a-Si (others did this using LTPS) (Nikkei BP, 2008 (TV
Hen)).
Samsung Electronics announces it developed a 40" LCD TV using
LED backlights (Fuji Chimera, 2006).
Samsung LCD begins production at line 7-2 (Tangjeong) (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung makes additional 28 billion yen investment in generation 7
line to increase production capacity form 75K sheets/month to 90K
sheets/month (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Sony and Samsung agree for S-LCD to set up new 8G production
(Techno Associates, 2008).
Samsung and AUO cross license LCD-TV technology (Techno
Associates, 2008).
Samsung SDI ships the equivalent of 4.3 million PDPs (converted to
42" size) (Nikkei BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung SDI ends production of 32-37" PDPs in face of strong 30"
class competition from LCD panels (Fuji Chimera, 2006).
Samsung SDI opens new PDP plant which uses much larger
substrate (2400X2200 mm) (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Samsung SDI announces 5.6" flexible OLED panel on metal foil at
SID 2006 (Nikkei BP, 2008 (OLED Hen)).
Samsung Electronics and LG Philips LCD have agree to cross
purchasing between their equipment makers (buy from each others
equipment makers) (Daewoo Securities, October, 2007).
Samsung develops 1cm deep 40" LCD panel (Nikkei BP, 2007
(Market Hen)).
Samsung begins selling 52" full HD LED backlit LCD TV (Nikkei
BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Samsung Electronics develops 0.82mm thick 2.2" LCD panel
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
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Samsung electronics develops 70" full HD TV with local dimming
LED technology (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
S-LCD adds capacity to generation 7 line for a second time. New
capacity is 15K sheets/mo. Additional investment is 28 billion yen
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
S-LCD begins production on generation 8 line. Investment is 1.9
billion USD (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen); Sangyo Times, 2008).
Samsung SDI begins mass production at Pusan #4 PDP line for 50"
production (Nikkei BP, 2008 (TV Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 50" full HD single scan PDP (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
Samsung begins shipping 50" full HD PDP TV "PAVV Cannes"
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 0.25mm thick OLED 4" panel prototype
using top emission, small particle materials, and LTPS (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
Kodak and Samsung SDI exhibit 14.1" WXGA white + color filter
OLED display prototype (Nikkei BP, 2008 (OLED Hen)).
KDDI begins selling cell phone with AM-OLED panel. Panel is
produced by Samsung SDI (Nikkei BP, 2008 (OLED Hen)).
Samsung SDI begins producing 2" AM-OLED panels at Chonan
plant (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
Samsung SDI develops 0.52mm thick 2.2" AM-OLED (Sangyo
Times, 2008).
Samsung SDI has profits of 130.5 billion Korean won during 2006
X
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Samsung Electronics announces it plans to build Generation 11 plant
with 3320X3000mm substrate to begin production ins 2010-2011
(Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung Electronics loses money in Q4 2008 (Nikkei BP, 2008
(Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
S-LCD announces it will build 8th generation line 8-2 (Nikkei BP,
2008 (Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 82" Ultra Definition (4X2K) LCD TV
at SID 2007 (Nikkei BP, 2009 (Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits ultra-thin 52" LCD TV at SID 2008
(Nikkei BP, 20098(Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung LCD begins production at line 8-1, phase II (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung LCD begins construction of line 8-2 (Tangjeong) (Samsung
Electronics, 2008).
Samsung Electronics exhibits 3D plasma TV (Nikkei BP, 2008
(Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
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Samsung Electronics exhibits 14.1" HD OLED TV at SID 2008 (SDI
made panel) (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung Electronics exhibits FHD 31" OLED TV at CES 2008. It
uses a SDI made panel (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyou Bunseki Hen);
Sangyo Times, 2008).
Samsung SDI announces 12.1 WXGA OLED panel (Nikkei BP, 2008
(Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits WVGA 3" OLED panel (Nikkei BP, 2008
(Kigyou Bunseki Hen)).
Samsung SDI exhibits 40" OLED panel at FPD International 2008
(Nikkei BP, 2008 (Senryaku Hen)).
Samsung Electronics and Samsung SDI set up JV to develop small
and mid size AM-OLED business (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyou Bunseki
Hen)).
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X Sanyo begins TV assembly (Hiramoto, 1994).
Sanyo begins basic research on LCD technology (Sangyo Times,
1993).
Sanyo's Tokyo location developed LCDs for clock applications
(Sangyo Times, 1990).
Sanyo began production of TN LCD for watches and calculators
(Sangyo Times, 1994).
Sanyo Electric developed TN-LCDs at central research lab (Sangyo
Times, 1992).
Tottori Sanyo begins selling (STN) LCD modules (Sangyo Times,
1993).
Sanyo develops world's first black and white a-Si TFT-LCD TV
(Sangyo Times, 1994).
Sanyo was first to successfully develop a-Si color TFT-LCD (Sangyo
Times, 1993).
Sanyo LCD Engineering was established to produce TFTs for
portable TVs and VTRs (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Sanyo Electric started a new TFT LCD R&D center (Nikkei BP,
1990).
Tottori Sanyo begins producing 9.2" color STN panels for laptop
applications. NEC will use this display in new laptop model (Nikkei
BP, 1990).
Sanyo plans to develop 12" a-Si TFT, and is focusing on mass
production technologies to realize this (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Sanyo states that they ceased research on flat CRT displays (Nikkei
X
BP, 1990).
X Sanyo begins making LCD projectors (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Sanyo successfully commercializes high vision LCD projector using
X
TFT technology (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Sanyo Electric develops 10.4" VGA TFT LCD for office automation
applications (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Tottori Sanyo builds plant to produce color filters for LCD (Sangyo
Times, 1993).
Sanyo Electric is developing polysilicon TFTs (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Sanyo builds small/mid size TFT production line GIII Building at
Gifu location (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Sanyo Electric develops 3" TFT LCD with 324X234 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1994).
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Sanyo is reported to be working on FLCD technology (Sangyo
Times, 1993).
Sanyo Electric announces it is first to develop a low temperature
process for fabricating poly-silicon (LTPS) TFT LCDs in volume
(Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sanyo develops 5" color TFT with 320X234 resolution (Nikkei BP,
1995).
Sanyo Electric develops 2.4" LTPS display with drivers on board and
320X240 resolution (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sanyo's strategy is to focus on 6" and smaller TFTs and increase its
outside sales (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Sanyo begins building LTPS line at Gifu plant (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Sony and Sanyo announce they have agreed to jointly develop LTPS
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sanyo Electric develops 2" LTPS display for personal applications
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
Sanyo Electric begins shipping samples of 2" 110K pixel LTPS LCDs
for digital cameras (Nikkei BP, 1996).
Sanyo Electric plans to enter large panel TFTs at its Tottori Sanyo
Electric group company. The company plans to begin constructing a
plant in 1997 to begin production later that year. Production of a-Si
modules is planned using 550X650 mm substrates (Sangyo Times,
1997).
Tottori Sanyo adds a second line to Shimane Sanyo color filter plant
(Sangyo Times, 1997).
Sanyo (Gifu plant) begins mass production on LTPS, begins shipping
sample displays (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Sony and Sanyo begin producing low temperature polysilicon
displays in a joint business. Sony designs the displays, and Sanyo
performs contract manufacturing (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sanyo Electric develops 4" LTPS with 320X240 resolution (Nikkei
BP, 1997).
Tottori Sanyo installs 47 billion yen TFT-LCD line, begins
production. Substrate is 550X670mm (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Sanyo Electric develops LTPS for digital still camera applications
(Nikkei BP, 1998).
Sanyo begins TFT production at new line in Gifu GIII plant (Sangyo
Times, 1998).
Tottori Sanyo's TFT production dramatically reduces its focus on
STNs (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Tottori Sanyo develops 15" XGA TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 1999).
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X

2001 X
2001 X
2001 X
2001 X
2001 X
2001 X
2001

Sanyo announces it will begin selling 15" LCD TV (Nikkei BP,
1999).
Tottori Sanyo begins producing 15" TFTs for monitors. It already
produced 12.1" TFTs (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Tottori Sanyo TFT production is 90% 12.1" size - Sanyo is late
entrant into market (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Tottori Sanyo's main STN and TFT customers are Taiwanese
notebook assemblers (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Sanyo and Kodak sign agreement to jointly develop OLED from
production to sales. Sanyo will bring low temp polysilicon driver
circuit for AM-OLED (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sanyo and Kodak announce they have successfully jointly developed
full color OLED as well as PM area color OLED (Sangyo Times,
2000).
Kodak and Sanyo announced they have jointly developed world's
first 2.4" AM-OLED panel (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)). It will
be used for digital still camera application (Nikkei BP, 1999).

X

Kodak and Sanyo announced they have jointly developed 5.5" full
color AM-OLED panel (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo releases 15" LCD TV with XGA resolution and IPS mode
panel (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo concentrates all LCD activities at Tottori Sanyo. All OLED is
concentrated at Sanyo Electric (Fuji Chimera, 2001).
Toppoly (Taiwan) received LTPS technology transfer from Sanyo
around 2001-2 (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Tottori Sanyo begins production at second plant (680X880 mm
substrate; a-Si) (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Tottori Sanyo exhibits 29" TFT panel with HD resolution (Nikkei BP,
2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo announces it will integrate TFT businesses from Tottori Sanyo
and Sanyo (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sanyo announces it will build an OLED business (Sangyo Times,
2002).

2001

X

Kodak and Sanyo Electric establish "SK"" JV to develop and produce
AM-OLEDs. The JV will be owned 66% Sanyo, 33 Kodak, and will
invest up to 50 billion yen (33 billion Sanyo, 17 billion from Kodak)
in production capability by 2005 (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).

2001

X

SK JV plans to produce large screen AM-OLED TV in 2004 (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Tottori Sanyo's number one plant will be bought by SK Display. SK
will invest and additional 42 to 47 billion yen on evaporation
equipment and other OLED related production equipment (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
Sanyo and Kodak build small volume line at Gifu (Sangyo Times,
2001).
Sanyo releases 32" PDP TV with 852X1024 resolution and ALIS
panel (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo intends to produce LCD TV panels at No. 2 Tottori Sanyo
plant beginning in 2003. These are to be assembled at 4 Sanyo TV
plants world-wide (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sanyo Electric exhibits 39.6" LCD TV panel at Edex (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Tottori Sanyo begins producing 29" and 40" TFT panels at its number
2 plant (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sanyo exhibits 2 color-filter-on-white OLED panels, 14.7" at Ceatec
Japan 2002 (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo Electric develops 14.7" color AM-OLED HD panel. (CF on
White OLED) (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo releases 42" PDP TV with 1024X1024 pixel resolution (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo releases 59" HD RPTV using DLP (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Sanyo and iFire agree to partner on TV application TDEL
development (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sanyo Electric begins LTPS production at Tottori plant (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo Electric releases 30" LCD TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2003, Sanyo has sold panels for TV usage to other firms,
including Samsung - but they don't seem to have used these panels
for their own TVs (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Sanyo begins production on second line in number two Tottori Sanyo
plant. Substrate is 680X880mm (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sanyo exhibits 1.9" semi transparent LCD at Ceatec 2003 (Sangyo
Times, 2004).
Sanyo shifts TFT production from large panels to mid and small
panels (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Tottori Sanyo and Twinhead of Taiwan enter into long term
partnership contract on LCD (Deutsche Bank, August, 2004).
As of June 2003, Tottori Sanyo is using MVA mode (Deutsche Bank,
June, 2003).
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Sanyo Electric exhibits 2.5" OLED using color filters on white
OLED (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
SK Display begins volume shipment of AM-OLEDs (Sangyo Times,
2003).
Sanyo to procure panels for TVs from outside, not interested in
making additional investment for consumer TV panel development or
production (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo releases 23" HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo and Epson agree to integrate their LCD businesses into a
single entity, Sanyo Epson Imaging Device. Epson to hold 55%,
Sanyo 45%. New company to develop, manufacture, and sell STN,
MD-TFD LCD, Amorphous TFT LCD, LTPS-TFT LCD. Note: high
temp polysilicon not included (Fuji Chimera, 2004; Sangyo Times,
2005). OLED isn't part of the deal, but most of the equipment used to
produce OLED moves to the new company (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Prior to establishing Sanyo Epson Imaging Device, Sanyo bought
HTPS from Epson, both had OEM relationships relating to
semiconductors (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Sanyo electric exhibits 2.5" AM-OLED panel (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Kodak and Sanyo exhibit 2.16" OLED with lower energy
requirements at IDW '04 -using white + color filter (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo announces new FPTV product line with 7 models having built
X in digital tuners ranging from 17" LCD to large PDP models (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo releases 55" HD RP TV with HTPS panel (Nikkei BP, 2004
X
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo releases 37" Full HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Sanyo Electric begins selling LCD TV with VA mode panels
produced by CMO. They had been using IPS mode panels (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo releases 42" PDP TV using 5th generation ALIS panels
X (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)), supplied by Panasonic (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
Sanyo exits small and middle size LCD panels, sells its stake in
Sanyo Epson to Epson (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Jitsumu Hen)). The
organization's new name is Epson Imaging Device (Sangyo Times,
2007).
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SK Display, the JV between Sanyo and Kodak that developed and
produced OLED panels, is dissolved as part of Sanyo's reorganization
(Sangyo Times, 2007).Tohoku Device purchases production line from
SK Display when SK exits OLED production (Sangyo Times, 2007).

X

X

Sanyo and Panasonic agree for Panasonic to acquire Sanyo (Sanyo,
2008).
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Wada, the person initially behind LCD development at Sharp,
first hears of LCDs through an NHK TV program "Sekai no
Kigyo." He had been interested in transparent films, EL, and
displays in general (Numagami, 1999).
Sharp licenses LCD technology from RCA (Murtha et al., 2001),
begins LCD development (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Sharp begins selling world's first LCD segment display
calculator, LC Mate EL805. The LCD used was a segment DSM
type (Nikkei BP, 2000; Sangyo Times, 1993).
Sharp is first to mass produce segment LCD displays (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Orient begins selling TN-LCD watches with LCD supplied by
Sharp (Numagami, 1999).
Sharp publishes paper on 2 layer agriculture EL (Nikkei BP,
1998).
Sharp develops PDA with FEM-LCD. This is first LCD display
that can be used for more than just characters (Sangyo Times,
1997).
Sharp demonstrates working video-capable EL panel at CES
(Johnstone, 1999).
Sharp begins research on high information LCDs for
applications such as OA and TV (Numagami, 1999).
Sharp develops TSTN, FSTN LCD technologies (Sangyo Times,
1999).
Sharp develops 6" single color EL monitor product (Nikkei BP,
1998).
Sharp begins mass production of B&W STN LCD displays
(Sangyo Times, 1993).
Sharp begins developing mass production technology for TFTLCD (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
Sharp begins producing PC with a color STN display (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp creates LCD department inside of its electronic parts
business unit. Until this point, LCD research had been
conducted in the display department. of the electronics parts
business unit together with EL and LED technologies
(Miyamoto, 2007).
Sharp exhibits 3" color TFT TV at Electronics Show (Sangyo
Times, 1993).
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Sharp's "Shoin" Japanese word processor with STN display
becomes a "hit product" (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp begins mass production of 3" color TFT LCD TV (Sangyo
Times, 1993). Yield on TFTs for the set is 2% (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp develops 14" TFT LCD display (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Sharp begins shipping samples of 14" and 11" high resolution
B&W STN LCD panels (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Sharp begins shipping samples of 5.7" full color TFT LCD
(Nikkei BP, 1990).
Sharp begins using DSTN-LCD for color displays in laptop
computer applications (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Sharp develops a 14" full color a-Si LCD (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Sharp president Asada predicts Hi Vision Japanese (Analog High
Definition) LCD TV can be developed in two years (Nikkei BP,
1990).
Sharp releases video camera with LCD viewfinder (Nikkei BP,
1990).
Sharp shows 10.4" TFT multicolor LCD panel with VGA
resolution (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Sharp uses LCD in car navigation application (Nikkei BP, 2006
(TV Gijutsu Hen)).
Sharp announces it has developed a 9.4" EL display with 16
gradation levels, VGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Sharp announces it plans to ship samples of 9" EL with VGA
resolution (Nikkei BP, 1990).
X Sharp develops 100" TFT projector (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Sharp begins producing 10" and 14" TFT LCDs (Nikkei BP,
1990).
Sharp begins selling the world's first wall-hanging LCD TV.
8.6" display; the price is 500,000 yen (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Sharp exhibits an 8.4" color TFT which is energy efficient and
aimed at laptop computer applications (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Sharp started producing 10.4" TFT VGA panels (Nikkei BP,
2006 (TV Gijutsu Hen)).
As of 1992, Hitachi is in the same realm as Sharp as far as LCD
patenting is concerned (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Sharp begins mass production of color 8.4" TFT displays for
laptops (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Sharp begins selling LCD View Cam video recorder with 3" TFTLCD display. This becomes major hit (Sangyo Times, 1993).
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Sharp begins construction of large TFT LCD plant in Mie
prefecture. This is the world's largest scale LCD plant at the
time. Initial investment is 53 Billion yen (Sangyo Times, 1994).
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Sharp establishes center for developing applications for LCD
displays at Tenri (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Sharp is first in the world to develop a 16.5" color TFT display
(Sangyo Times, 1992).
Sharp plans to invest 30 billion yen in LCD production facilities
for 1992 (Sangyo Times, 1992).
As of 1993, 88% of Sharp's production is color (Sharp TFTs are
100% color) (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Sharp develops 17" XGA TFT panel with wide viewing angle
(Nikkei BP, 1993).
Sharp develops 5" color TFT with 320X234 resolution for small
AV applications (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Sharp develops 6.4" VGA TFT LCD with low power usage for
subnotebook applications (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Sharp has 40% share in the LCD driver IC market (Sangyo
Times, 1993).
Sharp introduces Zaurus LCD based PDA (Sangyo Times,
1998).
Sharp develops 8.9" VGA EL display for factory automation and
measurement applications (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Sharp begins selling HDTV LCD projector with three
X
polysilicon Si TFT panels (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Sharp develops 200" color LCD projector using a 2" XGA
X
resolution a-Si panel (Nikkei BP, 1993).

X

Sharp begins producing mass producing plastic LCDs (Sangyo
Times, 1994).
Sharp develops prototype 21" VGA TFT LCD panel with wide
viewing angle (Nikkei BP, 1994).
Sharp develops reflective color LCD (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sharp is selling EL displays in 1994 (Nikkei BP, 19954).
Sharp begins production at Mie plant (Sangyo Times, 1994).
Sharp develops 11.3" TFT LCD with 800X600 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp is first to commercialize SVGA 11.3" color TFT (Sangyo
Times, 1995).
Sharp develops 12.1" color XGA TFT (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp develops 13.8" color XGA panel for monitor applications
(Nikkei BP, 1995).
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Sharp develops 28" color VGA TFT panel for TV applications
(Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp develops 4" LTPS display with drivers on board and
380X354 resolution (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp develops DMGH reflective color LCD technology
(Sangyo Times, 1998).
Sharp develops Super HA LCD technology (Sangyo Times,
1998).
Sharp introduces 8.4" color VGA TFT based television for
automotive applications (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp introduces "Window" LCD TV in 10.4" and 8.4" sizes.
Sharp sells out of initial production of 28K units in less than 3
months (Sangyo Times, 1996). 10.4" model is 150,000 yen.
(Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp introduces Mebius line of laptop computers using Sharp
LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Sharp is selling EL displays in 1995 (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp develops 5.8" reflective TFD display with 480X320
X
resolution for automotive applications (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sharp introduces Gaia (XV-R43) 43" rear projection TV using aX
Si LCD display (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Sharp's Urayama et al present paper on FED technology at
X
IEDM conference (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Kihon Gijutsu Hen)).
Sharp begins full production at world's largest LCD Plant in Mie
with 110 billion yen investment (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Sharp develops 13.3"and 15" XGA TFT LCDs for monitor
applications (Nikkei BP, 1996).
Sharp develops 40" color TFT with 800X600 resolution for TV
applications - it is world's largest (Nikkei BP, 1996, 1998).
Sharp develops Super-V technology which gives TFT LCDs
much wider viewing angle (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Sharp releases new model of 10.4" VGA TFT color TV
"Window. " It has two tuners allowing two different channels to
be watched simultaneously. Price is 170,000 yen (Nikkei BP,
1996).
Sharp increases "Window" LCD TV lineup to include 13"
model, sets goal of 200K units sales in 1996 (Sangyo Times,
1995).
Sharp enters licensing agreement with Techtronix on PALC (Fuji
Chimera, 2001).
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Sharp and Sony begin cooperating on PALC. Philips joins in
1997 (Fuji Chimera, 2001). The joint project is planned to last
until September of 1999. Focus is on 40" class screen (Fuji
Chimera, 1999).
Sharp develops 6"FLCD (Fuji Chimera, 2001).
Sharp develops 20.1" XGA TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Sharp develops 6.5" reflective TFT for portable use (640X240
pixels) (Nikkei BP, 1997).
Sharp successfully develops prototype 4.5"VGA LTPS. Plans to
enter production (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Sony, Sharp, and Philips successfully develop prototype 42"
PALC with wide view area (Sangyo Times, 1999, 2001).
Sharp had not clarified its LCD focus (over other display
technologies) at the time the NHK PDP development group was
formed in 1994. It declared this focus in 1997 and dropped out
of the group (Weber et al., 2008)
Sharp Develops 17" full color FLCD (Fuji Chimera, 2001).
Sharp declares it will replace its entire TV lineup with LCD TVs
by 2005 (Miyamoto, 2007; Weber et al., 2008).
Sharp and Quanta Computer plan to establish JV Quanta Display
to manufacture TFT LCD modules. This is seen as a way for
Sharp to increase market share in computer applications while
also reducing risk (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp and Semiconductor Energy Lab announced that they have
cooperated on developing Continuous Grain Silicon. This is
much faster than amorphous or low temperature polysilicon It is
seen as being suitable for rear projection TVs (Fuji Chimera,
2000).
Sharp announces worlds first full lineup of flat panel TVs
(Murtha et al., 2001).
Sharp begins production of 20.1" SXGA Super-V LCD with
high contrast and wide viewing angle (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Sharp develops 11.3" reflective color TFT with 800X600
resolution for NBPC applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Sharp develops 18.1" ASV color TFT with wide viewing angle
(Nikkei BP, 1998).
Sharp develops 20" VGA LCD based TV to be sold in Japan and
overseas in 1999 (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Sony, Sharp, and Philips successfully develop prototype 42"
PALC HDTV display and 42" VGA PALC display (Sangyo
Times, 2000).
Sharp develops 2.6" continuous grain crystal Si XGA TFT for
projection applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
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Sharp and Quanta computer jointly invest in TFT LCD
production JV called Quanta Display. Sharp will provide LCD
drivers to Quanta, and Quanta will perform contract production,
including notebook computers, for Sharp (Sangyo Times, 2000).
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1999 X
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1999
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2000 X
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2000 X
2000 X

2000 X

Sharp develops 60" RPTV using 2.6" CGS-LCD panels, with
HD resolution (Nikkei BP, 1998).

X

Sharp begins production of ASV wide angle viewing 20+" TVs
(Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sharp begins selling 20" "Window" LCD TV (Sangyo Times,
2000). The prices is 440,000 yen (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Sharp develops 3D color LCD TV (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sharp exhibits 28" HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Sharp introduces 10" LCD TV with depth of under 50mm, for
home and auto use (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sharp introduces 18.1" LCD computer monitor (Sangyo Times,
2000).
Sharp introduces notebook computer with 15" TFT and TV tuner
included (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sharp is first to develop color reflective STN plastic display
(Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sharp ships ten thousandth 20" LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Contract to cooperate on PALC ends, Philips does not renew.
Sony and Sharp continue cooperating on PALC development
(Sangyo Times, 2000).
Sharp announces prototype 65" PDP TV, entering PDP TV size
X
arena (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sharp and Hitachi agree on LCD patent cross-licensing deal
(Techno Associates, 2008).
Sharp begins production of large TFTs at Mie Number 2 Plant
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp buys Nippon Paint's STN LCD plant, and jointly develops
color filter technology (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
Sharp develops 28" TFT panel prototype with QSXGA
(2560X2048) resolution (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Sharp develops UHA LCD technology for ultra large apertures,
providing brighter displays with wider viewing angles (Sangyo
Times, 2001).
Sharp introduces AQUOS brand LCD TV line with 13, 15, and
20" panels, design by Japanese designer in Italy (Sangyo Times,
2001).
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Sharp begins receiving PDPs from Pioneer, and using them in
TVs in North America (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp changes focus of Mie Number 1 plant to smaller screen
production for cell phones, game boy advance, Zaurus, and car
navigation (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp begins production on its second line at Mie #2 plant. This
is be used for increasing supply of Aquos. Investment was 70
billion yen (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sharp begins shipping samples of plastic LCD for cell phone
applications. It is lighter, thinner, and stronger than LCDs using
glass substrate (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp develops Double Metal Twisted Nematic display for cell
phone applications (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sharp develops ULC HR-TFT, an energy efficient reflective TFT
that can be used in mobile devices (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sharp exhibits 3.7" CGS TFT with multi-resolution capability
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp exhibits 7" CGS TFT LCD with duty driver built in
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp introduces B-1 series of Aquos, in the same sizes as 2000
(Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sharp introduces C-1 series of Aquos TVs, including 30" and
22" LCD models. 30" model has HD resolution, 22" model has
VGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)). It has been
only 7 months since the B series was introduced (Sangyo Times,
2002).
Tohoku Pioneer, SEL and Sharp form JV ELDis to produce CG
Silicon TFTs for use in AM-OLED displays. Capital is 10
billion yen, Stakes are 45% each for Tohoku Pioneer, SEL, and
10% for Sharp. JV plant for producing CG silicon TFT
backplanes for AM-OLED applications. JV is to manufacture
and sell these products (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sharp decides not to produce PALC displays because they were
not convinced of the superiority of the display and there were
difficulties encountered regarding developing mass production
capability for PALC (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sharp releases 50" PDP TV with HD Resolution (Nikkei BP,
X
2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2002, Sharp is selling 30" LCD panels for TV application
to Pioneer (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
Sharp agrees to provide LCD technology to CPT, withdraws
patent infringement lawsuit (Sangyo Times, 2003).
X

X
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Sharp and 13 other firms including Microsoft and Sony
announce they have created a consortium to support the
development of 3D software contents and 3D display business
(Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sharp and SEL successfully fabricated an 8 bit CPU on LCD
glass substrate used in CGS LCDs (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sharp announces two 37" LCD TV models (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp announces it has developed an LCD display that can be
switched between 2d and 3d modes (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sharp begins selling 28" wide TFT LCD TV with HD resolution
for 1,100,000 yen in February 2002 (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Sharp announces it will build integrated LCD panel, module, and
TV assembly Plant in Kameyama, Mie. Total investment will be
100 billion yen including land and production equipment. The
plant is 7th generation and will use 1500X1800 mm substrate
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp begins construction of the Kameyama and Mie No. 3
plants (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sharp begins to mass production of Low temperature CGS LCD
at the NF-1 line of Tenri plant (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sharp develops 3 chip LED backlit 15" LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp develops 37" VA mode HD TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp exhibits 4" class plastic LCD prototype at LCD-PDP
International Show (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sharp had 55% market share in LCD panels for TVs in 2002
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sharp is only Japanese LCD manufacturer to be profitable in the
2002 fiscal year (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Sharp begins selling PDP TVs with built-in satelite recievers
X
using Pioneer-made panels (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sharp is shifting small/mid size LCD strategy to focus on system
LCDs - these have built in CMOS chips and are more than just
stand alone displays (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sharp and SEL usefully fabricated an audio circuit (including
digital to analogy converter, etc) on a LCD glass substrate for
CGS (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sharp begins production at Mie #3 plant, which specializes in
system LCDs using CGS technology (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sharp develops ASV (a version of VA) for mobile phone
applications (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
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Sharp exhibits 37" VA mode HD TFT LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp opens new LCD R&D center at Mie plant for mobile
LCDs. Previously, all LCD development had been at Tenri
location - this location will also continue R&D. Kameyama will
have TV related R&D (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sharp president claims the LCD TVs are the global trend at
Ceatec Japan 2003 trade conference (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Sharp releases 37" LCD TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
X Sharp exits PDP-TV market (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Sharp develops a LCD panel that acts as a speaker through
cooperative R&D with Hoshiden (Sangyo Times, 2004).
As of 2004, profitability at Sharp is more driven by smaller,
custom applications (digital cameras, etc.) rather than the large,
more commodity like production (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sharp exhibits 45" TFT panel with VA mode and Full HD
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp to begin selling (world's largest) 45" FHD LCD TV with
built in tuner in August (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp announces development of world's largest LCD TV - 65".
Sharp exhibits it at Ceatec Japan 2004, but does not plan to sell
it immediately (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Senryaku Hen); Sangyo Times,
2005).
Sharp is to begin production of world's first Generation 7
(1500x1800mm) line at Kameyama plant (Sangyo Times, 2003).
This is world's first LCD line dedicated to TV production
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sharp holds ceremony to celebrate completion of Kameyama
plant, announces roughly 80% production yield (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp establishes Kameyama TV sub brand (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Senryaku Hen)).
Sharp requests Japanese government block imports of Taiwanese
made LCD TVs citing patent infringements on LCD panel
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp and Sony share lead in WW LCD TV shipments at 11.9%
each. Sharp is a leader in numerous specific size ranges (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp's LCD business is profitable for FY2004. The small and
mid size LCD segment represents 60% of revenues and 70% of
profits (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
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Sharp's LCD revenues continue strong growth 38% up year on
year (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
For the year 2004, the three top LCD makers are: Sharp, #1, LG,
#2, and CMO, #3 (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Sharp exhibits 37 "FHD VA mode LCD TV panel (Nikkei BP,
2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp adds 57" full HD LCD TV with wide color range to its
Aquos line (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp adds 65" full HD LCD TV with three color backlight to its
Aquos line (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp releases its final 3 CRT TV models for the Japanese
market (Fuji Chimera, 2006 (Digital AV Market))
Sharp releases 32" LCD TV with wireless network capability
(Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp acquired Fujitsu Display Technology and Fujitsu Research
Lab's LCD business; this is effectively all of Fujitsu's LCD
related business. Fujitsu Display Technologies became a wholly
owned Sharp subsidiary called Sharp Yonago. According to
Sangyo Times (2006), Sharp purchased it in order to gain
additional LCD technicians and obtain Fujitsu's MVA
technology. Sharp also plans to develop closer ties to Fujitsu as
a supplier. The plant had been losing money recently (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
Sharp and AUO (Taiwan) cross-license TFT LCD patents
relating to PC applications after court battle (Techno Associates,
2008).
Sharp begins construction of Kameyama Number 2 plant which
will have generation 8 line using 2160X2400 mm substrate.
Sharp is first to build this generation. Plant to come on line in
October, 2006; total investment is 150 Billion yen (Fuji
Chimera, 2005; Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen); Sangyo times,
2006).
Sharp and Tokyo University establish Todai Sharp Lab, agree to
5 year cooperative research. A number of topics may be
included; the lab is not dedicated exclusively to display related
research (Sangyo Times, 2006).
Sharp develops ASV Premium Mega-contrast LCD. This
technology to be used in master monitor for video production
(Sangyo Times, 2006).
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Sharp developed TFT display with ability to control viewing
angles. The Veil View LCD can be limit view to narrow range
or open it back up. The Dual View LCD can show different
images depending on angle of the viewer (Sangyo Times, 2006).
Sharp develops mega contrast LCD with 1 million to 1 contrast
in dark locations (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2005, mid/ small LCDs become more competitive, and
Sharp lo longer has as much profitability in this area as a result
(Sangyo Times, 2006).
Sharp begins rear projection TV production using TI's DLP.
Sharp enters target markets are North America and China with
X 56" and 65" models. Sharp had previously been in rear
projection TV business using High Temperature CGS, but it is
no longer mass producing these (Sangyo Times, 2005).
As of 2005, Sharp sells LCD TV panels to Toshiba, JVC, and By
Design (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Quanta begins shipping LCD TV panels to Sharp (Techno
Associates, 2008).
Sharp and AUO broaden cross-license to include TV related
patents (Techno Associates, 2008).
Sharp and CMO (Taiwan) sign cross-licensing deal on LCD
panel technology. They agreement covers patents, with
exception of Sharp's 2 sided window technology, for a period of
5 years (Techno Associates, 2008).
Sharp announces it will participate in joint development of
flexible display technology with NEDO and 13 other firms
(Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
Sharp develops triple view in addition to dual view and veil view
LCDs which it had developed in 2005 (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Sharp develops very high contrast LCD with wide temperature
operating range, for use in automotive applications (Sangyo
Times, 2007).
Sharp exhibits 4K X 2K resolution 108" panel at Ceatec Japan
(Sangyo Times, 2007).
Sharp introduces 32" full HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2007
(Market Hen)).
Sharp is sourcing 32" and 42" panels from CMO for TV sets to
be sold abroad (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Sharp is sourcing 37" panels from AUO for TV sets to be sold
abroad (Sangyo Times, 2007).
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Sharp exhibits OLED panel with highest resolution, 202ppi, at
SID 2006 (Kotani, 2006).
Sharp increases sales of TV panels to Pioneer and Toshiba,
X building a stronger relationship with these firms (Sangyo Times,
2008).
Pioneer is cooperating with Sharp, and planning to use LCD in
40" and smaller TV lineup. They each purchase equity stakes in
each other, but Pioneer's stake in Sharp is less than 1%, and
Sharp's stake in Pioneer is 14% (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Sharp and Toshiba agree to supply each other with LCD panels
and semiconductors (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
Sharp announces 20mm thick LCD TV prototype (Nikkei BP,
2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
Sharp announces it will build 10th generation LCD plant.
Substrate size is 2850X3050. Sharp's investment will be approx
380 billion yen, and together with related plants attached to the
facility which will be built by equipment and supply makers,
total investment will be approximately 1 trillion yen. Production
to start in 2010 (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
Sharp announces world's largest LCD TV - 108" at CES (Nikkei
BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sharp begins selling 22" and 26" full HD LCD AQUOS TVs
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sharp begins selling 120hz TV sets (5 models) with 3000:1
contrast (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sharp begins production at the second line of Kameyama
number 2 plant with 8th generation substrate (Sangyo Times,
2009).
Sharp begins shipping samples of 2.8mm thick 12.1" LCD
panels with LED backlights (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
Sharp developed 0.68mm thick 2.2" 240X320 pixel display
(Sangyo Times, 2008).
Sharp developed a LCD panel with built in light sensor that can
be used for scanning or as a touch panel (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Sharp developed mobile ASV panels for new one segment TV
viewing on cell phones. These may sport the Aquous label. The
panels may also be made in other sizes for auto navigation and
digital still camera applications (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Sharp releases THX certified LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market
Hen)).
Sharp exhibits 2cm deep 52" LCD TV prototype (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Trend Hen)).
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Sharp installs 3rd line at Kameyama, increasing capacity (Nikkei
BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sharp passes Vizio to get top share during third quarter in North
American LCD TV market (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sharp and Sony form JV to manufacture large LCD modules for
TV sets at Sharp's plant under construction in Sakai. Sharp to
take 66% stake and Sony 34%. To achieve this, Sharp will make
10th generation line a separate entity (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo
Doko Hen)).
Sharp begins production at the fourth line of Kameyama number
2 plant with 8th generation substrate (Sangyo Times, 2009).
Sharp begins selling Aquos X Series LCD TVs with Mega ASV
technology (Sangyo Times, 2009).
Sharp exhibits flagship model LCD TV "XS" series at Ceatec
Japan. It has one million to one contrast, is 22.8mm at thinnest
portion, and has 150% of NTSC gamut (Nikkei BP, 2008
(Sangyo Doko Hen)).
Sony and Sharp announce that they will delay formation of their
LCD production JV from April, 2009 to March 2010 (Nikkei BP,
2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
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Sony announces research into color PDP (Nikkei BP,
1990).
Sony begins research on TFTs (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Sony says it will enter into PDP and announced several
PDP products (Yano Keizai, 1982).
Sony Atsugi Technology center develops printer head
TFT Technology (Sangyo Times, 1990).
Sony develops 4" LCD TV with built-in 8mm video
deck (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Sony introduces 36" Hi Vision (Japanese analogy high
definition standard) Trinitron (Jojima et al., 2006).
Sony begins work on HTPS TFT, focusing on
viewfinder and data projector applications in house
(Fuji Chimera, 1998).
Sony invests 10 billion yen, installs LCD line at
Nagasaki plant. It will begin production in 1991 and
manufacture 1" displays for video camera viewfinders
(Sangyo Times, 1990).
Sony began work on FED at its central research lab
around 1990 (Nikkei BP, 2001).
Sony introduces Kirara Basso TV sub-brand using
Super Trinitron CRTs (Jojima et al., 206).
Sony enters market for small TFT-LCDs, begins
shipping samples of 0.55" (world's smallest) and 0.7"
HTPS TFT LCDs for viewfinder and projector
applications (Sangyo Times, 1992, 1993).
Sony licenses PALC technology from Techtronix (Fuji
Chimera, 2001).
Sony develops 1.35" HTPS LCD with 1068X480
resolution for projection applications (Nikkei BP,
1994).
Sony says that its LCD business will focus on 2-inch
and smaller HTPS (Nikkei BP, 1994).
Sony begins R&D on OLED (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sony is first to introduce MD (micro display) rear
projection TV (Nikkei BP, 2006 (TV Hen)).
Sony releases Pary Vision CPJ-100 home use projector
with 170K dot resolution using a 1.3-in LCD (Sangyo
Times, 1994).
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Sony releases 50" RPTV using 3 HTPS panels. It is
priced at 580,000 yen (Nikkei BP, 1996).

1996
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Sony introduces 37" HTPS LCD rear projection TV
called "Flight" (Nikkei BP, 1996) with 3 LCDs in the
projection unit (KL-37HW1) (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Sony develops 25" PALC panel with 768X448
resolution for TV applications (Nikkei BP, 1995).
Sony announced that it is jointly developing digital
X mirror device technology with Texas Instruments (PR
Newswire, 1995; Sangyo Times, 1995).
Sony begins work on LTPS (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Sony and Sanyo begin producing LTPS displays
through cooperative arrangement. Sony designs the
displays, and Sanyo performs contract manufacturing
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sony develops 1.43" HTPS for projection applications
(Nikkei BP, 1996). Sony exhibits 1.3" HTPS XGA for
projector applications at Electronics Show (Nikkei BP,
1997).
Sony develops 2.5" and 5.6" LTPS (Nikkei BP, 1996).

Sony and Sharp agree to develop PALC and production
technology related to PALC. Sony, Sharp, and
Techtronix agree to sub-license of PALC technology
and joint development of the technology. Philips joins
the development group in 1997. The joint project is
planned to last until September of 1999. Focus is on
40" class screen (Fuji Chimera, 1999, 2001; Sangyo
Times, 1997, 1999).
Sony plans to begin selling 25" Plasmatron color TV,
model PZ-2500; prices is 900,000 yen (Sangyo Times,
1997). This model wins the good design award from
Sony sells PALC display - but this is made to order. It
also suffers from limited viewing angles (Fuji Chimera,
2001).
Sony Introduces KW-32HDF9, a flat screen Trinitron
based high vision TV and began using the brand name
"Wega"
(http://www.sony.co.jp/SonyInfo/CorporateInfo/History
/sonyhistory-c.html).
Sony and Toyota Looms established a JV to fabricate
LTPS TFTs (Sangyo Times, 1998).
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Sony establishes LCD Development Center at Kokubun
to develop HTPS (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Sony, Sharp, and Philips successfully develop
prototype 42" PALC with wide view area -- ASM
(Axially Symmetric aligned Micro Cell mode) (Sangyo
Times, 1999).
Sony exhibits 42" PALC at Electronics Show (Nikkei
BP, 1997).
Sony begins shipping HD ready 34" CRT TV (Nikkei
BP, 1998).
Sony develops 8.6" reflective LTPS with 1024X384
resolution for portable applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Sony begins selling NBPCs with LTPS panels (Nikkei
BP, 1998).
Sony and Candescent announce start of joint
development efforts. The focus is FED technology.
Sony will take an equity stake in Candescent and
license Candescent's technology and manufacturing
rights (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sony, Sharp, and Philips successfully develop
prototype 42" PALC HDTV display and 42" VGA
PALC display (Sangyo Times, 2000; Fuji Chimera,
2001).
Sony Introduces Super Fine Pitch FD Trinitron (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sanyo provides contract manufacturing of small low
temperature polysilicon TFTs for Sony (Sangyo Times,
1998).
Sony begins LTPS production at ST LCD JV, focusing
on DSC and Video Camera panels in 2", 2.5", and 3.4"
sizes (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Sony changes LCD organization, dividing the LTPS
and HTPS efforts (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sony develops 14.1" XGA LTPS panel (Nikkei BP,
19999).
Sony exhibits 15" LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 1999).
ST produces front-lit 9" LTPS used inViao computer
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Sony and Candescent exhibit 5.3" FED prototype with
320X240 resolution (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Contract to cooperate on PALC ends, Philips does not
renew. Sony and Sharp continue cooperating on PALC
development (Sangyo Times, 2000).
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Sony begins selling 32" and 36" Vega TVs with super
fine pitch FD trinitron CRTs. Sony fills out its Vega
Trinitron CRT TV line to cover 14 inch to 38 inch
models (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Sony begins selling 15" XGA LCD TV for 198,000
(Nikkei BP, 2000).
Sony announces it will take an equity stake in Fujitsu
Hitachi Plasma Display. Fujitsu 42.5%, Hitachi 42.5%,
Sony 15% is the new stake percentages (Sangyo Times,
2001); the firm later backs out.
As of the end of 2001, Sony plans to develop mass
production technology for OLEDs to allow production
of 20 and 30" panels, by the year 2003 (Nikkei BP,
2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Candescent exhibits 5.3" QVGA and 13.2"SVGA color
FEDs at SID 2000 developed in cooperation with Sony
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sony exhibits 13" FED at SID 2000 (Sangyo Times,
2001).
Sony closes Mizunami (Gifu Prefecture) location where
Sony and Sharp had cooperated on PALC R&D
(Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sony has received rights to develop, produce and sell
X relating to MEM displays from Silicon Light Machines
of the US (Business Wire, 2000; Sangyo Times, 2004)
Sony ends LTPS procurement from Sanyo (Sangyo
Times, 2002).
Sony began selling its first PDP TV in May, 2001. The
price was around 1 million yen, and it was 42" in size
(Nikkei BP, 2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sony released new PDP TVs in 32" and 42" sizes using
ALIS panels in Japan in October, 2001 (Nikkei BP,
2001 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sony and Universal Display agree to jointly develop
phosphorescent OLED materials to improve brightness
efficiency (Fuji Chimera, 2002; Sangyo Times, 2002).
Sony announces 1.4 mm thick 13" prototype full color
OLED TV panel with small particle materials and
LTPS (Sangyo Times, 2004; Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu
Hen); Nikkei BP, 2007 (OLED Hen)).
Sony exhibits 10.2" color OLED panel using small
particle materials (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Sony begins selling large FPD TVs including 50" PDP,
and 30" LCD models (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).

x

2002

Candescent exhibits 13.2" XGA color FED at SID 2001
developed in cooperation with Sony (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Senryaku Hen)).
Sony's joint development with Candescent ends with
original contract (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Sony will develop home audio video products centered
around the use of flat screen Vega CRTs according to
President Idei (Sangyo Times, 2003).
In seminar at LCD/PDP International Okami deputy
president of Sony's Home Network company says that
CRTs will be gone in 10 years (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen).
According to President Ando, Sony will obtain
(outside) supplies of a-Si TFTs and PDPs by working
together with other firms (Sangyo Times, 2003).

X

X

Sony begins selling LCD video projector using new
0.87" panel (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony releases 50" HD RPTV with HTPS LCD (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony starts HTPS production on 12" wafers at
Kumamoto Technology Center (Sangyo Times, 2002).
According to President Ando, Sony will obtain
(outside) supplies of A-Si TFTs and PDP by working
together with other firms (Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sony decides not to invest in Fujitsu Hitachi Plasma
Display. The firm decided that it was better to
concentrate investment in future display technologies
OLED and FED rather than investing in PDP, where it
was already behind other firms (Sangyo Shimbun, June
6, 2002).
Sony is negotiates with NEC to cooperate on PDP
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
2002 is the year that Sony changed course and
introduced a number of different FPD based TVs
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)). Sony's strategy for
"post trinitron" displays for homes focuses upon
strengthening development of FED and OLED
technologies (Sangyo Times, 2003). It is about 2 years
behind competitors (Jojima et al, 2006).
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Sony will develop small and mid sized OLED products
before working on other OLED applications (Nikkei
BP, 2002 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sony and Sharp discontinue joint development of
PALC in the face of rapidly declining PDP
manufacturing costs (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
Sony develops Micro Electro Mechanical System
(MEMS) technology that will be combined with Sony's
laser diode technology to allow for large projection
images. The more detailed name of this device is
X
called Grating Light Valve. It uses a micro ribbon
array. Although similar to TI's DLP, it is simpler and
more easily mass produced according to Sony (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
Sony develops Vega Engine to increase quality of
digital signals (reduce noise, etc.) -- it is designed to
X
work with multiple display technologies (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
As of 2003, LG Philips is Sony's lead TV Panel vendor
(LG is using IPS technology) (Fuji Chimera, 2003).
Sony and Samsung agree to form S-LCD joint venture
to produce a-Si TFTs for TV applications. They will
build a generation 7 plant in Korea (Fuji Chimera,
2005; Techno Associates, 2008).
Sony builds HTPS module assembly plant in China
(Sangyo Times, 2003).
Sony develops 0.78" FHD reflective LCD panel for
projection TV applications (Sangyo Times, 2005
(Senryaku Hen).
Sony develops LCOS for projector applications, plans
to begin shipments within the year (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony is selling HTPS based rear projection TVS in US,
Canada, Mexico, and in 2004 China and Europe
(Sangyo Times, 2005).
Sony is starting production of LTPS with system on
glass (SOG) for cell phone applications (Sangyo Times,
2004).
Sony releases 42" LCD TV with HD resolution (Nikkei
BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
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NEC receives capital 5 billion yen from Sony to pay for
part of investment in new TV PDP production line.
NEC supplied PDPs to Sony (Fuji Chimera, 2003,
2004).
Sony presents warning to PDP producers - firm thinks
PDP revenues will shrink in future as LCD increases
(Nikkei BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony releases 61" PDP TV with HD resolution (Nikkei
BP, 2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony announces 24.2" OLED display made by tiling 4
smaller panels (Nikkei BP, 2007 (OLED Hen)).
Sony develops Super Top Emission OLED technology
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sony announces plans to sell Spindt type FEDs in 2004
(Komoda, 2005).
As of 2004, Hitachi Displays is selling TV panels to
Sony and Tatung (Fuji Chimera, 2004).
At opening ceremony, Sony CEO Idei comments that SLCD's new 7th generation LCD line is a major world's
first, and not just about Japan and Korea "small talk"
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Samsung Electric and Sony agree to sign cross
licensing agreement covering over 10,000 patents (Fuji
Keizai, 2005; Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sharp and Sony share lead in WW LCD TV shipments
at 11.9% each. Sharp is a leader in numerous specific
size ranges. (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony has 50% share of world digital still camera
display market with its LTPS (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sony is first to sell a commercial LCD television with
LED backlighting. Two models, 40" and 46" use RGB
LEDs from US firm Lumilens, achieve 105% of NTSC
color gamut (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Sony releases 42" RP TV with HTPS panel (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony releases 70" FHD RPTV with LCOS panel.
Sony's LCOS technology is called SXRD (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony is selling 42" PDP TVs in the US market using
Korean-made panels (Deutsche Bank, May 6, 2006).
Sony releases 50" HD PDP TV (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
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Sony announces it will exit PDP TV in spring, 2005
(Daily Yomiuri, 2004).
Sony plans to build OLED line at ST LCD. It will
invest roughly 9 billion yen without Toyota
involvement. The focus is small OLEDs to be used in
Sony products -- no TV application is considered at this
time (Sangyo Times, 2004).
Sony builds OLED line at ST LCD (Sangyo Times,
2004). Sony will use panels in new Clie PDA (Nikkei
BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony begins producing full color 3.8" OLED panels to
be used in Clie PEG-VZ90 PDAs (Sangyo Times,
2005). It is 3.8" 480X320 pixel resolution, largest to be
used to date in a product sold on the consumer market.
Uses Sony's "Top Emission" technology with small
molecule OLED materials (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Sony exhibits 12.5" OLED prototype with RGB color
materials (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)). Another
report suggests panel used white OLED plus color
filters (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony plans to develop MEMs related products in 2004.
Production will be at Sony Kokubun (Sangyo Times,
2004).
Sony and Chimei bought all the shares of Display
Technology Inc. for 18.5 billion yen. ST Display took
over the Nozu plant and its employees, and renamed it
ST Mobile Display. Production of LTPS displays will
be done there for use in Sony's mobile display business
using low temperature polysilicon displays (Sangyo
Times, 2005, 2006).
As of 2005, Sony sources LCD panels from Hitachi and
CMO in addition to S-LCD (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Samsung and Sony agree to joint development of LCD
panels using Samsung's mass production knowledge
and Sony's video technologies (Techno Associates,
2008).
S-LCD begins shipments (Techno Associates, 2008).
Sony begins selling 42" and 50" HD RPTVs using
HTPS panels in Japan (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku)).
Sony develops 0.61" FHD reflective LCD panel for
projection TV applications (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Senryaku
Hen)).
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Sony exhibits front projection HTPS panel (Nikkei BP,
2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony releases 46" Full HD LCD TV with S-LCD panel
and live color creation backlight system (Nikkei BP,
2005 (Jitsumu)).
Sony and Idemitsu agree to cooperate on OLED
materials development - as part of the deal they also
cross license OLED patents (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Sony ends development of Clie line of PDAs. OLED
production also stops (Sangyo Times, 2006, 2007).
Sony establishes Display Development Department
directly under the control of electronics president
Chubachi (Osada, 2006). Sony's OLED business
preparation office is integrated into this department
(Sangyo Times, 2007).
Sony is said to be contemplating which technology
(OLED or FED) to pursue as future TV display device
(Sangyo Times, 2009).
Sony puts OLED development at the center of future
display development in mid-term management plan
(Osada, 2006).
Sony releases NW-E series portable music player with
OLED panel (Nezu, 2005; Nikkei BP, 2007 (OLED
Hen)).
Sony's OLED team members are redirected to focus on
LTPS for mobile displays (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Sony announces 19.2" SXGA FED using Spindt
emitters (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sony has set up a MEMS production line at its
Kokubun location (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Sony uses MEMs technology at Laser Dream Theatre
exhibit in the Aichi Banpaku exhibition (Sangyo Times,
2006).
Sony announces it plans to increase shift more TV
manufacturing internally from contract manufacturers
in the Sony Group Mid-term business plan. Sony aims
to make the TV business profitable in 2006 (Osada,
2006).
Sony's first quarter 2005 results show TV business with
29.3 billion yen loss, CRT and LCD sales both lower
than expected (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
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Sony discontinues WegaTV brand and launches Bravia
TV brand worldwide (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Sony targets 30% Japanese domestic market share for
its Bravia TV brand (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu Hen)).
AUO begins making LCD TV panel shipments to Sony
(Techno Associates, 2008).
Sony and Samsung agree for S-LCD JV to build
generation 8 plant (Techno Associates, 2008).
Sony has 40% share of Projection TVs in US (Nikkei
BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
Sony releases NW-S and NW-A series portable music
player with OLED panels (Nikkei BP, 2007 (OLED)).
Sony announces plans to sell a Spindt FED high quality
monitor (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Field Emission Technologies Inc. is established through
"carve out" from Sony (Fuji Chimera, 2007). FE
Technologies will continue development of FEDs
(Sangyo Times, 2007).
Sony dissolves small and medium size LCD panel JVs,
ST Display and ST Mobile Display, and integrates
different production assets into a single company
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)). New firm is called
Sony Mobile Display. Sony has 86% stake and Toyota
14%. Sony plans to have 100% stake by 2009 (Sangyo
Times, 2008).
S-LCD's 8G plant begins production (Techno
Associates, 2008).
Sony announces new Bravia TV production including
15 full HD and a 70" LED backlit model (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Market Hen)).
At SID 2007, Sony announces new technologies for
large panel OLED - these were Microcyrstal Si (TFT
technology) and laser induced pattern-wise sublimation
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen)).
Sony announces flexible AM-OLED prototype made on
film. It is 2.5" QQVGA (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend
Hen)).
Sony develops OLED display with organic TFT - a
world first (Sangyo Times, 2008).
Sony exhibits 27.3" OLED TV prototype at CES and
Display 2007 (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Trend Hen); Sangyo
Times, 2008).
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Sharp and Sony form JV to manufacture large LCD
modules for TV sets at Sharp's plant under construction
in Sakai. Sharp to take 66% stake and Sony 34%. To
achieve this, Sharp will make 10th generation line a
separate entity (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
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Sony introduces XEL-1, 11" OLED TV (Sangyo Times,
2008).
Sony announces it will exit the rear projection TV
X
business (Reuters, 2007).

Sony and Idemitsu jointly developed blue OLED
materials - announced improved efficiency at SID 2008
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
Sony announces professional use video camera monitor
using OLED display based upon XEL-1 (Nikkei BP,
2007 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
Sony exhibits 27" OLED TV at Ceatec 2008 (Nikkei
BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki Hen)).
Sony invests 22 billion yen in OLED production
equipment to pursue large, high density panel
production (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
Rear projection TV production ends at Sony (Sangyo
X
Times, 2008).
Sony and Sharp announce that they will delay
formation of their LCD production JV from April, 2009
to March 2010 (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Kigyo Bunseki
Hen)).
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NEC and Thomson announce agreement to cooperate on
development of PDP, PDP-TV, and PDP monitors. NEC will supply
Thomson with Plasma panels (Fuji Chimera, 1999).
Thomson introduces 42" plasma TV using NEC PDP in US and
European markets (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Thomson reports it is the second largest producer of large and very
large TV color picture tubes in the world (Thomson Annual Report,
2000).
Thomson is performing PDP related research at its location in
Moirans, France (Thomson Annual Report, 2000).
NEC and Thomson Multimedia agree to establish a 50-50 JV to
develop, produce, and sell PDP globally (Sangyo Times, 2002). This
plan was never carried through (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
Thomson releases 30" HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2045 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Thomson (RCA) releases 61" HD RPTV with DLP (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
Thomson exhibits 70" RPTV at CES (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
Thomson contributes its TV business to a joint venture with TCL of
China (Thomson Annual Report, 2008).
As of 2005, Pioneer (after acquiring NEC's plasma business) was
shipping panels to Thomson amongst others (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Chimei acquires a license for Thomson's LCD monitor technology
(Techno Associates, 2008).
Thomson reduces its stake in TCL to less than one percent,
effectively eliminating all exposure to the TV set business (Thomson
Annual Report, 2008).
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Toshiba begins TFT research (Sangyo Times, 1993).
Toshiba enters LCD business and begins mass producing STNLCDs (Sangyo Times, 1992, 1993).
Toshiba develops and begins commercialization of laptop
computers (Menzawa et al., 2008).
Toshiba and IBM establish LCD R&D joint venture focusing on
TFT-LCD development (Murtha et al., 2001).
Toshiba begins selling laptop computers with single color DCPDP displays (Nikkei BP, 1998). Matsushita supplied Toshiba
with PDPs for this (Weber et al., 2008).
Toshiba begins production of TFT-LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Toshiba announces 10.4" multicolor STN\-LCD panels with
VGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Toshiba begins production of 6.5" color TFT-LCD panels
(Nikkei BP, 1990).
Toshiba begins production of 10" color TFT-LCD panels for
aviation applications (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Toshiba and IBM announce 11.2" TFT multicolor LCD panel
with VGA resolution (Nikkei BP, 1990).
Toshiba and IBM establish joint venture Display Technologies
Inc. (DTI) to produce TFT-LCDs (Sangyo Times, 1992).
Toshiba finishes building large TFT pilot line in Himeji (Sangyo
Times, 1994).
Toshiba establishes LCD Business Unit (Sangyo Times, 1990).
DTI's first line begins production (Sangyo Times, 1994).
DTI invests 10 billion yen in R&D and construction of a pilot
TFT line at Fukaya (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Toshiba licenses its STN-LCD technology to Orion Electric of
Korea (Sangyo Times, 1995).
Toshiba develops 9.4" VGA TFT-LCD panel with low power
usage for NBPC applications (Nikkei BP, 1993).
Toshiba exhibits 13.8"wide viewing angle color TFT with
1152X900 resolution at Electronics show 1993 (Nikkei BP,
1993).
Toshiba plans to begin mass producing 7.8" VGA TFT-LCD
panels for subnotebook applications in April, 1994 (Nikkei BP,
1993).
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DTI's Fukaya pilot line enters production (Sangyo Times, 1994).
Toshiba develops 10.4: TFT-LCD with SVGA resolution (Nikkei
BP, 1994).
Toshiba develops 5" TFT-LCD with 240 X 234 resolution for
automotive applications (Nikkei BP, 1994).
Toshiba develops 7.8" reflective single color MIM-LCD for
portable applications (Nikkei BP, 1994).
DTI's second line begins production (Sangyo Times, 1994).
DTI plans to invest 40 billion yen in new LCD plant in Noya,
begins construction (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Toshiba transfers STN technology to CPT of Taiwan (Sangyo
Times, 1997).
Toshiba closes color STN line at Fukaya, exits STN (Sangyo
Times, 1999).
Toshiba develops 12.1" TFT-LCD with 800X600 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 1995).
Toshiba develops 15" color TFT for TV applications (Nikkei BP,
1995).
Toshiba begins development of LTPS LCD technology (Sangyo
Times, 1998).
Toshiba develops 12.1" XGA TFT for NBPC application
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
Toshiba develops 15" XGA TFT-LCD for monitor applications
(Nikkei BP, 1996).
DTI's Noya LCD plant enters full production (Sangyo Times,
1997).
Toshiba outsources 12.1" TFT production to Hyundai due to
capacity limitations (Sangyo Times, 1997).
Toshiba exhibits 12.1" LTPS XGA panel (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Toshiba exhibits 8" TFT for automotive use (480X234 pixels)
(Nikkei BP, 1997).
Toshiba is first to successfully develop reflective LCD with 3
color layers (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Toshiba establishes LCD Development Center at Fukaya to
develop leading edge LCD technologies (Sangyo Times, 1998).
Toshiba begins pilot production of LTPS at Fukaya LCD
Development Center (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Toshiba beings construction of Number 1 LTPS line at Fukaya
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
Toshiba began shipping LTPS panels from its new 400X500mm
line (Nikkei BP, 1998). Toshiba is first to successfully produce
large displays using LTPS technology (Sangyo Times, 2002).
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Toshiba develops 8.4" LTPS color panel with 800X600
resolution for portable applications (Nikkei BP, 1998).
Toshiba commercializes "Face" flat screen television (Menzawa
X
et al., 2008).
Toshiba and IBM provide technologies related to TFT
production to Jilin Electric (China) (Sangyo Times, 1999).
Toshiba agrees to provide Walsinlihwa Corp of Taiwan with
technology and technological assistance related to producing
large TFT displays. Walsinlihwa plans to start a new company to
manufacture LCDs based upon this technology transfer (Sangyo
Times, 1999).
Toshiba exhibits 15" LTPS TFT with 1600X1200 resolution for
NBPC applications (Nikkei BP, 1999).
Toshiba exhibits 4" VGA LTPS panel for portable applications
(Nikkei BP, 1999).
Toshiba's second LTPS line at Fukaya begins production
(Sangyo Times, 2000).
Toshiba establishes OLED project team in the LCD
Development Center at their Fukaya Plant (Sangyo Times,
2001).
Toshiba and Canon announce plans to jointly develop SCE
(Komoda, 2005).
Toshiba exhibits 2.2" reflective LTPS panel for cell phone
applications (Nikkei BP, 2000).
Toshiba was profitable in LCD panel related business during
2000 (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba invests 38 billion yen to increase LTPS volume at
Fukaya plant - making Toshiba the world's largest LTPS
manufacturer (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Philips and Toshiba cross license patents on display cells,
circuits, and extend this to LG-Philips LCD (Techno Associates,
2008).
Toshiba is providing HannStar (Taiwan) with a-Si TFT
technology. HannStar's 550X650mm plant will begin
production, and HannStar will provide contract manufacturing
of A-Si for Toshiba (Fuji Chimera, 2000).
Toshiba begins producing single color OLED for car audio
applications (Sangyo Times, 2000).
Toshiba makes prototype 2.85" OLED display with green color
using large molecule materials (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Toshiba exhibits 3.5" reflective TFT panel (Nikkei BP, 2001
(Jitsumu Hen)).
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Toshiba begins mass producing 14.1" XGA NBPC use LTPS
panels (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Toshiba lost a small amount of money in LCD panel business
during 2001 (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Display Technologies Inc. is dissolved at the end of the JV
contract by IBM and Toshiba (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Toshiba and Matsushita Denki Sangyo agree to form a JV to
produce LTPS in Singapore. Total investment is 123 billion yen.
Toshiba has 67% stake, Matsushita 33%. Production to be used
for NBPC, monitors, LCD TVs. Substrate size is 730X920mm
(Sangyo Times, 2001).
As of 2001, Toshiba is receiving roughly 30% of HannStar's
LCD Production (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Toshiba releases 42" PDP TV using color filters and with
853X480 resolution (Nikkei BP, 2001 (Jitsumu Hen)). Not
known where panel is sourced from.
Toshiba exhibits a 2.85" 260K color OLED using large particles
on and LTPS backplane (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Toshiba develops world's first full color OLED to use large
particle materials (Sangyo Times, 2002).
Toshiba and Matsushita establish Toshiba Matsushita Display
Technology JV (TMDT), integrating LCD operations from both
firms. Toshiba holds a 60% stake and Matsushita a 40% stake in
the JV, which integrates LCD activities from development to
sales (Fuji Chimera, 2002).
TMDT develops 14" LTPS VGA panel (Nikkei BP, 2002
(Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT exhibits 229ppi LTPS panel at Ceatec trade show
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT exhibits LTPS panel for LCD TV application (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology announces that it plans
to enter TV with LTPS, and will continue work on developing
OCB technology (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba and Matsushita's JV plant in Singapore "Advanced Flat
Panel Display" begins mass production - is largest LTPS plant in
world (Sangyo Times, 2001).
Toshiba announces bendable large LTPS LCD panel (Nikkei BP,
2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba announces it will begin selling 15" LCD TV in May
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba begins selling 20" LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
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TMDT has loss for year (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Toshiba begins selling 35" PDP TV with 853X480 resolution
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT exhibits 2.2" 176X220 128pp large particle OLED panel
(Nikkei BP, 2002 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT announces 17" OLED panel made using ink-jet printing
at EDEX 2002 trade show (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Oyo GijutsuHen)).
Development for this was done at Fukaya location (Sangyo
Times, 2003).
Toshiba-Matsushita had an OLED pilot line Fukaya plant (Fuji
Chimera, 2003).
TMDT says it hopes to achieve profitability at its Singapore
plant in 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2003 (Senryaku Hen)).
TMDT exhibits LCD Panel that can also function as scanner
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT begins selling lead-free industrial use TFT panels
(Sangyo Times, 2004).
Toshiba release 37" LCD TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba releases 42" PDP TV with HD resolution (Nikkei BP,
2003 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology exhibits 3.5" color
OLED panel using small particle materials (Nikkei BP, 2003
(Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT shows two small particle AM-OLED panels at EDEX
2003; a 2.2" 176X220 panel and QVGA 3.5" panel (Sangyo
Times, 2004).
Toshiba's president Okamura suggests that SED may first enter
monitor or medical display markets before the TV market
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba and Canon announce new SCE panel product to come
out in 2003 (Komoda, 2005). It does not materialize.
TMDT exhibits 23" and 32" OCB LCD panels. 32" has HD
resolution (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT begins mass production of OCB TFT panels for TV
applications (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Toshiba releases 32" HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
TMDT exhibits LCD prototype on 0.2mm glass substrate
(Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDS wins Advanced Display of the Year Award for its 0.3mm
thick polysilicon display at Flat Panel Production Technology
show in Tokyo (Sangyo Times, 2005).
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TMDT develops LCD panel which has variable (controllable)
viewing angle for ATMs and other applications where privacy is
an issue (Sangyo Times, 2005).
Hitachi, Toshiba, Matsushita sign formal agreement to JV, will
name it IPS alpha technology. (Initial Announcement: August,
2004, formal announcement: October, 2004) (Nikkei BP, 2004
(Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT exhibits 3.5" AM-OLED using small particle materials at
Ceatec Japan 2004 (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT announces it will begin mass producing 3.5" AMOLEDs display for portable AV applications in 2005 (Nikkei BP,
2004 (Jitsumu Hen); Sangyo Times, 2005).
TMDT began participating in a NEDO project from its midpoint presentation. The project is on making large, thin and light
displays using organic materials. The project began in 2002,
and will continue until 2006. Topics for research include ink jet
printing of OLED materials in display manufacture (Sangyo
Times, 2007).
Canon and Toshiba exhibit 36" SED prototype at press
conference (Nikkei BP, 2004 (Jitsumu Hen)).
Canon and Toshiba establish JV production company, SED Inc.
Canon has a very slight majority stake (Sangyo Times, 2006).
SED invests 20 billion yen in Canon's Hirazuka location for
initial "mass" production (Sangyo Times, 2006).
TMDT increases LTPS production at Ishikawa plant, increasing
its focus on LTPS and decreasing a-Si focus (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Senryaku Hen)).
TMDT begins construction of 3rd line at Ishikawa plant. New
line is 730X920mm substrate; LTPS (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Toshiba releases 47" full HD LCD TV (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
As of 2005, Sharp sells LCD TV panels to Toshiba, JVC, and By
Design (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
As of 2005, Hitachi displays sells LCD TV panels to Sony,
Toshiba, and Matsushita (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
Hitachi Displays, Matsushita Denki, Toshiba established IPS
Alpha Technology. IPS Alpha plans to produce 23" IPS panels
starting in q2, 2006 (Fuji Chimera, 2005).
As of 2005, Matsushita sells PDPs to Toshiba and others (Fuji
Chimera, 2005).
TMDT exhibits 3.5" OLED panel (Nikkei BP, 2005 (Jitsumu
Hen)).
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TMDT exhibits prototype 20.8" OLED with large particle
materials from CDT on LTPS backplane (Nikkei BP, 2005
(Jitsumu Hen)).
TMDT states it plans to mass produce OLEDs in 2008 (Nikkei
BP, 2005 (Senryaku Hen)).
TMDT beings producing small volumes of 3.5" small molecule
OLEDs for personal music players. Production is at Ishikawa
plant, where OLED development also is. Backplane is produced
at Fukaya (Sangyo Times, 2006).
Toshiba and Canon announce 55" SCE FED (Nikkei BP, 2007
(Market Hen)).
SED begins production at Hirazuka (Sangyo Times, 2007).
TMDT begins production of LTPS at new Ishikawa line (Nikkei
BP, 2006 (Senryaku Hen)).
TMDT announces it will invest 30 billion yen to build an
additional LTPS line at Ishikawa - it is planned to enter
production in late 2007 (Sangyo Times, 2007).
TMDT develops 0.99mm thick LTPS LCD for cell phone
application - world's thinnest. Samples are planned to ship in
4/2007 (Sangyo Times, 2007).
TMDT develops new low power LCD driving technology for
mobile PCs together with Intel (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Toshiba begins selling Regza brand LCD TVs (Menzawa et al.,
2008).
Toshiba decides not to exhibit 55" SED panel at CES next year
(Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Toshiba President Nishida says they will not let SED become
commoditized (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Toshiba and Canon announce plans to put off sales of SCD FED
based TV until 2007 (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
Sharp and Toshiba agree to supply each other with LCD panels
and semiconductors (Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
TMDT develops 21" large particle AM-OLED, shows it at
Display 2007 in Tokyo. The display uses inkjet printing on
LTPS. Resolution is WXGA. This display was part of project
funded through NEDO (Sangyo Times, 2008).
TMDT will receive large molecule OLED supply from CDT for
new 21" panel (Nikkei BP, 2007 (Market Hen)).
TMDT is planning to mass produce OLEDs in 2008-9. It will
use small particle OLED technology first in consumer products,
and continue performing R&D on large particle OLED
technology (Sangyo Times, 2008).
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Canon buys Toshiba's stake in SED, will continue on its own.
Reason for this is the lawsuit from US based Nano Proprietary
regarding patent licensing - they say that Canon broke the
agreement by involving Toshiba (Sangyo Times, 2007).
Toshiba sold its stake in IPS Alpha to Panasonic (Toshiba
Annual Report, 2008).
TMDT and Idemitsu jointly developed OLED materials (Nikkei
BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
TMDT decides to make 16 billion yen investment in Ishikawa
line to mass produce OLED, using part of an existing LTPS line
(Nikkei BP, 2008 (Sangyo Doko Hen)).
TMDT announces it plans to begin shipping small particle
OLED displays in October, 2009. Production will be done at a
new line at the Ishikawa plant (Sangyo Times, 2009).
Toshiba announces it plans to make 32" OLED TV using large
particle materials in 2009 (Nikkei BP, 2007 (OLED Hen)).
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